United States v. Jones , 242 F. App'x 945 ( 2007 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 07-4404
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    JAMES E. JONES,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Baltimore.    Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
    (1:05-cr-00331-CCB)
    Submitted:   September 12, 2007       Decided:   September 24, 2007
    Before NIEMEYER and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Gary W. Christopher, First
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for
    Appellant.   Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Gregory
    Welsh, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
    Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    James E. Jones was convicted by a jury of two counts of
    possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1)      (2000),    and      was   sentenced   to     262   months’
    imprisonment,         three    years    of    supervised       release,    and   a   $100
    assessment. On appeal, he argues (1) that the district court erred
    in finding him competent to stand trial, and (2) that the district
    court abused its discretion in excluding him from the courtroom
    during his jury trial.           For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    This    court    reviews       a     district     court’s    competency
    determination for clear error.                    United States v. Cox, 
    964 F.2d 1431
    , 1433 (4th Cir. 1992).                   A defendant shall be considered
    incompetent if the district court finds, “by a preponderance of the
    evidence that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental
    disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent
    that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
    proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”                         
    18 U.S.C. § 4241
    (d) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).                 The defendant bears the
    burden    of    establishing       his       incompetence.        United    States    v.
    Robinson, 
    404 F.3d 850
    , 856 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    546 U.S. 916
    (2005).
    Jones’ statements indicate that he is among a growing
    number of prisoners adhering to a “flesh and blood” sovereign man
    philosophy.       See United States v. Mitchell, 
    405 F. Supp. 2d 602
    ,
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    603-06 (D. Md. 2005) (describing the theory, its sources, and its
    anti-government movement predecessors).                Adherence to an ill-
    advised,     self-defeating     legal     strategy      does    not    indicate
    incompetence to stand trial.         United States v. Banks, 
    482 F.3d 733
    (4th Cir. 2007).         Competency determinations turn only on the
    capacity to understand and assist, and not on the willingness to do
    so.    See Bell v. Evatt, 
    72 F.3d 421
    , 432 (4th Cir. 1995).                   The
    district court found Jones competent based on the unrebutted report
    of the mental health staff at the Federal Correctional Institution
    in    Butner,    North   Carolina,   which    issued    after   six   weeks    of
    observation and evaluation.          That medical report is persuasive
    evidence.       See United States v. General, 
    278 F.3d 389
    , 398 (4th
    Cir. 2002).       We therefore find no error in the district court’s
    competency determination.
    Jones    also   challenges       the   district     court’s   order
    excluding him from the courtroom for disruptive behavior during his
    trial.      We review that order for abuse of discretion.                     See
    Illinois v. Allen, 
    397 U.S. 337
    , 343 (1970).              “[A] defendant can
    lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned
    by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive
    behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner
    so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his
    trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom.”                Id.; Fed.
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    R. Crim. P. 43(c).   Based on our review of the record, we find that
    Jones’ exclusion from the courtroom was not an abuse of discretion.
    We therefore affirm Jones’ convictions and sentence.   We
    dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
    are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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