Dennis Haynes v. Dunkin' Donuts LLC ( 2018 )


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  •               Case: 18-10373    Date Filed: 07/31/2018   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 18-10373
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 0:17-cv-61072-WPD
    DENNIS HAYNES,
    individually,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    versus
    DUNKIN’ DONUTS LLC,
    a foreign limited liability company,
    DD IP HOLDER LLC,
    CASHSTAR, INC.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (July 31, 2018)
    Case: 18-10373     Date Filed: 07/31/2018     Page: 2 of 6
    Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, WILSON, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Dennis Haynes is blind. To use the internet, he relies on screen reading
    software, specifically a program called “JAWS.” According to the allegations in
    his third amended complaint, one day Haynes attempted to go to the website for
    Dunkin’ Donuts, www.dunkindonuts.com, but the website was not compatible with
    his, or any, screen reading software.
    Haynes sued Dunkin’ Donuts, LLC, claiming that it violated Title III of the
    Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12188 et seq., by not maintaining a
    website compatible with screen reading software. 1 He sought declaratory and
    injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C
    § 12205.
    On Dunkin’ Donuts’ motion, the district court dismissed Haynes’
    complaint. It determined that Haynes did not state a plausible claim for relief
    under Title III of the ADA. It reasoned that Haynes failed to allege a nexus
    between the barriers to access that he faced on the website and his inability to
    access goods and services at Dunkin’ Donuts’ physical store. This is Haynes’
    appeal.
    1
    Along with Dunkin’ Donuts, Haynes sued DD IP Holder LLC and Cashstar, Inc. Those
    three companies operated www.dunkindonuts.com and its associated websites. We’ll refer to
    them collectively as Dunkin’ Donuts.
    2
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    “We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim,
    construing all [factual] allegations in the complaint as true and in the light most
    favorable to the plaintiff.” Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 
    294 F.3d 1279
    ,
    1281–82 (11th Cir. 2002). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
    contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
    face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678, 
    129 S. Ct. 1937
    , 1949 (2009)
    (quotation marks omitted). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible
    claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
    draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 
    Id. at 679,
    129 S. Ct. at 1950.
    Haynes contends that the district court erred in dismissing his third amended
    complaint. He argues that Dunkin’ Donuts’ “website is a service, facility,
    privilege, advantage, benefit and accommodation of” Dunkin’ Donuts’ place of
    public accommodation (that is, its shops), which means that the ADA requires the
    website to be accessible to blind people like himself. Dunkin’ Donuts does not
    dispute that the shops are places of public accommodation, see 42 U.S.C.
    § 12181(7)(B) (listing “a restaurant” as an example of a “place of public
    accommodation”), but argues that its website is neither a place of public
    accommodation nor a good, service, facility, privilege, or advantage of its shops,
    and as a result, it claims that Haynes has failed to state a claim because the website
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    is not covered by the ADA. 2
    The ADA prohibits discrimination “on the basis of disability in the full and
    equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
    accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who . . .
    operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). One example
    of discrimination prohibited by the ADA is when a place of public accommodation
    “fail[s] to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a
    disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently
    than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services . . . .”
    
    Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
    The prohibition on discrimination is not limited to tangible barriers that
    disabled persons face but can extend to intangible barriers as well. 
    Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1283
    (“A reading of the plain and unambiguous statutory language at issue
    reveals that the definition of discrimination provided in Title III [of the ADA]
    covers both tangible barriers . . . and intangible barriers . . . that restrict a disabled
    2
    Dunkin’ Donuts does argue that even if the website is a service, privilege, advantage, or
    accommodation, it is not a service, privilege, advantage, or accommodation of its physical place
    of public accommodation because, according to Dunkin’ Donuts, it is merely the franchisor of
    Dunkin’ Donuts shops. But the complaint doesn’t allege anything about Dunkin’ Donuts being a
    franchisor; it alleges that Dunkin’ Donuts owns and operates shops all around the country and
    near Haynes. At this stage it would be inappropriate to consider Dunkin’ Donuts’ factual
    assertions that it is merely a franchisor. The district court did not convert the motion to dismiss
    into a motion for summary judgment, which would have allowed it to consider materials outside
    the complaint. See Day v. Taylor, 
    400 F.3d 1272
    , 1275–76 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The district court
    generally must convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment if it considers
    materials outside the complaint.”).
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    person’s ability to enjoy the defendant entity’s goods, services and privileges.”)
    (footnotes omitted). In Rendon, the plaintiffs alleged that a telephone selection
    process screened out disabled contestants from competing on the show Who Wants
    to be a Millionaire. 
    Id. Even though
    the telephone selection process was an
    intangible barrier, and was not at the studio’s place of public accommodation, we
    held that the plaintiffs stated a claim for relief under the ADA because the
    inaccessibility of the telephone selection process prevented the plaintiffs from
    accessing a privilege (the opportunity to be a contestant on the show) that was
    afforded by the television studio. 
    Id. at 1283,
    1286.
    Haynes alleges that the inaccessibility of Dunkin’ Donuts’ website has
    similarly denied blind people the ability to enjoy the goods, services, privileges,
    and advantages of Dunkin’ Donuts’ shops. Among other things, he alleges that
    Dunkin’ Donuts’ website allows customers to locate physical Dunkin’ Donuts
    store locations and purchase gift cards online. Haynes also alleges that Dunkin’
    Donuts’ website “provides access to” and “information about . . . the goods,
    services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of” Dunkin’ Donuts’
    shops. Because the website isn’t compatible with screen reader software, Haynes
    alleges that neither he, nor any blind person, can use those features.
    Taking all of those allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in
    the light most favorable to Haynes, as we must at this stage, see 
    id. at 1281–82,
    he
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    has shown a plausible claim for relief under the ADA. It appears that the website
    is a service that facilitates the use of Dunkin’ Donuts’ shops, which are places of
    public accommodation. And the ADA is clear that whatever goods and services
    Dunkin’ Donuts offers as a part of its place of public accommodation, it cannot
    discriminate against people on the basis of a disability, even if those goods and
    services are intangible. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); see also 
    Rendon 294 F.3d at 1283
    . As much as the telephone selection process in Rendon prevented the
    plaintiffs in that case from accessing a privilege of that defendant’s physical place
    of public accommodation, the alleged inaccessibility of Dunkin’ Donuts’ website
    denies Haynes access to the services of the shops that are available on Dunkin’
    Donuts’ website, which includes the information about store locations and the
    ability to buy gift cards online. The failure to make those services accessible to the
    blind can be said to exclude, deny, or otherwise treat blind people “differently than
    other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services . . . .” 42
    U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(b)(2) (giving “screen
    reader software” as an example of an auxiliary aid or service for “individuals who
    are blind or have low vision”). And as a result, Haynes has alleged a plausible
    claim for relief under the ADA.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    6