Strang v. Wells Fargo Home Mtg , 266 F. App'x 108 ( 2008 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2008 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    2-20-2008
    Strang v. Wells Fargo Home Mtg
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 05-5154
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    Recommended Citation
    "Strang v. Wells Fargo Home Mtg" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 1578.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/1578
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 05-5154
    _____________
    NORAH T. STRANG;
    ROBERT J. STRANG,
    Appellants
    v.
    WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC.;
    OLD GUARD MORTGAGE AND FINANCIAL SERVICES
    INC.; CHELSEA SETTLEMENT SERVICES, INC.;
    WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    No. 04-CV-2865
    District Judge: Honorable J. Curtis Joyner
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    February 8, 2008
    Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: February 20, 2008)
    OPINION
    ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
    In this appeal, Norah and Robert Strang contend that the United States District
    Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania erred in dismissing their case against Old
    Guard Mortgage and Financial Services, Inc., on the basis of a written release executed
    by the Strangs, Chelsea Settlement Services, Inc., and Old Guard.1 We will affirm.
    I.
    Because we write exclusively for the parties before us and the parties are familiar
    with the facts and proceedings below, we will not revisit them here.
    The Strangs contend that they did not intend to release Old Guard from liability,
    that this intention can be observed from the “context of the negotiations,” and therefore
    that the District Court erred in dismissing the Strangs’ case against Old Guard.
    Appellants’ Br. at 38. We disagree.
    “It is firmly settled that the intent of the parties to a written contract is contained in
    the writing itself. When the words of a contract are clear and unambiguous, the intent is to
    be found only in the express language of the agreement. Clear contractual terms that are
    capable of one reasonable interpretation must be given effect without reference to matters
    outside the contract.” Samuel Rappaport Family P’ship v. Meridian Bank, 
    657 A.2d 17
    ,
    21 (Pa. Super. 1995) (quoting Krizovensky v. Krizovensky, 
    624 A.2d 638
    , 642 (Pa.
    1
    Appellants’ separate appeal from judgment in favor of Wells Fargo Home
    Mortgage, Inc., and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., raising other issues, was dismissed by this
    Court after the parties entered into a stipulated settlement.
    2
    Super. 1993)) (internal citations omitted).
    Here, the language of the Release is clear and unambiguous. Old Guard, a
    signatory to the Release, is identified as one of the Parties. Paragraph 1.2 of the Release
    states that “[t]he settlement settles and resolves all claims, cross-claims and counter-
    claims asserted, or which could have been asserted, by the Parties against each other as of
    the date of this Agreement since the beginning of time arising out of the Parties’
    relationship.” App. at 262. Paragraph 1.5 states that, upon Chelsea’s payment of $500 to
    the Strangs, “[the Strangs] shall dismiss, or cause to be dismissed, the above-referenced
    civil action pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
    Pennsylvania.” 
    Id. The Strangs
    requested that the District Court approve the Release and
    the District Court did so, properly dismissing the Strangs’ case against both Chelsea and
    Old Guard.
    Because the language in the release is clear and unambiguous, we need not turn to
    extrinsic evidence.
    II.
    We have considered all contentions raised by the parties and conclude that no
    further discussion is necessary. The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-5154

Citation Numbers: 266 F. App'x 108

Filed Date: 2/20/2008

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023