United States v. Richard Harris Walley , 271 F. App'x 966 ( 2008 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 31, 2008
No. 07-14653
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00006-CR-KD
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RICHARD HARRIS WALLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(March 31, 2008)
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Richard Harris Walley, a probationer, appeals from his conviction for
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),
following a jury trial. On appeal, Walley argues that the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress the firearm as the result of an illegal search. After
thorough review, we affirm.
We apply a mixed standard of review to the denial of a defendant’s motion
to suppress, reviewing the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its
application of law to those facts de novo. United States v. Lyons, 403 F.3d 1248,
1250 (11th Cir. 2005). We construe the facts in the light most favorable to the
party who prevailed below. United States v. Muegge, 225 F.3d 1267, 1269 (11th
Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). We also may affirm the district court’s judgment on
any ground that finds support in the record. United States v. Mejia, 82 F.3d 1032,
1035 (11th Cir. 1996).
Walley argues that the search of his home was suspicionless, and there was
no Alabama statute authorizing such a search, so the district court erred in relying
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847, 126
S. Ct. 2193, 2196 (2006), which interpreted a California statute allowing
suspicionless searches of parolees and their property. He further argues that his
probation agreement did not state that he agreed to suspicionless searches, so the
district court also erred by relying on our unpublished opinion in United States v.
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Stewart, 213 F. App’x 898 (11th Cir.), rehearing en banc denied by __ F.3d __
(11th Cir. Mar 22, 2007). Additionally, Alabama regulations for probation officers
require “reasonable grounds” to support a search of a probationer’s home. Walley
concedes that the Supreme Court may have abandoned a suspicion requirement for
the search of a probationer’s house where there was no statutory authority for the
search and the probationer waived Fourth Amendment protection. Walley claims,
however, that he was still entitled to some Fourth Amendment protection.
Although the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in Samson and
Stewart -- the cases on which the district court based its decision -- we can affirm a
district court’s judgment on any grounds supported by the record. Mejia, 82 F.3d
at 1035. In United States v. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d 1302, 1310-1311 (11th Cir.
2005), we upheld a district court’s denial of a probationer’s motion to suppress
where his probation certificate did not explicitly require him to submit to
warrantless searches. We employed the Supreme Court’s test in United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S. Ct. 587, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2001), which required us
to balance the intrusion upon a probationer’s privacy with the degree to which the
intrusion is necessary for the promotion of the government’s legitimate interest in
supervising probationers. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d at 1309. We stated that the
government had a “considerable interest” in supervising probationers and that
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Yuknavich, who was on probation for distributing material involving child
pornography, had a “greatly reduced expectation of privacy in his computer.” Id.
at 1309-11. We thus determined that even though the certificate lacked an explicit
condition allowing warrantless searches and Georgia did not have a regulation
requiring Yuknavich to submit to warrantless searches, probation officers did not
need more than “reasonable suspicion” to conduct a search of the probationer’s
computer. Id. at 1310-1311. Reasonable suspicion consists of “a sufficiently high
probability that criminal conduct is occurring to make the intrusion on the
individual’s privacy interest reasonable.” Id. at 1311 (citation omitted).
Here, as in Yuknavich, there is no applicable state law authorizing
warrantless searches, and Walley’s probation agreement did not expressly allow
them, although the agreement did provide that he would be subject to searches “at
any time, day or night.” Yuknavich therefore applies to this case, and we must
determine whether on this record, the probation officer had a “reasonable
suspicion” to conduct a search of Walley’s home. The record shows, and Walley
concedes, that after a traffic stop, Walley and his wife were arrested for possession
of marijuana. It is also undisputed that at the time of the traffic stop, Walley was
on probation for the distribution of marijuana, and was barred by the terms of his
probation from having contact with illegal drugs. Undisputed testimony from the
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suppression hearing further reveals that it was Walley’s probation officer, Gene
Whitson, who searched his home. Specifically, Whitson testified that the police
department contacted him on the day of Walley’s arrest to relay that Walley was
being held in jail for possession of marijuana. Whitson then picked up Walley and
took him and two police officers to his residence for the search. At the residence,
Walley showed Whitson where his room was, and upon searching the room,
Whitson and the two officers discovered a two-ounce bag of marijuana and a rifle.
At that point, the search was discontinued and a search warrant for the residence
was then obtained, but no other contraband was found.
In short, when the probation officer was informed that Walley and his wife
had been arrested for possession of marijuana -- the very same contraband Walley
was on probation for distributing -- there was a “sufficiently high probability” that
illegal contraband could be found at Walley’s home. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d at 1311.
Accordingly, we agree that the probation officer had the requisite “reasonable
suspicion” to support the search of Walley’s home, and we affirm the denial of the
motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
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