Estate of Bennett CA4/1 ( 2022 )


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  • Filed 10/17/22 Estate of Bennett CA4/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    Estate of LUCIA REYES BENNETT,
    Deceased.
    JOSEPHINE BENNETT,                                                   D078025
    Petitioner and Respondent,
    v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. 37-2017-
    00049047-PR-LA-CTL)
    MONICA BENNETT,
    Objector and Appellant.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
    Robert Longstreth, Judge. Affirmed.
    Monica A. Bennett, in pro. per., for Appellant.
    Josephine Bennett, in pro. per., for Respondent.
    INTRODUCTION
    Josephine Bennett and Monica Bennett are sisters engaged in litigation
    over the estate of their deceased mother, Lucia Reyes Bennett.1 Monica, an
    attorney herself, is self-represented. Wishing to take Monica’s deposition in
    advance of a mandatory settlement conference, Josephine served Monica with
    a notice of deposition. Monica did not respond. Josephine’s attorney reached
    out to Monica one week before the noticed deposition date and, only then, did
    Monica indicate that she intended to object to the notice. Monica filed a
    motion to quash the notice of deposition four days later. The motion was the
    first and only written notice of Monica’s objections received by Josephine or
    her counsel. The trial court denied Monica’s motion and awarded sanctions
    in the form of attorney fees to Josephine, based in part on Monica’s failure to
    adequately meet and confer before filing the motion to quash. Monica
    appeals the order awarding sanctions on several grounds, but none have
    merit. We affirm the order.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Josephine and Monica’s mother, Lucia, died in October 2016. Lucia
    was survived by six adult children, including Monica and Josephine. The
    majority of Lucia’s children believed she died intestate, but Monica claimed
    Lucia executed two holographic wills before her death, leaving her house to
    just three of the six children. Josephine filed a petition for probate in
    December 2017, and Monica filed a competing petition several months later,
    based on the alleged holographic wills.
    1     We refer to the members of the Bennett family by their first names to
    avoid confusion.
    2
    Josephine believed Monica had significant personal knowledge and
    access to documents relevant to the litigation. Monica lived with Lucia up
    until Lucia’s death, and continued to live in Lucia’s home after her death.
    Josephine began requesting Monica’s deposition as early as October 2019. 2
    That same month, the parties agreed a mandatory settlement conference
    (MSC) would be appropriate, and there was at least a possibility that the
    parties could reach a resolution. But, despite multiple requests, Monica
    never provided any potential dates for a deposition.
    On January 31, 2020, Josephine served Monica with a notice of
    deposition. The notice set Monica’s deposition for February 27, 2020, and
    included 30 requests for the production of documents. Monica did not
    respond, so Josephine’s attorney, Amanda McCarty, initiated a telephone call
    with her on February 20, one week before the deposition was scheduled to
    occur. According to McCarty, the call was brief and lacked substance.
    Monica stated, generally, that she did not believe she needed to sit for a
    deposition or produce any documents. There was “no discussion as to the
    individual document requests, other than [Monica] making broad statements
    that the documents could be obtained from other sources and [the notice] was
    burdensome upon her.” In a follow up email, dated February 24, McCarty
    asserted that Monica had not provided any justification for taking the
    deposition off calendar, and reiterated, “it is imperative that we obtain your
    testimony prior to the MSC set for early April.”
    Monica responded by filing a “motion to quash” the deposition notice
    and request for a protective order that same day. Monica asked the court to
    2    Monica was represented by counsel for a short period of time, including
    October 2019. Her counsel substituted out of the case on December 20, 2019,
    and Monica has been a self-represented litigant since.
    3
    vacate the deposition notice; to limit the method of future discovery requests
    to written interrogatories or demands for production, rather than oral
    deposition; and, to limit the scope of the deposition “to matters which are
    relevant to the pending will contest.” She also requested $5,000 in sanctions
    against Josephine for noticing the deposition and opposing the motion to
    quash. Although she had not previously provided written objections to the
    notice to Josephine’s counsel, Monica attached detailed objections to each of
    the 30 requests for production as an exhibit to her motion.
