United States v. Jackson , 166 F. App'x 54 ( 2006 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 04-5061
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    RONALD SAMUEL JACKSON, a/k/a Young,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg. James C. Turk, Senior
    District Judge. (CR-03-93)
    Submitted:   January 4, 2006                 Decided:   February 7, 2006
    Before WIDENER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Marc Seguinot, THE HELEIN LAW GROUP, L.L.P., McLean, Virginia, for
    Appellant. John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney, William F.
    Gould, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    Ronald Jackson appeals his jury conviction and sentence for
    one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with the
    intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base (crack),
    
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (b)(1)(A) and 846.         The district court sentenced
    Jackson to 240 months’ imprisonment.        On appeal, Jackson presses
    several claims.     After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm
    Jackson’s conviction and sentence.
    Jackson first claims that the district court erroneously
    allowed the government to strike the only African-American juror in
    violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 
    476 U.S. 79
     (1986).               Great
    deference is given to a district court’s determination of whether
    a peremptory challenge was based on a discriminatory motive and the
    court’s ruling is reviewed for clear error.        Jones v. Plaster, 
    57 F.3d 417
    , 421 (4th Cir. 1995).         Generally, a Batson challenge
    consists of three steps: (1) the defendant makes a prima facie
    showing; (2) the government offers a race-neutral explanation; and
    (3) the district court decides whether the defendant has carried
    his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.        United States v.
    Barnette, 
    211 F.3d 803
    , 812 (4th Cir. 2000).        “Once a prosecutor
    has   offered   a   race-neutral    explanation   for   the   peremptory
    challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question
    of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the
    defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.”        Hernandez
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    v. New York, 
    500 U.S. 352
    , 359 (1991) (plurality opinion).                  “At
    this step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the
    prosecutor’s     explanation.        Unless   a   discriminatory   intent   is
    inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will
    be deemed race neutral.”        
    Id. at 360
    .
    The government’s proffered explanation was that it struck the
    juror in question because: (1) “she did not answer any questions
    [during voir dire]”; (2) she told the clerk that she was “single,
    but yet she [gave] a spouse’s occupation”; (3) she was “older”; and
    (4) she did not appear to be “following what was going on.”             (J.A.
    115).    The government’s explanation unquestionably satisfies the
    second   step.      Indeed,    the    district    court   expressed   similar
    reservations concerning the struck juror when it commented that it
    “wondered, too, a little bit, whether or not she followed the
    questions or whatnot.”        (J.A. 117).
    Turning to the third step in the inquiry, we review only for
    clear error the district court’s finding that Jackson failed to
    carry his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.             Jones, 
    57 F.3d at 421
    .     Jackson offered no meaningful evidence in support of
    his conclusory allegations of racial motivation.               Based on our
    review of the record in this case, the district court did not
    clearly err in denying Jackson’s Batson motion.
    Jackson next claims that there is insufficient evidence in the
    record to support his conspiracy conviction. The jury’s verdict in
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    this case must be sustained if there is substantial evidence,
    taking the view most favorable to the government, to support it.
    Glasser v. United States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80 (1942).         “[S]ubstantial
    evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept
    as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
    guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Burgos, 
    94 F.3d 849
    , 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).         In evaluating the sufficiency
    of the evidence, this court does not review the credibility of the
    witnesses and assumes that the jury resolved contradictions in
    testimony in favor of the government.         United States v. Romer, 
    148 F.3d 359
    , 364 (4th Cir. 1998).         “To prove a conspiracy under 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    , the government must prove (1) an agreement between
    two or more persons to engage in conduct that violates a federal
    drug law, (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the conspiracy, and (3)
    the   defendant’s   knowing   and    voluntary    participation    in   the
    conspiracy.”   United States v. Strickland, 
    245 F.3d 368
    , 384-85
    (4th Cir. 2001).
    After thoroughly reviewing the record, we find the evidence
    sufficient to support Jackson’s conspiracy conviction.            Multiple
    witnesses testified that Jackson participated in a conspiracy to
    distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute fifty or
    more grams of crack.     One of the witnesses testified concerning
    Jackson’s role in a controlled buy that led to both of their
    arrests.   Moreover, a law enforcement officer testified that he
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    witnessed the controlled buy and recovered money used in the
    controlled buy from Jackson after his arrest.               The record also
    contains evidence demonstrating that Jackson disposed of an item
    upon his arrest that contained a large amount of crack.              This item
    tested positive for crack and weighed over fifty grams.
    Finally, relying on Section 4A1.3(b) of the United States
    Sentencing Guidelines (USSG), Jackson argues that his criminal
    history,     which     included     a    prior   drug    felony    conviction,
    substantially over-represented the seriousness of his criminal
    history and, therefore, the district court should have found his
    criminal history category to be II instead of III.                Any error in
    this regard is harmless because Jackson was sentenced to the
    statutory minimum sentence of twenty years pursuant to 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A). See USSG § 5G1.1(b) (“Where a statutorily required
    minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable
    guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be
    the   guideline      sentence.”).        Consequently,   Jackson’s    criminal
    history category has no bearing on the appropriateness of his
    sentence.*
    *
    On November 10, 2005, Jackson filed a motion for leave to
    file a supplemental brief. On November 28, 2005, Jackson filed,
    pro se, a series of materials which we construe as a motion for
    leave to file a pro se supplemental brief. The court grants both
    of these motions. After reviewing the motions, we conclude that
    all of the arguments raised therein are without merit.
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    For the reasons stated herein, we affirm Jackson’s conviction
    and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
    the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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