Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1959 )

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF TEXAS
November 24, 1959
Honorable Charles L. Reynolds
County Attorney
Childress County
Childress, Texas Opinion No. W-74;
Re: Who determines ade-
quacy of transporta-
tion and whether a Com-
missioners' Court may
compensate a Sheriff
under Subsection (c)
when transportation is
furnished under Sub-
section (a) of Article
6877-1, Vernon's Civil
Dear Mr. Reynolds: Statutes.
We quote from your recent letter:
"Childress County, Texas, is a county
whose officers are compensated on a salary
basis. The county owns two automobiles that
are used exclusively by the SherSff and his
deputies and all expenses incidental to the
upkeep and operation of both automobiles are
paid for solely by the co,untyunder the pro-
visions of Subsection (a) of Article 6877-1,
Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes. Recently, one
of the two automobiles was being repaired and
was out of service, clurj~ng
which time the Sher~
iff used his personal automobile for officials
business. The other county owned automobile
was available and was used for official county
business during that per;.odof time. The
Sheriff has submitted his sworn statement of
claim against the county for reimbursement of
transportation expenses incurred in the use of
his personally owned automobile for official
county business during this period of time.
The Comm.jssioners'Court was not apprised of
the transportation situation until the
Hon. Charles L. Reynolds, page 2 (WW-743)
Sheriff's claim was submitted to it, and
naturally had taken no action with re-
spect to either a,uthorizingor denying the
use of the Sheriff's personally owned auto-
mobile for official cou~ntybusiness, and
the Court is of the opinion that during
the period of time in question there was
no emergency requiring the use of any trans-
portation other than the county owned auto-
mobile available for use.
"Action by the Commissioners' Court on
the claim is being held pending your formal
opini~onas to:
"1. Who shall determine what is adequate
transportation?
"2 . Is it mandatory that the Commissioners
Court pay this claim?
“3 . May the court in its discretion allow
the Claim?
“4 . Is the hurt prohibited from approving
the claim?"
Article 6877-1, Vernon's Civil Statutes, provides
in part as follows:
"The County Commissioners Courts of this
State are directed to supply and pay for trans-
portation of sheriffs of their respective
counties and their deputies to and from points
within this State, under one of the four (4)
following sections:
"(a) Such sheriffs and their deputies shall
be furnished adequate motor transportation in-
cluding all expense incidental to the upkeep
and operation of such motor vehicles.
"(b) Motor vehicles shall be furnished to
such sheriffs and their deputies who may furnish
gas and oil, wash and grease, incidental to the
operation of such vehicles; for which gas and
oil, wash and grease, such sheriffs and deputies
shall be compensated at a rate not to exceed four
.
Hon. Charles L. Reynolds, page 3 (WW-743)
cents (4$) per mile for each mile such
vehicle is operated in the performance of
the duties of his office.
"(c) Alternatively such County Com-
m?ssioners' Courts may allow sheriffs
and their deputies in their respective
counties to use and operate cars on of-
ficial business which cars are personally
owned by them for which such offl~cersshall
be paid not less than six cents (6#) per
mile nor more than ten cents (lOa) per
mile~for each ~mlletraveled in the per-
formance of official duties of their
office."
In answer to yo’ur first question, it is for the Com-
missioners' Court to determine what is "adequate motor
transportation' within the meaning of Subsection (a) of
the above statute. The Commissioners' Court is given the
statutory duty to,provide such transportation. Implied
authority exists in the Commissioners' Courts to do what
may be necessary to exercise the duties and powers con-
ferred upon them; Anderson v. Wood, 137 Tex. 201, 152
S.W.2d 1084 (1941); Canales v. Laughlin, 147 Tex. 169,
214 S.W.2d 451 (1948). Manifestly the Commissioners'
Co,urtmust determine what "'adequatemotor transportation"
is if the Court is to furnish such transportation.
Moreover, Section 18 of Article V of the Constitution
I Courts powers and juris-
of Texas confers on Comml.ssioners
business." The subject determination
diction over "cou~n'ty
clearly falls within the p'urviewof 'county business."
However, such determinations are subject to judicial
review by the District Court in a proper suit for such pur-
pose. Article V, Secti~on8, Texas Constitution; Article
1908, Vernon's Civil Statutes; Harris County v. Bassett, 139
S.W.2d 180 (Civ. App. 1940, error ref.).
In answer to your second question, it is not mandatory
that the Commissioners I Court pay the claim in question un-
less the Commissioners Co,urtfinds that it has not supplied
'adequate transportation"'in the situation described in
your letter and elects to use Subsection (c) of the stat-
ute.
We have previously held that the Commissioners' Court
may not legally supply and pay for transportation of the
Hon. Charles L. Reynolds, page 4 (WW-743)
sheriff and his deputies under more than one of the
three subsections of the statute at a time. WW-707
(1959); V-293 (1947). Therefore, if the Commissioners'
Court is already supplyin "adequate motor transporta-
tion" under Subsection (a7 It cannot allow the claim
in question. If, however, the Commissioners' Court
makes a valid determination that the Court is not fur-
nishing "adequate motor transportation" when one of
the two county owned automobiles is available for use
by the sheriff and the other automobile is not, then
the Commissioners' Court could, and would even have
to, supply and pay for transportation of the sheriff
and his deputies under either Subsection (b) or (c)
of the statute. The Commissioners' Court has a manda-
tory duty to supply and pay for such transportation
under at least one of the three Subsections. V-293 (1947).
The question of whether the sheriff and his depu-
ties have had adequate motor transportation involves a
factual determination which must be made by the Com-
missioners' Court in the light of many varied factors
that are peculiar to the local situation. Of such
factors the Commissioners' Co,urtis cognizant and this
department is not.
Based upon the statement in your letter that the
"court is of the opinion that during the period of time
in question there was no emergency requiring the use
of any transportation oth$r than the county owned a~uto-
mobile available for use, we infer that the court has
fo,undthat "adequ.atemotor transportation" has been fur-
nished to the sheriff. Assuming that such determination
is valid in light of the facts and circumstances present
in Childress County, your third question is, therefore,
answered in the negative and your fourth in the affirma-
tive. ;
SUMMAXY
Commissioners' Courts determine what
is "adequate motor transportation"
within the meaning of Subsection (a)
of Article 6877-1, Vernon's Civil
Statutes, subject to judicial review
in a proper case. A claim made ,under
- .
Hon. Charles L. Reynolds, page 5 (WW-743)
Subsection (c) of the Statute
cannot be approved by the Com-
missioners' Co~ur'c
when adequate
motor transportation is being
furnished under Subsection (a).
Very truly yours,
WILL WILSON
Attorney General of Texas
Assistant
HB:me:ms
APPROVED:
OPINION COMMITTEE
W. V. Geppert, Chairman
J. C. Davis, Jr.
Hou.ghtonBrownlee, Jr.
Paul W. Floyd, Jr.
Raymond V. Loftin, Jr.
REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNZX GENERAL
BYi: Leonard Passrrore