United States v. Hunt , 56 F. App'x 210 ( 2003 )


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  •                           UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,              
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
                No. 02-4585
    SHIRLEY SCOTT HUNT, a/k/a Shirley
    Marie Scott,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.
    N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Chief District Judge.
    (CR-01-431)
    Submitted: January 28, 2003
    Decided: March 3, 2003
    Before MICHAEL and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and
    HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    Bruce T. Cunningham, Jr., CUNNINGHAM, DEDMOND, PETER-
    SEN & SMITH, L.L.P., Southern Pines, North Carolina, for Appel-
    lant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Michael F. Joseph,
    Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
    Appellee.
    2                       UNITED STATES v. HUNT
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Shirley Scott Hunt pled guilty to attempting to possess with intent
    to distribute three kilograms of cocaine, 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a), (b)(1)(B)
    (2000). She was sentenced to a term of fifty-seven months imprison-
    ment. Hunt appeals her sentence, contending that the district court’s
    application of a two-level weapon enhancement, U.S. Sentencing
    Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2001), together with the safety
    valve provisions, USSG §§ 2D1.1(b)(6), 5C1.2, violated the rule of
    lenity. We affirm.
    Hunt and two co-defendants were arrested as they attempted to buy
    three kilograms of cocaine for $40,000 from an undercover officer.
    One of Hunt’s co-defendants was carrying two concealed firearms. In
    connection with her sentencing, Hunt stated that she had not known
    that the firearms were present. Nevertheless, she received a weapon
    enhancement on the ground that it was reasonably foreseeable that her
    co-defendant might have a weapon. See United States v. Kimberlin,
    
    18 F.3d 1156
    , 1160-61 (4th Cir. 1994) (applying USSG
    § 1B1.3(a)(2)). Hunt also received a two-level reduction in her
    offense level under the safety valve provision, USSG § 2D1.1(b)(6),
    which is available to a defendant who meets the five criteria set out
    in USSG § 5C1.2. The second § 5C1.2 criterion is that the defendant
    not have possessed a firearm or other dangerous weapon in connec-
    tion with the offense, or induced any participant to do so.
    Hunt contends that § 2D1.1 is ambiguous in permitting the weapon
    enhancement for a defendant who qualifies for the safety valve reduc-
    tion. The rule of lenity requires courts to construe ambiguous criminal
    statutes against the government and in favor of the defendant. United
    States v. Photogrammetric Servs., Inc., 
    259 F.3d 229
    , 249 (4th Cir.
    2001), cert. denied, 
    122 S. Ct. 1295
     (2002). Because the issue raised
    is one of legal interpretation of the guidelines, the standard of review
    UNITED STATES v. HUNT                          3
    is de novo. United States v. Kinter, 
    235 F.3d 192
    , 195 (4th Cir. 2000),
    cert. denied, 
    532 U.S. 937
     (2001).
    The § 2D1.1(b)(1) weapon enhancement is determined by relevant
    conduct as defined by § 1B1.3, which includes "all reasonably fore-
    seeable acts . . . of others in furtherance of [a] jointly undertaken
    criminal activity." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). The enhancement may
    be applied when the defendant did not know about or participate in
    a co-defendant’s weapon possession, as long as the possession was
    foreseeable. By contrast, we have held that a defendant may qualify
    for the safety valve reduction even if a co-defendant possessed a fire-
    arm, unless the defendant was personally involved in the co-
    defendant’s action. United States v. Wilson, 
    114 F.3d 429
    , 432 (4th
    Cir. 1997) (holding that "for purposes of § 5C1.2(2), the term ‘defen-
    dant’ ‘limits the accountability of the defendant to his own conduct
    and conduct that he aided or abetted, counseled, commanded,
    induced, procured, or willfully caused’"); accord United States v.
    Pena-Sarabia, 
    297 F.3d 983
    , 987-89 (10th Cir. 2002); United
    States v. Clavijo, 
    165 F.3d 1341
    , 1343 (11th Cir. 1999); United States
    v. Wilson, 
    105 F.3d 219
    , 222 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Sealed Case, 
    105 F.3d 1460
    , 1461-65 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Thus, the safety valve reduction
    is allowed when a co-defendant’s firearm possession was foreseeable
    by the defendant, but the foreseeability factor may nevertheless bring
    about the enhancement. Section 2D1.1 is not ambiguous. We con-
    clude that the district court did not err in determining that the rule of
    lenity did not apply, and interpreted § 2D1.1 and § 5C1.2 correctly.
    We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the district court. We
    dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
    are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argu-
    ment would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED