Franz A. Wakefield v. Cordis Corporation , 211 F. App'x 834 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 20, 2006
No. 06-13043 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-23285-CV-CMA
FRANZ A. WAKEFIELD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CORDIS CORPORATION,
A Johnson & Johnson Co.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(November 20, 2006)
Before BIRCH, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Franz A. Wakefield, proceeding pro se, appeals the denial of his motion for
reconsideration following the dismissal of his Title VII action against his
employer, Cordis Corporation (Cordis”). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Wakefield was employed as an engineer by Cordis until March 11, 2002,
about two years after he graduated from college. On March 7, 2003, Wakefield
filed a complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”) that
Cordis discriminated against him on account of race. On January 6, 2004, the
FCHR determined that it did not have jurisdiction over Wakefield’s complaint
because Wakefield had signed a separation agreement that released all claims
against Cordis. Wakefield appealed to an administrative law judge who dismissed
Wakefield’s complaint on May 12, 2004. Wakefield then appealed this
determination through the Florida court system and on May 26, 2005, the Florida
Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of mandamus to reinstate his
complaint.
On December 22, 2005, Wakefield filed this action in the district court and
complained of racial discrimination. Wakefield requested over one billion dollars
in damages. He alleged that Cordis created a hostile work environment on account
of his race and retaliated against him because he complained internally. Wakefield
alleged numerous acts on the part of Cordis, including filing patent applications for
2
two of his inventions without giving him credit.
Cordis moved to dismiss the complaint based on the statute of limitations
and Wakefield’s failure to obtain a “right-to-sue” letter from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The district court treated the
motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and ordered Wakefield to
produce a “right-to-sue” letter. Wakefield argued that the determination of the
FCHR that it lacked jurisdiction over his complaint constituted a “right-to-sue”
letter. The district court granted summary judgment for Cordis on the ground that,
even if the FCHR determination constituted a “right-to-sue” letter, Wakefield filed
his federal complaint more than 90 days after this determination issued. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
Wakefield filed a motion for reconsideration and alleged that his failure to
bring his action in a timely fashion was the fault of Cordis, the FCHR, and the
EEOC. The district court construed Wakefield’s motion as a request for equitable
tolling. The district court determined that Wakefield did not meet the requirements
for the extraordinary remedy of equitable tolling and denied the motion for
reconsideration.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion.
3
Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113, 1121 (11th Cir. 2004).
III. DISCUSSION
Wakefield makes two arguments that the district court abused its discretion
in denying his motion for reconsideration. First, Wakefield argues he is entitled to
equitable tolling of the 300-day period to request a “right-to-sue” letter from the
EEOC. Second, Wakefield argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the 90-
day period he had to file suit after receiving a “right-to-sue” letter. Wakefield
argues that he should be granted equitable tolling because (1) he did not discover
Cordis’s alleged discriminatory appropriation of his patents until April and
November of 2004; (2) the FCHR gave him inadequate notice of his rights and did
not dual-file his charge with the EEOC; and (3) he was litigating in Florida state
court. These arguments fail.
“[T]he statutory time limits applicable to lawsuits against private employers
under Title VII are subject to equitable tolling.” Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans
Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) (footnote omitted). “Under equitable tolling, Title
VII’s statute of limitations period does not start to run until a plaintiff knew or
reasonably should have known that [he] was discriminated against.” Carter v.
West Publ’g Co., 225 F.3d 1258, 1265 (2000). The plaintiff must establish that
tolling is warranted because equitable tolling “is an extraordinary remedy which
4
should be extended only sparingly.” Bost v. Federal Express Corp., 372 F.3d
1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). “Equitable tolling is appropriate
when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both
beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence.” Sandvik v. United
States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999).
Wakefield fails to establish that the 300-day period should be tolled.
Because Florida is a deferral state that prohibits discriminatory employment
practices under state law, see E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265,
1271 (11th Cir. 2002), a claimant must file an employment discrimination charge
with the EEOC within 300 days of the last discriminatory act. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(e)(1). Wakefield waited more than 300 days after he left Cordis to file a
complaint with the FCHR, so Wakefield’s 300-day window closed before he ever
began to litigate in state court. After that point, Wakefield could not have filed a
charge with the EEOC and anything that the FCHR may have suggested to the
contrary is irrelevant.
Wakefield says that he learned of the patent “misappropriations” more than a
year before he filed this action in federal court. Assuming without deciding that
Wakefield could have sought a “right-to-sue” letter based on these newly-
discovered alleged discriminatory acts, he had ample time. No act of the FCHR or
5
of Cordis prevented Wakefield from requesting a “right-to-sue” letter within 300
days.
Wakefield’s argument that the 90-day period for filing his complaint, after
receipt of a “right-to-sue” letter, should be tolled also fails. An employee must file
a Title VII complaint within 90 days of exhausting his administrative remedies and
after receipt of a “right-to-sue” letter from the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(1); Green v. Union Foundry Co., 281 F.3d 1229, 1233-34 (11th Cir. 2002).
The employee’s right to sue “is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation
which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.”
Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004)
(quotation omitted). Because allegations of discriminatory acts not encompassed
by an EEOC charge require a new “right-to-sue” letter, see id. at 1279-80,
Wakefield’s discovery of the patents in 2004 does not help his equitable tolling
argument. The Notice of Determination of the FCHR, which the district court
assumed, arguendo, functioned as Wakefield’s “right-to-sue” letter, arose from
Wakefield’s discrimination complaint with the FCHR in March of 2003, before the
patent applications were granted. Even if we were to assume that Wakefield had a
right to sue, his allegations concerning the patents would be outside the scope of
this right to sue. See Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1279-80. As a result, the alleged patent
6
“thefts” do not support equitable tolling of Wakefield’s Title VII claim.
There is no evidence that the FCHR or the EEOC did anything to discourage
Wakefield from bringing a prompt suit in federal court after he received the
purported “right-to-sue” letter. The Notice of Determination stated that
Wakefield’s discrimination claim was denied because of the existence of his
settlement agreement, outlined the procedures to seek review of the order, and
suggested that Wakefield seek legal counsel. That Wakefield sought review of the
Notice of Determination in Florida state court instead of filing a complaint under
Title VII in federal court does not give him grounds for equitable tolling.
We are mindful that “procedural requirements established by Congress for
gaining access to the federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of a
vague sympathy for particular litigants.” Baldwin County Welcome Center v.
Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984). Wakefield failed to act with due diligence and
file his action with the EEOC within the 300-day statute of limitations or file his
federal claim within 90 days of any purported “right-to-sue” letter. The district
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wakefield’s motion for
reconsideration.
IV. CONCLUSION
The denial of Wakefield’s motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED.
7