Morris Mester v. Dr. Walker , 675 F. App'x 793 ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              JAN 26 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MORRIS L. MESTER,                                No. 14-56512
    Plaintiff-Appellant,              D.C. No. 3:13-cv-00064-H-NLS
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    DR. WALKER, C.M.E. at RJD; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted January 18, 2017**
    Before:        TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
    Morris L. Mester, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
    court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate
    indifference to his serious medical needs and safety. We have jurisdiction under
    28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 
    391 F.3d 1051
    , 1056
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    (9th Cir. 2004). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Johnson
    v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 
    534 F.3d 1116
    , 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment because Mester failed
    to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were
    deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See 
    Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057-60
    (a prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if he or she knows
    of and disregards an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health; negligence and a mere
    difference in medical opinion are insufficient to establish deliberate indifference).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mester’s motions to
    reopen discovery after the deadline set forth in the pretrial scheduling order
    because Mester failed to demonstrate good cause. See Johnson v. Mammoth
    Recreations, Inc., 
    975 F.2d 604
    , 607, 609-10 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth standard
    of review and “good cause” requirement to modify a scheduling order).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mester’s request for
    additional time to respond to defendants’ motion for summary judgment because
    the district court granted two extensions of time, and Mester failed to demonstrate
    good cause for any further extensions. See Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 
    624 F.3d 1253
    , 1258-60 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review for denial of
    extension of time and good cause requirement under Fed. R .Civ. P. 6(b)).
    2                                     14-56512
    To the extent Mester alleged that defendants were deliberately indifferent
    regarding the placement of shower mats, dismissal of this claim was proper
    because Mester failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants were
    deliberately indifferent to his safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 
    511 U.S. 825
    , 837
    (1994) (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he “knows of and
    disregards an excessive risk to inmate . . . safety”).
    We reject as unsupported by the record Mester’s contentions that the district
    court never responded to his motion to amend the judgment on the pleadings, was
    biased toward him, and improperly screened out certain defendants.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                     14-56512