In re A.M.B. ( 2014 )


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  • An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
    controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
    with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    NO. COA14-309
    NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
    Filed: 7 October 2014
    IN THE MATTER OF:
    Mecklenburg County
    No. 12 JT 32
    A.M.B.
    Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 16 December
    2013 by Judge Elizabeth T. Trosch in Mecklenburg County District
    Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 September 2014.
    Twyla Hollingsworth-Richardson for petitioner-appellee
    Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services.
    J. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-appellant.
    Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, by Theresa M. Sprain
    and Carolyn C. Pratt, for guardian ad litem.
    STEELMAN, Judge.
    The trial court’s conclusion that termination of parental
    rights was in the best interests of the juvenile was supported
    by the findings of fact required under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
    1110(a).
    I. Factual and Procedural History
    -2-
    On 20 January 2012, the Mecklenburg County Department of
    Social     Services,      Youth        and       Family      Services          (DSS)       filed    a
    petition    alleging          that    A.B.       was     a       neglected      and     dependent
    juvenile,    based       on    reports       that      the        child’s      mother,       J.A.B.
    (mother)     had     engaged          in     domestic            altercations         in     A.B.’s
    presence. The petition also alleged that during the previous six
    months mother had lived at five different residences and was
    evicted from each due to her behavior. On 20 January 2012 a non-
    secure custody order was entered granting DSS custody of A.B. On
    12 April 2012, A.B. was adjudicated neglected based on mother’s
    substance abuse and her “inability to manage her aggression.”
    Following    a     permanency         planning         review       hearing          held    on    10
    January 2013, the trial court suspended reunification efforts
    and   changed      the   permanent           plan      for       A.B.    to    termination         of
    parental rights and adoption.
    On    15   March        2013,    DSS       filed       a    petition       to    terminate
    mother’s    parental          rights,      alleging          that       grounds       existed      to
    terminate mother’s parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §
    7B-1111(a)(1)       (neglect),             (2)     (failure         to        make     reasonable
    progress), (3) (failure to pay reasonable child support) and (7)
    (abandonment).       DSS       also        alleged        that       grounds         existed       to
    terminate the parental rights of A.B.’s father, whose identity
    was unknown, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(5) (2013).
    -3-
    On    16   December    2013,       the    trial     court      entered       an   order
    terminating mother’s parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.
    §    7B-1111(a)(1),    (2)   and    (3).    The     unknown     father’s      parental
    rights were also terminated.
    The present appeal is only by mother.
    II. Standard of Review
    “The termination of parental rights statutes provide for a
    two-stage termination proceeding: an adjudication stage and a
    disposition stage. In the adjudication stage, the trial court
    must determine whether there exists one or more grounds for
    termination    of   parental       rights       under   N.C.    Gen.      Stat.   §   7B-
    1111(a). If the trial court determines that at least one ground
    for   termination     exists,    it      then    proceeds      to   the    disposition
    stage where it must determine whether terminating the rights of
    the parent is in the best interest of the child, in accordance
    with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a).” In re D.H., __ N.C. App. __,
    __, 
    753 S.E.2d 732
    , 734 (2014) (citing In re Montgomery, 
    311 N.C. 101
    , 110, 
    316 S.E.2d 246
    , 252 (1984)).
    “We review the trial court’s decision to terminate parental
    rights for abuse of discretion.” In re Anderson, 
    151 N.C. App. 94
    , 98, 
    564 S.E.2d 599
    , 602 (2002) (citation omitted). “‘The
    trial court is subject to reversal for abuse of discretion only
    upon a showing . . . that the challenged actions are manifestly
    -4-
    unsupported by reason.’” D.H., __ N.C. App. at __, 753 S.E.2d at
    734 (quoting In re J.L.H., __ N.C. App. __, __, 
    741 S.E.2d 333
    ,
    337 (2012) (internal quotation omitted)).
    III. Trial Court’s Determination that Termination was in
    the Juvenile’s Best Interests
    Mother does not challenge the evidentiary support for the
    trial court’s findings of fact or its determination that grounds
    existed to support termination of her parental rights, and does
    not argue that the court abused its discretion by concluding
    that it was in A.B.’s best interest for mother’s parental rights
    to be terminated. Mother’s sole argument on appeal is that the
    trial court erred in its determination that it was in the best
    interest     of    A.B.   to   terminate    mother’s   parental     rights    by
    failing to make the findings required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
    1110(a). We disagree.
