United States v. Wyatt , 108 F. App'x 780 ( 2004 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-4959
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ANTWOYNE L. WYATT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (CR-03-173)
Submitted: July 23, 2004 Decided: September 3, 2004
Before TRAXLER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jessica M. Erickson, HUNTON & WILLIAMS, L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Michael J.
Elston, Stephen W. Miller, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Following a jury trial, Antwoyne L. Wyatt was convicted
of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000) (Count One), possession of cocaine base,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2000) (Count Two), possession of
a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000) (Count Three), and
possession of a firearm by an unlawful user of a controlled
substance, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (2000) (Count
Four). Count Two, a lesser included offense of Count One, was
merged with Count One for sentencing purposes. Wyatt received a
total sentence of 217 months in prison, consisting of 157 months on
Count One, a consecutive sixty months on Count Three, and a
concurrent 120 months on Count Four. Wyatt timely appeals,
claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions on Counts Three and Four. Finding no merit to his
claims, we affirm.
A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
“bears a heavy burden.” United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064,
1067 (4th Cir. 1997). “The verdict of a jury must be sustained if
there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to
the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 80 (1942). This court “ha[s] defined ‘substantial evidence,’
in the context of a criminal action, as that evidence which ‘a
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reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient
to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir.
2003) (quoting United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862-63 (4th
Cir. 1996) (en banc)). In evaluating the sufficiency of the
evidence, this court does not review the credibility of the
witnesses and assumes that the jury resolved all contradictions in
the testimony in favor of the government. United States v. Romer,
148 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1998). The court reviews both direct
and circumstantial evidence and permits “the government the benefit
of all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those sought
to be established.” United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021
(4th Cir. 1982).
As to Count Three, we conclude that the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to permit a reasonable fact
finder to conclude that Wyatt knowingly possessed the gun and that
Wyatt’s possession of the gun was “in furtherance” of a drug-
trafficking crime. See United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705
(4th Cir. 2002) (discussing the factors that might lead a jury to
conclude that there was a connection between a defendant’s
possession of a firearm and the defendant’s drug-trafficking
activity); id. at 706 (explaining that “[f]act finders are not
required to blind themselves to the unfortunate reality that drugs
and guns all too often go hand in hand. . . . Therefore, a fact
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finder is certainly entitled to come to the common-sense conclusion
that when someone has both drugs and a firearm on their person, the
gun is present to further drug trafficking.”).
As to Count Four, we conclude that the evidence was
sufficient to permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude that
Wyatt knowingly possessed the gun and that Wyatt was an “unlawful
user” of a controlled substance within the meaning of § 922(g)(3).
See United States v. Jackson, 280 F.3d 403 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding
that firearm possession and drug use need not be simultaneous to
support § 922(g)(3) conviction).
Accordingly, we affirm Wyatt’s convictions. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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