    Monica provided a short declaration in support of the motion, in which
    she asserted she had telephonically met and conferred with Josephine’s
    counsel on February 20, 2020, before filing the motion to quash. She stated
    further: “This deposition appears designed to harass responding party.
    Although there were six beneficiaries I have been informed by [Josephine’s
    counsel] that I am the only party in this case who is scheduled[d] for a
    deposition.” Monica did not provide a memorandum of points and authorities
    or any other detailed arguments in support of the motion or, more
    specifically, her request to vacate the deposition.
    McCarty asked if Monica was still willing to sit for the deposition,
    subject to the document objections. Monica declined. On February 28, 2020,
    Josephine filed an ex parte application to shorten time on the motion to
    quash or, in the alternative, to continue the MSC. Josephine asserted it was
    critical that Monica’s deposition occur before the MSC. The trial court held a
    hearing on the ex parte application on March 13. Monica objected to the
    court “mov[ing her] motion forward.” The trial court overruled the objection
    and issued the following ruling on the ex parte application: “1. To the extent
    that the motion to quash is addressed to oral testimony rather than
    4
    producing documents it is advanced to today and denied. [¶] 2. In all other
    respects the ex parte application is denied.”
    Less than a week later, the Governor issued stay-at-home orders due to
    the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, the probate court suspended all
    hearings. Monica never sat for a deposition. The probate court eventually
    rescheduled the hearing on Monica’s motion to quash, and Josephine filed an
    opposition. Josephine asserted Monica failed to reasonably meet and confer
    both before and after filing the motion, the motion did not comply with
    several local rules, and Monica failed to set forth an adequate factual or legal
    basis to support the motion or the request for sanctions.
    Rather, Josephine asked the trial court to impose sanctions on Monica,
    in the form of reasonable attorney fees and costs, pursuant to Code of Civil
    Procedure section 2023.010.3 Josephine argued sanctions were appropriate
    because Monica failed to respond to an authorized method of discovery, made
    evasive and unmeritorious objections without substantial justification, and
    failed to adequately meet and confer before filing her motion. McCarty
    provided a declaration detailing her hourly rate, the time she spent
    responding to the motion, and costs she incurred to secure a court reporter for
    the hearing on the motion.
    Monica filed a “reply declaration” on June 19, 2020, the day of the
    hearing. She asserted the hearing had been temporarily reset for July 3, but
    “moved back” to June 19 (because July 3 was a court holiday), and once again
    objected to the court “advanc[ing]” the hearing. Although the trial court did
    not “see much warrant” to continuing the hearing, it agreed to do so out of an
    3     All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
    Section 2023.010 sets forth a nonexclusive list of “[m]isuses of the discovery
    process” subject to sanctions.
    5
    abundance of caution. The court reset the hearing for July 10, but noted it
    was inclined to include any additional expenses incurred by Josephine as a
    result of the continuance in the sanctions award.
    Monica filed an “objection” to the trial court’s tentative ruling on July
    6, 2020, just four days before the scheduled hearing. Monica did not provide
    a declaration to support her “objection” but stated, in the objection papers,
    that she “did engage in a lengthy phone call” with Josephine’s counsel on
    February 20, in which counsel “declined to limit her written discovery
    requests so as to comply with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure
    2016.010 et seq.” (Some capitalization omitted.) Monica asserted she did
    discuss her objections to the discovery requests on the call, but Josephine’s
    counsel “was not open to negotiation.” In addition, Monica asserted she had a
    serious ongoing medical situation that precluded her from sitting for a
    deposition, and that an award of attorney fees would place “an unreasonable
    financial burden” on her. Josephine objected to the filing as procedurally
    improper and asked the trial court to disregard it.
    After hearing further argument from the parties, the trial court denied
    the motion to quash in its entirety and granted Josephine’s request for
    sanctions. The court noted both the “reply declaration” and the “objection” to
    the tentative ruling were filed late, but exercised its discretion to consider
    them anyway. The court found Monica’s objections to the document requests
    lacked merit, Monica failed to establish substantial justification for failing to
    respond to the discovery requests or for filing the motion to quash, and
    Monica failed to adequately meet and confer before filing the motion.
