Z.P. v. K.P. ( 2022 )


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  • J-A22036-21
    
    2022 PA Super 6
    Z.P.                                       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                           :
    :
    :
    K.P.                                       :
    :
    :
    APPEAL OF: COMMONWEALTH OF                 :
    PENNSYLVANIA                               :        No. 547 MDA 2021
    Appeal from the Order Entered April 14, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
    Civil Division at No(s): 2019-FC-2270-03
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.
    OPINION BY KING, J.:                                   FILED JANUARY 06, 2022
    Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from the order
    entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas, which placed limitations
    on the manner in which the Commonwealth was permitted to interview R.P.
    (d.o.b. June 2014) and A.P. (d.o.b. January 2016) (“Children”) as part of its
    investigation into child abuse allegations against Z.P. (“Father”).         For the
    following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.1
    In its opinion, the trial court accurately set forth some of the relevant
    facts and procedural history of this case as follows:
    In December 2019, K.P. (Mother) alleged that an incident
    ____________________________________________
    1 Although the Commonwealth included the parties’ full names in the caption
    of its notice of appeal, we have changed the caption to reflect the initials of
    the parties, as the trial court record uses the parties’ initials. See Pa.R.A.P.
    904(b)(1) (stating parties shall be stated in caption as they appeared on
    record of trial court at time appeal was taken).
    J-A22036-21
    occurred while Z.P. (Father) was putting cream on his son,
    R.P., who was 5 years old at that time. Mother and/or
    Maternal Grandmother then later alleged that something
    happened with his daughter, A.P., then age 3. York County
    Office of Children Youth and Families (CYF) became
    involved. Both children underwent forensic medical exams
    and interviews with a [Sexual Assault Forensic Examination
    (“SAFE”)] nurse in December 2019. They then underwent
    separate forensic interviews at the Children’s Advocacy
    Center (CAC) on multiple occasions. R.P. was interviewed
    in December 2019, January 2020, and June 2020. A.P. was
    interviewed in December 2019 and June 2020. [CYF]
    initially indicated the report for both children[.] Father, who
    was a teacher, was suspended without pay from his job. No
    criminal charges were ever filed, and Father appealed the
    CYF determinations.
    On December 9, 2019, Mother filed for a Protection from
    Abuse (PFA) Order for herself and both children in action
    2019-FC-002270-12.         Father’s parental rights were
    effectively suspended as of December 9, 2019 by
    Temporary Order based on the…allegations made by Mother
    in her PFA Petition. On April 6, 2020, Father filed a
    Complaint for Custody seeking physical and legal custody of
    the children. Some delays occurred in both cases due to the
    ongoing investigation. An Interim Order for Custody was
    entered by the court on May 26, 2020, granting Mother sole
    legal and primary physical custody of the children due to the
    ongoing CYF investigation into the allegations made by
    Mother. The Order directed that Father would have no rights
    of partial physical custody or visitation unless and until
    ordered by the [c]ourt. The parties agreed to entry of a
    final PFA Order on behalf of the children against Father on
    May 28, 2020. The order was entered without admissions
    to the allegations contained in the petition and provided that
    Mother was to have temporary physical custody of the
    [children] with Father permitted supervised contact with the
    children as the parties could agree.
    From December 2019 through June 2020, Father had no
    contact with the children. A Pre-Trial Custody Conference
    was held on June 30, 2020. The resulting Order permitted
    Zoom calls in a therapeutic setting and scheduled a custody
    settlement conference for September 23, 2020. At the
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    Settlement Conference, issues were raised that required…a
    Threat of Harm hearing, which was scheduled for December
    3, 2020. Additionally, the resulting Order gave counsel
    access to the CAC interviews, and counsel agreed that the
    court should view the CYF file in camera. The Threat of
    Harm hearing commenced on December 3, 2020, but it was
    not completed in the time allotted. The court did issue an
    order on December 3, 2020 expanding Father’s rights from
    Zoom calls and therapeutic sessions to [supervised] visits….
    The hearing was continued to February 19, 2021. The court
    heard from Dr. Casey Shienvold, who had evaluated Father
    for a threat of harm in accordance with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5329.
    Dr. Casey Shienvold opined that Father did not fit the profile
    for a perpetrator and did not pose a threat of harm. Dr.
    Arnold Shienvold performed psychological evaluations of
    both parents. He did not raise any significant issues with
    Father and notably opined that “Mother’s religious beliefs
    appear to set the foundation for what she perceives as ‘right’
    and ‘wrong’ and how she interprets it. She forms her
    opinions secondary to emotional reactions. After forming
    her opinion, Mother may then obsessively search for ‘facts,’
    which again may be more emotionally then tangibly based,
    to prove her perceptions are ‘true.’” (Father’s Ex. E).
    While CYF originally indicated a report on Father based on
    the alleged abuse, Father appealed the determination. CYF
    then declined to pursue the case, and on December 30,
    2020, DHS ordered that the reports be expunged. At the
    time of the February 19, 2021 hearing, the PFA was vacated
    by agreement of the parties. Additionally, there did not
    appear to be a pending criminal investigation, and no
    criminal action had been taken.       Therefore, the court
    modified the interim order to provide some custody for
    Father to be supervised by Paternal Grandmother. The
    threat of harm hearing was continued until April 5, 2021,
    which was supposed to have been in person with the court
    talking to the children. However, just prior to April 5,
    Mother’s counsel informed the court and counsel that
    Mother and the children had been exposed to COVID. Even
    though no supporting documentation was provided, the
    court rescheduled the testimony of the children to an in-
    person interview on April 14, 2021, and proceeded with
    other testimony via Zoom on April 5. In accordance with
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    the prior agreement of counsel (N.T. 2/19/21 at page 218),
    the court watched the five CAC interviews of the children
    during the weekend prior to the April 5th hearing.
