American Council of the Blind v. Steven Mnuchin , 878 F.3d 360 ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued October 19, 2017             Decided December 26, 2017
    No. 17-5013
    THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE BLIND, ET AL.,
    APPELLANTS
    v.
    STEVEN T. MNUCHIN, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,
    APPELLEE
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 1:02-cv-00864)
    Jeffrey A. Lovitky argued the cause and filed briefs for the
    appellants.
    Megan Barbero, Attorney, United States Department of
    Justice, argued the cause for the appellee. Charles W.
    Scarborough, Attorney, was with her on brief.
    Before: HENDERSON and SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges, and
    WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.
    KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: In 2008, we
    held that visually impaired individuals lacked meaningful
    2
    access to United States paper currency in violation of section
    504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Am. Council of
    the Blind v. Paulson, 
    525 F.3d 1256
    (D.C. Cir. 2008)
    (remanding to district court). The district court subsequently
    issued an injunction ordering the Secretary of the United States
    Department of the Treasury (Secretary) to provide meaningful
    access by the next time the Treasury Department released
    redesigned banknotes. The Secretary approved a plan to do so
    that called for, in part, using raised tactile features on bills so
    that visually impaired individuals could differentiate banknote
    denominations by touch.
    At the time, the district court and the parties expected—
    based on the timeframe of previous redesigns and the
    Secretary’s representations—that the next round of redesigned
    currency would occur between 2013 and 2018. Now, however,
    the next redesigns will fall—if everything goes according to the
    Treasury Department’s plan, which has not been the case so
    far—between 2026 and 2038. Understandably, plaintiffs
    American Council of the Blind and Patrick Sheehan asked the
    district court to modify the injunction to hold the Secretary to
    an earlier deadline for providing meaningful access to
    currency. The district court declined and this appeal followed.
    For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for the
    district court to better support its findings supporting its denial
    of modified injunctive relief.
    I. BACKGROUND
    In 2002, the plaintiffs sued the Secretary, alleging that the
    design of United States paper currency violated section 504 of
    the Rehabilitation Act and seeking declaratory and injunctive
    relief. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that no
    qualified individual with a disability “shall, solely by reason”
    of the disability, “be denied the benefits of” federal programs.
    3
    29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Under section 504, disabled individuals
    must have “meaningful access” to the benefit. Alexander v.
    Choate, 
    469 U.S. 287
    , 301 (1985).
    Depending on the source, an estimated 8 to 12 million
    Americans are visually impaired, including approximately
    300,000 to 1.3 million who are blind. U.S. GOV’T
    ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. CURRENCY: READER PROGRAM
    SHOULD BE EVALUATED WHILE OTHER ACCESSIBILITY
    FEATURES FOR VISUALLY IMPAIRED PERSONS ARE DEVELOPED
    3 (Sept. 2014) [hereinafter GAO U.S. CURRENCY REPORT]
    (collecting studies). The plaintiffs claimed visually impaired
    individuals lacked “meaningful access” to paper currency
    because denominations of our paper currency cannot be
    distinguished except by sight. Unlike the currency of many
    other countries, our paper currency does not come in different
    sizes or have different tactile characteristics that denote the
    currency’s denomination.
    The district court held that the Secretary had violated
    section 504 by “fail[ing] to design and issue paper currency that
    is readily distinguishable to blind and visually impaired
    individuals” and entered a declaratory judgment for the
    plaintiffs. Am. Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 
    463 F. Supp. 2d 51
    , 62 (D.D.C. 2006). We affirmed the declaratory judgment
    but remanded for the district court to “address the request for
    injunctive relief.” Am. Council of the 
    Blind, 525 F.3d at 1260
    .
    We did not prescribe how the Secretary must comply with
    section 504 but instead stated that the Secretary “has discretion
    to choose from a range of accommodations” to provide
    meaningful access to paper currency. 
    Id. at 1271.
    On remand, the district court held a hearing to determine
    the terms of the injunction. The district court, “detect[ing] . . .
    [t]he familiar slow moving hand of the government,” Joint
    4
    Appendix (JA) 317, expressed concern about an “open-ended”
    timeline, JA 318. At the hearing, the Treasury Department
    counsel noted that the Secretary had an ongoing statutory
    mandate to protect against counterfeiting threats in any
    currency redesign1 and said: “I think it’s more than a goal, I
    think it is the standard that . . . every seven to 10 years [the
    Treasury] want[s] to come out with new designs.” JA 325.
