A.J. BAYNES FREIGHT CONTRACTORS, LT v. POLANSKI, JR., NORMAN L. , 936 N.Y.2d 428 ( 2011 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    1296
    CA 11-01428
    PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND SCONIERS, JJ.
    A.J. BAYNES FREIGHT CONTRACTORS, LTD., AJAC
    TRUCKING, LLC, AND LENNON WILLIAMS,
    PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS,
    V                               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    NORMAN L. POLANSKI, JR., AS MAYOR OF CITY OF
    LACKAWANNA, CITY COUNCIL OF CITY OF LACKAWANNA,
    JAMES L. MICHEL, AS CHIEF OF CITY OF LACKAWANNA
    POLICE DEPARTMENT AND CITY OF LACKAWANNA,
    DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
    HODGSON RUSS LLP, BUFFALO (DANIEL A. SPITZER OF COUNSEL), FOR
    DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
    PHILLIPS LYTLE LLP, BUFFALO (ALISA A. LUKASIEWICZ OF COUNSEL), FOR
    PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS.
    Appeal from a judgment (denominated order and judgment) of the
    Supreme Court, Erie County (Diane Y. Devlin, J.), entered October 5,
    2010 in a declaratory judgment action. The judgment, among other
    things, declared City of Lackawanna Municipal Code § 215.53, as
    amended effective March 3, 2009, unconstitutional and invalid.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment   so appealed from is
    unanimously modified on the law by vacating   that part of the third
    decretal paragraph declaring that defendant   City of Lackawanna
    Municipal Code § 215.53 is unconstitutional   and as modified the
    judgment is affirmed without costs.
    Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking a
    declaration that section 215.53 of the City of Lackawanna Municipal
    Code, as amended on March 3, 2009 (hereafter, 2009 ordinance), is
    invalid and unconstitutional. The 2009 ordinance established a truck
    route system that prohibits heavy trucks, i.e, those having a gross
    weight in excess of 10,000 pounds, from traveling on all but two
    specified routes within defendant City of Lackawanna (City). The 2009
    ordinance also contained an exception for local deliveries that the
    parties agree is not relevant to this appeal. Prior to the 2009
    amendment, the ordinance allowed heavy trucks to travel on a third
    route as well, namely, South Park Avenue, but the 2009 ordinance
    prohibited such trucks from traveling on that route. The 2009
    ordinance allegedly caused a hardship for plaintiffs, all of whom are
    involved in the delivery of milk to the Sorrento cheese manufacturing
    -2-                          1296
    CA 11-01428
    plant in the City of Buffalo, just north of the Lackawanna border.
    Because their trucks could no longer travel on South Park Avenue,
    plaintiffs had to take a longer and more circuitous route to reach the
    Sorrento plant.
    We agree with plaintiffs that Supreme Court properly determined
    that the 2009 ordinance is invalid under Vehicle and Traffic Law §
    1640 (a) (10) to the extent that it prohibits heavy trucks to travel
    on South Park Avenue, and thus properly issued a declaration that the
    ordinance in question is invalid. Section 1640 (a) (10) provides that
    any system of truck routes established by a city or village “shall
    provide suitable connection with all [S]tate routes entering or
    leaving such city or village.” The purpose of the statute is to
    ensure that State thoroughfares “enable vehicles passing through to
    proceed . . . to and from their destinations” (People v Grant, 306 NY
    258, 266). Although the court erred in determining that South Park
    Avenue is a State route within the City, there is no dispute that,
    south of the City’s limits, it becomes U.S. Route 62 and is maintained
    by the State. Thus, South Park Avenue is a State route as it
    “enter[s] or leav[es]” the City within the meaning of section 1640 (a)
    (10), and the truck route system established by the 2009 ordinance
    fails to provide any connection between U.S. Route 62 as it enters the
    City and the City’s truck route system. Contrary to defendants’
    contention, the fact that the trucks may travel on other State routes
    within the City to reach the Sorrento plant does not satisfy the
    “suitable connection” requirement with respect to U.S. Route 62 (id.).
    Indeed, the statute provides that the truck route system of a city or
    village “shall provide suitable connection with all [S]tate routes”
    (id. [emphasis added]), rather than merely some State routes.