    During the hearing on April 5, 2021, the [c]ourt was made
    aware that another referral was made against Father
    following his weekend of supervised custody. Counsel for
    CYF and the caseworker assigned were able to Zoom into
    court and report the status. The [c]ourt had the discussion
    off the record with all counsel and the caseworker present;
    but no parties [were] present as the discussion concerned
    an ongoing investigation. The caseworker was new to the
    case and was not [the caseworker] who had testified
    previously with regard to the other allegations. The court
    was informed that another CAC interview was scheduled on
    April 13, the day before the children’s rescheduled
    testimony to the court. Additionally, there was some
    confusion as to whether Mother had contact with the
    children immediately following Father’s weekend, and the
    caseworker may not have been aware that Mother taught at
    the school that the children attended. While the [c]ourt did
    not issue a separate Order, the court indicated that no one
    was to talk to the children, including the CAC, prior to the
    children’s scheduled testimony nine days later. The CYF
    solicitor…was present and did not object.
    The court then received a call from the District Attorney’s
    office requesting an emergency meeting. As a courtesy, an
    Emergency Status Hearing was scheduled and held at 8:30
    a.m. [on April 9, 2021] before other scheduled court
    business.
    (Trial Court Opinion, filed May 11, 2021, at 2-7).
    On the morning of April 9, 2021, the court informed the Commonwealth
    that it would be canceling the CAC interview scheduled with the Children for
    April 13th as part of the Commonwealth’s child abuse investigation. The court
    stated that Children were “CAC’d out.” (N.T. Hearing, 4/9/21, at 2; R.R. at
    2a).    The court expressed its concern that Children had already been
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    interviewed multiple times and Father had no unsupervised time with Children
    in over a year. The court explained that Children were “burned out from going
    over the same information over and over again.”        (Id. at 5; R.R. at 5a).
    Further, the court said it had “serious coaching concerns.” (Id.)
    The Commonwealth responded that the trial court lacked standing in the
    child abuse investigation to dictate if future interviews would occur.    The
    Commonwealth maintained that there was a new allegation of abuse against
    Father, and the Commonwealth had a duty to investigate that allegation.
    Further, to the extent Mother or Maternal Grandmother might be coaching
    Children, the Commonwealth would investigate that as well because that could
    be a criminal issue.
    In response, the trial court emphasized that it had jurisdiction over
    Children regarding the underlying custody matter and needed to act in
    Children’s best interests. The court wanted any interviewers to familiarize
    themselves with the history of this case and watch any previous CAC
    interviews. Accordingly, the court issued the following verbal order:
    And now, this 9th day of April 2021, the [c]ourt is issuing an
    Order that no one will interview these children about any
    allegations involving sexual misconduct by Father unless he
    or she has read both of the reports by Dr. Shienvold, the
    transcript of all custody proceedings to date, and watched
    all of the prior CAC interviews.
    The [c]ourt is extremely concerned about coaching in this
    case of these children and CAC burnout. It was clear
    watching the interviews of the children in order that their
    descriptions of events became more specific rather than less
    specific over the time involved and that they made
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    extremely disparaging comments regarding Father and his
    family that were clearly coming from Mother and her family.
    It was also clear that Father has undergone an extensive
    threat of harm assessment and that there has been a
    separate report where the psychologist concluded that
    Mother, rather than changing her view to fit the facts,
    changes her facts to fit her view.
    The [c]ourt will be interviewing these children on the 14th of
    April 2021 and does not want their testimony tainted by an
    interview on the 13th by other individuals who are clearly
    not aware of the entire history of this case or the testimony
    this [c]ourt has taken thus far. The [c]ourt makes a specific
    finding that that would be harmful to the children at this
    point in time.
    The [c]ourt will make the transcript of the children’s
    testimony available to York County CYF and the York County
    District Attorney’s Office.       Additionally, under the
    circumstances, the [c]ourt will allow an attorney from the
    District Attorney’s Office to be present for the children’s
    interview by the [c]ourt on the 14th. If there are any
    questions that the District Attorney’s office would like the
    [c]ourt to explore, they may be submitted in advance to the
    [c]ourt.
    The [c]ourt will hold anyone in contempt who allows these
    children to be interviewed outside the parameters of this
    [c]ourt Order.
    (Id. at 11-13; R.R. at 11a-13a). The court also indicated that it would be
    appointing a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for Children.
    On April 13, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal, along
    with a certification stating the appeal was proper per Pa.R.A.P. 313 (involving
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    collateral orders).2       That same day, the Commonwealth also filed an
    application for emergency stay in this Court, asking this Court to stay and
    enjoin the trial court from conducting its scheduled interviews of Children on
    April 14th, and to enjoin the trial court from barring the Commonwealth from
    conducting a proper child abuse investigation as mandated by law.
    The parties and the Commonwealth appeared before the court again on
    April 14, 2021. The court referred the Commonwealth to Section 5329.1 of
    the Domestic Relations Code (consideration of child abuse and involvement
    with protective services) in support of its decision to place limitations on the
    Commonwealth’s interview of Children. (N.T. Hearing, 4/14/21, at 5; R.R. at
    51a). Under that statute, the trial court insisted CYF was required to fully
    cooperate with the court and assist the court in fulfilling its duties to determine
    if child abuse occurred in this case. (Id. at 10; R.R. at 56a). The court stated
    that it had a duty under Section 5329.1 to develop procedures to implement
    the provisions of that section and the statute required CYF to cooperate with
    the court—not the court to cooperate with CYF. (Id. at 13-14; R.R. at 59a-
    ____________________________________________
    2 The Commonwealth contends that it filed its concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal along with the notice of appeal on April 13, 2021,
    consistent with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). Nevertheless, the Commonwealth’s
    Rule 1925 statement is docketed one day after the notice of appeal. Even if
    the Commonwealth did not file its Rule 1925 statement contemporaneously
    with the notice of appeal, we can overlook this defect. See In re K.T.E.L.,
    
    983 A.2d 745
     (Pa.Super. 2009) (holding failure of appellant in children’s fast
    track case to file contemporaneously concise statement with notice of appeal
    will result in defective notice of appeal, disposition of which will be decided on
    case-by-case basis).
