Chrisner v. Astrue , 249 F. App'x 354 ( 2007 )


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  •            IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    October 2, 2007
    No. 07-50358                     Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Summary Calendar                           Clerk
    MICHELLE CHRISNER
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security
    Defendant-Appellee
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    1:06-CV-00476
    Before WIENER, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Plaintiff-Appellant, Michelle R. Chrisner, appeals the decision of the
    United States Magistrate Judge which affirmed the decision of the
    Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) that
    Chrisner is not entitled to Social Security Disability (“SSD”) benefits or
    Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits. We affirm.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 07-50358
    Chrisner injured her left arm. She applied for SSD and SSI benefits,
    claiming the injury prevented her from working. Her application was denied as
    was her petition for reconsideration. After a hearing, the Administrative Law
    Judge (“ALJ”) determined that Chrisner was not entitled to benefits. The
    Appeals Council denied her request for review. The ALJ’s decision thus became
    the final decision of the Commissioner. Chrisner appeals.
    On appeal, Chrisner raises three arguments. Chrisner contends that (1)
    the ALJ’s conclusion is not supported by the evidence, (2) the ALJ did not
    properly consider the opinions of the treating and examining doctors, and (3) the
    ALJ did not evaluate the credibility of her testimony properly.
    Our review of the final decision of the Commissioner is limited to two
    questions: “(1) whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the
    decision; and (2) whether the decision comports with relevant legal standards.”
    Brock v. Chater, 
    84 F.3d 726
    , 728 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). “We may
    neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of [the
    Commissioner or the ALJ].” Villa v. Sullivan, 
    895 F.2d 1019
    , 1021-22 (5th Cir.
    1990).
    To determine whether a disability exists, the ALJ must weigh the
    following elements of proof: “(1) objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses and
    opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) the claimant’s subjective
    evidence of pain and disability; and (4) the claimant’s age, education, and work
    history.” Wren v. Sullivan, 
    925 F.2d 123
    , 126 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing De Paepe v.
    Richardson, 
    464 F.2d 92
    , 94 (5th Cir. 1972). The ALJ noted his obligation to
    consider these elements and then properly (and extensively) considered them.
    The ALJ found that Chrisner had a severe impairment, but concluded that the
    evidence of record did not substantiate the degree of pain and functional
    limitation she alleged. In reaching his decision, the ALJ relied on evidence,
    including but not limited to Dr. Mittal’s conclusion that Chrisner had only minor
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    No. 07-50358
    exertional limitations and Chrisner’s testimony that she regularly performed
    certain household chores and treated her symptoms for years with nothing more
    than Ibuprofen. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion
    that Chrisner does not have a qualifying disability.
    Chrisner also claims that the ALJ should have given greater weight to the
    opinion of her chiropractor. Chrisner overlooks Griego v. Sullivan, 
    940 F.2d 942
    ,
    945 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that “the relevant regulations accord less weight to
    chiropractors than to medical doctors.”). Chrisner also claims that the ALJ
    disregarded the opinions of the examining doctors. The record contradicts this
    assertion; the ALJ specifically adopted Dr. Mittal’s findings. The ALJ properly
    considered the opinions of the treating and examining doctors and accorded
    them the proper weight.
    The final issue is whether the ALJ properly evaluated the credibility of
    Chrisner’s testimony. The ALJ may determine credibility and weigh testimony.
    Greenspan v. Shalala, 
    38 F.3d 232
    , 237 (5th Cir. 1994). We accord great
    deference to the ALJ’s credibility determination. Newton v. Apfel, 
    209 F.3d 448
    ,
    459 (5th Cir. 2000). The ALJ considered Chrisner’s testimony concerning her
    pain and functional limitations but held that the evidence of record refuted their
    alleged severity. The ALJ’s credibility determination was within his authority
    and supported by substantial evidence.
    For the above reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the Magistrate Judge.
    3