Gadlin v. Watkins , 93 F. App'x 204 ( 2004 )


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  •                                                                          F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    MAR 12 2004
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    JAVAN A. GADLIN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                     No. 03-1313
    v.                                        District of Colorado
    GARY WATKINS, Warden; C/O W.                       (D.C. No.03-Z-556)
    WIEGERT; C/O S. JOHNSON; C/O
    DAVID A. BORCYCZKOWSKI; JOE
    ORTIZ, Executive Director of the
    Colorado Department of Corrections;
    ANTHONY A. DECESARO; AL
    ESTEP; MAJOR TORNOSKI;
    MAJOR DAY; CAPT. OUTEN; C/O
    DAN FANDRICH; LT. E. SAMU;
    RON WIMMER, Mental Health
    Worker; C/O WILSON; C/O
    UPDEGRAFF; SGT. MARLAR; LT.
    D. ADAMS; SGT. ROMERO; LT.
    DEGUELLE; LT. CAVALLI,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT         *
    Before EBEL , MURPHY , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Plaintiff Javan Gadlin is in the custody of the Colorado Department of
    Corrections (“DOC”) and is currently housed at the Limon, Colorado,
    Correctional Facility. Mr. Gadlin is appealing the district court’s dismissal of his
    complaint brought pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , which alleges that DOC officials
    violated his constitutional rights. After careful review of the record and
    proceedings below, we affirm the district court’s decision and dismiss this appeal.
    I. Background
    Actions giving rise to this case
    Plaintiff instituted this action after two separate grievances filed with the
    DOC were denied. The first stems from Plaintiff’s complaint that prison officials
    were indifferent to his medical needs and that they failed to provide him with
    additional toilet paper. DOC responded to this complaint noting that Plaintiff was
    provided with two rolls per week, as mandated by the DOC policy, and thus had
    no basis to pursue his grievance. 1 See Letter from Anthony DeCesaro (February
    7, 2003), R. doc. 5.
    1
    Because plaintiff complains only of constitutional violations and does not
    seek to have his prison privileges restored, we deem his administrative remedies
    to be exhausted. See Letter from Anthony DeCesaro (February 7, 2003), R. doc.
    5.
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    The second grievance involved DOC’s actions to move Plaintiff and house
    him in a different part of the prison facility (apparently as a result of the ruckus
    he caused when his requests for toilet paper were denied). Plaintiff claimed that
    he could not move to the new cell because he was afraid of heights. (The new
    cell is apparently on the second or third floor of the facility.) Plaintiff assumed a
    limp position and refused to move, stating “you are going to have to carry me.”
    Notice of Charges (October 25, 2002), R. doc. 5. As a result, the officers placed
    Plaintiff in a transport wristlock and moved Plaintiff to the new cell. Mr. Gadlin
    claimed that moving him despite his fear of heights demonstrated deliberate
    indifference to his health, and that he was subjected to cruel and unusual
    punishment during the course of the move. Informal Resolution Attempt
    (December 20, 2002), R. doc. 5.
    Anthony DeCesaro, the DOC Grievance Officer, replied to Plaintiff’s
    grievance, stating:
    You have not presented any witnesses that would corroborate
    your version of the facts. I could find no evidence of the use
    of excessive force such [as] a medical report or other report,
    outlining your injuries. You have also failed to specifically
    state the nature of your injuries, except the general terms of
    physical and psychological abuse. There are not specifics as to
    this abuse, except the unsubstantiated claim that you have a
    fear of heights and the unsubstantiated claim that you [were]
    injured by the “transport wristlock”. Overall, no evidence was
    provided to me which would allow me to recommend any
    relief, therefore no relief is recommended.
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    Letter from Anthony DeCesaro (February 14, 2003), R. doc. 5.
    Procedural History
    Following the denial of both administrative grievances, Mr. Gadlin filed a
    complaint in federal court alleging: (1) a due process violation for being taken
    into segregation without any process or notice for requesting a roll of toilet paper;
    (2) an equal protection violation predicated on the theory that he was singled out
    for no other reason than “being an inmate of the black race,” and that guards on
    numerous occasions “denied [plaintiff] the same rights enjoyed by white
    inmates”; and, (3) a claim that prison officials demonstrated deliberate
    indifference to his medical needs by taking him to higher floors of the
    correctional facility, despite known orders by the mental health officer that
    plaintiff was not to be housed on the upper floors. Compl. 5, R. doc. 5.
    In response to Mr. Gadlin’s complaint, the district court, through the
    magistrate judge, directed Plaintiff to amend his complaint. Specifically, the
    magistrate judge’s order held:
    Mr Gadlin’s amended complaint does not include a short and
    plain statement of his claims showing that he is entitled to
    relief in this action. The amended complaint lacks the specific
    information necessary to give the defendants adequate notice
    of the claims being asserted against them. The complaint is
    not specific as to each defendant’s personal participation in the
    alleged constitutional violations. In addition, Mr. Gadlin’s
    claims are so lacking in supporting factual allegations that it is
    not possible for the court to link the claims asserted in the
    amended complaint with the claims Mr. Gadlin alleges he has
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    exhausted through the DOC’s three-step administrative
    grievance process.
    Order Directing Plaintiff to File Second Amended Complaint, dated May 8, 2003,
    at 3, R. doc 6.
    Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint. This subsequent
    filing did not correct the problems identified by the magistrate judge in the initial
    complaint. In fact, as to certain points, Plaintiff provided even less factual
    support for his claims than in his prior filing, and in general, repeated the same
    generalized allegations without substantively addressing the defects pointed out in
    the magistrate judge’s order. Plaintiff did, however, somewhat shift the emphasis
    of his deliberate indifference claim, now arguing that he did not receive medical
    treatment for injuries caused by prison guards.
