Gary Carl Cremeens v. The City of Montgomery, Alabama , 427 F. App'x 855 ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-14695 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar MAY 31, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 2:09-cv-00409-WHA-CSC
GARY CARL CREMEENS,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
THE CITY OF MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
________________________
(May 31, 2011)
Before WILSON, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Gary Cremeens, a former Fire Investigator with the City of Montgomery,
Alabama (“the City”), appeals the district court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of the City on his discrimination suit brought pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. He argues
the district court erroneously concluded that firefighting was an “essential
function” of the Fire Investigator position. He also contends that the City’s
physical fitness requirements for Fire Investigators are not “job-related” or
consistent with “business necessity.”1
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Holly v.
Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2007). Summary
judgment is appropriate when the evidence before the court demonstrates that
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2010).
I. Is Firefighting an Essential Function of the Fire Investigator Position?
We evaluate ADA discrimination claims under the McDonnell Douglas2
1
Cremeens’s brief also raises the issue of whether the district court erred in denying his
motion to alter judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, but the brief does not
offer any argument on this issue. Therefore, the issue is deemed abandoned. See Greenbriar,
Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, Ala., 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989).
2
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973).
2
burden-shifting analysis. See Holly, 492 F.3d at 1255. Under this framework, the
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: “(1)
he is disabled; (2) he is a qualified individual; and (3) he was subjected to
unlawful discrimination because of his disability.” Id. at 1255–56.
A “qualified individual” is “someone with a disability who, ‘with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires.’” Id. at 1256 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
12111(8)). “[E]ssential functions ‘are the fundamental job duties of a position that
an individual with a disability is actually required to perform.’” Id. at 1257(quoting Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2000) (per
curiam)). If the particular function is essential, an ADA plaintiff must show that
he can perform it either without accommodation or with a “reasonable
accommodation.” Id. at 1256. An accommodation is reasonable only if it enables
the individual to perform the essential functions of the job. Id. Though the ADA
may require an employer to alter or eliminate marginal job functions, it does not
require an employer to eliminate essential job functions. Id. And an employer’s
previous acceptance of an accommodation pertaining to an essential function does
not require the employer to make that accommodation in the future. See Holbrook
v. City of Alpharetta, Ga., 112 F.3d 1522, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997). Thus, if a
3
disabled individual is unable to perform an essential function of the job, even with
a reasonable accommodation, he is not a “qualified individual” and cannot
establish a prima facie case under the ADA. Holly, 492 F.3d at 1256.
Whether a particular job duty is an essential function is evaluated on a
case-by-case basis. Id. at 1258. The ADA’s implementing regulations provide a
non-exclusive list of factors indicating that a particular function is essential, which
includes, inter alia: (1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are
essential; (2) the written job descriptions of the position; (3) the amount of time
spent on the job performing the function; and (4) the consequences of not
requiring the individual to perform the function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). We
give substantial weight to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a
position are essential, but that factor alone is not conclusive. Holly, 492 F.3d at
1258.
The evidence in this case establishes that firefighting is an essential function
of the Fire Investigator position, a function that Cremeens concedes he cannot
perform. Assistant Chief Davis, the division chief of the Fire Investigations
Division, testified that Fire Investigators may be ordered to engage in fire
suppression activities by either a superior officer or an on-scene fire commander
and that failure to comply could subject them to disciplinary action. Davis also
4
testified that, even absent such an order, Fire Investigators have a responsibility to
engage in fire suppression activities if the lives of other firefighters or civilians are
in danger and fire suppression units are not on the scene. Fire Investigators may
engage in fire suppression activities infrequently, but that does not mean
firefighting is a nonessential function of the position. Indeed, the firefighting
function is essential whenever the need arises, and the consequences of not
requiring a Fire Investigator to engage in fire suppression activities when
necessary could be dire.
Cremeens’s proposed accommodation—to work as a Fire Investigator
without being required to fight fires—is not reasonable because it would require
the City to eliminate an essential job function from the Fire Investigator position,
which the ADA does not require it to do. Accordingly, Cremeens is not a
“qualified individual” within the meaning of the ADA, and we affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City.
II. Are the City’s Physical Fitness Requirements for Fire Investigators Job-
Related and Consistent with Business Necessity?
Discrimination under the ADA includes an employer’s use of qualification
standards or employment tests that tend to screen out those individuals with
5
disabilities, “unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the
covered entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is
consistent with business necessity . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6).
[J]ob-relatedness is used in analyzing the questions or
subject matter contained in a test or criteria used by an
employer in making hiring or promotional decisions.
Business necessity, in contrast, is larger in scope and
analyzes whether there is a business reason that makes
necessary the use by an employer of a test or criteria in
hiring or promotional decision making.
Allmond v. Akal Sec., Inc., 558 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(alterations, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). “Once an employer
demonstrates that the pertinent qualification standard is job-related and consistent
with business necessity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to offer a reasonable
accommodation that would allow him to satisfy that standard.” Id.The physical fitness requirements are directly related to a Fire Investigator’s
duty to fight fires, and they are necessary to ensure that Fire Investigators are able
to perform that function when called upon to do so. As stated above, Cremeens’s
proposed accommodation is not reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City.
AFFIRMED.
6