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    60a).
    The Commonwealth informed the court that it filed a notice of appeal
    from the court’s April 9, 2021 verbal order because it believed the child abuse
    investigation should proceed independently from the custody action. (Id. at
    8; R.R. at 54a). The court then told the Commonwealth that it lacked standing
    to file a notice of appeal in the custody action because the Commonwealth
    had not filed a petition to intervene.      Nevertheless, the court told the
    Commonwealth that if it moved to intervene in the custody action for the
    purpose of pursuing the already filed appeal, the court would grant that
    request. (Id. at 8-9; R.R. at 54a-55a). The court stated it still intended to
    interview Children that day.
    The Commonwealth responded that it did not think the court could
    interview Children in light of the Commonwealth’s notice of appeal.
    Additionally, the Commonwealth explained it filed the application for stay in
    this Court to prevent the trial court from interviewing Children to avoid any
    taint in the child abuse investigation. (Id. at 12; R.R. at 58a).
    The court also clarified that it did not intend to prevent the
    Commonwealth       from   investigating   but   sought   only   to   restrict   the
    Commonwealth from interviewing Children due to the numerous CAC
    interviews Children had already undergone. The court noted that its April 9,
    2021 verbal order had not even been filed yet when the Commonwealth filed
    its notice of appeal because the court had not yet reduced it to writing. In
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    any event, the court explained it intended to amend its April 9, 2021 order.
    (Id. at 29; R.R. at 75a). The court expressed its concern in this case, as well
    as others, where children in high conflict custody cases were being subject to
    multiple CAC interviews in a short timeframe, which the court did not believe
    were in the best interests of the children. (Id.) The court also stressed its
    belief that a GAL should have the option of being present at such interviews if
    doing so would further the best interests of the children. (Id.)
    The court remarked:
    I have lost trust in the CAC because we have a problem. We
    have a problem that law enforcement and the DA’s office
    when you take the position you’ve got to talk to these kids
    every time [there is an allegation of abuse] is becoming that
    problem. It’s compromising the credibility of these kids, it’s
    compromising the credibility of the parents, it’s
    compromising the credibility of the process, and it’s making
    everybody unwitting partners in a pattern of harassment,
    and I have a concern about that. Now, no judge wants to
    put kids into a situation where they are being abused, but
    the standard isn’t, oh, the kids might be abused if possibly
    we put them with dad. In this case it’s preponderance of
    the evidence. Now I know in child abuse cases we want to
    err on the side of making sure these children are safe, but I
    also have to follow the law. And if you’re going to do an
    investigation it has to be one that I have confidence in
    because ultimately I am the decision maker. And I don’t
    have confidence in the process right now, and that is the
    bigger problem you have.           And we need to work
    cooperatively to solve that, okay?
    (Id. at 30-31; R.R. at 77a-78a). The court reiterated that it sought only to
    limit the Commonwealth’s interviews with Children—not to impede the child
    abuse investigation in any other way.      (Id. at 34-35; R.R. at 80a-81a).
    Specifically, the court said it was “restraining [law enforcement] from…talking
    -9-
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    to children without appropriate safety measures in place to guarantee that
    [Children] will not be psychologically harmed and they won’t need to be talked
    to about the same set of incidents repeatedly by multiple individuals.” (Id. at
    37; R.R. at 83a).
    The   Commonwealth      interjected     that   the   new   allegations   the
    Commonwealth sought to investigate were not necessarily the same as older
    allegations already discussed with Children. (Id. at 42; R.R. at 88a). The
    court stated it was under the impression the new allegation came about after
    Children’s first weekend with Father since the initial abuse allegations and
    pertained to Father and Paternal Grandfather. The court was concerned about
    Mother’s involvement in that allegation. (Id. at 43; R.R. at 89a). The court
    then entered the following amended order:
    And Now, this 14th day of April 2021, the [c]ourt is issuing
    an order that no one interview these children about any
    allegations involving sexual misconduct by father or
    grandfather unless he or she has read both of the reports
    by the Dr. Shienvolds, the transcript of all of the custody
    proceedings to date and watched all of the prior CAC
    interviews.
    Additionally, no interview of the children shall be conducted
    by any attorney or law enforcement without the permission
    of the GAL and attorney appointed in this case, Lori Yost.
    Attorney Yost need not be present for the interview if she
    feels that it is not necessary to protect the interest of her
    client. However, a decision by her to be present for any
    interview, including an interview at the CAC, is solely at the
    discretion of the GAL looking at protecting the interest of
    her clients.
    The [c]ourt is extremely concerned about coaching in this
    case of these children and CAC burnout. It was clear
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    watching the interviews of the children in order that their
    description of events became more specific rather than less
    specific over time and that they made extremely disparaging
    comments regarding father and his family that were clearly
    coming from Mother and her family.
    The [c]ourt has also heard testimony from Dr. Shienvold
    regarding evaluations of father, mother and the situation
    involving the threat of harm…. Dr. Arnold Shienvold opined
    that mother rather than changing the view to fit the facts,
    is changing the facts to fit her view. The [c]ourt feels it is
    important for any interviewer to understand the context in
    which allegations are being made.
    (Id. at 48-49; R.R. at 94a-95a). The court further noted it was appointing
    the GAL as Children’s legal counsel as well. Additionally, the court ordered
    that any violation of its order would constitute contempt. (Id. at 50; R.R. at
    96a).
