United States v. Reyes-Bojorquez , 254 F. App'x 732 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                         FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    November 16, 2007
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    __________________________
    Clerk of Court
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    No. 07-2051
    v.                                              (D.Ct. No. CR-05-2458-JC)
    (D. N.M.)
    MOISES REYES-BOJORQUEZ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before O'BRIEN, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
    GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.
    Appellant Moises Reyes-Bojorquez pled guilty to one count of conspiracy
    to possess with intent to distribute more than one kilogram of heroin within one
    thousand feet of real property comprising a school or playground, in violation of
    
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 846, 856(a)(1), 856(a)(2), and 860(a). He
    now appeals his 120-month sentence, arguing the district court erred in: 1)
    failing to apply a two-level “safety valve” reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
    however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
    Cir. R. 32.1.
    § 3553(f) and United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”)
    § 5C1.2; and 2) failing to make “meaningful factual findings” in denying the
    reduction. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (a) and 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and affirm Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez’s sentence.
    I. Factual and Procedural Background
    From approximately September 2004 through November 2005, the Drug
    Enforcement Agency (DEA) participated in a multi-district investigation of a
    heroin trafficking ring involving Mexican heroin producers who recruited
    Mexican nationals to participate in heroin distribution organizations in several
    United States cities, including Albuquerque, New Mexico. 1 Information
    corroborated by border patrol records established Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez traveled
    from Mexico to the United States in July 2005. On October 3, 2005, DEA agents
    investigating the Albuquerque organization arranged a traffic stop for the purpose
    of identifying two individuals, including one referred to as “Junior,” who acted as
    couriers with the organization. One of the individuals involved in the traffic stop
    1
    Background information in the record included information from
    investigative reports prepared by DEA agents and recounted in the presentence
    report as well as sworn agent affidavits, sworn accounts of co-conspirator
    debriefing statements, transcripts of recorded telephone calls, and copies of
    photographs. To the extent Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez objected to certain facts in the
    presentence report, the district court overruled those objections, relying on the
    government’s memoranda, which included attached affidavits and evidence
    rebutting Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez’s unsupported factual assertions, which we
    discuss hereafter.
    -2-
    was Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez, whom agents learned went by the nickname “Junior.”
    Over the next several days, agents observed Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez
    participate in drug deals. His participation in these drug deals was corroborated
    through the monitoring of a dispatch phone used to contact Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez
    and co-conspirators who identified him as an active street courier for the
    organization. During some of these transactions, Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez was
    observed training another individual as a courier for the organization, as later
    confirmed by co-conspirators.
    On October 18 and 19, 2005, following the arrest of two Albuquerque
    organization members, Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez acted as the organization’s
    dispatcher, using the dispatch phone for taking orders and dispatching himself and
    another individual for the purpose of conducting drug deals. On October 21,
    2005, following the arrest of five more organization members, DEA agents
    executed a search warrant at the organization’s main stash house, located within
    one thousand feet of a park’s playground, where they found more than a kilogram
    of heroin packaged in individual ounces; agents also found items tying various
    members of the organization to that address, including Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez’s
    cell phone and a ledger with his name on it. On the same day, agents executed a
    search warrant at an apartment, located within one thousand feet of a middle
    -3-
    school and associated with the organization, where they found balloons filled with
    heroin and other drug-related contraband. On November 15, 2005, agents
    arrested Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez, the manager, and two other members of the
    Albuquerque heroin organization.
    Following two prior federal indictments, a grand jury issued a second
    superseding indictment on August 8, 2006, naming Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez and
    eight co-defendants in the drug conspiracy. Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez was named in
    nine counts of the indictment, including count one for conspiracy to possess with
    intent to distribute more than one kilogram of heroin within one thousand feet of
    real property comprising a school or playground, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 846, 856(a)(1), 856(a)(2), and 860(a). On August 22,
    2006, Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez pled guilty to count one pursuant to a plea agreement.
