Lyles v. Samuels , 257 F. App'x 531 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2007 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    12-7-2007
    Lyles v. Samuels
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 07-1609
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    Recommended Citation
    "Lyles v. Samuels" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 118.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/118
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 07-1609
    ___________
    JERRA MCCREA LYLES,
    Appellant
    v.
    CHARLES E. SAMUELS, Jr.,
    Warden, Federal Correctional Institution
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-02094)
    District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    November 27, 2007
    Before: MCKEE, SMITH AND CHAGARES, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
    (Opinion filed: December 7, 2007)
    ___________
    OPINION
    ___________
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Jerra McCrea Lyles, a federal prisoner serving a 40-year term at the
    Federal Correctional Institution at Fort Dix, New Jersey, appeals pro se from the District
    Court’s order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
    . In
    1976, Lyles was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
    on a multi-count indictment including charges of conspiracy to manufacture heroin,
    distribution of heroin, possession with the intent to distribute heroin, continuing criminal
    enterprise, and other federal drug-related offenses. After Lyles was mandatorily released
    from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons on an aggregate 30-year prison term, he
    received a grant of early termination from mandatory release supervision and began
    service of his 40-year special parole term. Lyles subsequently pled guilty to another
    federal drug conspiracy charge in 2000, and the United States Parole Commission
    thereafter revoked Lyles’s special parole. Lyles seeks his release on the ground that his
    imprisonment following the revocation of a 40-year special parole term violates the
    statutory mandates of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
     and his constitutional rights. For the following
    reasons, we will affirm.
    We need not repeat the background of this case or the details of Lyles’s claims
    here as they are well-known to the parties and are summarized in the District Court’s
    memorandum. For substantially the reasons stated by the District Court, we conclude that
    Lyles’s § 2241 petition was properly denied. As explained by the District Court, Lyles’s
    current imprisonment based on the revocation of his 40-year special parole term is an
    imprisonment contemplated by 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (c)(repealed),1 in addition to his statutory
    1
    This provision was repealed, but remains applicable to criminal offenses
    committed, as here, before November 1, 1987.
    2
    15-year term under § 841(b)(1)(A), and does not violate due process or exceed any
    statutory maximum sentence. See Roberts v. United States, 
    491 F.2d 1236
    , 1238 (3d Cir.
    1974) (“[Special Parole] is designed to take effect upon the expiration of the period of
    parole supervision following mandatory release, or at the full term date following parole,
    or upon release from confinement following sentence expiration.”) (per curiam); Bell v.
    United States, 
    521 F.2d 713
    , 715 (4th Cir. 1975) (“Since the statute prescribes no
    maximum special parole term, the additional prisoner sentence may be lengthy.”) .
    Further, Lyles’s contention that his special parole term “would [have] to be
    commenced” before his federal 15-year term expired is without merit. The United States
    Parole Commission appropriately aggregated Lyles’s multiple sentences into a single 30-
    year sentence, and ordered that Lyles’s special parole term would begin to run after he
    was discharged from mandatory release supervision following his release from the
    aggregate 30-year prison term. See Lueth v. Beach, 
    498 F.3d 795
     (8th Cir. 2007)
    (rejecting appellant’s argument that his special parole term should have started running on
    the date he discharged the longest sentence on the counts carrying special parole). See
    also Fowler v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 
    94 F.3d 835
    , 840 (3d Cir. 1996) (special term of
    parole to be served after completion of incarceration and any term of regular parole)
    (citation and quotation omitted); Mastrangelo v. United States Parole Comm’n, 
    682 F.2d 402
    , 404-05 (2d Cir. 1982) (special parole term was “designed to test the offender’s
    ability to lead a lawful life in the community . . . . To permit the special parole term to run
    concurrently with an ordinary term of imprisonment would undermine this process . . . .”)
    3
    (per curiam).
    For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
    4