Roderick Isaac v. James E. Donald , 211 F. App'x 859 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
-------------------------------------------U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 06-12129 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DEC 14, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar
-------------------------------------------- THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 04-00172-CV-RWS-2
RODERICK ISAAC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JAMES E. DONALD, in his official
capacity as Commissioner of Georgia
Department of Corrections,
Defendant,
SGT. NIX, in his official and individual
capacity as the Warden of the Hall County
Correctional Institute,
JOHN DOE, No. 1, in his official and individual
capacity as the Physician for Hall County Correctional
Institute,
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER AND JOHN DOE,
No. 3, in his official Capacity as the “Detail Officer”
for Hall County Correctional Institute,
JANE DOE, in her official capacity and Individual
Capacity as the Counselor for Hall County Correctional Institute,
DOE, No. 4, No. 5, No. 6 in their Official Capacity as the
Classification Committee for Hall County Correctional Institute,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
---------------------------------------
(December 14, 2006)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, ANDERSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Roderick Isaac, a prisoner of the State of Georgia,
appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Warden
Nix, who was named in his individual capacity and his official capacity as Warden
of the Hall County Correctional Institute, in Plaintiff’s action filed under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
Plaintiff’s section 1983 suit asserts that he was forced to work under
conditions that were medically contraindicated in violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights. According to Plaintiff, he suffered a stroke on 26 September
2002, while performing manual labor in the hot sun despite Plaintiff’s claim that
he earlier informed prison officials that his medical condition precluded such
work. Plaintiff was hospitalized for three days; he claims to have suffered
permanent damage from the stroke.
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Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance concerning his work detail and
injuries on 7 April 2004, more than one and one-half years after the events
occurred giving rise to his claim. The grievance procedures applicable to
Plaintiff’s claim required that a grievance be filed within five business days from
the date the inmate discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the incident
giving rise to the complaint; the grievance form required an inmate to explain the
reasons for delay when a grievance is filed outside the five-day period. Plaintiff
explained that his grievance was not filed within the five-day limit because he had
“been in the hospital. Medical is unsuccessful in restoring my eyesight.”
Plaintiff’s grievance was denied because it was filed well beyond the allowable
time with insufficient explanation for the delay.
Plaintiff appealed the denial of his grievance; he offered no further
explanation for the delay. Instead, Plaintiff opined that “due process mandates
that when a person suffers a chronic, lifelong injury, he may file an action at
anytime.” According to Plaintiff’s grievance appeal form, “courts have ‘ample’
discretion’ to forego exhaustion of a (state grievance procedure) if you miss
grievance deadlines.” Plaintiff’s appeal was denied; he filed a complaint in
federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the district court concluded that
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Plaintiff failed to show good cause necessary to excuse his untimely filing. We
agree.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) requires that a prisoner
exhaust all available administrative remedies before a suit challenging prison
conditions may be brought. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). As the Supreme Court has
observed, an invigorated exhaustion requirement is a centerpiece of the PLRA’s
effort to reign in the quantity of prisoner suits. Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378,
2382 (2006) (holding that proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is
necessary under section 1997e(a)). Exhaustion is left to the discretion of neither
the complaining prisoner nor the district court; exhaustion is mandatory. See id.;
Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1155 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
2978 (2006). A district court’s decision that a prisoner failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies under section 1997e(a) of the PLRA is subject to de novo
review. Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th Cir. 2000).
The PLRA sets out this exhaustion requirement:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other
Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
4
That Plaintiff failed to file timely his administrative grievance under the
Georgia Department of Corrections grievance procedure is undisputed. That
Plaintiff offered the Georgia Department of Corrections no sufficient good cause
for his 18-month delay is also clear. Plaintiff’s three days’ of hospitalization
provides no explanation; and while Plaintiff mentioned that medical had not been
successful in restoring his eyesight, his explanation suggests no inability to file
because of a visual impairment. When faced with the denial of his grievance
based on his failure to file timely, Plaintiff offered no further explanation in his
administrative appeal that would show good cause for the delay. Instead, Plaintiff
appears to believe that his tardiness is offset by the gravity of his claimed injury.
Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies in a timely way; and he failed to
provide prison officials with reason to excuse his delay.
Plaintiff advanced an additional reason for his delay before the district court
-- prison officials denied Plaintiff grievance forms -- a reason that was not offered
prison officials. The district court concluded that the record showed that Plaintiff
was provided with a grievance form at least fourteen months before he filed the
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grievance under review. And now on appeal, Plaintiff argues that his memory
after the stroke was so impaired he could not earlier file his grievance.1
Explanations for the delay that are not first proffered by the prisoner to the
administrative body appropriately are not to be considered in a section 1983 suit.
As we have said, section 1997e(a) “require[s] that a prisoner provide with his
grievance all relevant information reasonably available to him.” Brown, 212 F.3d
at 1208.
First, exhaustion protects administrative agency
authority. Exhaustion gives an agency an opportunity to
correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it
administers before it is haled into federal court, and it
discourages disregard of [the agency’s] procedures.
Second, exhaustion promotes efficiency. Claims
generally can be resolved much more quickly and
economically in proceedings before an agency than in
litigation in federal court. ... And even where a
controversy survives administrative review, exhaustion
of the administrative procedure may produce a useful
record for subsequent judicial consideration.
Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2385 (internal quotes and citations omitted)(alteration in
original). These important purposes served by the exhaustion doctrine would be
1
Before the district court, Plaintiff made references to his diminished mental acuity, but such
references did not state clearly that Plaintiff was incapable of earlier filing a grievance and,
reasonably, were not so understood by the district court.
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undermined by judicial consideration of matters which could have been --but were
not -- presented to prison officials.
Summary judgment was due to be granted against Plaintiff’s claim; suit
under section 1983 is barred by section 1997e(a).2
AFFIRMED.
2
We note that Plaintiff’s claimed memory incapacity is short on record citations. Although
Plaintiff cites to his own deposition, that deposition is no part of the record on appeal. Even were
we to consider reasons advanced for the first time in judicial proceedings, these reasons are belied
by materials that are in the record.
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