    As part of the plea agreement, Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez stipulated, in part, that
    he: 1) conspired with others to possess with intent to distribute more than one
    kilogram of heroin within one thousand feet of a school or playground; 2) had
    direct personal knowledge of, or personally handled, between one and three
    kilograms of heroin; 3) maintained premises at both the stash house and the
    apartment searched, which are both within one thousand feet of a school or
    playground, and also maintained premises at another apartment subsequently
    -4-
    rented in conjunction with the organization; 4) conspired with others to possess
    with intent to distribute approximately 34.38 net grams of heroin at the apartment
    searched; and 5) conspired with others to possess with intent to distribute
    approximately 37.2 net grams of heroin at the newly-rented apartment. The
    government and Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez also stipulated:
    Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, the Defendant may be eligible for the
    safety valve provisions set forth at 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (f). If the
    Defendant’s eligibility is established, the Defendant would be
    entitled to a reduction of two levels from the base offense level as
    calculated under the sentencing guidelines. This reduction depends
    on the Defendant truthfully providing to the government, before
    sentencing, all information and evidence concerning the offenses that
    were part of the same course of conduct underlying this agreement.
    R., Vol. 1, Doc. 193 at 5 (¶ 9(d)). (Emphasis added.)
    Following the plea hearing, a probation officer prepared a presentence
    report, calculating Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez’s base offense level at 34, which,
    together with a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, resulted in a
    total offense level of 31. An offense level of 31, together with Mr. Reyes-
    Bojorquez’s criminal history category of I, resulted in a Guidelines range of 108
    to 135 months imprisonment. However, because the statute of conviction for the
    offense required a minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment, the probation
    officer calculated the final Guidelines range at 120 to 135 months imprisonment.
    The presentence report did not recommend applying a safety valve reduction,
    -5-
    stating Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez had not provided all the information and evidence he
    had concerning the instant offense.
    In making his objections to the presentence report, Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez
    contested certain facts based on the premise agents confused him with co-
    conspirators. 2 In addition, he argued he qualified for the two-level “safety valve”
    reduction referenced in the plea agreement because he 1) adequately debriefed the
    government by truthfully providing it with information about the Albuquerque
    heroin organization, and 2) was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor
    of others, but acted as a “minimal participant” in the conspiracy. In support of
    his contention he qualified as a “minimal participant,” Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez
    claimed, in part, that: 1) he was a “trainee courier” learning his duties within the
    organization at the time of his involvement; 2) no evidence established he
    2
    In his first memorandum objecting to the presentence report, Mr. Reyes-
    Bojorquez only generally contested facts regarding his misidentification claims
    and explicitly identified objections to only two paragraphs in the presentence
    report which concerned the assessed base offense level and the recommendation
    not to provide a role adjustment, to which the government responded. According
    to the presentence report, Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez filed with the district court a
    second memorandum specifically identifying the portions of the presentence
    report to which he objected, and to which the government again responded.
    However, Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez did not submit his second set of objections to the
    probation officer for his response or into the appeal record for our review. While
    we generally require a defendant to provide all documents on which his appeal is
    based in order to render a decision, we are able, in this case, to address his appeal
    based on his first round of general objections and the government’s responsive
    memorandum extensively identifying the specific facts to which Mr. Reyes-
    Bojorquez objected in his second set of objections.
    -6-
    directed anyone involved in the conspiracy; 3) no photos showed he handled
    drugs or money, nor were any drugs or money found on his person; 4) several
    other individuals were nicknamed “Junior” and each had a share of calls
    attributed to “Junior” in the conspiracy; and 5) many of the defendants looked
    remarkably alike, spoke with the same dialect, and went by the same nickname,
    “Junior,” causing agents to mistakenly attribute certain actions or words to him.
    In making these contentions, Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez did not submit an affidavit in
    support of his argument, but instead attempted to establish agents misidentified
    him by submitting a copy of a few of the government’s photographs; a transcript
    of one of its monitored phone calls; an unsigned, unsworn document identifying
    others as “Junior”; and the government’s application to intercept wire
    communications.
