United States v. Castelan , 207 F. App'x 294 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4591
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CARLOS MARURI CASTELAN,
a/k/a Daniel Hernandez,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. Frank W. Bullock, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (1:04-cr-419-1)
Submitted: November 21, 2006 Decided: November 28, 2006
Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, John A. Dusenbury,
Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender for Appellant. Anna Mills
Wagoner, United States Attorney, Michael Francis Joseph, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Carlos Maruri Castelan appeals his 75-month prison
sentence resulting from his conviction for possession with intent
to distribute cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) (2000). Castelan’s attorney has filed a
brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
certifying there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but
questioning whether Castelan’s sentence was reasonable. Castelan
was advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but
has not done so. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Counsel’s brief questions the reasonableness of
Castelan’s sentence. After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220(2005), a sentencing court is no longer bound by the range
prescribed by the sentencing guidelines, but still must calculate
and consider the guideline range as well as the factors set forth
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000). See United States v. Hughes, 401
F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 2005). We will affirm a post-Booker
sentence if it is both reasonable and within the statutorily
prescribed range. Id.Castelan pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to possession with intent to distribute 6.8 kilograms of
cocaine hydrochloride. As part of the plea agreement, Castelan
agreed to the drug quantity and that the offense carried a ten-year
statutory mandatory minimum sentence. In the presentence report,
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Castelan’s base offense level was determined to be 32 based on 6.8
kilograms of cocaine. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”)
§ 2D1.1(c)(4) (2004). Because Castelan met the requirements of
USSG § 5C1.2 (a)(1)-(5), he received a two level reduction to his
offense level under the safety valve provision of USSG
§ 2D1.1(b)(7). After a three-level adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility, Castelan had a total offense level of 27. With an
offense level of 27 and criminal history category I, his advisory
guideline range was 70-87 months’ imprisonment. There were no
objections to the presentence report. The district court sentenced
Castelan to 75 months in prison, which is within the applicable
guideline range and below the statutory mandatory minimum. Because
Castelan met the requirements of the safety valve provision, he was
to be sentenced within the applicable guidelines without regard to
the statutory mandatory minimum. See USSG § 5C1.2, comment.
(n. 9).
As Castelan’s 75-month prison sentence is within the
properly calculated guideline range, it is presumptively
reasonable. United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th
Cir.2006). Castelan has not rebutted that presumption as the
district court appropriately treated the guidelines as advisory,
considered the guideline range, and weighed the relevant factors
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
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Pursuant to Anders, we have examined the entire record
and find no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of the district court. This court requires that
counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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