    The district court apparently interpreted counsel to mean
    the Treasury Department “requires new currency” every seven
    to ten years. JA 328. There is no such statutory mandate,
    however; the seven-to-ten-year period is an internal
    government expectation. See JA 286 (Secretary’s October 3,
    2008 Status Report, describing timeline as “goal”). Against the
    backdrop of the seven-to-ten-year expectation, the district
    judge decided—and the parties agreed—that it would be
    “reasonable” to link the deadline for section 504 compliance to
    the next planned redesign. JA 328. At the time, the parties
    expected the next redesigns to fall between 2013 and 2018 if
    the seven-to-ten-year goal was adhered to as it had been since
    the 1990s.2
    Accordingly, the district court issued an injunction on
    October 3, 2008, ordering the Secretary to “take such steps as
    1
    The Secretary “shall” design currency “in the best manner to
    guard against counterfeits and fraudulent alterations.” 12 U.S.C. §
    418.
    2
    The first modern round of redesigns to incorporate anti-
    counterfeiting features occurred between 1990 and 1993. After that,
    the $5 bill was redesigned in 2000 and 2008; the $10 bill was
    redesigned in 2000 and 2006; the $20 bill was redesigned in 1998
    and 2003; and the $50 bill was redesigned in 1997 and 2004. The
    History of American Currency, U.S. CURRENCY EDUCATION
    PROGRAM, https://www.uscurrency.gov/content/history-american-
    currency (last visited Nov. 21, 2017).
    5
    may be required to provide meaningful access to [each
    denomination of] United States currency for blind and other
    visually impaired persons . . . not later than the date when a
    redesign of that denomination is next approved” by the
    Secretary. 3 JA 265. Thus, the district court coupled the
    Secretary’s duty to provide meaningful access to currency to
    the timeline for the next currency redesign rather than setting a
    separate, firm deadline. Under the injunction, the Secretary
    also had to file status reports every six months.
    In 2011, the Secretary approved the Treasury
    Department’s Bureau of Engraving and Printing’s (Bureau)
    recommended three-pronged approach to providing
    meaningful access to currency: (1) add a raised tactile feature
    to bills; (2) continue adding large, high-contrast numerals to
    bills; and (3) implement a supplemental currency-reader
    distribution program. At the time, the Secretary had not
    “established a timetable for the next currency redesign”
    although he restated the Bureau’s “goal” to do so every seven
    to ten years. JA 286.
    Since 2011, the Bureau has produced tangible results
    under the second prong; all denominations include large
    numerals and some denominations—the $5, the $50 and the
    $100—include high-contrast numerals. The Bureau has also
    achieved limited results under the third prong. It created and
    produced free currency readers (the iBill Talking Banknote
    Identifier, an electronic key-fob-style device that reads inserted
    3
    The injunction did not include the $1 bill because the
    Congress prohibited the Secretary from redesigning the $1 bill. See
    Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, sec. 6,
    div. D, tit. I, § 113. The prohibition is still in effect under current law.
    See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, sec.
    8, div. E, tit. I, § 117. The injunction also did not include the $100
    bill because it was in the latter stage of a redesign at the time.
    6
    banknotes and announces the denomination by voice, tone or
    vibration) that, as of September 2017, it has distributed 55,216
    times. It also developed free currency-reading applications for
    mobile phones (the EyeNote for Apple devices and the IDEAL
    Currency Identifier for Android devices), which have been
    downloaded a combined 47,868 times as of September 2017.4
    But the external currency readers help approximately 100,000
    individuals—between 1.2 per cent and 4 per cent of all
    Americans who are visually impaired, depending on the source.
    Meeting the first prong has been a work in progress.
    Developing a raised tactile feature for paper currency that is
    durable and functional has proven to be difficult 5 and the
    Treasury Department has fallen “behind its internal schedule”
    to provide a raised tactile feature.6 JA 415.
