United States v. Atkins , 294 F. App'x 892 ( 2008 )


Menu:
  •                                  REVISED October 14, 2008
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    September 30, 2008
    No. 07-30934
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    REGINALD B. ATKINS,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    5:06-CR-50081-ALL
    Before GARZA and DENNIS, Circuit Judges, and MILLS, District Judge.*
    PER CURIAM:**
    The Government appeals the district court’s pre-trial order suppressing
    in the “interest of justice” certain statements that the defendant, Reginald B.
    Atkins, allegedly made to law enforcement officers, but which the defendant
    *
    Chief District Judge of the Northern District of Mississippi, sitting by designation.
    **
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 07-30934
    could not subsequently recall as a result of amnesia. For the following reasons,
    we REVERSE and REMAND.
    The defendant, Reginald B. Atkins, was indicted and arrested for being a
    felon in possession of firearms in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1). After his
    arrest, while on bond, the defendant suffered an episode of hypoxic
    encephalopathy, resulting in a medically verifiable brain injury. As a result of
    the defendant’s condition, the defendant was unable to recall certain events
    leading up to his arrest. Specifically, the defendant did not recall inviting three
    officers into the house in which he was residing, leading the officers to a garage
    filled with guns, and then, when referring to a case with two rifles in it, telling
    the officers: “Those two are mine,” or “Those are my two sniper rifles.” The
    defendant also did not recall telling the officers, who informed the defendant
    that they were investigating a report of a missing shotgun, that “They’re over
    there” in referring to the guns located in the garage.1
    A magistrate judge conducted a competency hearing to determine whether
    the defendant could obtain a fair trial despite his amnesia. The magistrate
    judge found that the defendant’s amnesia was real, but nonetheless concluded
    that the defendant was competent to stand trial.                 The magistrate judge
    acknowledged that the defendant’s statements presented a “real challenge,” but
    observed that “the fact that he does not remember the statement does not,
    standing alone, render the statement inadmissible. The District Judge will be
    able to deal with any issues regarding the statement in the context of the actual
    trial.”
    The district court then held a pre-trial conference, in which the court sua
    sponte expressed its intent to suppress the defendant’s statements.                     The
    1
    The defendant’s mother, Wanda Lacy, called the police to report that a shotgun owned
    by her late husband was missing from a house she owned, but in which her son, the defendant,
    was residing. Her call is what led the police to the defendant.
    2
    No. 07-30934
    defendant made an oral motion to suppress the statements, which the district
    court granted, “[o]n the grounds that he cannot remember giving the statement
    and cannot question how it was given, when it was given, and whether it was
    given, and the nuances thereunder.”
    The Government moved the district court to reconsider its ruling and
    requested an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress. The
    district court held a suppression hearing in which the three law enforcement
    officers and the defendant’s mother testified. After the hearing, at the district
    court’s request, the Government filed a letter stating that it had no evidence in
    the case beyond the defendant’s statements and his physical possession of the
    rifles.
    The district court issued a written order. In the order, the district court
    concluded, consistent with the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation,
    that the defendant was competent to stand trial. Nonetheless, the district court
    held that
    in light of the evidence before this Court regarding Atkins’ lack of
    memory surrounding his statements to [the officers] on February 25,
    2005, related to Atkins’ ownership of the two sniper rifles, and
    Atkins’ inability to contradict the testimony of those officers or
    assist counsel in his defense as it relates to his making those
    statements, the interest of justice compels suppression of those
    statements.
    Pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3731
    ,2 the Government appealed the district court’s
    suppression order.
    2
    Section 3731 provides in relevant part:
    An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or
    order of a district court suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the
    return of seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after the defendant
    has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an indictment or
    information, if the United States attorney certifies to the district court that the
    appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial
    proof of a fact material in the proceeding.
    3
    No. 07-30934
    The parties debate the applicable standard of review. The Government
    argues that the district court’s suppression order is most analogous to an
    application of the exclusionary rule based upon a violation of the defendant’s
    constitutional rights under the Fourth or Fifth Amendment. As such, the
    Government argues that the court should review the district court’s findings of
    fact for clear error, but that the court should review de novo whether the district
    court properly applied the exclusionary rule.        See, e.g., United States v.