    The Commonwealth then made an oral motion to intervene in the case,
    which the court granted. (Id.) No party objected to the Commonwealth’s
    motion.    At that point, the Commonwealth noted it was in receipt of this
    Court’s grant of the application to stay the trial court from interviewing
    Children until further order of Court.3 (Id. at 51; R.R. at 97a). The custody
    trial then continued, with the exception of the court’s interview of Children. 4
    ____________________________________________
    3This Court’s order did not rule on the Commonwealth’s additional request to
    enjoin the trial court from prohibiting the Commonwealth from proceeding
    with its child abuse investigation.
    4 The court heard testimony from Mary Glunt, a preschool teacher at A.P.’s
    school, and from Mother.
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    The Commonwealth now raises one issue in this appeal:5
    Chapter 63 of the Domestic Relations Code mandates that
    law enforcement conduct a criminal investigation into
    suspected child abuse allegations that may violate
    Pennsylvania criminal laws. In this civil action in which the
    Commonwealth was not a direct party, the trial court as a
    collateral matter has barred the Commonwealth, through
    the Office of the District Attorney and other agencies, from
    conducting a criminal child abuse investigation including a
    forensic interview of the suspected minor complainants at
    the York County Children’s Advocacy Center. Did the trial
    court exceed the scope of its authority and violate Title 23,
    Chapter 63 by prohibiting the Office of the District Attorney
    and/or law enforcement from conducting its criminal
    investigation into suspected child abuse?
    (Commonwealth’s Brief at 4).
    As a preliminary matter, “the appealability of an order directly implicates
    the jurisdiction of the court asked to review the order.” Estate of Considine
    v. Wachovia Bank, 
    966 A.2d 1148
    , 1151 (Pa.Super. 2009). Pennsylvania
    law makes clear:
    [A]n appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order or an order
    ____________________________________________
    5 Because the court’s verbal April 9, 2021 order was not reduced to writing or
    entered on the docket when the Commonwealth filed its notice of appeal, and
    given that the court did not even grant the Commonwealth standing in this
    matter until April 14, 2021, we will treat the Commonwealth’s notice of appeal
    as from the April 14, 2021 amended order, and relate it forward to that date.
    See In re L.M., 
    923 A.2d 505
     (Pa.Super. 2007) (stating order is not
    appealable until it is entered on docket with required notation that appropriate
    notice has been given). See also Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (stating notice of
    appeal filed after announcement of determination but before entry of
    appealable order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on day thereof).
    Thus, we disagree with the Commonwealth’s contention that the April 14,
    2021 amended order was a “legal nullity” where the appeal was already
    pending (see Commonwealth’s Brief at 38 n.128), as the Commonwealth’s
    appeal prior to entry of any written docketed order was premature.
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    certified as a final order (Pa.R.A.P. 341); (2) an
    interlocutory order as of right (Pa.R.A.P. 311); (3) an
    interlocutory order by permission (Pa.R.A.P. 312, 1311, 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b)); or (4) a collateral order (Pa.R.A.P.
    313).
    Stahl v. Redcay, 
    897 A.2d 478
    , 485 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 
    591 Pa. 704
    , 
    918 A.2d 747
     (2007). A final order in a civil case is one that disposes
    of all the parties and all the claims; or is entered as a final order pursuant to
    the trial court’s determination under Rule 341(c). See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1),
    (3). “[A] custody order will be considered final and appealable only after the
    trial court has completed its hearings on the merits and the resultant order
    resolves the pending custody claims between the parties.” G.B. v. M.M.B.,
    
    670 A.2d 714
    , 715 (Pa.Super. 1996) (en banc).
    A collateral order is defined in Rule 313 as follows:
    Rule 313. Collateral Orders
    *    *       *
    (b) Definition. A collateral order is an order separable
    from and collateral to the main cause of action where the
    right involved is too important to be denied review and the
    question presented is such that if review is postponed until
    final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.
    Pa.R.A.P. 313(b).
    “With regard to the first prong of the collateral order doctrine, an order
    is separable from the main cause of action if it is entirely distinct from the
    underlying issue in the case and if it can be resolved without an analysis of
    the merits of the underlying dispute.” K.C. v. L.A., 
    633 Pa. 722
    , 729, 128
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    21 A.3d 774
    , 779 (2015) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
    Regarding the second prong, “a right is important if the interests that would
    go unprotected without immediate appeal are significant relative to the
    efficiency interests served by the final order rule.” Id. at 730, 128 A.3d at
    779.   “[I]t is not sufficient that the issue under review is important to a
    particular party; it ‘must involve rights deeply rooted in public policy going
    beyond the particular litigation at hand.’” Stahl, 
    supra at 485
    . Concerning
    the third prong, whether a party’s claims will be “irreparably lost” if review is
    postponed turns on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. See
    K.C., supra; G.B., 
    supra.
    Instantly, the record makes clear the court’s April 9, 2021 verbal order
    and April 14, 2021 amended order did not resolve all of the custody issues
    between the parties. Consequently, there was no “final” order for purposes
    of Rule 341.     See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b); G.B., 
    supra.
              Nevertheless, the
    Commonwealth has certified that the appeal is proper under Rule 313. As to
    the first prong of the collateral order doctrine, we agree with the
    Commonwealth that the order placing limitations on the Commonwealth’s
    interview with Children is separable from the underlying custody dispute
    between Mother and Father. See K.C., supra. Regarding the second prong
    of the test, we also agree that the right at issue—the Commonwealth’s ability
    to conduct a child abuse investigation without interference from a custody
    court—is a right too important to be denied review. See id. Finally, we agree
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    with the Commonwealth that its right would be irreparably lost if we denied
    review, because the Commonwealth would then have to follow the dictates of
    the court’s restrictions to conduct its child abuse investigation. Id. Therefore,
    we agree the appeal is properly before us pursuant to the collateral order
    doctrine. See Pa.R.A.P. 313(b).