    In response, the government filed two memoranda. In the first, it explained
    it did not contest Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez was a minimal participant, but that the
    safety valve reduction should not apply because he lied about his involvement in
    the drug trafficking organization as shown, in part, by his denial he sold heroin or
    was anything other than a trainee courier when, in fact, evidence established he
    delivered heroin on several occasions, trained another individual to be a courier,
    and acted as a dispatcher. In the second, responsive memorandum, the
    government addressed Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez’s specific factual objections to the
    -7-
    presentence report and, in so doing, included sworn agent affidavits establishing
    those investigating the drug operation never actually confused Mr. Reyes-
    Bojorquez with others, either by nickname, voice, or physical appearance, and
    only mistakenly misidentified others as him a few times in written reports, as
    relied on in the presentence report. To the extent misstatements or clerical errors
    existed, agents stated Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez was the individual meant to be
    identified rather than those mistakenly identified. In addition, the government
    submitted photographs of both Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez and the individuals
    misidentified as him, as well as surveillance photographs, for the purpose of
    showing it was Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez involved in the courier transactions at issue,
    and not any other person.
    At the sentencing hearing, the district court addressed Mr. Reyes-
    Bojorquez’s objections to the presentence report, stating, “[a]fter reviewing the
    government’s sentencing memorandum and response to specific [objections]3,
    [and] various paragraphs in the PSR, the court overrules these objections and
    finds that the government has adequately addressed each [in its] memorandum.”
    R., Vol. 3 at 4-5. The district court then expressly declined to apply the safety
    valve reduction in calculating his sentence. Prior to imposing a sentence, the
    3
    At oral argument, Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez’s counsel acknowledged that the
    district court used, or meant to use, the words “specific objections,” although the
    transcript reads “specific protections.”
    -8-
    district court stated it had considered the Guidelines applications and factors set
    forth in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). It then imposed a term of 120 months
    imprisonment, which is the minimum statutory term of imprisonment for the
    instant offense and at the low end of the 120- to 135-month Guidelines range.
    II. Discussion
    Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez now appeals his sentence, contending the district
    court erred in failing to: 1) apply the safety valve reduction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, and 2) make “meaningful factual findings” on his
    eligibility for such a safety valve reduction. In support of his contentions, Mr.
    Reyes-Bojorquez asserts the facts set forth in his memoranda opposing the
    presentence report demonstrate his eligibility for a safety valve reduction and that
    the government did not present any evidence at sentencing to contradict the
    information in his memoranda or factually support its contrary arguments. As a
    result, Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez argues he has met his burden of proving his
    eligibility for a safety valve reduction. With regard to the district court’s failure
    to make “meaningful factual findings” on his safety valve eligibility, Mr. Reyes-
    Bojorquez suggests the district court’s “very short generic statement” establishes
    it did not consider or rule on his objections, resolve any factual disputes, or
    provide sufficient clarity for him to “respond to the court’s denial of the safety
    valve” or “advance cogent and succinct arguments relating to any contested
    -9-
    facts.” Apt. Br. at 10-12. In addition, he suggests the district court’s failure to
    explain its rejection of his “safety valve” argument in conjunction with the
    § 3553(a) sentencing factors resulted in an unreasonable sentence.
    A. Safety Valve Reduction
    We begin our discussion by examining whether the district court
    erroneously found Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez did not qualify for a safety valve
    reduction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. When reviewing a
    district court’s application of the Guidelines in calculating a sentence, including
    the application of § 5C1.2, we review legal questions de novo and any factual
    findings for clear error, giving due deference to the district court’s application of
    the Guidelines to the facts. See United States v. Patron-Montano, 
    223 F.3d 1184
    ,
    1188 (10th Cir. 2000). “A district court’s factual finding is clearly erroneous
    only if it is without factual support in the record or if this court, after reviewing
    all the evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
    made.” 
    Id.