    Tompkins, 
    130 F.3d 117
    , 119–20 (5th Cir. 1997) (“With regard to ruling on a
    motion to suppress, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error
    and its ultimate conclusion as to the constitutionality of the law enforcement
    action de novo.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). On the other hand, the
    defendant argues that the district court’s decision was an evidentiary ruling,
    which we should review only for an abuse of discretion. See United States v.
    Crawley, 
    533 F.3d 349
    , 353 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Evidentiary rulings are reviewed
    for an abuse of discretion.”).    We decline to resolve this dispute because
    reviewing the district court’s order under either standard, we conclude that the
    district court erred in suppressing the defendant’s statements by invoking the
    “interest of justice.”
    The district court’s order articulated no legal authority for suppressing the
    defendant’s statements. We cannot countenance the district court’s exercise of
    unbridled discretion to admit or exclude evidence based on the district court’s
    unelaborated invocation of the “interest of justice.” See generally In re Dean, 
    527 F.3d 391
    , 394 (5th Cir. 2008) (“With due respect for the district court’s diligent
    efforts to do justice, we conclude that, under the specific facts and circumstances
    of this case, it was contrary to the provisions of the CVRA for the court to permit
    and employ the ex parte proceedings that have taken place-proceedings that
    have no precedent, as far as we can determine.”). The interest of justice guides
    us always in performing our duties. Nonetheless, reliance on the “interest of
    4
    No. 07-30934
    justice,” without more, does not afford the district court any basis to ignore the
    Federal Rules of Evidence or to disregard established precedent defining the
    contours of the exclusionary rule. Because the district court’s only basis for
    suppressing the defendant’s statements—invocation of the “interest of
    justice”—is insufficient to support that ruling, we REVERSE and REMAND.3
    3
    We express no opinion on the district court’s competency ruling. The district court is
    free to reconsider or not reconsider its competency decision on remand. Furthermore, we
    reverse only the district court’s exclusion of the evidence based on the court’s invocation of the
    “interest of justice,” as that was the only basis for the court’s decision.
    5
    No. 07-30934
    DENNIS, Circuit Judge, specially concurring.
    I fully concur in the majority opinion reversing the suppression of the
    defendant’s statements and remanding to the district court. I write separately
    to note that the defendant’s competency appears to present serious
    constitutional issues which the district court may reconsider.
    The defendant’s amnesia may prevent him from receiving a fair trial
    because of the particular context of this case, and a brief overview of the facts is
    warranted. At the time of his arrest the defendant was living in a house owned
    by his mother, who resided elsewhere, and which had previously been occupied
    by his mother and step-father. On February 24, 2005, Wanda Lacy, the
    defendant’s mother, brought her grandson with her to the house in which the
    defendant was living in order to take an inventory of a collection of guns left
    there by her late husband. Lacy and her grandson did not believe the defendant
    to be home. As they were packing up the guns, however, the defendant appeared
    and accused them of trying to steal the guns. Lacy was frightened, and she and
    her grandson left the house without taking any of the firearms. According to
    Lacy, she then called the Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office and asked for assistance
    removing the guns, reported one particular gun as missing, and told the police
    that Atkins was a convicted felon. Later that night, according to Lacy, Lacy’s
    grandson told her he had seen the supposedly missing gun in the garage at the
    residence occupied by the defendant, and she informed the police that the gun
    had been located.
    The police, however, claim Lacy never told them that the defendant was
    a convicted felon. Instead, they assert that after Lacy called to report the gun
    missing they went to the house to speak to the defendant but did not find him
    there. The next day they returned, despite Lacy’s testimony that she had
    reported that the gun had been found, and according to their testimony they
    found the defendant, who told them he had the missing gun and that it was in
    6
    No. 07-30934
    the garage. According to the police the defendant escorted them to the garage,
    gestured at several gun cases, and told them the missing gun was in one of them.
    The police testified that as they began opening the cases they discovered two
    additional guns; according to the police the defendant then said one of the
    following things: “Those two are mine,” “Those two rifles are mine,” or “Those are
    my two sniper rifles” (the officers testified slightly differently on this score). The
    police then called Lacy to notify her that they had found the gun and returned
    to the police station, where they claim to have discovered for the first time that
    the defendant was a convicted felon. They then obtained an arrest warrant for
    the defendant and a search warrant for the house.