    Accordingly, the court awarded sanctions against Monica in the amount of
    $7,657.50, to compensate Josephine for the reasonable attorney fees and costs
    she incurred responding to the motion.
    6
    Monica timely appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in imposing
    sanctions against Monica. “We review the trial court’s order [imposing
    discovery sanctions] under the abuse of discretion standard and resolve all
    evidentiary conflicts most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. We will
    reverse only if the trial court’s order was arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical.
    It is appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error and where the
    evidence is in conflict, we will affirm the trial court’s findings.” (Williams v.
    Russ (2008) 
    167 Cal.App.4th 1215
    , 1224; accord Ellis v. Toshiba America
    Information Systems, Inc. (2013) 
    218 Cal.App.4th 853
    , 878 (Ellis) [appellant
    “has the burden to demonstrate that the trial court erred, and where the
    evidence is in conflict we will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings”].)
    We find no abuse of discretion in this case.
    A trial court “may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one
    engaging in the misuse of the discovery process . . . pay the reasonable
    expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that
    conduct.” (§ 2023.030, subd. (a).) Here, after denying Monica’s motion to
    quash, the trial court found Monica made “numerous meritless arguments”
    and failed to establish any reasonable justification for bringing the motion.
    Failing to respond or submit to an authorized method of discovery, making an
    unmeritorious objection without substantial justification, and making an
    unsuccessful motion to limit discovery without substantial justification are
    all misuses of the discovery process that subject a party to sanctions.
    (§ 2023.010, subds. (d), (e), (h).) The trial court’s finding that Monica filed an
    unmeritorious discovery motion without reasonable justification alone
    supported the imposition of sanction.
    7
    The trial court, however, also found Monica failed to adequately meet
    and confer before filing the unmeritorious motion. The failure to confer with
    the opposing party “in a reasonable and good faith attempt to resolve
    informally any dispute concerning discovery” prior to filing a motion is also a
    misuse of the discovery process that subjects a party to sanctions.
    (§ 2023.010, subd. (i); see also § 2025.420, subd. (a) [motion for protective
    order must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration].) In addition,
    pursuant to section 2030.010, “[n]otwithstanding the outcome of the
    particular discovery motion, the [trial] court shall impose a monetary
    sanction ordering that any party or attorney who fails to confer as required
    pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as
    a result of that conduct.” (§ 2023.020, italics added.) Thus, the trial court
    both properly exercised its discretion to impose sanctions for Monica’s various
    misuses of the discovery process, and was required to impose sanctions based
    on Monica’s failure to adequately meet and confer before filing her motion.
    (See Ellis, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 879 [section 2023.020 requires
    sanctions against a party that fails to meet and confer].)
    Monica asserts there was not substantial evidence to support the trial
    court’s finding that she failed to adequately meet and confer before filing the
    motion to quash. (See Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 
    67 Cal.App.4th 424
    ,
    430−431 (Obregon) [holding factual determinations underlying the imposition
    of sanctions are subject to the substantial evidence standard of review but
    “[a] determination of whether an attempt at informal resolution is adequate
    also involves the exercise of discretion”].) We disagree. In her initial filings,
    Monica relied solely on the February 20 telephone call to assert she fulfilled
    8
    the requirement to meet and confer.4 But she provided limited details
    regarding the nature and substance of the call. She simply averred, “we
    discussed my objections” but “McCarty was firm in her intention to proceed
    with the deposition on the scheduled date and covering the noticed Demand
    for Production.”
    By contrast, McCarty, in her own declaration, described the telephone
    call as “brief” and lacking in substance.5 She explained that Monica did not
    discuss any individual document request. Instead, Monica stated, generally,
    that she did not believe she needed to sit for a deposition or produce any
    documents. McCarty also attached a copy of a confirming email she sent to
    Monica on February 24, 2020. In the email, McCarty noted Monica had
    “highlighted objections [she] may have about certain document requests,” and
    asserted any “objection to a particular document request” could be put on the
    record, but was not a reason to take the deposition off calendar. (Italics
    added.) Monica responded to the email by serving McCarty with a copy of the
    motion to quash, and asserting the motion automatically stayed the
    deposition.