     (quotation marks and citation omitted). Since the Supreme Court’s
    decision in United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), we have clarified that
    in reviewing a defendant’s sentence, we review the district court’s sentence for
    abuse of discretion, asking whether it is reasonable under the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)
    sentencing factors. See United States v. Garcia-Lara, 
    499 F.3d 1133
    , 1135 (10th
    Cir. 2007). Thus, we employ the abuse of discretion standard by reviewing a
    -10-
    district court’s factual findings for clear error and defer to the district court’s
    exercise of discretion within the bounds of reasonableness. See 
    id. at 1136
    . We
    require reasonableness in two respects – “the length of the sentence, as well as the
    method by which the sentence was calculated.” United States v. Kristl, 
    437 F.3d 1050
    , 1055 (10th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). A procedurally reasonable sentence is
    one that is “calculated utilizing a legitimate method.” United States v. Cage, 
    451 F.3d 585
    , 591 (10th Cir. 2006). “Even if a sentence is calculated properly, i.e.
    the Guidelines were properly applied and the district court clearly considered the
    § 3553(a) factors and explained its reasoning, a sentence can yet be
    unreasonable.” Id.
    Applying this standard of review, we turn directly to the legal principles
    applicable to Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez’s safety valve claim. By statute, pursuant to
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (f), the district court “shall impose a sentence pursuant to [the]
    guidelines ... without regard to any statutory minimum sentence” if the court finds
    at sentencing that the defendant meets certain safety valve criteria. 4 18 U.S.C.
    4
    To qualify for a safety valve reduction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (f) and
    U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, the following criteria apply: 1) the defendant does not have
    more than one criminal history point; 2) the defendant did not use violence or
    credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or
    induce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense; 3) the offense
    did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person; 4) the defendant was
    not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense and was
    not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise; and 5) not later than the time of
    (continued...)
    -11-
    § 3553(f); see also U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 (relying on the same criteria for the purpose
    of granting a below-mandatory minimum sentence). Here, the only contested
    criterion is whether Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez truthfully provided to the government
    all information and evidence he possessed concerning his conspiracy offense. 5
    See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (f)(5) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(5). This criterion requires
    truthful disclosure, regardless of whether the information is deemed relevant or
    useful to the government’s investigation. See United States v. Acosta-Olivas, 
    71 F.3d 375
    , 377, 379 (10th Cir. 1995). The burden is on Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez to
    show by a preponderance of the evidence he met this criterion. See United States
    v. Stephenson, 
    452 F.3d 1173
    , 1179 (10th Cir. 2006). In making factual
    determinations, “[i]t is well established that the sentencing court is entitled to rely
    on uncontested facts contained in the PSR for certain sentencing purposes.”
    United States v. Mateo, 
    471 F.3d 1162
    , 1166-67 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
    
    127 S. Ct. 2890
     (2007).
    In this case, the district court’s determination Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez did not
    4
    (...continued)
    the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to the government
    all information and evidence he has concerning the offense or offenses that were
    part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan. See generally
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (f)(1)-(5); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(1)-(5).
    5
    Because the government does not contest the other § 3553(f) criteria, we
    will not address them in the disposition of this appeal.
    -12-
    qualify for a safety valve reduction is supported by the record. In preparing the
    factual findings for the presentence report, the probation officer relied on
    government investigation reports, which were corroborated by agent affidavits,
    photographs, and recorded telephone transcripts, and established Mr. Reyes-
    Bojorquez delivered heroin on several occasions, trained another individual to be
    a courier, and acted as a dispatcher. This evidence shows Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez
    prevaricated about his participation in the drug trafficking operation when he
    claimed he was only a “trainee courier,” did not direct anyone in the conspiracy,
    and did not handle drugs or money. Indeed, Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez admitted in his
    plea agreement he had direct personal knowledge of, or personally handled,
    between one and three kilograms of heroin.
    In addition, Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez did not object to many of the factual
    findings in the presentence report implicating him as an active street courier who
    handled heroin and, instead, disputed only those facts relating to his alleged
    misidentification claims and attempted to attribute certain actions to others in the
    conspiracy. To rebut these claims, the government submitted sworn agent
    affidavits establishing agents did not confuse Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez with anyone
    else. In turn, at no time did Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez support his claims with a sworn
    affidavit or submit what we perceive to be mitigating evidence. Instead, a review
    of the record shows overwhelming evidence supported the factual findings in the
    -13-
    presentence report, including those objected to by Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez.
