Martinelli v. Penn Millers Ins Co , 269 F. App'x 226 ( 2008 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2008 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    3-18-2008
    Martinelli v. Penn Millers Ins Co
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 07-1956
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    Recommended Citation
    "Martinelli v. Penn Millers Ins Co" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 1426.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/1426
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 07-1956
    ____________
    KAREN MARTINELLI,
    Appellant,
    v.
    PENN MILLERS INSURANCE COMPANY
    ____________
    On Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D. C. No. 02-cv-02292)
    District Judge: Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie
    ____________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    March 7, 2008
    Before: BARRY, JORDAN and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: March 18, 2008)
    ____________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ____________
    HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
    In this employment discrimination case, Karen Martinelli appeals following a jury
    verdict in favor of her former employer, Penn Millers Insurance Company (PMIC).
    Martinelli asserts various trial errors and argues that the District Court erred in granting
    PMIC summary judgment on her hostile work environment claim.
    I.
    Because we write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and
    proceedings below, we will not revisit them here. Martinelli first claims that the District
    Court erred when it precluded testimony from one of Martinelli’s former co-workers,
    Roseanna Klim, who allegedly suffered disparate treatment while employed at PMIC.
    “[A]s a general rule, evidence of a defendant’s prior discriminatory treatment of a
    plaintiff or other employees is relevant and admissible . . . to establish whether a
    defendant’s employment action against an employee was motivated by invidious
    discrimination.” Becker v. ARCO Chemical Co., 
    207 F.3d 176
    , 194 n. 8 (3d Cir. 2000)
    (internal citations omitted). But such evidence must have a proper purpose and be
    admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 - 403. Ansell v. Green Acres
    Contracting Co., 
    347 F.3d 515
    , 520 (3d Cir. 2003). The proponent of such evidence
    “must be able to articulate a way in which the tendered evidence logically tends to
    establish or refute a material fact in issue, and that chain of logic must include no link
    involving an inference that a bad person is disposed to do bad acts.” 
    Id. at 520-21
    (internal quotations and citations omitted).
    2
    Here, Klim would have testified that she performed the functions of an underwriter
    but was not paid as such. The District Court found that this testimony had little probative
    value in establishing PMIC’s intent to discriminate because the discriminatory nature of
    the past conduct was unclear and it was dissimilar to Martinelli’s situation. We find that
    the District Court did not abuse its discretion in so holding. See Hurley v. Atlantic City
    Police Dep’t., 
    174 F.3d 95
    , 110 (3d Cir. 1999). As the District Court aptly noted,
    evidence of prior acts is admissible where “the inference of the employer’s discriminatory
    attitude came from the nature of the prior acts themselves,” but not where the evidence is
    offered merely for “the purpose of establishing the fact that the employer engaged in any
    particular act or course of conduct in connection with the plaintiff’s termination.”
    
    Becker, 207 F.3d at 194
    n.8. It was no abuse of discretion for the District Court to
    conclude that Klim’s circumstances were not sufficiently similar to Martinelli’s to allow
    an appropriate inference about PMIC’s state of mind in this case to be drawn from Klim’s
    experience. At most, Klim’s testimony tended to show that PMIC underpaid employees
    who were doing underwriting work, and that it was mistreating Martinelli in the same
    fashion as it had previously mistreated Klim. This evidence becomes even less probative
    in light of the District Court’s observation that Martinelli and Klim had different job titles
    and focused on entirely different sectors of PMIC’s business.
    The difference in circumstances between Martinelli and Klim also precludes any
    suggestion that Klim’s testimony should have been admitted as evidence of a pattern or
    3
    plan to underpay women who performed underwriting work. To be admissible as pattern
    or plan evidence, the two acts “must be connected, mutually dependent, and interlocking”
    and must “consist of incidents [that] were sufficiently similar to earmark them as the
    handiwork of the same actor.” 
    Id. at 197
    (internal citation omitted); See also J&R Ice
    Cream Corp. v. Cal. Smoothie Licensing Corp., 
    31 F.3d 1259
    , 1269 (3d Cir. 1994).
    Klim’s testimony falls well short of this standard.
    We are similarly unpersuaded by Martinelli’s suggestion that the District Court
    erred by instructing the jury that “this case is to be decided, solely, on the employer’s
    treatment of Ms. Martinelli, it has nothing to do with any other employees.” This was
    nothing more than an accurate statement of the law.