    Weighing the evidence, as it was entitled to, the trial court concluded
    the single telephone call, initiated by opposing counsel, was not adequate to
    4    In her briefing on appeal, Monica asserts she “did email Amanda
    McCarty to inform her that she intended to file the motion and that they
    needed to meet and confer.” Monica provides no citation to the record to
    support her assertion, and the record itself contains no such email.
    5      Monica asserts McCarty averred, in support of her request for attorney
    fees, that she spent 1.5 hours meeting and conferring with Monica, but the
    declaration actually states McCarty “spent at least 1.5 hours trying to meet
    and confer with M[onica] about the instant motion and the issues underlying
    the motion.” (Italics added.)
    9
    fulfill the requirement of a reasonable and good faith attempt to informally
    resolve the discovery dispute. (See Ellis, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 880
    [“ ‘ “[A] reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails
    something more than bickering with [opposing] counsel. . . . Rather, the law
    requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views,
    consult, and deliberate.” ’ ”]; Obregon, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 430−431
    [trial court’s weighing of credibility and perception of inherently factual
    matters “must not be lightly disturbed”].) McCarty’s declaration, alone, is
    sufficient support for the trial court’s finding.
    Relying on Obregon, Monica asserts the adequacy of a party’s attempts
    to meet and confer depends on the circumstances of the individual case and,
    here, contrary to the trial court’s finding, the single telephone call was
    sufficient. (Obregon, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 431.) But, as Monica herself
    concedes, the issue in Obregon was whether an exchange of written letters
    addressing the adequacy of responses to specific discovery requests was
    sufficient to fulfill the pre-filing meet and confer requirement. (Id. at
    pp. 432−433.) The court noted, “[a] single letter, followed by a response which
    refuses concessions, might in some instances be an adequate attempt at
    informal resolution,” but ultimately concluded, under the specific
    circumstances of the case, “the trial judge’s decision that a greater effort at
    informal resolution should have been made [was] amply supported by [the]
    record.” (Ibid.) Similarly, here, the trial court’s finding that Monica did not
    make an adequate effort at informal resolution prior to filing her motion is
    amply supported by the record, and we see no reason to disturb it on appeal.
    Monica’s remaining arguments are equally unavailing. Monica asserts
    the trial court improperly “admonished” her for failing to appear for the
    noticed deposition on February 27, 2020. But it is apparent from the record
    10
    that the trial court did not consider Monica’s failure to appear for the
    deposition in awarding sanctions against her. At the July 10 hearing, the
    court explained: “I don’t understand this motion to have anything to do about
    your failure to appear for a deposition. That’s not at issue. That had been
    ruled on, and I had denied the protective order in that respect, and, you
    know, then we moved on to deal with the document request, and, you know,
    that’s what has brought us . . . here.” Thus, any statements the court
    happened to make about the deposition were not relevant to its decision to
    impose sanctions, the sole issue on appeal.
    Next, Monica asserts the trial court did not have jurisdiction to rule on
    the ex parte request because it improperly advanced the previously set date
    for her motion to quash. She argues that any “orders which are traced to the
    [court’s ruling on the ex parte application], as well as the resulting sanctions,
    should be reversed.” But, as we have just explained, the trial court’s decision
    to impose sanctions was separate from its prior ruling on the ex parte
    application. Thus, the sanctions ruling cannot be “traced” to the prior
    ruling.6 Regardless, Monica has not established that the trial court erred by
    advancing the motion. She cites a San Diego Superior Court, Division IV,
    Probate Local Rule, rule 4.4.2, which states, “[u]nless otherwise ordered by the
    court, when a hearing on a probate matter has been noticed . . . the matter
    cannot be heard before the date set, either by means of a new petition, an
    amended petition, or by a new notice.” (Italics added.) Here, the trial court
    6     We note as well that Monica did not appeal from the trial court’s
    February 28, 2020 ex parte ruling, nor could she have, as the ruling was not
    independently appealable. (See Doe v. United States Swimming, Inc. (2011)
    
    200 Cal.App.4th 1424
    , 1432−1433 [concluding discovery orders are not
    independently appealable and limiting an appeal from an order imposing
    sanctions to the propriety of the sanctions].)
