United States v. James Caswell Jones , 241 F. App'x 676 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                           [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    AUGUST 2, 2007
    No. 07-10317                 THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 05-00283-CR-4
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    JAMES CASWELL JONES,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Georgia
    _________________________
    (August 2, 2007)
    Before TJOFLAT, ANDERSON and HULL, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    James Caswell Jones, who is serving a 77-month sentence for possession
    with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and
    (b)(1)(C); possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation
    of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1), appeals his convictions. The indictment under which
    Jones was convicted followed an earlier indictment, which was dismissed without
    prejudice for violations of the Speedy Trial Act, 
    18 U.S.C. § 3161-3174
    . The
    indictment under which Jones was convicted, however, is based on the same facts
    as the earlier indictment.
    I.
    Jones first argues that his confession, and the firearms obtained through a
    search warrant based on his confession, should have been suppressed. Jones
    argues that his motion to suppress was timely because he reserved the right to
    supplement the motion to suppress that he originally filed. Jones asserts that he
    attempted to raise the motion to suppress before the jury was empaneled, but the
    district court did not give him the opportunity to do so. Jones additionally
    contends that the district court was required to excuse the jury and conduct a voir
    dire hearing to resolve his motion to suppress.
    A district court’s denial of a motion to suppress as untimely is reviewed for
    abuse of discretion. United States v. Milian-Rodriguez, 
    828 F.2d 679
    , 683 (11th
    2
    Cir. 1987). A motion to suppress evidence must be made before trial.
    Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3)(c). However, a district court may, “at the arraignment or
    as soon afterward as practicable, set a time for the parties to make pretrial motions
    and may also schedule a motion hearing.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(c). “A party waives
    any Rule 12(b)(3) defense, objection, or request not raised by the deadline the
    court sets under 12(c) or by any extension the court provides. For good cause, the
    court may grant relief from the waiver.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(e). A district court may
    deny a motion to suppress as untimely without conducting a voir dire hearing, even
    where the motion concerns the voluntariness of statements made to the police. See
    United States v. Taylor, 
    792 F.2d 1019
    , 1025 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that while
    it may be permissible for the district court to consider a motion to suppress
    involuntary statements despite its untimeliness, the district court is not required to
    do so). An amended motion to suppress may be considered untimely even where
    the initial motion was timely filed. See United States v. Hirschhorn, 
    649 F.2d 360
    ,
    364 (5th Cir. 1981).
    “A motion to suppress must in every critical respect be sufficiently definite,
    specific, detailed, and nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that a
    substantial claim is presented . . . . A court need not act upon general or
    conclusory assertions.” United States v. Cooper, 
    203 F.3d 1279
    , 1284 (11th Cir.
    3
    2000) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 
    764 F.2d 1514
    , 1527 (11th Cir.
    1985)).
    In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jones’s
    motion to suppress. Despite Jones’s assertion, the motion to suppress was not
    timely. Jones’s first motion to suppress was completely conjectural and wholly
    lacked the detail that we require. Cooper, 
    203 F.3d at 1284
    . Moreover, Jones has
    conceded that the motion to suppress was denied in its entirety. Accordingly, that
    portion of the motion in which he asked to reserve the right to amend the motion to
    suppress also was denied.
    Even if Jones successfully had reserved the right to amend his motion to
    suppress, the district court has the right to manage its docket. See Fed.R.Crim.P.
    12(c). Thus, the district court may limit the time for filing pretrial motions,
    including amended motions to suppress. Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(c); Hirschhorn, 
    649 F.2d at 364
    . In this case, the district court limited the time for filing pretrial
    motions to 10 days after the arraignment. Jones’s amended motion to suppress,
    raised orally at trial more than nine months after the district court disposed of the
    other pretrial motions, was well outside that time limit.
    Finally, Jones has not shown good cause for relief from the waiver of his
    motion to suppress. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(e). As the district court noted in the
    4
    denial of Jones’s request for an evidentiary hearing, the facts of the case are the
    same as those under the previous indictment, and Jones was provided open
    discovery. Given that all the files were available at least nine months before the
    trial, there is no reason Jones’s counsel should not have previously discovered the
    basis for this motion to suppress. See Taylor, 
    792 F.2d at 1025
    . However, the
    motion was filed on the day of the trial, more than nine months after the facts
    underlying the motion were made available to Jones and after the time for filing
    motions to suppress expired. “These facts demonstrate inexcusable delay and last-
    minute motion filing.” Milian-Rodriguez, 
    828 F.2d at 683
    . Accordingly, the
    district court properly denied Jones’s motion to suppress as untimely.