    Based on these circumstances, we must reject Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez’s bald
    assertions he met his burden of establishing his eligibility for the safety valve
    reduction and that the government failed to present evidence contradicting his
    contentions. For the same reasons, we cannot say the district court’s
    determination Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez did not qualify for the safety valve reduction
    lacks factual support or has otherwise left us with a definite and firm conviction a
    mistake has been made for the purpose of establishing clear error. See Patron-
    Montano, 
    223 F.3d at 1188
    . We therefore conclude the district court’s failure to
    apply such a reduction was not an abuse of discretion or in any way unreasonable.
    B. Explanation in Conjunction with § 3553(a) Factors
    Turning to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez
    complains the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence by failing to fully
    explain its reasons for denying his safety valve reduction request. The
    government argues that because Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez did not make this argument
    during the sentencing hearing or otherwise request the district court to provide
    further explanation, we should review the issue for plain error only. Mr. Reyes-
    Bojorquez does not contest the application of plain error review but contends the
    district court’s failure to explain his sentence, consider his objections to the
    -14-
    presentence report, or expressly overrule his objections constitutes plain error
    based on a violation of his substantial rights and a miscarriage of justice. He
    fails, however, to explain with any specificity how his substantial rights were
    violated or a miscarriage of justice occurred.
    We have held that when, like here, “the defendant fails to object to the
    method by which the sentence was determined, such as a claim ... that the court
    did not adequately explain the sentence with reference to the factors set forth in
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a), we review only for plain error.” United States v. Torres-
    Duenas, 
    461 F.3d 1178
    , 1182-83 (10th Cir. 2006) (relying on United States v.
    Lopez-Flores, 
    444 F.3d 1218
    , 1221 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 
    127 S. Ct. 3043
    (2007)), cert. denied, 
    127 S. Ct. 3054
     (2007). Plain error arises when 1) an error
    occurs, 2) that is plain, which 3) affects substantial rights, and which 4) seriously
    affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See
    Lopez-Flores, 
    444 F.3d at 1222
    . Because the components required for plain error
    are disjunctive, we need not continue our analysis if we determine that under the
    first component no error occurred.
    Turning to the issue of the district court’s explanation of the sentence under
    the § 3553(a) factors, we have held “[t]here is no question that, in addition to
    guiding our reasonableness review on appeal, the sentencing factors set forth in
    -15-
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) must be considered by the district court itself when imposing
    a sentence.” United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 
    446 F.3d 1109
    , 1115 (10th Cir.
    2006). However, “[w]hen the defendant has not raised any substantial
    contentions concerning non-Guidelines § 3553(a) factors and the district court
    imposes a sentence within the Guidelines range, our post-Booker precedents do
    not require the court to explain on the record how the § 3553(a) factors justify the
    sentence.” Lopez-Flores, 
    444 F.3d at 1222
    . On the other hand:
    Where a defendant has raised a nonfrivolous argument that the
    § 3553(a) factors warrant a below-Guidelines sentence and has
    expressly requested such a sentence, we must be able to discern from
    the record that the sentencing judge did not rest on the guidelines
    alone, but considered whether the guidelines sentence actually
    conforms, in the circumstances, to the statutory factors.
    Sanchez-Juarez, 
    446 F.3d at 1117
     (quotation marks and citation omitted).
    In reconciling Lopez-Flores and Sanchez-Juarez, this court has explained
    that when a district court imposes a sentence which falls within the range
    suggested by the Guidelines, as it did in Lopez-Flores, § 3553(a) requires the
    court to provide only a general statement of the reasons for imposition of the
    particular sentence. See United States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 
    477 F.3d 1196
    , 1199,
    1202 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    128 S. Ct. 113
     (2007). While a detailed sentencing
    explanation may prove beneficial in some instances, it is nonmandatory when
    imposing a sentence which falls within the Guidelines range. Id. at 1202.