    The police attempted unsuccessfully to serve the warrant several times
    over the following week - eventually, on March 2, 2005, the day the warrant
    expired, the police informed Lacy that they would have to break into her house
    to execute the search warrant. Lacy volunteered to bring the defendant to the
    house to avert this possibility. When Lacy and the defendant arrived the police
    arrested the defendant and executed the search warrant, seizing 25 guns
    including the two sniper rifles defendant had allegedly claimed as his own
    during his first encounter with the police. The defendant was released on bond,
    and two months later, on April 25, 2005, he was admitted to the hospital for
    hypoxic encephalopathy (lack of oxygen supply to the brain), sepsis, and acute
    respiratory, renal and liver failure. The defendant was in the hospital for several
    weeks, some of which were spent in a drug-induced coma. According to the
    defendant’s doctor, Dr. Craig L. Miller, the illnesses and treatment resulted in
    extensive brain damage.
    This brain damage gave rise to the defendant’s amnesia which is at the
    center of this case. At a competency hearing held before a magistrate judge prior
    to trial, experts for both the government and the defense testified that while the
    defendant could rationally understand the charges and proceedings against him,
    7
    No. 07-30934
    his brain injuries had left him amnesiac as to the events leading to his arrest.
    The government’s expert, Dr. Robert Johnson, a forensic neuropsychologist
    employed by the Federal Bureau of Prisons in Forth Worth, Texas, testified that
    the defendant had an “amnesic disorder” that prevented him from remembering
    the events leading to his arrest. Although Dr. Johnson testified he believed the
    defendant was competent to stand trial because he understood the charges
    against him, the possible punishments, and the nature of the court proceedings,
    but he admitted that it was “a challenge” to see how the defendant could assist
    his lawyer in his own defense, ROA at 147, since “if he has no memory, he’s not
    going to be able to respond to [questions about the day he was arrested],” ROA
    at 148. Dr. Seiden, a forensic psychiatrist who testified for the defense, testified
    that the defendant was amnesic and that the question was not so much whether
    he was competent, in terms of understanding the process, the parties, and the
    consequences of the charges, but whether he could receive a fair trial given his
    amnesia. Dr. Seiden agreed with Dr. Johnson that “If you ask [the defendant]
    questions or if he has to challenge statements made during the time of his
    amnesia, he would not be able to give you information.” ROA at 156. Dr. Seiden
    also testified that the defendant’s amnesia was not likely to improve over time.
    Despite this testimony the magistrate judge found that the defendant was
    competent to stand trial because, apart from his memory deficit, he “had a good
    understanding of the charges against him and the roles of the various
    participants in court proceedings.” ROA at 115. The magistrate judge also found
    that the defendant could receive a fair trial despite his amnesia because the
    issues in the case were “whether Defendant possessed the guns and whether he
    was a convicted felon,” and these issues could be reconstructed based on the
    government’s evidence and the testimony of the defendant’s mother, who was
    involved in some of the events leading up to his arrest. ROA at 116. The district
    8
    No. 07-30934
    court adopted these recommendations but suppressed the statements made by
    the police about the defendant’s claims of ownership of the guns.
    The majority opinion fully and correctly addresses the suppression of these
    statements in the “interests of justice.” I write separately here to explain my
    view that the magistrate judge incorrectly applied the competency standard and
    the case law in finding that the defendant was competent and could receive a
    fair trial despite his amnesia as to the events leading to his arrest.
    Competency is an important component of due process in a criminal trial,
    and, as this court has recognized, also implicates “an accused’s Fifth and Sixth
    Amendment rights to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel.” United
    States v. Swanson, 
    572 F.2d 523
    , 526 (5th Cir. 1978).            As “an essential
    consideration in the fairness of the trial,” it may be evaluated or reevaluated “at
    any time during or after the trial . . .with or without a motion by counsel.” 
    Id.
     at
    526 n.3. See also 
    18 U.S.C. § 4241
    (a) (competency can be evaluated on motion of
    the government or defendant or on court’s own motion at any time between
    commencement of a prosecution and sentencing); United States v. White, 
    887 F.2d 705
    , 709 (6th Cir. 1989) (“It is also clear that [
    18 U.S.C. § 4241
    ] in no way
    limits the court to a single inquiry into a defendant’s competency. Indeed § 4241
    contemplates inquiry over a wide period of time . . .”). Further, a magistrate
    judge’s prior determination of competency does not prevent the parties or the
    court from requesting or conducting further competency proceedings at trial.