    4
    The statistics on the number of downloads come from the
    Secretary’s Eighteenth Status Report, which was filed in district
    court after briefing on appeal was complete. Am. Council of the Blind
    v. Mnuchin, No. 1:02-cv-00864, ECF 156 (Sept. 18, 2017). We take
    judicial notice of it. See Veg-Mix, Inc. v. Dep’t of Agric., 
    832 F.2d 601
    , 607 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Courts may take judicial notice of
    official court records . . . .”).
    5
    In Canada, for example, embossed features on currency often
    wear down after a few years in circulation. In Bureau focus-group
    testing of different styles and patterns of tactile features, folds and
    creases in bills sometimes confused participants in the study and
    caused misidentification of denominations. Am. Council of the Blind
    v. Mnuchin, No. 1:02-cv-00864, ECF 156, at 2. (Sept. 18, 2017).
    6
    In July 2013, for example, the Bureau anticipated it would
    select the application method—that is, the manufacturing process by
    which the raised tactile feature is added to banknotes—by December
    2013. JA 388. In the Secretary’s most recent district court filing, the
    Bureau is still conducting testing to determine which of two potential
    application methods it will use. Am. Council of the Blind v. Mnuchin,
    No. 1:02-cv-00864, ECF 156, at 2. (Sept. 18, 2017).
    7
    In 2013, the Bureau established a 2020 target date to
    release a new $10 bill design but provided no specific target
    dates for the redesign of other bills. In 2016, the Bureau pushed
    the $10 bill target date to 2026, JA 467, because it “recently
    learned of significant developments in counterfeiting
    technology” that would require creating and implementing new
    security features for the next redesign, JA 460. The timeline for
    other bills remained unspecified.
    In 2016, the plaintiffs moved to modify the district court’s
    injunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    60(b)(5).7 Given the Treasury Department’s delays in rolling
    out new versions of currency—the scheduled release of the $10
    bill was then eight years behind what the parties contemplated
    at the time the district court issued the injunction, with the other
    denominations set to be released at an even later, unspecified
    date—the plaintiffs were no longer amenable to pairing
    meaningful access to currency with the timeline for the next
    anti-counterfeiting redesign. They asked the district court to set
    a deadline of December 31, 2020 for providing meaningful
    access to the $10 bill and a deadline of December 31, 2026 for
    providing meaningful access to the other denominations. The
    plaintiffs argued the delay in redesigning the currency against
    the backdrop of the initial seven-to-ten-year goal was a
    changed circumstance warranting modification of the
    injunction. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 
    502 U.S. 367
    , 383 (1992).
    The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion. Under its
    Rule 60(b)(5) analysis, the district court held that the delay in
    releasing redesigned currency was not “so ‘significant’” that
    7
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) provides in relevant
    part: “On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its
    legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding [if]
    . . . applying [the judgment] prospectively is no longer equitable.”
    8
    the injunction was “detrimental to the public interest.” JA 840.
    The district court reasoned that the “balance struck by” the
    injunction—tying the provision of meaningful access to the
    next planned anti-counterfeiting redesign—would be “upset”
    by requiring the Treasury Department to produce two
    redesigns—one to provide meaningful access to visually
    impaired individuals and one to combat counterfeiting—
    released at different times. JA 840. The district court noted the
    “substantial” progress made by (1) creating a currency reader
    program and continuing to add large, high-contrast numerals to
    bills and (2) continuing to work toward including a raised
    tactile feature on bills. JA 840. Although declaring the progress
    “is not as significant as a released redesigned note,” the district
    court concluded that forcing the Treasury Department to
    comply with a separate deadline might be “more detrimental to
    the public interest” than leaving the injunction unmodified. JA
    840–41. Because the Treasury Department has an ongoing duty
    to produce currency that combats counterfeiting, the district
    court held, decoupling the timelines “could create
    unnecessarily duplicative work and potentially increase costs
    for both the government and the private sector.” JA 841.
