N. Canton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Revision (Slip Opinion) , 152 Ohio St. 3d 292 ( 2018 )


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  • [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as N.
    Canton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-
    1.]
    NOTICE
    This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
    advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
    promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
    South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
    formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
    the opinion is published.
    Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-1
    NORTH CANTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT B OARD OF EDUCATION,
    APPELLEE, v. STARK COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES; LFG
    PROPERTIES, L.L.C., APPELLANT.
    [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
    may be cited as N. Canton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Stark Cty. Bd. of
    Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-1.]
    Taxation—Real-property valuation—Presumption that forced sale was not at arm’s
    length rebutted—Decision of the Board of Tax Appeals reversed and cause
    remanded.
    (No. 2015-0349—Submitted September 12, 2017—Decided January 2, 2018.)
    APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, Nos. 2013-6181 and 2013-6222.
    _______________________
    DEWINE, J.
    {¶ 1} This appeal concerns the valuation for tax purposes of a property that
    was sold following a foreclosure proceeding. The primary issue before us involves
    the application of the “forced sale” provision of R.C. 5713.04. As we have applied
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    the provision, a forced sale gives rise to a presumption that the sale price is not the
    property’s true value. See Olentangy Local Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Delaware Cty.
    Bd. of Revision, 
    141 Ohio St. 3d 243
    , 2014-Ohio-4723, 
    23 N.E.3d 1086
    , ¶ 40. That
    presumption can be rebutted, however, by evidence that an arm’s-length transaction
    occurred. 
    Id. at ¶
    43. When the presumption is overcome, the sale price is used as
    the property’s value. 
    Id. at ¶
    24.
    {¶ 2} In this case, the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) applied the
    presumption, despite uncontradicted evidence demonstrating that the transaction
    was at arm’s length. We reverse the decision of the BTA and remand the case with
    the instruction that the $1,200,000 sale price be used as the property’s true value
    for tax purposes.
    I.      The Property Is Marketed and Sold Following Foreclosure
    {¶ 3} The property is a 36-unit apartment complex in North Canton. After
    the complex went into foreclosure, the common pleas court appointed a receiver
    over the property, and Huntington National Bank obtained a judgment of about
    $1,700,000 against its borrower. The property was set for sheriff’s sale with a
    minimum bid of $1,400,000. There were no bids, and the property did not sell.
    {¶ 4} The receiver then marketed the property through a national real estate
    brokerage firm, Hendricks & Partners. The firm sent out marketing materials to
    many developers, including a mass-mailing flyer that showed a list price of
    $1,325,000 and a pro forma statement of income and expenses for operating the
    apartment complex. In addition, the property was advertised on two national
    commercial-real-estate websites. The marketing materials made no mention of the
    sheriff’s sale that failed to sell the subject property.
    {¶ 5} Ultimately, Hendricks & Partners received 17 inquiries from potential
    buyers, and at least a half-dozen offers to purchase were submitted, ranging from
    $820,000 to $1,200,000. The highest and best offer was $1,200,000, submitted by
    LFG Properties, L.L.C. There was no relationship between LFG Properties and the
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    January Term, 2018
    receiver or the former property owner. The receiver presented the offer to the court,
    and the court approved the sale, finding that it was “commercially reasonable.” The
    property was transferred to LFG Properties in June 2011.
    {¶ 6} LFG Properties filed a valuation complaint with appellee Stark
    County Board of Revision (“BOR”) seeking to reduce the property’s tax-year-2012
    valuation from $1,841,300 to $1,200,000. North Canton City School District Board
    of Education (“school board”) filed a countercomplaint seeking to retain the
    auditor’s valuation. At the BOR hearing, LFG Properties was the only party to
    present evidence. After considering the evidence, the BOR noted that there was
    evidence in the record that a distress sale occurred. It found, however, that the
    presumption of involuntariness was rebutted with “strong testimony” by LFG
    Properties, and “good evidence [was] presented” showing that the property was
    marketed over time. The BOR found that the June 2011 sale represented the
    property’s fair market value at the time of the sale. It then adjusted that sale price
    by $101,500 to account for repairs that were made by LFG Properties after the sale,
    thereby establishing a total value of $1,301,500.
