United States v. Wallace , 170 F. App'x 852 ( 2006 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-4466
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    JAMES THOMAS WALLACE,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Florence.   Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
    (CR-03-918)
    Submitted:   February 28, 2006            Decided:   March 17, 2006
    Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Milton M. Moore, Jr., Bennettsville, South Carolina, for Appellant.
    Jonathan S. Gasser, United States Attorney, Columbia, South
    Carolina; A. Bradley Parham, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    James    Thomas   Wallace   pled   guilty   to   one   count   of
    possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1), 924(e) (2000), and was sentenced to imprisonment for
    180 months.     Finding no error, we affirm.
    Wallace first contends on appeal that the district court
    erred in its application of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”)
    because the court considered convictions that were neither admitted
    to nor found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.           When reviewing
    a district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines, we
    review legal determinations de novo.          United States v. Blake, 
    81 F.3d 498
    , 503 (4th Cir. 1996).         A district court may enhance a
    sentence based on the “fact of a prior conviction” regardless of
    whether or not it was admitted to by the defendant or found by a
    jury.    United States v. Thompson, 
    421 F.3d 278
    , 282 (4th Cir.
    2005).   Therefore, a district court may determine if a defendant
    has been convicted of the predicate offenses required by the ACCA
    so long as the facts necessary to support the enhancement “inhere
    in the fact of conviction” rather than being “extraneous to it.”
    
    Id. at 283
    .
    We    have   previously     determined   that    the   statutes
    underlying Wallace’s convictions constitute “violent felonies” for
    ACCA purposes.     See Thompson, 
    421 F.3d at 284-85
    ; United States v.
    Pierce, 
    278 F.3d 282
    , 289 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Bowden,
    - 2 -
    
    975 F.2d 1080
    ,   1081-1085   (4th   Cir.   1992).   Furthermore,   the
    offenses occurred on different dates, in different geographical
    locations, and involved different criminal objectives and victims.
    See Thompson, 
    421 F.3d at 284-86
    ; United States v. Williams, 
    187 F.3d 429
    , 431 (4th Cir. 1999). Therefore, we conclude the district
    court properly enhanced Wallace’s sentence under the ACCA.
    Wallace also contends that his sentence was unreasonable.
    After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), a sentencing court is no longer bound by the range
    prescribed by the sentencing guidelines. See United States v.
    Hughes, 
    401 F.3d 540
    , 546 (4th Cir. 2005). However, in determining
    a sentence post-Booker, sentencing courts are still required to
    calculate and consider the guideline range prescribed thereby as
    well as the factors set forth in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) (2000).           
    Id.
    If the sentence imposed is within the properly calculated guideline
    range, it is presumptively reasonable.         United States v. Green, __
    F.3d __, 
    2006 WL 267217
    , at *5 (4th Cir. Feb. 6, 2006) (No.
    05-4270).     Because the district court appropriately treated the
    guidelines as advisory, properly calculated and considered the
    guideline range, and weighed the relevant § 3553(a) factors, we
    find Wallace’s sentence reasonable.
    Accordingly, we affirm Wallace’s sentence.      We dispense
    with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
    would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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