    White, 
    887 F.2d at 709
    . Thus the district court in this case has the authority -
    even the responsibility - to reexamine competency on remand. 
    18 U.S.C. § 4241
    (a) (“The court . . . shall order [a competency] hearing on its own motion, if
    there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be
    suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent
    . . . .”).
    9
    No. 07-30934
    A defendant must be declared incompetent to stand trial if the court finds
    him to be “presently insane or otherwise so mentally incompetent that he is
    unable to understand the proceedings against him or properly assist in his own
    defense.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 4241
    (d). The Supreme Court has interpreted this test to be
    an inquiry into whether the defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult
    with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether
    he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
    him.” Swanson, 
    572 F.2d at 525-26
     (referencing Dusky v. United States, 
    362 U.S. 402
     (1960)).
    Although in most cases the competency inquiry focuses on whether the
    defendant is able to understand the charges, the proceedings, and the roles of
    the various players in the judicial process, a defendant is incompetent if he
    cannot satisfy either part of the standard. “To show a substantive violation [of
    defendant’s due process rights], an accused must prove an inability either to
    comprehend or participate in the criminal proceedings.” Holmes v. King, 
    709 F.2d 965
    , 967 (5th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). In ordinary circumstances a
    defendant who cannot understand the charges, proceedings, or judicial process
    is unlikely to be able to participate in his defense, and vice versa. It is only in the
    rare case, as here, that the two parts of the test do not automatically follow from
    one another. Nevertheless, the fact that the test is often collapsed does not mean
    that the two parts are not still independent requirements.
    In the case of an amnesiac defendant who is otherwise generally mentally
    sound, it is the second part of the test - the requirement that the defendant be
    able to participate in his own defense - that is most relevant. This circuit has
    dealt with this rare situation before. In United States v. Swanson, one of the
    defendants to an extortion charge moved for dismissal on the grounds that his
    amnesia as to the events in question prevented him from participating in his
    own defense and receiving a fair trial. Swanson, 
    572 F.2d at 525
    . In that case,
    10
    No. 07-30934
    this court indicated that a criminal defendant’s amnesia is not a per se bar to
    trial, but instead triggers a case-by-case fact-based analysis. 
    Id. at 526
    . The
    inquiry into an amnesiac defendant’s competency proceeds on two levels. At the
    first, “subjective” level, the court considers the defendant’s ability to participate
    in his own defense. The factors at this stage include (1) the defendant’s ability
    to take the stand on relevant matters other than those which he cannot
    remember, (2) whether the defendant has any other conditions that hinder his
    ability to participate in his own defense, (3) whether a continuance would
    improve the chances of a fair trial or make a fair trial more difficult, and (4)
    whether the amnesia appears to be real or feigned. 
    Id. at 526-27
    . At the second,
    “objective” level, the court considers whether the defendant can receive a fair
    trial despite the challenges his amnesia may raise when it comes to assisting in
    his own defense. Factors at this stage include (1) whether the crime and the
    defendant’s whereabouts can be reconstructed without his testimony, (2) the
    strength of the case against the defendant, and (3) whether some of the
    disadvantage could be mitigated by giving the defendant access to the
    government’s files. 
    Id. at 527
    .
    The record in this case demonstrates that the defendant’s amnesia may
    prevent him from receiving a fair trial. At the subjective level, only the first
    factor applies here. The defendant cannot take the stand on related relevant
    matters because there are no other relevant matters - the only relevant matters
    are precisely those which he cannot remember, viz., what, if anything, he said
    to the police about the guns that were found in his mother’s house.
    Both the first and second factors of the objective prong illustrate the
    defendant’s disadvantage for the same reasons. There is no way to reconstruct
    the scene accurately, through the time-tested method of the adversarial process,
    without his testimony. Moreover, as the government has admitted, there is no
    evidence supporting the charge of possession of a firearm except the testimony
    11
    No. 07-30934
    by the police officers as to the defendant’s statements. ROA at 208. The
    government has no evidence that the defendant purchased the guns, 
    id.,
     and
    thus no way to prove ownership or possession apart from the alleged statements.
    The fact that they were in the house belonging to his mother in which he was
    living is not dispositive, since his step-father, who lived there previously, had
    owned and kept a large collection of guns which remained in the house after his
    death - inventorying those guns was the reason the defendant’s mother went
    over to the house on February 24 in the first place.
