Bonner v. St Martin Parish School Board , 93 F. App'x 612 ( 2004 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS         March 10, 2004
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _____________________             Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 03-30837
    Summary Calendar
    _____________________
    RALPH BONNER,
    Plaintiff/Appellant,
    versus
    ST MARTIN PARISH SCHOOL BOARD,
    Defendant/Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana, Lafayette Division
    District Court Cause No. 02-CV-2052
    _________________________________________________________________
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.1
    PRADO, Circuit Judge.
    This appeal arises from an employment discrimination
    lawsuit.   In his complaint, Appellant Ralph Bonner (Bonner)
    asserted that his employer, Appellee St. Martin Parish School
    Board (the school board), failed to promote him twice, as
    principal of a junior high and high school, because of his race.
    In response to Bonner’s complaint, the school board moved for
    summary judgment. After considering the motion, the district
    1
    Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, this Court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R.
    47.5.4.
    1
    court determined that Bonner had failed to present evidence that
    raised a genuine question of material fact about whether the
    school board’s stated reasons for not promoting him was a pretext
    for racial discrimination and granted the motion.      Bonner
    challenges the summary judgment in this appeal.
    Standard of Review
    This Court reviews a district court’s summary judgment
    decision de novo.     See Daniels v. City of Arlington, Tex., 
    246 F.3d 500
    , 502 (5th Cir. 2001).      Consequently, this Court will
    uphold a summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of
    material fact.     See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(c).
    In deciding whether a question of material fact exists, a
    court must view the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in
    the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.      See 
    Daniels, 246 F.3d at 502
    .     A genuine issue of material fact exists if the
    evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
    for the non-moving party.     See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
    
    477 U.S. 242
    , 248 (1986); Mason v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
    274 F.3d 314
    , 316 (5th Cir. 2001).      The moving party bears the burden
    of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material
    fact.   “To satisfy this burden, the moving party may either
    submit evidentiary documents that negate the existence of some
    material element of the nonmoving party's claim or defense or, if
    the crucial issue is one for which the nonmoving party will bear
    2
    the burden of proof at trial, merely point out that the
    evidentiary documents in the record contain insufficient proof
    concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or
    defense.”   Lavespere v. Niagra Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 
    910 F.2d 167
    , 178 (5th Cir. 1990); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 325 (1986).   On the other hand, if the alleged fact in
    issue is one for which the nonmoving party bears the burden of
    proof, the movant may merely point out that the evidentiary
    documents in the record contain insufficient proof of an
    essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense.       See
    
    Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325
    ; 
    Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178
    .       Once the
    moving party has proven no genuine issue of material fact exists,
    the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show that summary
    judgment is not appropriate.    See 
    Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324
    .
    Burden Shifting in an Employment Discrimination Case
    In an employment discrimination case, the plaintiff bears
    the initial burden and must first establish a prima facie case of
    unlawful discrimination.    See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod.,
    
    530 U.S. 133
    , 142 (2000).   To meet this burden, the plaintiff
    must show: (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was
    qualified to do the job, (3) he suffered an adverse employment
    action, and (4) others outside the protected group were treated
    more favorably than he was.    See McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v.
    Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
    , 802 (1973).       That Bonner met this burden is
    3
    not disputed in this appeal.
    If the plaintiff meets his initial burden and establishes a
    prima case, the burden shifts to the defendant-employer to
    produce evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for
    the treatment of the plaintiff.          See 
    Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142
    .
    This burden is one of production, not persuasion, and involves no
    credibility assessment.    See 
    id. If the
    defendant-employer meets
    its burden of production, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff
    to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s
    reason for the disparate treatment is pretextual.          See 
    id. at 143.
    To survive summary judgment, the plaintiff must present
    documentary evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact
    about whether the employer’s reason for the employment action.
    See Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 
    81 F.3d 38
    , 42 (5th Cir.
    1996).    In proving pretext, the plaintiff retains the burden of
    persuading the fact-finder.    See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty Affairs v.
    Burdine, 
    450 U.S. 248
    , 253 (1981).         It is not enough for the
    plaintiff to show that the defendant-employer’s stated reason was
    false.    The plaintiff must show that discrimination was the
    actual reason for disparate treatment.          See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr.
    v. Hicks, 
    509 U.S. 502
    , 516-517 (1993).         The actual reason,
    however, may be inferred to be discrimination by the falsity of
    the employer’s explanation.    See 
    Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142
    .          Thus,
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    a genuine fact issue may be raised and summary judgment may
    therefore be defeated by the plaintiff’s prima facie case
    combined with sufficient evidence to indicate that the employer’s
    asserted justification is false.       See 
    Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142
    ;
    Vadie v. Miss. St. Univ., 
    218 F.3d 365
    , 373 (5th Cir. 2000).
    Whether Summary Judgment Was Appropriate
    In the instant case, Bonner asserts that the district court
    erred in granting the school board’s motion for summary judgment.
    In particular, Bonner complains that the district court erred by
    failing to assess the sufficiency of the school board’s evidence
    of a non-discriminatory reason for not promoting him.      The school
    board’s burden, however, is not a burden of persuasion.       See
    
    Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142
    .   Instead the school district’s burden is
    one of production, and thus, and involves no credibility
    assessment.   See 
    id. at 142.
      Because the school board presented
    evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for not promoting Bonner,
    it met its burden.   Thus, the only remaining question is whether
    Bonner presented evidence that raises a question of fact about
    whether the school district’s reason was a pretext for racial
    discrimination.
    The school board articulated several reasons why other
    applicants were hired as principal instead of Bonner.      One reason
    advanced by the school board was that Bonner had no prior
    association with the applicable schools.      Although Bonner relies
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    on evidence of his success as an elementary school principal, and
    statistics intended to depict disparity in the numbers of African
    American principals compared to Caucasian principals, he has not
    raised a question of fact about whether the absence of prior
    association with the schools was a pretext for racial
    discrimination.
    The summary judgment evidence indicates that the two
    applicants who received the jobs Bonner sought had more
    experience in similar settings.    Michael Kraemer, who received
    the principalship at St. Martinville High School, not only taught
    in that high school for fifteen years, but at the time served as
    assistant principal of another 5-A high school.    Allen Blanchard,
    who received the principalship of Cecilia Junior High School,
    previously taught in that particular school, was known and
    respected by the faculty, and was at the time the school’s
    assistant principal.
    The school district also maintained that Bonner was not the
    best qualified applicant for the jobs.    The school district
    presented evidence of disciplinary problems at the elementary
    school Bonner supervised, and that Bonner had outside business
    and professional interests which could prevent him from devoting
    all of his time to performing his duties.    In particular, the
    evidence indicates Bonner served as pastor for a church 70 miles
    out of town, and Bonner held positions with administrative duties
    at a local college.    These factors could legitimately affect a
    6
    school board’s decision when choosing the principal of a large
    high school with numerous evening and weekend activites.   Bonner,
    however, failed to present any evidence that indicates this
    reason for not promoting him was a pretext for racial
    discrimination.
    Although the statistics Bonner presented show that the
    school board had hired more Caucasian principals than African
    American principals, and Bonner’s evaluations show that he was
    proficient at performing his past jobs, this evidence does not
    raise a question of fact about whether the school board’s reasons
    for not promoting Bonner were a pretext for discrimination.    To
    survive summary judgment, Bonner was required to show that the
    proffered reasons are either false or not worthy of credence, and
    that a discriminatory reason was more likely the true reason.
    But Bonner did not meet this burden.   Bonner has not shown that
    he was a better qualified applicant, or that the reasons given by
    the school board, such as support from the applicable school
    faculties and lack of outside responsibilities, were pretexts for
    racial discrimination.   While the statistics may show more
    Caucasians were hired in the past, the evidence also indicates
    that some of the positions did not even have an African American
    applicant.   Because Bonner failed to raise a question of fact
    about whether the school board’s reasons for not promoting him to
    the positions he sought, the district court properly entered
    summary judgment in favor of the school board.   For that reason,
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    this Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the district court.
    AFFIRMED.
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