    On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court exceeded its
    authority by unilaterally canceling a forensic interview of Children that were
    the subject of sex abuse allegations and by imposing requirements on law
    enforcement before any interviews with Children.           The Commonwealth
    contends that the trial court erroneously relied on Section 5329.1 of the
    Domestic Relations Code to impede the Commonwealth from proceeding with
    its child abuse investigation, where that statute only grants the trial court
    authority in custody settings. The Commonwealth admits that Section 5329.1
    grants the trial court authority to interview children during a custody trial
    regarding abuse allegations to make an informed custody decision.            The
    Commonwealth further concedes that it had no authority to prohibit the trial
    court from interviewing Children during the custody trial. Nevertheless, the
    Commonwealth insists the trial court had no authority under Section 5329.1
    to interfere with a child abuse investigation. The Commonwealth emphasizes
    that Section 5329.1 also does not require law enforcement to assist the court.
    The Commonwealth stresses that the court’s actions constituted “judicial
    overreach” into a child abuse investigation. (Commonwealth’s Brief at 31).
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    By contrast, the Commonwealth highlights that Section 6334.1 of the
    Domestic Relations Code (responsibility for investigation of suspected child
    abuse) requires the Commonwealth to investigate allegations of child abuse.
    Unlike Section 5329.1, which expressly authorizes the trial court’s role in child
    abuse custody settings, the Commonwealth submits that Section 6334.1 does
    not reference the judiciary at all. The Commonwealth suggests that if the
    legislature wanted the judiciary to have a role in child abuse investigations in
    non-custody settings, then it would have included such language in Section
    6334.1. The Commonwealth further relies on Section 6365 of the Domestic
    Relations Code, which charges the District Attorney’s Office, not the trial court,
    with convening a multidisciplinary investigative team regarding child abuse
    allegations. The Commonwealth claims the trial court lacked jurisdiction over
    Children as it relates to any child abuse investigation and maintained
    jurisdiction over Children only as it pertains to the specific custody action
    before it.
    The Commonwealth further argues that the court abused its discretion
    by ordering the GAL to have decision-making powers as it relates to a child
    abuse investigation. The Commonwealth avers that the GAL cannot serve as
    a gatekeeper to law enforcement engaging in a child abuse investigation. The
    Commonwealth proclaims it has no obligation to discuss a pending child abuse
    investigation with the GAL, and the GAL cannot unilaterally decide if she will
    be present for an interview with Children as it relates to a child abuse
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    investigation.6     The Commonwealth concludes the trial court abused its
    discretion and exceeded the scope of its authority by interfering with a child
    abuse investigation, and this Court must reverse and remand with instructions
    that Children are permitted to be interviewed pursuant to the child abuse
    investigation protocols of York County. For the following reasons, we agree
    with the Commonwealth’s position.
    Issues involving statutory construction are questions of law, for which
    our standard of review is de novo and scope of review is plenary. Shafer
    Elec. & Const. v. Mantia, 
    626 Pa. 258
    , 
    96 A.3d 989
     (2014).
    Under [the rules of statutory construction], we must
    interpret and construe the challenged statute in a manner
    that ascertains and effectuates the full intention of the
    legislature. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). “When the words of a
    statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it
    is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its
    spirit.” Id. § 1921(b). We must further assume that the
    legislature did “not intend a result that is absurd, impossible
    of execution or unreasonable.” Id. § 1922(1). Finally, it is
    not for the courts to add, by interpretation, to a statute, a
    requirement which the legislature did not see fit to include.
    ____________________________________________
    6 The Commonwealth also argues that the trial court’s decision was motivated
    by bias and ill-will against the District Attorney’s Office and the CAC. (See
    Commonwealth’s Brief at 32-44). Nevertheless, the Commonwealth did not
    preserve this claim of error in its Rule 1925 statement, so it is waived on
    appeal. See In re A.B., 
    63 A.3d 345
     (Pa.Super. 2013) (reiterating general
    rule that issues not raised in concise statement of errors are waived on
    appeal). To the extent the Commonwealth contends that the court did not
    demonstrate bias until the April 14, 2021 proceeding, which was after the
    Commonwealth had already filed its concise statement of errors, the
    Commonwealth did not seek to supplement its concise statement to raise this
    additional claim.
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    J-A22036-21
    Shafer, supra at 266, 96 A.3d at 994 (some internal citations omitted).
    Our review of this appeal implicates the interplay of different sections of
    the Domestic Relations Code. Section 5329.1, on which the trial court relied
    at the April 14, 2021 hearing, falls under Chapter 53 of the Domestic Relations
    Code, and applies to disputes relating to child custody matters.         See 23
    Pa.C.S.A. § 5321 (scope of chapter). Section 5329.1 provides as follows:
    § 5329.1     Consideration of child             abuse     and
    involvement with protective services
    (a)      Information sharing.—In accordance with
    section 6340(a)(5.1) (relating to release of information in
    confidential reports), where a party seeks any form of
    custody, subject to the examination of the parties, the
    court shall determine:
    (1) With respect to child abuse under Chapter 63
    (relating to child protective services) or a child who is a
    victim of a crime under 18 Pa.C.S. (relating to crimes and
    offenses) which would constitute abuse under Chapter 63:
    (i)  Whether the child is the subject of an indicated or
    founded report of child abuse.
    (ii)  Whether a party or a member of the party’s
    household has been identified as the perpetrator in an
    indicated or founded report of child abuse.
    (iii)   The date and circumstances of the child abuse.
    (iv) The jurisdiction where the child abuse investigation
    took place.
    (2) With respect to child protective services or general
    protective services under Chapter 63:
    (i)   Whether a party or a member of a party’s
    household has been provided services.