    11
    had good reason to hear the separate ex parte application in advance of the
    date originally set for Monica’s motion. The deposition was critical to the
    upcoming MSC. Monica had already filed her papers on the motion to quash,
    and had an opportunity to respond to the ex parte application, both in writing
    and at the hearing. She presents no evidence or argument establishing she
    was prejudiced by the court’s ruling, and there does not appear to be any
    violation of the local rule.
    Next, Monica asserts the trial court erred by failing to consider the
    impact of certain emergency orders related to the COVID-19 pandemic on her
    ability to comply with the notice of deposition. As we have just explained, the
    imposition of sanctions was not tied to Monica’s failure to sit for the
    deposition. And Monica does not demonstrate how the emergency orders
    impacted her ability to respond to the requests for production. She asserts,
    without evidentiary support, that the orders impaired her ability to locate or
    procure documents from the actual holders of information. But she does not
    explain how the orders prevented her from producing relevant documents
    that were already in her own possession, or, more specifically, in Lucia’s
    home, where she continued to live. Regardless, Monica filed her motion,
    refusing to produce any documents, and without adequate attempts to
    informally resolve the dispute, on February 24, 2020, before the emergency
    orders went into effect.
    Monica similarly asserts the pandemic and her own personal medical
    issues provided “substantial justification” for her non-compliance with the
    discovery requests and the pre-filing meet and confer requirement. This
    argument fails for the same reasons. Most notably, Monica does not explain
    how either the pandemic or her own medical issues precluded her from
    meeting and conferring with opposing counsel before filing her
    12
    motion. Again, the stay-at-home orders were put into place only after Monica
    filed her motion to quash. Monica included detailed objections to the
    individual requests for production in the motion and provides no explanation
    as to why she could not have provided those same objections to opposing
    counsel for discussion before filing the motion.
    Finally, Monica asserts the amount of the sanctions award was “unjust”
    and unreasonable. We disagree. The trial court’s award was based on
    McCarty’s sworn declaration, in which she set forth her hourly rate, the time
    she spent responding to the motion to quash, and the costs incurred in
    providing a court reporter for the hearings on the motion. (See Argaman v.
    Ratan (1999) 
    73 Cal.App.4th 1173
    , 1179 [monetary discovery sanction may be
    based on reasonable attorney fees and expenses incurred by the opposing
    party].) Monica simply asserts “[t]his claimed time was excessive,” but the
    trial court, familiar with the proceedings, rejected those same arguments.
    The court noted Monica herself requested $5,000 in sanctions for responding
    to the deposition notice, and concluded McCarty’s claimed hours were
    reasonable. Monica fails to explain why we should reach a different
    conclusion on appeal.
    Still, Monica asserts, even if the fees were reasonable, the award was
    “unjust” because it presents an unreasonable financial hardship to her. The
    trial court considered and rejected this argument as well. Monica asserted,
    in her objection to the court’s tentative ruling, “per my Court confidential
    financial filings” that the requested sanctions “would place an unreasonable
    financial burden on me, such that imposition of sanctions in this sum would
    13
    be unjust per [section] 2025.450[, subdivision] (g)(2).”7 But, the trial court
    explained, “Monica does not identify these filings, nor does she provide any
    documentation to support this assertion.” It continued, “Monica is also a
    licensed attorney, and she has made numerous meritless arguments and
    failed to follow the proper procedures regarding this discovery dispute.” The
    court concluded, “Monica has failed to carry her burden in showing that
    sanctions would be unjust.”