    {¶ 7} LFG Properties and the school board both appealed to the BTA. The
    BTA rejected the BOR’s reliance on the 2011 sale price as an indicator of value,
    found that the sale was a forced sale, and reinstated the auditor’s valuation. LFG
    Properties appealed to this court.
    II.     The BTA Erred in Failing to Apply the Sale Price
    {¶ 8} LFG Properties raises two issues on appeal. Under its first proposition
    of law, it argues that the BTA erred in failing to value the property at the sale price
    of $1,200,000. Under its second proposition of law, it argues in the alternative that
    the BTA erred in not reinstating the BOR’s value of $1,301,500.
    A.      The School Waived Its Evidentiary Challenge
    {¶ 9} Before we get to the merits of the matter, there is an evidentiary issue
    we must address. The school board contends that we cannot consider certain
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    documents that were filed in the foreclosure action, including the order appointing
    the receiver, a joint motion seeking approval of the sale (which included a copy of
    the sale agreement and an affidavit that explained the marketing of the property),
    and the order approving the sale. In the proceeding below, LFG Properties moved
    the BTA to take judicial notice of these documents, and the BTA admitted the
    documents into evidence and referred to them in its decision. See 2015 Ohio Tax
    LEXIS 738 at *3.
    {¶ 10} Importantly, the school board did not object to the admission of the
    documents at the BTA hearing and, in fact, argued that they supported its position
    that the sale was forced. By failing to object and relying upon their contents, the
    school board has waived any objection to the use of the documents. See Plain Local
    Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    130 Ohio St. 3d 230
    , 2011-
    Ohio-3362, 
    957 N.E.2d 268
    , ¶ 20.
    B.      LFG Properties Rebutted the Forced-Sale Presumption
    {¶ 11} When real property has been the subject of a recent arm’s-length
    sale, former R.C. 5713.03, as in effect on the tax-lien date in this case, required the
    property to be valued according to the sale price. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 260, 140 Ohio
    Laws, Part II, 2665, 2722; Berea City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty.
    Bd. of Revision, 
    106 Ohio St. 3d 269
    , 2005-Ohio-4979, 
    834 N.E.2d 782
    , ¶ 13. But
    when the underlying transaction is an auction or forced sale under R.C. 5713.04, a
    rebuttable presumption exists that the sale price is not evidence of the property’s
    value. Olentangy Local Schools, 
    141 Ohio St. 3d 243
    , 2014-Ohio-4723, 
    23 N.E.3d 1086
    , at ¶ 40. To rebut the presumption, the proponent of the sale price must
    present “evidence showing that the sale occurred at arm’s length between typically
    motivated parties.” 
    Id. at ¶
    40.
    {¶ 12} The BTA found that the forced-sale provision applied—something
    no party disputes. It then concluded that the June 2011 sale was not “a reliable
    indicator of value * * * because the transaction in question was a court mandated
    4
    January Term, 2018
    sale, i.e., a sale by a receiver, which this board has previously held, on numerous
    occasions, constitutes a forced sale.” 2015 Ohio Tax LEXIS 738 at *3.
    {¶ 13} In reaching this conclusion, the BTA did not consider any of the
    evidence set forth by LFG Properties that the property was subject to an arm’s-
    length transaction. The BTA instead cited five other cases, all of which predate
    Olentangy Local Schools, in which it refused to consider evidence that the property
    was openly marketed. 
    Id. In effect,
    the BTA adopted a conclusive presumption
    that the sale was not at arm’s length and thus not indicative of value. In doing so,
    it failed to consider whether the presumption had been rebutted as required by our
    holding in Olentangy Local Schools.
    {¶ 14} In another case, we might stop here and simply remand for the BTA
    to properly perform its analysis. But there is no need to do so here because the only
    evidence in the record demonstrates that the sale was at arm’s length.