    -16-
    In this case, it is evident the district court considered Mr. Reyes-
    Bojorquez’s objections to the presentence report when it stated it had reviewed
    the government’s sentencing memorandum and response to Mr. Reyes-
    Bojorquez’s specific objections and then stated it overruled those objections,
    finding the government had adequately addressed each in its memorandum and
    responsive memorandum. It would be fallacious to assume the district court
    could find the government adequately addressed each objection without knowing
    or considering what those objections were. Similarly, Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez’s
    contention the district court did not expressly overrule his objections is
    nonsensical, in light of the district court’s express statement it was overruling
    those objections. It is also apparent the district court, for judicial economy,
    simply relied on or adopted the government’s reasoning, contained in its
    memorandum and responsive memorandum, to overrule Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez’s
    objections – all of which related to his alleged truthful disclosure in support of a
    safety valve reduction. Because Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez received copies of the
    government’s memoranda, he received sufficient clarity from the district court as
    to its reasons for overruling his objections and denying his safety valve reduction
    request.
    As to the § 3553(a) factors, because the district court imposed a sentence
    which falls within the range suggested by the Guidelines, it was only required to
    -17-
    provide a general statement of the reasons for imposition of that particular
    sentence. See Ruiz-Terrazas, 
    477 F.3d at 1199
    . In addition, Mr. Reyes-
    Bojorquez did not raise any substantial contentions concerning the § 3553(a)
    factors in making his objections to the presentence report, either in his written
    objections or at the sentencing hearing. Instead, Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez cursorily
    pointed out that the district court must consider the § 3553(a) sentencing factors,
    but did not articulate how any one of the seven § 3553(a) factors applied for the
    purpose of lowering his sentence. Consequently, because Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez
    did not raise any substantial contentions concerning the § 3553(a) factors, and the
    district court imposed a sentence within the Guidelines range, our post-Booker
    precedents did not require it to explain on the record how the § 3553(a) factors
    justified the sentence. See Lopez-Flores, 
    444 F.3d at 1222
    .
    As a result, the district court’s express statement it considered the factors
    set forth in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a), together with its explicit rejection of Mr. Reyes-
    Bojorquez’s safety valve request and other objections on the grounds set forth in
    the government’s memoranda, comprise sufficient explanation in this instance.
    While a more detailed sentencing explanation would have proven beneficial in
    dispelling any confusion Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez may have had over the sentence he
    received, it was nonmandatory under the circumstances. See Ruiz-Terrazas, 
    477 F.3d at 1202
    . Having found no error, we need not address the remaining
    -18-
    disjunctive plain error components.
    C. Unreasonable Sentence Length
    Finally, for the first time on appeal, in his reply brief, Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez
    contends his sentence is unreasonable in length under § 3553(a) because the
    kingpin of his drug trafficking organization received the same sentence as a
    street-level courier. However, he does not clarify whether he is the street-level
    courier referenced, identify the length of the sentence the co-conspirator received,
    or submit for our review the record document to which he refers in support of his
    argument.
    As a rule, this court will not address issues raised for the first time in a
    reply brief on appeal. See United States v. Beckstead, 
    500 F.3d 1154
    , 1162-63
    (10th Cir. 2007). Even if we addressed this issue, we have determined a
    presumption of reasonableness attaches to a sentence, like here, which is within
    the correctly-calculated Guidelines range. See Kristl, 
    437 F.3d at 1053-54
    . “This
    is a deferential standard that either the defendant or the government may rebut by
    demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when viewed against the other
    factors delineated in § 3553(a).” Id. at 1054. In this case, Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez
    has not met such a burden or otherwise demonstrated his sentence is unreasonable
    in conjunction with the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) sentencing factors.
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    III. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Mr. Reyes-Bojorquez’s sentence.
    Entered by the Court:
    WADE BRORBY
    United States Circuit Judge
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