Giddings v. Joseph Coleman Ctr , 278 F. App'x 131 ( 2008 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2008 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    5-19-2008
    Giddings v. Joseph Coleman Ctr
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 07-1736
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008
    Recommended Citation
    "Giddings v. Joseph Coleman Ctr" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 1207.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/1207
    This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
    OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    NOS. 07-1736 and 07-2407
    DENIAL S. GIDDINGS
    Appellant
    v.
    JOSEPH COLEMAN CENTER; RONALD T. MORRISON,
    Deputy Director, Joseph E. Coleman Center; PAMELA BROWN,
    Unit Supervisor, Joseph E. Coleman Center, SUE MARTIN,
    Registered Nurse, Joseph E. Coleman Center; KEVIN NANCE,
    Operations Shift Supervisor, Joseph E. Coleman Center;
    AGENT AMY CLEWELL, Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole;
    WARRANT OFFICER WILLIE PULLINS, Pennsylvania Board of
    Probation and Parole; WARRANT OFFICER DEBORAH MCKNIGHT,
    Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole; MANUEL ARROYO,
    Facility Director, Joseph E. Coleman Center; KELLY RASCOE,
    Unit Manager, Joseph E. Coleman Center; EARL HAWKINS, Unit
    Counselor, Joseph E. Coleman Center; JOSEPH BUTLER, Operations
    Supervisor, Joseph E. Coleman Center
    On Appeal From the United States District Court
    For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 04-cv-04382)
    District Judge: Hon. Anita B. Brody
    Argued February 12, 2008
    BEFORE: SLOVITER, SMITH and STAPLETON,
    Circuit Judges
    (Opinion Filed: May 19, 2008)
    Dennis R. Supplee
    Stephen A. Fogdall (Argued)
    Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis
    1600 Market Street - Suite 3600
    Philadelphia, PA 19103
    Attorneys for Appellant
    Thomas W. Corbett, Jr.
    Attorney General
    Claudia M. Tesoro (Argued)
    Senior Deputy Attorney General
    Calvin R. Koons
    Senior Deputy Attorney General
    John G. Knorr, III
    Chief Deputy Attorney General
    Chief, Appellate Litigation Section
    Office of the Attorney General
    21 South 12th Street, Third Floor
    Philadelphia, PA 19107
    Attorneys for Appellees
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
    Denial S. Giddings appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in
    favor of parole agent Amy Clewell. We will affirm.
    I.
    2
    Because we write only for the parties who are familiar with the factual context and
    procedural history of the case, we set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis.
    On the evening of December 2, 2003, the Joseph Coleman Center contacted Agent
    Clewell after finding resident Denial S. Giddings, a parolee with a history of mental
    illness, pressing a razor blade against his arm. After she arrived, and after the incident
    was resolved, Clewell decided to arrest Giddings for violating his parole – meaning that
    he would be sent to S.C.I. Graterford as soon as transportation could be arranged. A lack
    of available officers prevented any transfer that evening, so as an interim solution,
    Clewell agreed with the recommendation of the Coleman Center’s director that Giddings
    be housed in the Center’s mental health unit overnight.
    Before retiring for the evening, neither Clewell nor the Coleman Center’s staff
    searched Giddings or the room where he would be staying. Apparently, Giddings took
    advantage of this oversight by either smuggling a razor blade into the room, or finding
    one that was already there, and by using it to carve a deep gash into his forearm. The next
    morning, when she discovered this new injury, Clewell contacted the on-duty nurse, who,
    after tending to the wound, assured Clewell that it was safe to transport Giddings. He
    was then dispatched to S.C.I. Graterford.
    Based on these facts, Giddings sued Agent Clewell and others arguing that they
    were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and therefore violated his
    Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, as well as his
    3
    Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights, citing specifically the state-created danger
    doctrine. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Clewell (the only
    defendant remaining in this case) based on its view that the evidence simply did not
    support any finding that a constitutional violation occurred. In the alternative, it
    suggested that Clewell was entitled to qualified immunity. Giddings now appeals.1
    II.
    The only aspect of Giddings’ appeal that merits discussion is whether Clewell’s
    failure to search him and the room he would be occupying – or to see to it that the
    Coleman Center’s staff conducted such a search – constituted deliberate indifference to
    his serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 
    429 U.S. 97
    , 106 (1976) (articulating the
    standard). The framework for assessing such “failure to prevent” claims was established
    by Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 
    946 F.2d 1017
    , 1023 (3d Cir. 1991) (abrogated on
    other grounds):
    a plaintiff . . . has the burden of establishing three elements: (1) the detainee had a
    “particular vulnerability to [the serious condition],” (2) the custodial officer or
    officers knew or should have known of that vulnerability, and (3) those officers
    “acted with [deliberate] indifference” to the detainee’s particular vulnerability.
    Taken in the light most favorable to Giddings, the evidence supports finding that he was
    1
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , review the District Court’s grant
    of summary judgment de novo, and will affirm so long as we are satisfied that no material
    issue of fact exists when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the
    non-moving party. Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 
    166 F.3d 581
    , 585-87 (3d Cir. 1999);
    Penn. Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 
    63 F.3d 231
    , 236 (3d Cir. 1995); F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(c).
    4
    vulnerable to self-mutilating behavior, a serious condition, and that Clewell, who was
    present for the December 2nd incident, knew of this proclivity. 
    Id.
     at 1025 n.1
    (“Custodians have been found to ‘know’ of a particular vulnerability . . . when they have
    had actual knowledge of an obviously serious . . . threat.”).
    However, even though Clewell was aware of Giddings’ propensity for self-
    mutilation, the evidence would not support a finding that she was deliberately indifferent
    to his vulnerability. The evidence shows that Clewell took the appropriate steps to assure
    Giddings’ welfare during the overnight hours by accepting the recommendation of the
    Coleman Center’s director that he be housed in the Center’s mental health unit.   Further,
    the Coleman Center assured Clewell that the staff, who knew all about the situation
    because they too had witnessed it, would care for Giddings during his stay. Under the
    circumstances, Clewell’s assumption that they would not let Giddings have access to
    more razor blades was likely a reasonable one. In any event, making this assumption
    could not be found to constitute acting with deliberate indifference to Giddings’ serious
    medical needs.2
    2
    Giddings also argues that Clewell exhibited deliberate indifference in not sending him
    to a hospital on the evening of December 2nd and in waiting for the Coleman Center staff
    to retrieve him on the morning of December 3rd. Finally, he advances a state-created
    danger claim. We have reviewed these claims and find them to be without merit. In
    addition, while we are unsure as to whether Giddings is raising this issue on appeal, we
    perceive no deliberate indifference in the way Clewell conducted herself on December
    3rd. Finally, because no constitutional violation occurred, we forgo any discussion of
    qualified immunity.
    5
    III.
    For the reasons set forth above, the judgement of the District Court will be
    affirmed.
    6