    In addition, defendant’s counsel has no way of knowing how to cross-
    examine the police officers since his client has no memory of the events in
    question. The government’s expert admitted as much at the competency hearing.
    ROA at 148. This case turns on a credibility determination among competing
    witnesses - or rather, it would if the defendant could testify as to anything that
    happened. The fact that the defendant’s mother’s testimony differs from that of
    the police officers in troubling ways (she testifies that she told them he was a
    convicted felon, the police say they had no idea; she testifies she told them the
    gun had already been found before they went looking for the defendant, the
    police went to look for the defendant anyway despite allegedly not knowing he
    was a convicted felon) only emphasizes the importance that the defendant’s
    testimony would have, were he able to give it. Given these facts, the
    government’s case is extremely weak.
    Finally, with regards to the third factor, this disadvantage cannot be
    mitigated by giving the defendant access to the government’s files. The
    government has conceded there is no evidence beyond the statements of the
    police officers.
    The magistrate judge who determined the defendant’s competency relied
    heavily on United States v. Doke, 
    171 F.3d 240
     (5th Cir. 1999), in which this
    court found the district court did not err by finding a defendant competent to
    12
    No. 07-30934
    stand trial despite his claims of amnesia as to the events leading to his arrest
    and conviction for financial fraud. Doke, however, is distinguishable from this
    case on several important points. First, in Doke, the defendant claimed to suffer
    some “memory lapses” but there was no agreement, as there is here, on the
    severity of the problem. The government expert in that case, in fact, believed
    that the defendant’s “overall ability to utilize his memory functions is still
    adequate and consistent with what might be expected from someone at his
    intellectual level,” Doke, 
    171 F.3d at 248
    , and testified that “the defendant
    “remembers a great deal, is aware of his intentions and plans concerning this
    business at that time, and can even be reminded and sometimes remember
    details if he is provided with helpful information.” 
    Id.
     In its analysis in Doke,
    this court noted particularly, in reference to how the amnesia might
    disadvantage the defendant in assisting in his own defense, that access to
    government files about the financial transactions could fill in the defendant’s
    memory, and that “someone with no mental defects likely would have had
    reduced memory of ten-year-old financial transactions.” 
    Id.
    The facts in this case are very different. First, both the government and
    the defense experts agree that the defendant has complete or near complete
    amnesia about the events surrounding his arrest and is unlikely to recover from
    it. The defendant has no memory of what happened, and cannot remember
    anything either about his general disposition at the time or the precise events
    that took place. As discussed earlier, the government files provide no additional
    information. The magistrate judge, in comparing Doke to the instant case,
    seemed to believe that the fact that Doke was a complicated financial case meant
    that amnesia would be more of a problem in Doke, and thus that since the
    defendant in Doke had been held competent the defendant here must be
    competent too. ROA at 116 (“This is not a complicated fraud case which would
    require Defendant to explain or justify detailed transactions that took place
    13
    No. 07-30934
    years earlier”). But, in fact, it is the complex financial nature of Doke that made
    the defendant’s amnesia less problematic there than it is here. Financial
    transactions are the kind of evidence that appear in official records and can be
    consulted by either party in preparation for trial - they are, to some extent at
    least, verifiable facts. Their complexity is not the crucial factor - what is relevant
    is that the defendant in Doke was in the position of having a sense of his general
    approach to his business but not being able to remember every detail of
    complicated transactions he made a decade prior to his trial. The defendant here
    has no memory of anything that happened around his arrest, and whatever did
    happen is not an independently verifiable recorded fact. If the government had
    paperwork showing the defendant owned the guns that would be more analogous
    to Doke - but as it has admitted, it has no such proof. Any statements of
    ownership or non-ownership that the defendant may or may not have made are
    not verifiable apart from eyewitness testimony.
    The magistrate judge also noted that since the defendant’s mother was
    involved in some of the incidents leading to his arrest she could testify to fill in
    the gaps. ROA at 116. But she was not present during the crucial conversation
    in which the defendant allegedly claimed ownership of the guns. And to the
    extent she has testified, as explained above, her testimony differs from that
    given by the police, suggesting again that a credibility determination is essential
    to this case and thus that the defendant’s testimony would be essential as well.
    For all these reasons, the defendant’s amnesia may prevent him from receiving
    a fair trial.
    14