    We also reject defendants’ contention that the 2009 ordinance is
    authorized by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1640 (a) (5), which provides
    that a city or village may exclude trucks from its highways regardless
    of weight, and/or by subdivision (a) (20) of section 1640, which
    allows a city or village to exclude trucks “in excess of any
    designated weight,” length, or height, or eight feet in width, from
    its highways. Although neither of those statutory subdivisions
    contains a “suitable connection” requirement for State routes, we
    agree with plaintiffs that, because the three provisions are in pari
    materia, they must be read together and harmonized. To interpret
    paragraphs (5) and (20) of section 1640 (a) as defendants suggest
    would effectively remove the “suitable connection” requirement of
    paragraph (10) from the statute entirely. That interpretation would
    not only defeat the purpose of the “suitable connection” requirement,
    but it would also be contrary to the rule of interpretation directing
    that “[e]very part of a statute must be given meaning and effect . .
    ., and the various parts of a statute must be construed so as to
    harmonize with one another” (Heard v Cuomo, 80 NY2d 684, 689). In
    sum, because the truck route system established by the 2009 ordinance
    provides no suitable connection whatsoever for heavy trucks entering
    the City on U.S. Route 62, we conclude that it is invalid under
    section 1640 (a) (10).
    We further conclude in any event that the 2009 ordinance also is
    -3-                          1296
    CA 11-01428
    invalid under the “access highway” regulations of the Department of
    Transportation (DOT) to the extent that it prohibits heavy truck
    traffic on Ridge Road and South Park Avenue south of Ridge Road (see
    17 NYCRR 8000.7 [a] [2]; 8114.00 [q], [ae]). Pursuant to Vehicle and
    Traffic Law § 100-a, an access highway “provid[es] access between a
    qualifying highway” and, inter alia, terminals and facilities for
    food, fuel and repairs. Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 134-a,
    qualifying highways generally are those that, inter alia, make up the
    interstate highway system, and DOT has mandated that heavy truck
    traffic is generally allowed on access highways (see 17 NYCRR 8000.7
    [a]). Contrary to defendants’ contention, the authority granted to
    cities and villages under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1640 does not
    trump the authority of DOT over access highways. In fact, the
    Legislature has specifically delegated to DOT the authority to
    “designate public highways within the [S]tate as access highways” (§
    1627 [b]). We conclude that the statutory scheme reflects the intent
    of the Legislature that DOT’s authority to designate access highways
    acts as a limitation on the authority of municipalities to regulate
    truck traffic.
    We reject defendants’ further contention that DOT may only
    designate highways that are part of the State highway system - which
    would necessarily exclude Ridge Road and South Park Avenue within the
    City - as access highways. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1627 (b)
    authorizes DOT to designate any “public highway[]” as an access
    highway. While it is true that DOT’s own regulations refer to access
    highways as “State highways” (17 NYCRR 8000.4), DOT has not
    interpreted that reference to be a limitation on the authority granted
    to it by section 1627 (b) to designate any “public highway[]” as an
    access highway. Rather, it has consistently interpreted its own
    regulation as allowing any public highway to be designated as an
    access highway (see e.g. 17 NYCRR 8114.00, 8126.00), and does not
    limit such designation to those roads that make up the State highway
    system (see generally Highway Law § 341). “ ‘[T]he interpretation
    given to a regulation by the agency which promulgated it and is
    responsible for its administration is entitled to deference if that
    interpretation is not irrational or unreasonable’ ” (Matter of
    Fairport Baptist Homes v Daines, 60 AD3d 1356, 1357, lv denied 12 NY3d
    714, quoting Matter of Gaines v New York State Div. of Hous. &
    Community Renewal, 90 NY2d 545, 548-549), and, particularly in light
    of the broad authority delegated to DOT under Vehicle and Traffic Law
    § 1627 (b), we conclude that DOT’s interpretation is neither
    irrational nor unreasonable.
    We agree with defendants, however, that the court erred in
    declaring that the 2009 ordinance is unconstitutional, and we
    therefore modify the judgment accordingly. “Courts should not decide
    constitutional questions when a case can be disposed of on a
    nonconstitutional ground” (Matter of Beach v Shanley, 62 NY2d 241,
    254). Because the court properly declared the 2009 ordinance invalid
    on statutory grounds, the court should not have addressed plaintiffs’
    constitutional challenge to the 2009 ordinance.
    -4-                 1296
    CA 11-01428
    Entered:   December 30, 2011         Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CA 11-01428

Citation Numbers: 90 A.D.3d 1630, 936 N.Y.2d 428, 936 NYS2d 428

Filed Date: 12/30/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023