    After the district court’s ruling but before oral argument in
    our Court, the Treasury Department responded to a United
    States Senator’s inquiry “about the incorporation of tactile
    features into the redesign of currency” and provided its
    “working timeline” for denominations other than the $10 bill,
    which timeline the Treasury Department had previously left
    unspecified: 2028 for the $5 note; 2030 for the $20 note; 2032–
    2035 for the $50 note; and 2034–2038 for the $100 note. Letter
    from Leonard Olijar, Dir. of Bureau of Engraving and Printing,
    to Sen. Ron Wyden (Aug. 1, 2017).8
    8
    Like the download 
    statistics, supra
    n.6, Director Olijar’s
    letter was filed in district court after briefing on appeal was complete,
    9
    II. ANALYSIS
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) provides that a
    court “may relieve a party” from an injunction if “applying [the
    injunction] prospectively is no longer equitable.” Fed. R. Civ.
    P. 60(b)(5). Under the Rule, “a party can ask a court to modify
    or vacate a judgment or order if ‘a significant change either in
    factual conditions or in law’ renders continued enforcement
    ‘detrimental to the public interest.’” Horne v. Flores, 
    557 U.S. 433
    , 447 (2009) (quoting 
    Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384
    ). The “party
    seeking relief bears the burden of establishing that changed
    circumstances warrant relief.” 
    Id. In institutional
    reform
    litigation, where, as here, an injunction typically remains in
    place for many years, the court “must take a ‘flexible approach’
    to Rule 60(b)(5) motions.” 
    Id. (quoting Rufo,
    502 U.S. at 381).
    We review a district court’s denial of a 60(b)(5) motion for
    abuse of discretion. Pigford v. Johanns, 
    416 F.3d 12
    , 16 (D.C.
    Cir. 2005).
    With the newest timeline, the Secretary will be in violation
    of federal law for eight to twenty more years than it would have
    been had it met its expected timeline for currency redesigns
    when the injunction issued. Its much greater than planned delay
    in providing meaningful access to visually impaired
    individuals is unquestionably a change in factual conditions.
    See Evans v. Williams, 
    206 F.3d 1292
    , 1298 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
    (“It is enough that the parties did not actually contemplate the
    changed circumstances” when the injunction issued). The
    Secretary acknowledges the change. See Appellee’s Br. at 23
    n.9 (noting the timeline “changed in light of unanticipated
    developments in counterfeiting technology”). He instead
    argues that the plaintiffs should live with their “strategic
    Am. Council of the Blind v. Mnuchin, No. 1:02-cv-00864, ECF 156-
    1 (Sept. 18, 2017), and we likewise take judicial notice of it, see Veg-
    Mix, 
    Inc., 832 F.2d at 607
    .
    10
    choice[]” not to ask for a hard deadline when the injunction
    issued. Appellee’s Br. at 23 n.9. But this argument misses the
    point of Rule 60(b)(5): it permits a court to alter an injunction
    to respond to unanticipated factual changes. See United States
    v. W. Elec. Co., Inc., 
    46 F.3d 1198
    , 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
    (“Rule 60(b)(5) does not foreclose modifications based on
    developments that, in hindsight, were things that ‘could’
    happen. . . . The focus of Rule 60(b)(5) is not on what was
    possible, but on what the parties and the court reasonably
    anticipated.”).
    The question, then, becomes whether the changes are
    “significant” such that they “warrant relief.” 
    Horne, 557 U.S. at 447
    . Under the injunction’s current terms, millions of
    visually impaired Americans who could have expected
    meaningful access to currency by 2018 must now wait until
    2026 and beyond. In the meantime, only a fraction of them are
    helped by the other measures put in place by the Secretary.
    Balanced against the delay is the potential cost to the Treasury
    Department and the private sector of granting the plaintiffs’
    modification and forcing an earlier redesign of currency
    separate from the planned anti-counterfeiting redesign. The
    district court reasoned that granting the plaintiffs’ motion may
    be “more detrimental” than leaving the injunction untouched
    because of the “potential increased costs” for both the
    government and the private sector. JA 840–41.
    The plaintiffs argue the district court abused its discretion
    because (1) it improperly considered the costs to the
    government and the private sector and (2) even if such costs
    were permissibly considered, the district court lacked sufficient
    relevant evidence about the costs of decoupling the currency
    redesign timelines to make a reasoned decision that
    maintaining the injunction prospectively remains equitable.
    11
    We disagree with the plaintiffs’ first argument. We agree with
    their second argument.
    A.
    The plaintiffs first argue that the district court improperly
    considered the cost to the Treasury Department of granting
    their proposed modification. According to the plaintiffs, the
    Treasury Department’s cost cannot offset the public interest in
    requiring the Secretary to comply with the Rehabilitation Act.
