United States v. Williams , 138 F. App'x 553 ( 2005 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4801
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RICHARD LYNN WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees,
District Judge. (CR-01-12)
Submitted: June 17, 2005 Decided: July 8, 2005
Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., RUDOLF, WIDENHOUSE & FIALKO, Chapel
Hill, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert,
United States Attorney, D. Scott Broyles, Assistant United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Richard Lynn Williams appeals his conviction and sentence
for conspiracy to manufacture over 500 grams of methamphetamine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846, 851 (2000), possession with
intent to distribute over fifty grams of methamphetamine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 851, and using and carrying a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2000). We affirm.
Williams argues his guilty plea was not knowing and
voluntary as to the firearm count because the district court did
not adequately explain that the firearm must have been used or
carried in relation to a drug trafficking crime. He also contends
the firearm count was not adequately supported by a factual basis.
Because Williams did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea in the
district court, we review these issues for plain error. See United
States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 527 (4th Cir. 2002).
Before accepting a guilty plea, a trial court, through
colloquy with the defendant, must inform the defendant of, and
determine that he understands, the nature of the charge(s) to which
the plea is offered. Id. at 530. A judge has wide discretion in
deciding how to ensure the defendant’s understanding. Id. We have
reviewed the record and conclude the district court did not
contravene Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b) in explaining the firearm charge
to Williams.
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Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must
also determine that there is a factual basis for the plea. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(b)(3). This “ensures that the court make clear exactly
what a defendant admits to, and whether those admissions are
factually sufficient to constitute the alleged crime.” United
States v. Defusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991). The court
“may conclude that a factual basis exists from anything that
appears on the record.” Id. Our review of the record reveals that
the district court did not unreasonably determine that there was a
sufficient factual basis for the charge. We therefore affirm
Williams’s conviction.
Williams next challenges his sentence, asserting it
violates the rule announced in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct.
738 (2005). We conclude, however, that because Williams was
sentenced to the statutory minimums for two counts of conviction,
and received a concurrent sentence on the third count that did not
exceed the sentence to which it was tied, Williams can show no
prejudicial error. See United States v. Ellis, 326 F.3d 593, 599-
600 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 907 (2003). Accordingly, we
affirm Williams’s sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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