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    J-A22036-21
    (ii)   The type of services provided.
    (iii) The circumstances surrounding the provision of
    services.
    (iv)   The status of services.
    (v)    The date the services were provided.
    (vi)   The jurisdiction where the services were provided.
    (b)       Cooperation.—The following apply:
    (1) The Department of [Human Services] and the
    county children and youth social service agency shall
    fully cooperate with the court and assist the court in
    fulfilling its duties under this section.
    (2) The Department of [Human Services] and the
    county children and youth social service agency shall fully
    cooperate with the governing authority in order to
    implement the provisions of this section.
    (3) The governing authority shall develop procedures
    to implement the provisions of this section.
    (4) As used in this subsection, the term “governing
    authority” shall have the meaning given to it in 42 Pa.C.S.
    § 102 (relating to definitions).
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5329.1 (emphasis added) (internal footnote omitted). See
    also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(2.1) (requiring trial court to consider information
    set forth in Section 5329.1(a) as part of 16-factor custody analysis in making
    custody determination).
    Section 6334.1, on which the Commonwealth relies, falls under Chapter
    63 of the Domestic Relations Code, known as the Child Protective Services
    Law (“CPSL”). See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301. The purpose of the CPSL is to:
    - 19 -
    J-A22036-21
    encourage more complete reporting of suspected child
    abuse; to the extent permitted by this chapter, to involve
    law enforcement agencies in responding to child abuse; and
    to establish in each county protective services for the
    purpose of investigating the reports swiftly and
    competently, providing protection for children from further
    abuse and providing rehabilitative services for children and
    parents involved so as to ensure the child’s well-being and
    to preserve, stabilize and protect the integrity of family life
    wherever appropriate or to provide another alternative
    permanent family when the unity of the family cannot be
    maintained. …
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(b). Thus, the CPSL “tasks county Children and Youth
    Agencies with investigating reports of suspected child abuse or neglect. The
    CPSL defines ‘child abuse’ for reporting purposes and outlines specific
    considerations an agency must assess and tasks it must perform to complete
    its investigation. Further actions are authorized dependent on the conclusions
    reached.” Interest of D.R., ___ Pa. ___, ___, 
    232 A.3d 547
    , 548 (2020).
    Upon receipt of a report of child abuse, a county agency is required to
    immediately initiate an investigation. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6368. Under Section
    6334.1, titled “Responsibility for investigation”:
    The department shall establish procedures regarding the
    following different responses to address suspected child
    abuse and protective services depending on the person’s
    allegedly committing the suspected child abuse or causing a
    child to be in need of protective services:
    (1) If the suspected child abuse is alleged to have been
    committed by a perpetrator, the appropriate county agency
    shall investigate the allegation as provided in this chapter.
    (2) If the suspected child abuse is alleged to have
    been committed by a perpetrator and the behavior
    constituting the suspected child abuse may include a
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    J-A22036-21
    violation of a criminal offense, the appropriate county
    agency and law enforcement officials shall jointly
    investigate the allegation through the investigative
    team established in section 6365(c) (relating to
    services for prevention, investigation and treatment
    of child abuse) and as provided in this chapter.
    (3) If the suspected child abuse is alleged to have been
    committed by a person who is not a perpetrator and the
    behavior constituting the suspected child abuse may include
    a violation of a criminal offense, law enforcement officials
    where the suspected child abuse is alleged to have occurred
    shall be solely responsible for investigating the allegation.
    (4) If a child is alleged to be in need of other protective
    services, the appropriate county agency shall assess the
    needs of the child as provided in this chapter.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6334.1 (emphasis added). A “perpetrator” includes a parent
    of the child at issue. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303 (definitions). Additionally,
    under Section 6365:
    A multidisciplinary investigative team shall be used to
    coordinate child abuse investigations between county
    agencies and law enforcement. The county agency and
    the district attorney shall develop a protocol for the
    convening of multidisciplinary investigative teams for
    any case of child abuse by a perpetrator involving
    crimes against children which are set forth in section
    6340(a)(9) and (10) (relating to release of information in
    confidential reports).      The county multidisciplinary
    investigative team protocol shall include standards and
    procedures to be used in receiving and referring reports and
    coordinating investigations of reported cases of child abuse
    and a system for sharing the information obtained as a
    result of any interview. The protocol shall include any
    other standards and procedures to avoid duplication
    of fact-finding efforts and interviews to minimize the
    trauma to the child.        The district attorney shall
    convene the multidisciplinary investigative team in
    accordance with the protocol. The multidisciplinary
    investigative team shall consist of those individuals and
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    J-A22036-21
    agencies responsible for investigating the abuse or for
    providing services to the child and shall at a minimum
    include a health care provider, county caseworker and law
    enforcement official.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6365(c) (emphasis added).
    Instantly, the trial court explained its reasons for placing limitations on
    the Commonwealth’s child abuse investigation, as follows:
    Under [Section 6365(c)], the Commonwealth is directed to
    have and implement standards and procedures to “avoid
    duplication of fact-finding efforts and interviews to minimize
    the trauma to the child.” But if not the court, who holds
    them to those standards?          Additionally, the DA is to
    “convene” the multidisciplinary team. Does that mean that
    they are totally in control and can run roughshod over
    everyone else? Under 6365(c), the DA and CYF are team
    members and one cannot simply overrule the other on a
    matter. If CYF and the DA disagree, should they be able to
    come to the court to help resolve the dispute, or does the
    DA get to dictate to CYF, who had no issues with the court’s
    action, how the investigation is to be conducted? It is the
    DA’s position that the court can grant no relief and that we
    lack the authority to resolve any dispute. The court should
    have the authority at least to make sure the DA follows this
    statute, which they are not doing.