    That argument is relevant to whether the Secretary is violating
    the Rehabilitation Act and is an issue we have already decided.
    See Am. Council of the 
    Blind, 525 F.3d at 1271
    –74 (holding the
    Treasury Department’s potential methods of compliance were
    not so expensive as to constitute undue burden, an affirmative
    defense to alleged Rehabilitation Act violation, see Barth v.
    Gelb, 
    2 F.3d 1180
    , 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). For the issue before
    the district court and now before us—the timing of
    compliance—the Treasury Department’s financial burden is a
    relevant factor. See 
    Rufo, 502 U.S. at 392
    –93 (“Financial
    constraints may not be used to justify . . . constitutional
    violations” but they “are a legitimate concern of government
    defendants in institutional reform litigation and therefore are
    appropriately considered in tailoring a[n injunction]
    modification”). The district court did not abuse its discretion
    by considering the costs to the government.
    We reach the same conclusion regarding private sector
    costs. The plaintiffs argue such costs cannot be considered
    because no third parties intervened and because the Secretary
    lacks standing to assert their interests. But institutional reform
    cases such as this one “reach beyond the parties involved
    directly in the suit.” 
    Rufo, 502 U.S. at 301
    (internal quotation
    omitted). The “public interest” is a “significant reason”
    undergirding Rule 60(b)(5)’s “flexible” modification standard.
    12
    
    Id. Here, private
    third parties will unquestionably be affected
    by the currency redesign: for example, approximately 400,000
    ATMs will likely need to be modified to handle dispensing and
    authenticating bills with raised tactile features. See JA 759,
    615. Therefore, the district court permissibly considered third-
    party costs as part of the overall “public interest.” See Twelve
    John Does v. District of Columbia, 
    861 F.2d 295
    , 298 (D.C.
    Cir. 1988) (“[C]ourts sitting in equity are obliged to consider
    the interests of all those affected by a decree” in considering a
    60(b)(5) modification request (emphasis added)).
    B.
    Although we do not believe the district court abused its
    discretion in considering the costs of granting modification, we
    conclude that it did abuse its discretion in denying the
    modification without adequate evidentiary support for the cited
    costs to the Treasury Department and the private sector. See
    Kickapoo Tribe of Indians of Kickapoo Reservation in Kan. v.
    Babbitt, 
    43 F.3d 1491
    , 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“The exercise of
    discretion contemplates reasoned decision making on the basis
    of relevant and appropriate considerations to the task at
    hand.”). The district court based its decision at least in part on
    its conclusion that decoupling the timelines may significantly
    increase costs. The added financial burden of decoupling the
    timelines may very well render the Secretary’s ongoing
    violation of the Rehabilitation Act—which the parties
    reasonably expected to be cured in one decade but under the
    Secretary’s current timeline will stretch into a second decade,
    and most likely a third—equitable. But we find the record
    evidence insufficient to support such a conclusion.
    Regarding the Treasury Department’s costs, the district
    court relied solely on the declaration of Michael Wash, the
    Bureau’s Associate Director and Chief Technology Officer.
    13
    Wash stated that the “investment required to prepare” the
    Bureau to produce banknotes with a raised tactile feature will
    be “less than” $5 million or “up to” $66 million, with annual
    maintenance costs of $12 million or less, depending on whether
    “existing manufacturing equipment can be used.” JA 759. The
    declaration is inadequate to fully and independently serve as
    the basis for the district court’s decision.
    As an initial matter, the cost estimates are hardly precise.
    The district court was required to make a reasoned decision
    about whether the equities favor imposing an earlier timeline
    to provide meaningful access to the millions of visually
    impaired individuals who will be waiting a decade or longer
    than expected. A range of $5 to $66 million for investment
    costs and $12 million to an unknown lower sum for
    maintenance costs does not provide solid ground on which the
    district court could do so. Nor did the district court explain
    whether or how it took into account the enormous variance in
    potential costs.
