United States v. Mabrey , 185 F. App'x 271 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-5153
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
KAMAL MABREY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(CR-03-511-RDB)
Submitted: April 26, 2006 Decided: June 16, 2006
Before MICHAEL, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, John H. Chun, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland; Sherri Keene, Staff
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, John F. Purcell, Assistant United States Attorney,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Kamal Mabrey pled guilty to being a felon in possession
of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000). The
district court sentenced him as an armed career criminal under 18
U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005), to 188 months of
imprisonment, the bottom of the then-mandatory sentencing
guidelines range. We affirmed Mabrey’s conviction, vacated his
sentence, and remanded for resentencing in light of United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). See United States v.
Mabrey, 150 F. App’x 274 (4th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-5077)
(“Mabrey I”).
On remand, the district court resentenced Mabrey to a
180-month prison term, the statutory mandatory minimum sentence.
Mabrey appeals the sentence imposed on remand, asserting that the
district court erred in concluding that his second-degree burglary
conviction under Maryland law qualified as a violent felony for
purposes of sentencing him as an armed career criminal and that his
Sixth Amendment rights were violated because the predicate offenses
were neither submitted to a jury nor admitted by him. Mabrey
acknowledges, however, that he is precluded from raising these
issues in this appeal because he litigated them in Mabrey I.
In Mabrey I, we rejected the claims Mabrey now seeks to
raise in this appeal. Thus, we find that Mabrey’s claims are
barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine and that none of the
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exceptions applies. See United States v. Aramony, 166 F.3d 655,
661 (4th Cir. 1999) (discussing doctrine and exceptions thereto);
see also S. Atl. Ltd. P’ship of Tenn. v. Riese, 356 F.3d 576, 583
(4th Cir. 2004) (discussing mandate rule). Accordingly, we affirm
Mabrey’s sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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