Holland v. Valley Services, Inc. , 845 F. Supp. 2d 220 ( 2012 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MICHAEL H. HOLLAND et al., :
:
Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 06-178 (RMU)
:
v. : Document No.: 22
:
VALLEY SERVICES, INC. et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING THE PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND AN
INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT; ORDERING SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING ON DAMAGES
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the court on the plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend the court’s
decision to grant in part and deny in part the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. The
plaintiffs are trustees of the United Mine Workers of America 1992 Benefit Plan who seek to
recover from the defendants pursuant to the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act (“the Coal
Act”), 26 U.S.C. § 9701 et seq., and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. In response to cross-motions for summary judgment, the
court ruled that the defendants were liable for certain claims under the Coal Act, but that certain
claims were time-barred. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the court’s
calculation of the applicable statute of limitations. Because the plaintiffs’ motion would properly
adjust the application of the statute of limitations, the court grants the plaintiffs’ motion.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1962, Valley Services, Inc. was incorporated for the purpose of operating a coal mine.
Compl. ¶ 8. Ovila Bibeau and Dorothy Kilbourne, husband and wife at the time, became owners
of Valley Services in 1975. Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 4. Valley Services ceased operations in
November 1979, id., and formally dissolved shortly thereafter. Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 4.
Defendant Bibeau Construction, which is owned entirely by Ovila Bibeau, was established in
approximately 1962 and has been in operation since that time. Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 4.
On September 25, 1979, Arthur Marcum, Jr., a Valley Services employee, injured his
back when he jumped off of a bulldozer that he was operating. Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 4.
On April 4, 1995, Marcum’s application for retiree health benefits coverage from the United
Mine Workers of America 1992 Benefit Plan (“the 1992 Plan”) was approved, but he was
informed that Valley Services was no longer in business. Id. at 4-5. As a result, the 1992 Plan
agreed to pay his medical bill until it could identify a company that was related to Valley
Services. Id. at 5. The 1992 Plan was obligated to pay for his health care costs dating back to
February 1, 2003, the date the 1992 Plan was established. Id at 6. The 1992 Plan paid more than
$4,000 in medical bills for Marcum and his dependent child. Id.On December 6, 2004, the 1992 Plan notified Bibeau Construction that it was a related
person to Valley Services under the Coal Act and, therefore, it would be considered jointly and
severally liable for the payment of monthly premiums for Marcum. Compl. ¶ 12. The 1992 Plan
requested payment within twenty days. Id. Receiving no response, on October 17, 2005, the
1992 Plan again contacted Bibeau Construction, demanding payment and cautioning that if no
payment was received within 15 days, the failure to pay would be treated as a delinquency. Id. ¶
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13. The plaintiffs alleged that Bibeau Construction owed the principal sum of $100,573.90, plus
interest, liquidated damages and attorney’s fees and costs. Id. ¶ 14.
The plaintiffs initiated this action in February 2006, see generally Compl., and in
September 2007, they moved for summary judgment. Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 12. The court
granted in part the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and ordered supplemental briefing
on the issue of damages. See generally Mem. Op. (May 7, 2009). The plaintiffs subsequently
filed a motion for relief upon reconsideration. See generally Pls.’ Mot. for Reconsideration
(“Pl.’s Mot.”). With that motion now ripe for adjudication, the court now turns to the relevant
legal standards and the parties’ arguments.
III. ARGUMENT
A. Legal Standard for Altering or Amending an Interlocutory Judgment1
A district court may revise its own interlocutory decisions “at any time before the entry
of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 54(b); see also Childers v. Slater, 197 F.R.D. 185, 190 (D.D.C. 2000) (citing the Advisory
Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)). The standard for the court’s review
of an interlocutory decision differs from the standards applied to final judgments under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b). Compare Muwekma Tribe v. Babbitt, 133 F. Supp. 2d
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The plaintiffs filed this motion under Rule 59(e). See generally Pl.’s Mot. As the defendants
note, however, Rule 59(e) only applies to final judgments, and the court has not yet issued a final
judgment in this case. Defs.’ Opp’n at 1-2. Because the court’s partial judgment is interlocutory
in nature, Debrew v. Reno, 2001 WL 469076, at *1 (4th Cir. May 3, 2001), the court construes
the plaintiffs’ motion as a motion to alter or amend an interlocutory judgment under Rule 54(b).
See Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 419 (7th Cir. 1984) (“The Federal Rules are to be construed
liberally so that erroneous nomenclature in a motion does not bind a party at his peril.”); Miller v.
Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1983) (“The court will construe [a
motion], however styled, to be the type proper for the relief requested.”).