    {¶ 15} As the appellant before the BTA, the school board bore the burden
    to prove its right to an increase in the value determined by the BOR. Columbus
    City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    90 Ohio St. 3d 564
    ,
    566, 
    740 N.E.2d 276
    (2001), citing Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Hamilton
    Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    78 Ohio St. 3d 325
    , 328, 
    677 N.E.2d 1197
    (1997). It sought
    to meet this burden by arguing that a sale by a court-appointed receiver as a matter
    of law could not be considered an arm’s-length transaction. In support of this
    argument, it offered only citations to BTA decisions that predated this court’s
    decision in Olentangy Local Schools. It did not, however, identify any evidence
    establishing that this particular sale was not at arm’s length.
    {¶ 16} Indeed, the closest it came to challenging the arm’s-length nature of
    the sale was to point out that (1) the property had been submitted for a sheriff’s
    sale, (2) there were no bidders at the sheriff’s sale, and (3) the property sold within
    17 days after the sheriff’s sale. But these circumstances demonstrate only that the
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    ultimate sale came fairly close in time to the sheriff’s sale. They do not show that
    the sale to LFG Properties was not at arm’s length.
    {¶ 17} Whether a transaction occurred at arm’s length depends on whether
    the sale was voluntary, whether it took place on the open market, and whether the
    parties acted in their own self-interest. Walters v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    47 Ohio St. 3d 23
    , 25, 
    546 N.E.2d 932
    (1989). LFG Properties put forth substantial
    evidence before the BOR to show that its purchase of the property met these criteria.
    The evidence demonstrated that the property had been aggressively marketed by a
    qualified professional, that there was interest in the property from a number of
    buyers and at least a half-dozen offers, that the buyer was unconnected with the
    receiver or former property owner, that the buyer had not been aware of the sheriff’s
    sale, that the highest and best offer was accepted, and that the court found the sale
    price to be “commercially reasonable.”
    {¶ 18} All the school board offered in response was a legal theory that was
    rejected by this court in Olentangy Local Schools. Though it bore the burden of
    proof before the BTA, the school board failed to point to any evidence that the sale
    price was not indicative of the value or that the transaction was not at arm’s length.
    {¶ 19} Because the school board failed to meet its burden before the BTA
    and because we determine that the evidence establishes that the 2011 sale was at
    arm’s length, we conclude that the BTA erred in not applying former R.C. 5713.03
    to find that the 2011 sale price constituted the value of the property.
    C.      The Property Value Should Not Be Adjusted by the
    Repair Costs
    {¶ 20} Under its second proposition of law, LFG Properties suggests that as
    an alternative to valuing the property at the sale price, we could reinstate the BOR’s
    value of $1,301,500 (sale price plus repair cost).
    {¶ 21} The BOR’s approach has a certain intuitive appeal—as a practical
    matter it might make sense in at least some cases to adjust the sale price for postsale
    6
    January Term, 2018
    repairs. But former R.C. 5703.13 leaves no room to do it that way. It mandated
    that the auditor “shall consider” a recent arm-length’s sale “to be the true value for
    taxation purposes.” 140 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2665, 2722. Once a recent sale is
    determined to be at arm’s length, the sale price must be used.
    III.   Conclusion: The Case Is Remanded with Instructions to Value
    the Property at the Sale Price
    {¶ 22} The school board failed to meet its burden to prove its right to an
    increase in the value determined by the BOR. The uncontradicted evidence in the
    record established an arm’s-length transaction. In similar circumstances, we have
    remanded with instructions that the sale price be used as evidence of the property’s
    value for the tax year. See Schwartz v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 143 Ohio
    St.3d 496, 2015-Ohio-3431, 
    39 N.E.3d 1223
    . We apply the same remedy here.
    {¶ 23} We reverse the BTA’s decision and remand the case with the
    instruction that the property’s true value for tax year 2012 be set at $1,200,000.
    Decision reversed
    and cause remanded.
    O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ.,
    concur.
    FISCHER, J., concurs in judgment only.
    _________________
    Lane, Alton & Horst, L.L.C., and Robert M. Morrow; and Mary Jo Shannon
    Slick, for appellee North Canton City School District Board of Education.
    Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Karen H. Bauernschmidt, for
    appellant.
    ___________________
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2015-0349

Citation Numbers: 2018 Ohio 1, 95 N.E.3d 372, 152 Ohio St. 3d 292

Judges: DeWine, J.

Filed Date: 1/2/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023