    On appeal, Monica asserts she asked the trial court “to consider the
    fact that she was proceeding under a fee waiver to mitigate the amount of the
    sanctions which were ordered.” But we see no mention of the fee waiver in
    the trial court record. (See Ochoa v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1998) 
    61 Cal.App.4th 1480
    , 1488, fn. 3 [reviewing court need not address arguments
    not raised in the trial court or developed on appeal].) And Monica presents
    no authority to support her assertion that a party is not subject to sanctions
    for misuses of the discovery processes simply because they have a fee waiver
    on file.
    Monica relies primarily on cases in which the courts have waived court
    issued fees, or precluded courts from requiring parties to pay private referee
    fees, to facilitate indigent access to the judicial process. (See, e.g., McDonald
    v. Superior Court (1994) 
    22 Cal.App.4th 364
     [trial court abused its discretion
    by delegating discovery matters to a private referee without considering
    economic hardship imposed on parties as a result]; Solorzano v. Superior
    7     Section 2025.450, subdivision (g)(2), provides “the court shall impose a
    monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) . . .
    unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with
    substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of
    the sanction unjust.”
    14
    Court (1993) 
    18 Cal.App.4th 603
    , 614−615 [same]; Martin v. Superior Court
    (1917) 
    176 Cal. 289
     [confirming the right to bring a civil action in forma
    pauperis]; Majors v. Superior Court (1919) 
    181 Cal. 270
    , 279 [directing trial
    court to waive juror fees for plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis]; Bank of
    America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn. v. Superior Court (1967) 
    255 Cal.App.2d 575
    , 577 [trial court has authority to waive security fees for in forma pauperis
    plaintiff].) These cases do not address sanctions intended to compensate one
    party for the expenses they were forced to incur as a result of the other
    party’s misuse of the litigation process without justification, like the
    sanctions issued here. (See County of Sutter v. Superior Court (1966) 
    244 Cal.App.2d 770
    , 772 [“The poor litigant’s fees are one matter, the opposite
    party’s costs another. To relieve an indigent plaintiff of public exactions is
    quite different than permitting him to conduct a lawsuit at the possible
    expense of his adversary.”]; Solorzano, at p. 616 [noting discovery sanctions
    could be used to combat discovery abuses by any party, including indigent
    plaintiffs].) As the trial court noted, Monica, a licensed attorney, made the
    choice to file the unmeritorious motion to quash without following the proper
    procedures. Requiring her to compensate the opposing party for having to
    respond does not in any way impair her access to the judicial process.
    Monica further asserts that imposing “sanctions without evaluating the
    parties’ relative incomes challenges constitutional protections against
    [e]xcessive fines.” Again, Monica provides no authority to support the
    assertion. At most, Monica provides a single citation to People v. Dueñas
    (2019) 
    30 Cal.App.5th 1157
    , which deals with a defendant’s ability to pay
    criminal fines and fees. Dueñas is in no way applicable to civil sanctions.
    Monica also points out that other statutes, such as Family Code section 270,
    expressly require the trial court to consider the relative income of the parties
    15
    when imposing sanctions. Had the Legislature wished to include such a
    provision in the statutes governing discovery sanctions, it certainly had the
    ability to do so. It did not. Regardless, Monica presented no evidence, in the
    trial court or on appeal, of Josephine’s financial position relative to her own.
    Thus, neither court had the ability to assess the relative incomes of the
    parties, even if it were relevant.8
    DISPOSITION
    The order is affirmed. Josephine Bennett is awarded her costs on
    appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)
    DO, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
    DATO, J.
    8      Josephine asks this court to impose additional sanctions on Monica
    pursuant to section 907, which permits such additional sanctions when it
    appears the appeal is “frivolous or taken solely for delay.” (§ 907.) We
    decline to do so. Josephine does not develop the argument, and, while we
    conclude Josephine’s arguments lack merit, we are not convinced the appeal
    is frivolous or taken solely for the purpose of delay.
    16
    

Document Info

Docket Number: D078025

Filed Date: 10/17/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/17/2022