    *     *      *
    [I]n this particular case, R.D. had undergone three
    interviews at the York CAC within the span of 7 months with
    a fourth forensic interview and exam by a [SAFE] nurse.
    The prior CYF caseworker had also testified that a separate
    investigation had been conducted in Cumberland County
    during the same time period, possibly with additional
    interviews. …[T]he children were last interviewed in June
    2020. With the exception of some possible information
    involving paternal grandfather, all interviews covered the
    same incidents as the children had no contact with Father
    outside of a therapeutic setting between December 2019
    and December 2020. All contact since December 2020 has
    been supervised.
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    J-A22036-21
    The DA does not represent children, nor should it allow itself
    to become a tool of the accusing parent in a high-conflict
    custody case. The DA represents the Commonwealth. …
    Children, especially young children, should not be subjected
    to a CAC interview every time an allegation is received, nor
    should it constitute the entire investigation. There is no
    requirement that every investigation requires even
    one, let alone multiple CAC interviews. No child should
    be subjected to even one potentially traumatic CAC
    interview unless there is a likelihood that it can meet the
    legal standard for admissibility or result in information that
    would further the investigation.       Additionally, at least
    someone present should be familiar with the child and/or
    the evidence in ongoing complex cases such as this one.
    CAC interviews are designed to be less traumatic for child
    victims, but that is hardly the same as not traumatic.
    *     *      *
    … Perhaps more importantly than any decision by [the
    Superior Court] or the [trial] court, the DA is not hearing
    what the court is telling them, specifically there are serious
    issues with their CAC interviews regarding frequency,
    timing, and bias. If the judges do not trust that these
    interviews are happening in an unbiased way, respecting
    children’s rights and putting the best interests of the
    children first, then they have much bigger problems than
    any limits the court places on the children’s interviews here.
    (Trial Court Opinion at 18-24) (emphasis in original) (internal citations
    omitted).
    In further support for its decision, the trial court cited law from other
    jurisdictions that purports to afford greater protection to Children than the
    procedures implemented by York County in conducting its child abuse
    investigations. (Id. at 26-27). According to the trial court, “two trends have
    emerged. The first trend is an increased recognition of children’s rights. The
    - 23 -
    J-A22036-21
    second trend is a recognition of systemic trauma. The policies and practices
    developed and used by the DA have failed to recognize these trends and the
    law’s movement in that direction.” (Id. at 27).
    The trial court went on to cite Section 5329.1, noting that the trial
    court’s contact on the investigative team is CYF, not the DA’s office. (Id. at
    27-29). Additionally, the trial court relied on Section 6365(c), to support its
    position that the GAL should be part of the multidisciplinary investigation team
    and permitted to be “present” to observe the interview just as the caseworker
    would. (Id. at 30-31). The trial court opined that “[t]he DA’s ‘best practices’
    [to exclude the GAL from the interview] may be more historical and fail to
    consider the more recent attention to reducing trauma and respecting
    children’s rights.” (Id. at 32). The trial court expressed its concern that child
    abuse interviews can occur at the CAC without anyone present to protect the
    children’s rights or best interests. In the trial court’s view, a GAL is in the
    best position to balance minimizing trauma while furthering the child abuse
    investigation. (See id. at 33-38). Consequently, the trial court advocates
    that a GAL should always be informed, have an opportunity to object, and be
    able to be present with the investigative team in the other room during the
    CAC interview. (Id. at 40).
    The trial court also expressed its unease that Mother might be coaching
    Children, and whether Children are able to distinguish “the truths they
    experience from the ‘truth’ they may have been told by Mother and her family
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    J-A22036-21
    for the past year.”   (Id. at 46).    The court indicated that the prior CAC
    interviews spent about three hours exploring what Father might have done
    but less than three minutes exploring Mother’s possible manipulation or
    alienation of Father. (Id. at 47). The court stated that it intends to balance
    “the extensive questioning regarding Father with at least some questions
    regarding Mother and Mother’s family” when the court conducts its interview
    as part of its custody trial.   (Id. at 47-48).   The trial court concluded by
    expressing its worry about the rights, mental health, and best interests of the
    most vulnerable children becoming lost in the absence of the limitations set
    by the court in this case. (Id. at 51-52).
    Although we recognize the trial court’s serious concerns regarding the
    child abuse investigatory process, and genuine attempt to act in the best
    interests of Children, we agree with the Commonwealth that the trial court
    exceeded the scope of its authority in this case. There is no dispute that the
    trial court had the authority to interview Children and act to protect Children’s
    best interests as it pertains to the custody action. As well, the trial court had
    a duty to consider any allegations of child abuse in rendering its custody
    decision. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5328(a)(2.1); 5329.1. Notwithstanding the
    trial court’s reliance on Section 5329.1(b), which requires the Department of
    Human Services and CYF to fully cooperate and assist the court in fulfilling its
    duties under Section 5329.1 (see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5329.1(b)), the provisions
    on which the court relies apply only to disputes relating to child custody
    - 25 -
    J-A22036-21
    matters (see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5321) and do not mention law enforcement.
    The court’s duties under Section 5329.1 concerning the abuse
    allegations as part of rendering the custody decision are independent of the
    duties of CYF and law enforcement to investigate suspected child abuse under
    the CPSL. Section 6334.1 makes clear that if the suspected child abuse is
    alleged to have been committed by a perpetrator, which includes a parent,
    and the suspected child abuse might constitute a criminal offense, CYF and
    law enforcement officials shall jointly investigate the allegation through the
    investigative team established in Section 6365(c).        See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
    6334.1.   Section 6365 requires that “[t]he county agency and the district
    attorney shall develop a protocol for the convening of multidisciplinary
    investigative teams for any case of child abuse by a perpetrator involving
    crimes against children” and the county multidisciplinary investigative team
    protocol “shall include any other standards and procedures to avoid
    duplication of fact-finding efforts and interviews to minimize the trauma to the
    child. The district attorney shall convene the multidisciplinary investigative
    team in accordance with the protocol.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6365(c). “[T]he county
    agency and law enforcement officials shall cooperate and coordinate, to the
    fullest extent possible, their efforts to respond to and investigate reports of
    - 26 -
    J-A22036-21
    suspected child abuse.”7 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6346(c).