    II.
    Jones next argues that the district court erred in dismissing without prejudice
    the earlier indictment against him. Jones contends that the district court misapplied
    the statutory factors for determining whether to dismiss without prejudice. Jones
    argues that his offense was not very serious because: (1) he was initially arrested
    for failure to pay child support; (2) there was no evidence that he used the firearms
    or possessed the firearms during the commission of a crime; and(3) the lack of
    violence in the charges against him. Jones adds that the facts and circumstances
    leading to dismissal mandated dismissal with prejudice because the government
    5
    and the court were responsible for most of the delay while the speedy trial clock
    was ticking. Jones also argues that the interests of justice would best have been
    served by dismissal with prejudice because he was forced to live under restrictions
    for the entirety of the delay. Jones asserts that the district court should also have
    considered the deterrent effect on governmental delay that would have been made
    by a dismissal with prejudice. Finally, Jones argues that the district court erred in
    finding that his rights to a speedy trial were not violated because most of the delay
    was the government’s fault, and he was incarcerated for the entire time.
    We review a district court’s determination to dismiss a case with or without
    prejudice upon finding a violation of the Speedy Trial Act for abuse of discretion.
    United States v. Brown, 
    183 F.3d 1306
    , 1309 (11th Cir. 1999).
    Under the Speedy Trial Act:
    In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a
    defendant charged in an information or indictment with the
    commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from
    the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment,
    or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of
    the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3161
    (c)(1). Thus, if the defendant moves for dismissal, and the 70
    days have expired, the district court must dismiss the case. United States v.
    Miranda, 
    835 F.2d 830
    , 834 (11th Cir. 1988). The district court has discretion to
    dismiss the case with or without prejudice, and we do not perceive a preference for
    6
    either form of dismissal. 
    Id. at 834
    . However, the district court must balance the
    statutory factors under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3162
    (a)(2), which are: (1) the seriousness of the
    offense; (2) the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and
    (3) the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of the Speedy Trial Act and
    the administration of justice. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3162
    (a)(2).
    We review de novo a motion to dismiss based upon the Sixth Amendment
    right to a speedy trial. United States v. Harris, 
    376 F.3d 1282
    , 1286 (11th Cir.
    2004). Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, “the accused shall enjoy the right to a
    speedy and public trial . . . .” U.S. Const. amend VI. As we have held:
    In order to determine whether a defendant has been deprived of his
    [Sixth Amendment] right to a speedy trial, this court must consider (1)
    whether the delay before trial was uncommonly long; (2) whether the
    government or the defendant is more to blame for that delay;
    (3) whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy
    trial; and (4) whether the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of
    the delay (the ‘Barker factors’).
    Harris, 
    376 F.3d at 1290
     (citations omitted). “The first factor serves a triggering
    function; unless some ‘presumptively prejudicial’ period of delay occurred, we
    need not conduct the remainder of the analysis.” 
    Id.
     However, unless the first
    three factors weigh heavily against the government, the defendant must show
    actual prejudice to prevail on a Sixth Amendment violation. 
    Id. at 1296
    .
    Moreover, that prejudice must be to his defense. Doggett v. United States, 505
    
    7 U.S. 647
    , 656, 
    112 S.Ct. 2686
    , 2693, 
    120 L.Ed.2d 520
     (1992).
    The district court did not err in dismissing Jones’s original case without
    prejudice. As the district court found, the fact that Jones had not been caught using
    the gun or committing violent acts does not detract from the fact that Jones was a
    repeated felon who possessed firearms. Accordingly, the district court did not
    abuse its discretion in finding that Jones’s offense was serious enough to weigh in
    favor of dismissal without prejudice. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3162
    (a)(2). Moreover, the
    district court found that the majority of the delay was the result of administrative
    confusion, and was its fault. Where delay is the result of administrative confusion,
    we have expressed a preference for dismissal without prejudice. Miranda, 
    835 F.2d at 834
    . Finally, as the district court noted, Jones was partially responsible for
    the delay because he did not assert his speedy trial rights until after a trial date was
    set. Accordingly, dismissal with prejudice would have permitted Jones to use the
    Speedy Trial Act as an offensive tool. On the other hand, the public has an interest
    in seeing that convicted felons do not possess firearms. Thus, the public interest
    also dictates dismissal without prejudice.