    Once a trial court determines that statutory grounds for
    termination exist, it must “determine whether terminating the
    parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest.” N.C. Gen.
    Stat. § 7B-1110(a). This statute requires that in making its
    determination “the court shall consider the following criteria
    and   make   written      findings   regarding   the   following     that    are
    relevant”
    (1)   The age of the juvenile.
    (2)   The likelihood of adoption            of   the
    juvenile.
    -5-
    (3)     Whether the termination of parental
    rights will aid in the accomplishment
    of the permanent plan for the juvenile.
    (4)     The bond between the juvenile and the
    parent.
    (5)     The quality of the relationship between
    the juvenile and the proposed adoptive
    parent, guardian, custodian, or other
    permanent placement.
    (6)     Any relevant consideration.
    Although N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) requires the trial court
    to consider all six of the enumerated factors, it is required to
    enter written findings of fact “concerning only those factors
    ‘that are relevant.’” D.H. at __, 753 S.E.2d at 735 (citations
    omitted).
    Mother argues that the trial court failed to make findings
    of   fact   on     the    age    of    the     juvenile,         whether    termination       of
    parental rights would aid in the accomplishment of the permanent
    plan, or concerning the bond between mother and the juvenile, as
    required     by    N.C.        Gen.    Stat.     §     7B-1110(a)(1),         (3)    and     (4)
    respectively.        However,         analysis        of    the     trial    court’s       order
    reveals     that    the    court’s       findings          sufficiently      addressed       the
    relevant factors.
    Mother       correctly          notes    that        the     trial    court    made     no
    findings     addressing          A.B.’s        age.        However,    mother       does     not
    identify any evidence that the child’s age was a relevant factor
    in   this    case,       and    does     not    offer        any    argument    as     to    the
    significance of this omission. We conclude the trial court did
    -6-
    not err by failing to make a specific written finding of fact
    concerning A.B.’s age. See D.H. at __, 753 S.E.2d at 735 (“Since
    respondent    fails   to    point    to    any   evidence    in    the     record
    demonstrating that age was placed in issue as a relevant factor,
    such that it had an impact on the trial court’s decision, we do
    not believe that the trial court erred in not making specific
    findings concerning the children’s ages in its order.”).
    Mother also argues that the trial court failed to                        make
    findings    pertaining     to   whether    termination      of    her    parental
    rights would aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for
    the juvenile. We first note that, since the permanent plan was
    adoption,    termination        of   parental     rights     is     clearly     a
    prerequisite to achieving the permanent plan. In addition, N.C.
    Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(g) directs a trial court conducting a
    permanency planning hearing to determine “the best plan of care
    to achieve a safe, permanent home for the juvenile within a
    reasonable period of time.” Thus, the trial court’s findings
    regarding the need for “a safe, permanent home . . . within a
    reasonable period of time” are relevant to whether termination
    will achieve the permanent plan. In its order the trial court
    made a variety of findings illustrating the relationship between
    termination of mother’s parental rights and the need to achieve
    -7-
    a   safe   permanent   home   for   A.B.    within   a   reasonable   time,
    including the following:
    . . .
    3. [A.B.] was adjudicated neglected on 15
    March 2012. . . .
    . . .
    14. [Prior to the adjudication of neglect],
    the mother had at least five different
    addresses[.]. . . All of these residences
    were   disrupted  due   to   the   mother’s
    behaviors.
    . . .
    20. From October 17, 2001 until . . . 2005,
    [mother] had seven referrals involving her
    children. As a result . . . mother’s
    parental rights to her oldest three children
    were terminated.
    . . .
    22. [DSS] has been involved with the family
    since 2001 for issues related to [mother’s]
    substance abuse, mental health, and history
    of altercations, aggressive behavior, as
    well as the lack of housing stability, . . .
    [and] the injurious environment of the
    juveniles. [Mother] has failed or refused to
    comply with recommended therapy services for
    her and substance abuse treatment since
    [2001.]
    . . .
    25. There is a risk to [A.B.’s] permanence,
    if placed in the home of the mother[,] due
    to the mother’s pattern of coping that she
    displayed prior to custody and ever since; a
    style . . . illustrated by aggression,
    defensiveness and lack of insight. Her
    -8-
    pattern   has   led    to    conflict   and   criminal
    arrest.
    34. [Mother] lacks verifiable employment and
    lacks stable housing. . . .
    . . .