    We also agree with the District Court that Martinelli was not prejudiced by the
    limitations initially placed on the testimony of a former PMIC Assistant Underwriter, Ann
    Bedwick pertaining to the claims she made. The District Court initially held that
    Bedwick could not testify that she was considered an underwriter by the insurance agents
    and brokers with whom she dealt. It also prohibited her from testifying that a male
    employee, Barry Corrigan, had been suspended but not terminated for failing to keep
    track of certain insurance forms. Yet Bedwick subsequently testified, without objection,
    that “[t]he agents and brokers that I worked with, they considered me an Underwriter,
    they didn’t know I was still an Assistant Underwriter.” Furthermore, PMIC’s Vice-
    4
    President of Agribusiness Underwriting, Harold Roberts, testified about Corrigan’s
    probation in some detail, and indicated that PMIC had not ultimately terminated Corrigan.
    II.
    Martinelli next argues that the District Court erred when it excluded the EEOC’s
    written determination that PMIC’s treatment of Martinelli had violated Title VII. In
    Coleman v. Home Depot, Inc., 
    306 F.3d 1333
    (3d Cir. 2002), we held that “the decision
    of whether or not an EEOC Letter of Determination is more probative than prejudicial is
    within the discretion of the trial court, and to be determined on a case-by-case basis.” 
    Id. at 1345
    (internal citations omitted). We stressed that “considerations of undue delay,
    waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence, which are often necessary
    to counter an EEOC report,” were particularly salient in this context. 
    Id. Here, the
    District Court concluded that the letter’s claim to be a “determination as to the merits,”
    coupled with the fact that it originated from an authoritative government agency, could
    confuse and mislead the jury and unfairly prejudice PMIC. The District Court also
    concluded that the letter would provoke needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
    Because these concerns were entirely consistent with Rule 403 and our holding in
    Coleman, we hold that the decision to exclude the EEOC letter was well within the
    discretion of the learned trial judge.
    III.
    5
    Martinelli also claims that an unfairly prejudicial comment by PMIC’s counsel
    required the District Court to declare a mistrial. Our review of a district court’s decision
    regarding the grant of a new trial for prejudicial conduct by counsel is deferential.
    Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 
    980 F.2d 171
    , 207 (3d Cir. 1992). Because a
    district court “is in a far better position than we to appraise the effect of the improper
    argument of counsel,” Reed v. Philadelphia, Bethlehem & New England R.R. Co., 
    939 F.2d 128
    , 133 (3d Cir. 1991), we defer to its assessment of the prejudicial impact and
    whether its curative instructions to the jury are sufficient to expunge the prejudicial
    impact of counsel’s statements. 
    Fineman, 980 F.2d at 207
    .
    Here, PMIC’s counsel asserted during his opening statement that Martinelli had
    failed to exclude from an insurance policy an insured with a history of drunk driving,
    which resulted in a $1 million loss to PMIC when that driver was involved in a fatal car
    accident while intoxicated. We agree with the District Court that counsel’s reference to
    intoxication, while perhaps improper, was not so prejudicial as to deny Martinelli a fair
    trial, particularly in light of the District Court’s curative instruction and the isolated
    nature of counsel’s remarks. See Salas v. Wang, 
    846 F.2d 897
    , 908 (3d Cir. 1988)
    (finding “one isolated statement” to jury insufficient to warrant new trial). Martinelli’s
    claim that PMIC was able “to emphasize over and over the One Million Dollar payment
    6
    and the fact that the driver was drunk at the time of the fatality” is not supported by the
    record.1
    IV.
    Martinelli’s final assignment of error is that the District Court erred in granting
    partial summary judgment to PMIC on her hostile work environment claim. Although the
    parties focus much of their argument on the question of pretext, we will affirm for the
    same reasons stated by the District Court: no reasonable juror could find that the alleged
    scrutiny of Martinelli’s work was objectively hostile or abusive.
    This conclusion is not altered by our suggestion in Moore v. City of Philadelphia,
    
    461 F.3d 331
    (3d Cir. 2006), that employees claiming retaliation by workplace
    harassment are no longer required to show that the harassment was severe or pervasive
    enough to constitute a violation of Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision. 
    Id. at 341-42
    (discussing implication of Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway. Co. v. White, 126 S.
    Ct. 2405 (2006)). It is true that the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern
    broadened the definition of retaliatory conduct, but the Court also emphasized that Title
    VII was not intended to permit employees complaining of discrimination to immunize
    themselves from the “petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work”
    1
    Martinelli can point to only one similar remark by counsel during the entire trial.
    During his summation, PMIC’s counsel referenced the accident and stated “that’s the
    fatality which, ultimately, cost the company a million dollars, and there’s no dispute, the
    company paid that money.” Counsel then read from Martinelli’s note to a broker which
    referenced the specific circumstances of the accident.
    7
    simply by complaining of discrimination. Burlington 
    Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2415
    .
    PMIC’s scrutiny of Martinelli’s work, while unpleasant and annoying, did not create the
    sort of hostile work environment that would satisfy Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.
    For all of the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    8