    The district court also did not err in finding that Jones’s Sixth Amendment
    rights were not violated. While both parties agree that the delay before trial was
    uncommonly long, that the government received extensions for its briefs, and the
    8
    government filed its motion for reconsideration and notice of appeal 30 days after
    the orders complained of were entered, the delay is not purely the government’s
    fault. Much of the delay was the result of disposing of the government’s appeal
    and Jones’s petition for certiorari. Moreover, Jones could have moved to dismiss
    the indictment for a violation of the Speedy Trial Act within 8 days of the district
    court’s receipt of the denial of certiorari rather than waiting until a trial date was
    set. Jones did not do so, thus adding to the delay. Because the majority of the
    delay was not any one party’s fault, but rather the result of disposing of motions,
    appeals, and petitions for certiorari, and Jones did not timely assert his right to a
    speedy trial, both of those factors weigh against finding a Sixth Amendment
    violation. Harris, 
    376 F.3d at 1290
    . Finally, Jones has not argued that he suffered
    prejudice to his case as a result of the delay. Accordingly, that factor weighs
    against finding a Sixth Amendment violation as well. Doggett, 
    505 U.S. at 656
    ,
    
    112 S.Ct. at 2693
    . Because the factors weigh against finding a Sixth Amendment
    violation, the district court did not err in denying Jones’s motion to dismiss on this
    ground.
    III.
    Jones argues that his speedy trial rights were violated under the current
    indictment because more than 70 days passed between his indictment and the trial.
    9
    Jones asserts that the time was not tolled by his appeal of the dismissal of the prior
    indictment without prejudice. According to Jones, because the current case
    contains charges that were not included in the prior indictment, it could have
    moved to trial regardless of the disposition of the appeal.
    We review a claim under the Speedy Trial Act de novo and review a district
    court’s factual determinations on excludable time for clear error. United States v.
    Dunn, 
    345 F.3d 1285
    , 1288 (11th Cir. 2003). According to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3161
    (h),
    certain periods of delay are excluded when computing the time within which a trial
    must commence. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3161
    (h). Included on that list is “a period of delay
    resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not
    limited to” delays resulting from proceedings listed in the statute. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3161
    (h)(1).
    In United States v. Davenport, 
    935 F.2d 1223
     (11th Cir. 1991), a defendant
    awaiting trial filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging a violation of the
    Speedy Trial Act. 
    Id.
     After the defendant was eventually convicted of the crime
    for which he was awaiting trial, he argued on appeal that his trial was outside of
    the Speedy Trial Act’s limitations period. Id. at 2131. Specifically, he contended
    that the speedy trial clock should have run while his habeas petition, alleging
    violations of the Speedy Trial Act, was pending. Id. We rejected his contention
    10
    and found that the petition was an “other proceeding concerning the defendant,”
    and was analogous to an interlocutory appeal. Id. at 2131-32. Thus, the resulting
    delay was excluded from the speedy trial clock. Id. at 2132.
    In the instant case, Jones appealed a speedy trial decision rather than filing a
    habeas corpus case. However, the Supreme Court already has held that a criminal
    defendant may not immediately appeal a district court’s order dismissing an
    indictment until after conviction because the indictment is but a step toward final
    disposition of the merits of the case and will be merged in the final judgment. Parr
    v. United States, 
    351 U.S. 513
    , 519, 
    76 S.Ct. 912
    , 916, 
    100 L.Ed. 1377
     (1956).
    Accordingly, Jones’s appeal of the dismissal without prejudice also is analogous to
    an interlocutory appeal. As such, the district court did not err in comparing Jones’s
    case to Davenport and finding that the proceeding tolled the speedy trial clock
    under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3161
    (h)(1).
    IV.
    Jones argues that his initial arrest was unconstitutional because Detective
    Hein “pocketed” the warrant and then delayed serving it in hopes of conducting a
    search of Jones at a time when he would be able to find drugs.
    During the pendency of Jones’s prior indictment, we entertained an appeal
    on the issue of whether Jones’s arrest was illegal. United States v. Jones, 
    377 F.3d 11
    1313 (11th Cir. 2004). We held, in a published opinion, that subjective intentions
    should play no role in Fourth Amendment analysis. 
    Id. at 1314
    . Accordingly, we
    held that the district court erred in considering Hein’s subjective intent in serving
    the warrant. 
    Id.
     We also explicitly found that Jones’s arrest was constitutional.
    
    Id.
     Now Jones argues that, under the same facts, his arrest was unconstitutional
    because of Detective Hein’s subjective intent. This argument is foreclosed by our
    prior precedent, which held otherwise. 
    Id.
     Accordingly, Jones’s arrest was
    constitutional.
    Accordingly, upon review of the record and the arguments of both parties,
    Jones’s convictions are
    AFFIRMED.1
    1
    Jones’s motion to file his reply brief out of time is granted but his request for oral
    argument is denied.
    12