    46. The juvenile is bonded to her placement
    provider and is doing extremely well in her
    placement. She functions as a member of the
    family. She is in a potential adoptive
    placement.   The  likelihood   of   [A.B.’s]
    adoption is high.
    47. That while [A.B.] . . . knows [that
    mother is] her mother, [mother’s] lack of
    insight into the [effect that] patterns . .
    . symptomatic of [her] mental illness have
    had on her ability to provide [a] safe and
    stable home . . . make termination of
    parental rights in [A.B.’s] best interests.
    Since mother does not challenge these findings of fact,
    they are binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 
    330 N.C. 93
    , 97,
    
    408 S.E.2d 729
    , 731 (1991). The court’s findings of fact clearly
    illustrate the unlikelihood of any imminent change in mother’s
    behavior and the resultant need to terminate parental rights in
    order to facilitate A.B.’s adoption. While the trial court did
    not   explicitly   state   that    termination     of    mother’s   parental
    rights would aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for
    the juvenile, it is apparent that the court considered this
    factor.
    Mother also contends that the trial court failed to make
    sufficient written findings of fact regarding the bond between
    -9-
    mother and the juvenile. Although the court did not use the
    specific   word   “bond,”   it   made    numerous   findings   addressing
    mother’s emotional and mental health issues and her lack of
    involvement with A.B., including the following:
    . . .
    26.     [Mother’s]   psychological    testing
    illustrated that she is an individual who is
    hostile, impulsive and acts out with minimal
    to   no    awareness or   concern   regarding
    consequences of her actions, and tends to
    blame others for altercations and conflicts.
    27.    [Mother’s]    psychological testing
    indicated that she is angry, paranoid and
    distrusting of others.
    28. Dr. Hancock’s evaluation included the
    following diagnoses for [mother]: Bipolar,
    Cannabis    Dependence,   and    Narcissistic
    Personality Disorder with Antisocial Traits.
    . . .
    31. . . . [Mother] is not engaged in any
    known therapy and has not been engaged in
    any consistent therapy or mental health
    program since [A.B.] was placed in [DSS’s]
    custody[.] [Mother] informed Dr. Hancock . .
    . that she does not need therapy.
    32. . . . [Mother] was discharged from [the]
    Salvation Army Women’s Shelter in late
    December   2012  due   to   “intolerable and
    belligerent   behavior   towards   staff and
    residents.”
    33. At the 30 August 2012 hearing, [mother]
    was provided with an opportunity to visit
    [A.B.] at her daycare. [Mother] only visited
    with [A.B.] at her daycare four times
    between August 2012 and [the] 10 January
    -10-
    2013 court date despite being provided bus
    passes. [Mother] has not engaged in shared-
    parenting,   although  [it   is]   available.
    [Mother] did not . . . attend [A.B.’s]
    family    counseling   and    community-based
    rehabilitation services . . . [or] the
    Children’s       Developmental       Services
    appointments as recommended.
    . . .
    36. . . . [Mother] has not provided any
    consistent emotional or other support for
    [A.B.], and has not consistently taken
    advantage   of   opportunities   to   further
    develop a relationship with the child.
    . . .
    38.   [Mother] is   not   engaged in  any
    therapeutic, psychological or psychiatric
    services.
    . . .
    47. That while [A.B.] . . . knows [that
    mother is] her mother, [mother’s] lack of
    insight into the [effect that] patterns . .
    . symptomatic of [her] mental illness have
    had on her ability to provide [a] safe and
    stable home . . . make termination of
    parental rights in [A.B.’s] best interests.
    Mother’s unwillingness to address serious mental health issues
    clearly affects her ability to form an appropriate bond with
    A.B.,   and     her     unwillingness      to    take      advantage        of    the
    opportunities     to    spend   time    with    A.B.     further    impacted     the
    relationship      between   mother      and     child.     The     trial    court’s
    findings   make    it   clear   that     the    court    considered        the   bond
    -11-
    between mother and child when determining that termination was
    in A.B.’s best interest.
    The better practice is for a trial court to make findings
    that clearly track the statutory requirements for findings on
    relevant   issues.   However,   although   the   trial   court   did   not
    employ the specific language of the statute, the court’s order
    adequately   addressed    how   termination      will    facilitate    the
    permanent plan and the bond between mother and child. As this is
    mother’s only challenge to the termination order we conclude
    that the court did not err and that its order should be
    AFFIRMED.
    Judges CALABRIA and McCULLOUGH concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-309

Filed Date: 10/7/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021