    Under a plain reading of the relevant provisions of the CPSL, the trial
    court has no authority to establish the investigatory protocol, or place limits
    on how the District Attorney and CYF follow that protocol. See 23 Pa.C.S.A.
    §§ 6334.1, 6346(c), 6365(c).            Put simply, nothing in Section 6334.1 or
    6365(c) of the CPSL contemplates a custody court’s role in the investigatory
    process. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b) (stating: “When the words of a statute
    are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded
    under the pretext of pursuing its spirit”). Significantly, “it is not for the courts
    to add, by interpretation, to a statute, a requirement which the legislature did
    not see fit to include.” See Shafer, supra at 266, 96 A.3d at 994. To the
    extent that other jurisdictions might give the court a different role in the
    investigatory process or implement different procedures than those used in
    York County, we are not bound by those decisions.           See Eckman v. Erie
    Insurance Exchange, 
    21 A.3d 1203
     (Pa.Super. 2011) (observing well-
    ____________________________________________
    7  We note that the while the CPSL establishes joint investigative teams
    between county agencies and law enforcement officials for some reports of
    child abuse, and that the investigations might overlap, “each investigation
    serves a different ultimate purpose: police investigate to determine whether
    a crime was committed, whereas [the county agency] investigates to
    determine whether it should administratively designate a report of child abuse
    as indicated, which triggers inclusion in the statewide database of child abuse
    perpetrators.” Commonwealth v. Kane, No. 2509 EDA 2018, 
    2020 WL 2781553
    , at *8 (Pa.Super. filed May 28, 2020) (unpublished memorandum)
    (internal footnotes omitted). See also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (providing that
    unpublished non-precedential memorandum decisions of Superior Court filed
    after May 1, 2019 may be cited for their persuasive value).
    - 27 -
    J-A22036-21
    settled law that this Court is not bound by decisions of federal courts, other
    than United States Supreme Court, or decisions of other states’ courts).
    We do not make light of the trial court’s grave concerns in this case.
    Nevertheless, any problems with the timing, frequency, and other procedures
    employed during child abuse investigations are matters best left to the
    legislature to address. See Benson ex rel. Patterson v. Patterson, 
    574 Pa. 346
    , 349, 
    830 A.2d 966
    , 967 (explaining “it is not the role of the judiciary
    to legislate changes in the law which our legislature has declined to adopt”).
    We highlight that the CPSL mandates the establishment of citizen review
    panels to examine “[p]olicies, procedures and practices of State and local
    agencies and, where appropriate, specific cases to evaluate the extent to
    which State and local protective services system agencies are effectively
    discharging their child protection responsibilities[.]”       23 Pa.C.S.A. §
    6343.1(b). “Each citizen review panel shall meet not less than once every
    three months[,]” and “[t]he department shall issue an annual report
    summarizing the     activities and recommendations of the          panels and
    summarizing the department response to the recommendations.”                 23
    Pa.C.S.A. § 6343.1(d), (e).      Additionally: “A committee of the Senate
    designated by the President pro tempore of the Senate and a committee of
    the House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House of
    Representatives, either jointly or separately, shall review the manner in which
    this chapter has been administrated at the State and local level” for the
    - 28 -
    J-A22036-21
    purposes of, inter alia, “[e]nabling the General Assembly to determine
    whether the programs and services mandated by this chapter are effectively
    meeting the goals of this chapter.”            23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6384(2).   Thus, the
    legislature has set forth specific processes for evaluating whether the policies,
    procedures and practices of the county agencies are effectively ensuring the
    protection of children.8
    Based upon the foregoing, we hold that the trial court lacked authority
    to dictate the manner in which the Commonwealth and CYF conducted its child
    abuse investigation in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the April 14, 2021
    amended order placing any limitations on the Commonwealth’s interview with
    Children, and remand with instructions that the Commonwealth be permitted
    ____________________________________________
    8  We also observe that the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and
    Delinquency details the various requirements forensic interviewers must
    undergo to conduct forensic interviews of Children. Forensic interviews are
    provided by a multidisciplinary team with specialized training in conducting
    forensic interviews and are required to have successfully completed specific
    training and education. Forensic interviewing of alleged victims of child abuse,
    in the context of a multidisciplinary team response, is considered specialized
    and requires additional specialized training prior to conducing the forensic
    interviews. Additionally, individuals who conduct forensic interviews at the
    CAC must participate in a structured peer review process for forensic
    interviewers a minimum of twice a year, as a matter of quality assurance.
    Participation in peer review assures that forensic interviewers remain current
    and further develop and strengthen their skills based on new research and
    developments in the field that impact the quality of their interviews. The
    forensic interview standard as a whole reflects the National Children’s Alliance
    forensic interview standard for CAC accreditation.          See Pennsylvania
    Commission on Crime and Delinquency: Forensic Interviews of Children, at
    https://www.pccd.pa.gov/Victim-
    Services/Documents/Forensic%20Interviews%20of%20Children.pdf                (last
    visited November 17, 2021).
    - 29 -
    J-A22036-21
    to interview Children pursuant to the procedures established in York County.
    We also lift the stay prohibiting the trial court from interviewing Children in
    the custody trial.
    Order reversed.     Case remanded with instructions.      Jurisdiction is
    relinquished.
    Judge Olson joins this opinion.
    Judge Bowes files a concurring statement.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 01/06/2022
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