    In response to the Second Amended Complaint, the district court dismissed
    the complaint as frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915a(b). The district judge
    retraced the analysis set forth by the magistrate judge, highlighting the lack of
    specific supporting facts to state a claim, as well as plaintiff’s failure to link these
    allegations to the long list of defendants. Order and Judgment of Dismissal, dated
    July 10, 2003 at 3-4, R. doc. 11.
    Plaintiff then filed a motion construed by the district court as a motion for
    reconsideration. R. doc. 18. The motion was denied on substantially the same
    grounds as the order dismissing the case. R. doc. 21. Thereafter, the district
    -5-
    court denied Plaintiff’s motion to proceed on appeal to this Court in forma
    pauperis finding that “the appeal is not taken in good faith because plaintiff has
    not shown the existence of a reasoned nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts
    in support of the issues raised on appeal.” Order Denying Leave to Proceed on
    Appeal Pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
     and Fed. R. App. P. 24, dated May 12, 2003,
    at 1-2, R. doc. 24 (“Order Denying Leave”).
    Mr. Gadlin’s filings to this Court do not progress much beyond those
    submitted to the district court. His first issue on appeal complains that “the
    [district] Judge . . . abused her discretion, when working as the defendant’s
    advocates,” Appellant’s Br. 18, while his second issue claims a denial of equal
    protection under the law. As in his filings below, Mr. Gadlin fails to allege facts
    in support for his claims or to identify the role that each defendant played in
    allegedly violating his rights.
    II. Analysis
    We review the district court’s dismissal pursuant to § 1915a de novo. See
    McBride v. Deer, 
    240 F.3d 1287
    , 1289 (10th Cir. 2001). We affirm the decision
    of the district court and dismiss this appeal as frivolous.
    Plaintiff’s complaint includes a long list of defendants, twenty in all. Yet
    despite repeated warnings, neither his original complaint, his amended complaint,
    nor his filings before this court indicate with the requisite degree of particularity
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    how or when any of the named prison officials engaged in the allegedly
    unconstitutional acts. As stated by the district court, personal participation is an
    essential allegation in a civil rights action, Bennett v. Passic, 
    545 F.2d 1260
    ,
    1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976), and there must be an affirmative link between the
    alleged violation and each defendant’s participation, or failure to act or supervise.
    Butler v. City of Norman, 
    992 F.2d 1053
    , 1055 (10th Cir. 1993). These defects in
    the pleading are fatal to Plaintiff’s claims.
    Further, as noted at every stage of the proceedings below, Plaintiff has
    failed to allege facts with any specificity to support his assertions of
    constitutional violations. See Hall v. Bellmon, 
    935 F.2d 1106
    , 1110 (10th Cir.
    1991) (vague and conclusory allegations need not be accepted by the court). To
    state an equal protection claim, plaintiff must allege that the government treated
    him differently than others who were similarly situated. See Cleburne v.
    Cleburne Living Ctr., 
    473 U.S. 432
     (1985). However, Plaintiff has failed to point
    to any similarly situated white inmates who were given preferential treatment.
    Similarly, Mr. Gadlin has provided nothing more than conclusory statements that
    he suffered physical harm at the hands of prison officials; and a prisoner’s claim
    cannot be premised merely on mental or emotional injuries. See 42 U.S.C. §
    1997e(e) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a
    jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered
    -7-
    while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.”). Thus, there is
    insufficient basis to pursue either of these claims.
    Mr. Gadlin’s due process claim is similarly lacking. Due process is only
    constitutionally guaranteed when a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property.
    Templeman v. Gunter, 
    16 F.3d 367
    , 369 (10th Cir. 1994). Unless state law or
    prison regulations provide a liberty interest, a prisoner has no right to be housed
    in a particular cell or amongst the general prison population. See 
    id.
     We have
    previously held, under Colorado law, that a transfer to administrative segregation
    does not implicate the Due Process Clause. 
    Id.
     Thus, Mr. Gadlin has no legal
    basis to challenge his placement in segregation and the claim was properly
    dismissed.
    Because we deem this appeal frivolous we charge Mr. Gadlin with a strike
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (g). Plaintiff was warned at almost every stage that his
    complaint lacked factual and legal merit. The magistrate judge reviewed the
    complaint, found it deficient, and provided Plaintiff with an outline for curing the
    complaint. After he failed to do so, the district court dismissed the complaint and
    charged Mr. Gadlin with a strike. The district court subsequently reviewed the
    merits of Mr. Gadlin’s motion for reconsideration and denied it. Lastly, when
    denying Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis in this appeal, the district
    judge noted that the appeal “is not taken in good faith” and that Mr. Gadlin “had
    -8-
    not shown the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument.” Order Denying
    Leave at 1-2, R. doc 24. Undeterred by any of these warnings, and without
    addressing any of the substantive concerns raised by the judges below, Plaintiff
    proceeded to file this appeal.
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff’s motion to
    proceed on appeal without prepayment of fees and costs is GRANTED , and he is
    reminded that he is obligated to continue making partial payments toward the
    balance of his assessed fees and costs until they are paid in full. Because this
    appeal counts as a strike against Plaintiff pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (g), Mr.
    Gadlin will have earned a total of two strikes during the course of this litigation.
    Entered for the Court,
    Michael W. McConnell
    Circuit Judge
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