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42, 48 n.6 (D.D.C. 2001) (noting that “motions for [relief upon] reconsideration of interlocutory
orders, in contrast to motions for [relief upon] reconsideration of final orders, are within the
sound discretion of the trial court”) and United Mine Workers v. Pittston Co., 793 F. Supp. 339,
345 (D.D.C. 1992) (discussing the standard applicable to motions to grant relief upon
reconsideration of an interlocutory order) with LaRouche v. Dep’t of Treasury, 112 F. Supp. 2d
48, 51-52 (D.D.C. 2000) (analyzing the defendant’s motion for relief from judgment under Rule
60(b)) and Harvey v. District of Columbia, 949 F. Supp. 878, 879 (D.D.C. 1996) (ruling on the
plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e)). A motion pursuant to
Rule 59(e), to alter or amend a judgment after its entry, is not routinely granted. Harvey, 949 F.
Supp. at 879. The primary reasons for altering or amending a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e)
or Rule 60(b) are an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or
the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Id.; Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d
1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam); FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b); LaRouche, 112 F. Supp. 2d at
51-52.
By contrast, relief upon reconsideration of an interlocutory decision pursuant to Rule
54(b) is available “as justice requires.” Childers, 197 F.R.D. at 190. “As justice requires”
indicates concrete considerations of whether the court “has patently misunderstood a party, has
made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the [c]ourt by the parties, has made an
error not of reasoning, but of apprehension, or where a controlling or significant change in the
law or facts [has occurred] since the submission of the issue to the court.” Cobell v. Norton, 224
F.R.D. 266, 272 (D.D.C. 2004) (internal citation omitted). These considerations leave a great
deal of room for the court’s discretion and, accordingly, the “as justice requires” standard
amounts to determining “whether [relief upon] reconsideration is necessary under the relevant
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circumstances.” Id. Nonetheless, the court’s discretion under Rule 54(b) is limited by the law of
the case doctrine and “subject to the caveat that, where litigants have once battled for the court’s
decision, they should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it
again.” Singh v. George Washington Univ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 99 101 (D.D.C. 2005).
B. The Court Grants the Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend
The plaintiffs argue that the court was correct to deem the defendants liable under the
Coal Act. Pls.’ Mot. at 5. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs contend that the court’s precise calculation
of the statute of limitations for multiemployer pension funds, which is governed by ERISA,
requires adjustment. Id. at 5-6. In contrast, the defendants dispute the merits of the court’s
ruling in its entirety, arguing instead that all of the plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred. Defs.’
Opp’n at 2-4.
The Supreme Court has set forth a unique and specific framework to analyze the statute
of limitations for claims involving multiemployer pension funds. See Bay Area Laundry & Dry
Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., Inc., 522 U.S. 192, 194 (1997). Bay Area
Laundry holds that each missed payment under a multiemployer pension fund creates a separate
cause of action with its own six-year limitations period. Id. at 194-96. To calculate the proper
statute of limitations, therefore, a court must begin with the date the complaint was filed and then
count backwards to determine which causes of action were timely at the time the plaintiff filed
suit. Id. Here, the court initially calculated the statute of limitations by calculating the date
when the first premium was time-barred and then counted forwards six years. See Mem. Op. at 7
(“[T]he defendant had an obligation to pay the premium and defaulted on that obligation on May
15, 1995. Therefore, the six-year statute of limitations expired on May 15, 2001, and all claims
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to premiums due on or before that date are time barred.”). This analysis, however, deviates from
the framework set forth in Bay Area Laundry.
Under the Bay Area Laundry framework, the arithmetic proceeds as follows: the
complaint in this matter was filed on February 1, 2006. See generally Compl. Therefore, the
court is required to count backwards by six years to February 1, 2000 and deem the plaintiff’s
claim to be timely inasmuch as it seeks to recover payments that were missed after that date.
Bay Area Laundry, 522 U.S. at 196-97. Under this formula, the court concludes that the
plaintiff’s claim is timely insofar as it seeks to recover any payments that were missed on or after
February 1, 2000. Accordingly, the court grants the plaintiffs’ motion.2
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the
court’s interlocutory judgment. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is
separately and contemporaneously issued this 28th day of February, 2012.
RICARDO M. URBINA
United States District Judge
2
Adjudication of the extent of the damages to which the plaintiffs are entitled requires further
briefing on damages, as the parties conducted separate valuations of the plaintiff’s claims. See
generally Pl.’s Supplemental Briefing of Damages; Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Supplemental Briefing
on Damages. Accordingly, the court cannot determine the precise amount of damages absent
more up-to-date briefings from the parties. The court will therefore issue an order requiring
supplemental briefing in light of the court’s present decision.
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