    But the variance matters: the equities tilt more in the
    plaintiffs’ favor if the Treasury Department has to spend only
    an additional $5 million to provide meaningful access to
    currency in 2020 and 2026, rather than 2026 through 2038. A
    more concrete estimate of the financial burden of incorporating
    a raised tactile feature is necessary. The district court—and this
    Court—lacked it. As the Secretary’s counsel acknowledged at
    oral argument, “we don’t know exactly what the costs are.”
    Oral Argument at 20:55–21:05.
    Moreover, the “investment” costs—that is, purchasing or
    modifying printing equipment that can produce banknotes with
    a raised tactile feature—are upfront, nonrecurring costs. The
    Secretary’s counsel argued that “the costs are going to increase
    significantly if we have two separate redesigns.” Oral
    14
    Argument at 21:05–21:20. Granted, separating the redesigns
    may well be more inefficient. For example, the Treasury
    Department may have to change printing plates twice rather
    than once if a raised tactile feature is introduced before the next
    planned currency redesign. The costs of two redesigns will
    presumably then be higher than the cost of one redesign. But
    we do not know by how much. The investment costs cited by
    Wash are specific to producing a raised tactile feature and will
    be incurred whenever it is put to use without regard to
    coupling/decoupling. They tell us nothing about the difference
    in costs between the two timelines. And that financial
    difference is crucial to weighing the equities of the plaintiffs’
    requested modification.
    Although decoupling the timelines and producing
    banknotes with a raised tactile feature sooner than 2026 (at the
    earliest) may lead to more annual maintenance costs and
    therefore more total costs, the district court gave no indication
    that it based its decision on that particular evidence. Instead, it
    appeared to accept the Secretary’s arguments and the Wash
    declaration in their entirety, even though most of the
    projections did not speak to whether continuing to enforce the
    injunction—with the timelines coupled rather than
    decoupled—is “no longer equitable” under Rule 60(b)(5).
    “Without a more nuanced and detailed explanation, the district
    court’s acceptance of the nonmovants’ arguments in toto
    constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Gov’t of Province of
    Manitoba v. Zinke, 
    849 F.3d 1111
    , 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
    (reversing denial of 60(b)(5) motion).
    The district court order suffers a similar flaw regarding
    private sector costs. It cursorily stated that decoupling the
    redesign timelines could “potentially increase costs . . . for the
    private sector” and, again, relied only on the Wash declaration.
    JA 841. Wash’s declaration, without more, “estimated a cost
    15
    impact of $3–4 billion” to the private sector. JA 759. 9 The
    costs include “upgrade costs” and equipment changes that
    “may” be necessary to allow banknote machines, such as
    ATMs, to handle banknotes with raised tactile features. JA
    759–80. Further, Wash declared that decoupling the timelines,
    as the plaintiffs seek, “would . . . substantially increase private
    sector costs.” JA 762.
    Again, the evidence is insufficient to support the district
    court’s conclusion. The only quantified costs in Wash’s
    estimate are for upgrading and changing banknote equipment.
    As an initial matter, the soundness of his $3–4 billion estimate
    is unclear: even banking industry representatives say that “the
    9
    The relevant part of the Wash declaration provides:
    The impact to the private sector of adding [a
    raised tactile feature] to a U.S. banknote is being
    studied. A[ raised tactile feature] on a banknote may
    complicate existing note feeding mechanisms and
    the banknote authentication technologies used by
    these devices. We have estimated a cost impact of
    $3–4 billion to the [banknote equipment
    manufacturer] community given the changes that
    may be required to this equipment and the number
    of these devices located throughout the U.S. . . .
    ...
    . . . Requiring the Secretary to redesign each
    denomination twice in the near future, as I
    understand the plaintiffs envision—once to
    incorporate a [raised tactile feature] and again to
    incorporate new visual designs and enhanced
    security features to continue to minimize
    counterfeiting—would . . . substantially increase
    private sector costs . . . .
    JA 759–60, 762.
    16
    industry cannot make reasonable estimates until [the Bureau]
    announces the specific height and application method of the
    tactile feature,” GAO U.S. CURRENCY REPORT 20, which the
    Bureau has yet to do.
    Moreover, whether machines such as ATMs must be
    changed in a redesign separate from the anti-counterfeiting
    redesign or as part of the same redesign, the private sector will
    have to incur those costs. See Oral Argument at 28:10–28:30
    (Secretary counsel acknowledging Wash’s cost estimates “will
    occur whenever the [raised tactile feature] is incorporated”).
    The Secretary argues that incorporating a raised tactile feature
    will be “incredibly expensive” and therefore “we should do it
    in a way that . . . is efficient.” Oral Argument at 28:30–28:50.
    Although the private sector costs of two changes may be higher
    than the costs of a single coupled change, we do not have any
    data on the difference. The plaintiffs made this point to the
    district court below, see JA 807–08, but the district court order
    accepted the Secretary’s position without “explain[ing] why”
    it found the Secretary’s “presentation of data” persuasive,
    Gov’t of Province of 
    Manitoba, 849 F.3d at 1119
    .
    Wash did declare that separating the meaningful-access
    redesign from the anti-counterfeiting redesign “would . . .
    substantially increase” private sector costs. JA 762. But his
    declaration gave no indication how “substantial” the increase
    may be. The magnitude of the increase matters in determining
    whether continued enforcement of the injunction, instead of
    modifying the injunction, is “detrimental to the public interest.”
    
    Horne, 557 U.S. at 447
    . The district court needed more than
    guesstimates to make a reasoned decision. See Barbour v.
    Merrill, 
    48 F.3d 1270
    , 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (district court
    abuses its discretion if “the reasons given [do not] reasonably
    support the conclusion” (quoting Kickapoo 
    Tribe, 43 F.3d at 1497
    )).
    17
    The Secretary argues that the plaintiffs “quibble with the
    evidence” presented, Appellee’s Br. at 24,10 and we
    acknowledge that the district court need not provide an “over-
    elaboration of detail or particularization of facts,” Fed. R. Civ.
    P. 52(a) advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment; see
    also Gov’t of Province of 
    Manitoba, 849 F.3d at 1118
    (“Mere
    brevity does not provide sufficient grounds to find an abuse of
    discretion has occurred.”). Plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged
    that decoupling the timelines may create inefficiencies—and
    attendant increased costs—in the Bureau’s production process.
    See Oral Argument at 39:00–39:34 (stating, in response to
    Court’s question that “intuitively” it seems “decoupling would
    increase” costs because redesigns “operate on economies of
    scope,” that such proposition appears “unquestionably true”
    but “there’s [no]thing in the record on that”). If the district
    court is to properly conclude that withholding meaningful
    access to paper currency from millions of visually impaired
    individuals for eight to twenty years longer than expected—
    with external currency readers helping only a small fraction
    while they wait—remains equitable because of the potential
    financial burden resulting from granting the plaintiffs’
    10
    At oral argument, the Secretary’s counsel also noted a 2009
    study commissioned by the Bureau that studied multiple ways to
    comply with the injunction and provided corresponding cost
    estimates. See Oral Argument at 28:00–28:10; ARINC
    ENGINEERING SERVICES, LLC, FINAL REPORT: STUDY TO ADDRESS
    OPTIONS FOR ENABLING THE BLIND AND VISUALLY IMPAIRED
    COMMUNITY TO DENOMINATE U.S. CURRENCY (July 2009). But the
    district court did not cite the study. Nor did Wash’s declaration rely
    on it. The district court is free to consider it on remand but we note
    the study’s data may be stale, given the length of time that has
    elapsed, the fact that the study’s estimates were made before the
    Secretary had finalized a plan to provide meaningful access to
    visually impaired individuals and the fact that the study’s estimates
    vary from Wash’s estimates.
    18
    modification, the district court needs more concrete estimates
    of the costs that matter.
    We recognize that our “review for abuse of discretion does
    not permit us to substitute our judgment for that of the trial
    court.” United States v. Mathis-Gardner, 
    783 F.3d 1286
    , 1288
    (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted); see also Nat’l
    Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 
    427 U.S. 639
    , 642 (1976) (court reviewing for abuse of discretion does
    not ask whether it “as an original matter” would have reached
    same conclusion). We are not doing so. The district court may
    well deny the plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b)(5) motion on remand but it
    must do so with adequate evidentiary support and reasoning.
    By failing to do so, we conclude, the district court abused its
    discretion. Accordingly, the district court denial of the
    plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b)(5) motion is reversed and the matter is
    remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    So ordered.