Ryan v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Chicago , 426 Ill. Dec. 593 ( 2018 )


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    2018 IL App (1st) 172669
    FOURTH DIVISION
    November 8, 2018
    No. 1-17-2669
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
    FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    SHEILA RYAN                                                     )
    )    Appeal from
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                                    )    the Circuit Court
    )    of Cook County
    v.                                                      )
    )    2016-CH-09800
    THE ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE CITY OF                      )
    CHICAGO, RAYMOND T. DeGRAZIA, LAURA                             )    Honorable
    SHEEHAN, AND 636-638 WEST 37TH STREET, INC.,                    )    Anna Helen Demacopoulos,
    )    Judge Presiding
    Defendants-Appellees.                                   )
    PRESIDING JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
    Justices Gordon and Reyes concurred in the judgment and opinion.
    OPINION
    ¶1     Over Sheila Ryan’s objection, the Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Chicago
    (Zoning Board of Appeals) granted a 2.5-inch reduction to the standard 24-inch setback required
    between the side of her home and the new home next door that was purchased by Laura Sheehan
    from building contractor Raymond T. DeGrazia and his corporation, 636-638 West 37th Street,
    Inc. Ryan attempted to overturn the board’s decision by a judicial review in the circuit court of
    Cook County. The circuit court, however, granted Sheehan’s motion to dismiss Ryan’s
    complaint because the caption of her summons of service listed only “Zoning Board of Appeals
    of the City of Chicago, et al” as defendants and did not expressly include Sheehan. On appeal,
    1-17-2669
    Ryan contends that the summons adequately notified Sheehan of the legal action and that the
    decision to dismiss elevated form over substance. She asks us to reverse and remand for a
    resolution on the merits rather than on the basis of a minor, technical error.
    ¶2     Ryan’s property is located at 640 West 37th Street. For simplicity, we will use “638
    West” to refer to the new construction at 638 West 37th Street and “636-38 corporation” to refer
    to home builder DeGrazia’s company.
    ¶3     The record compiled before the Zoning Board of Appeals indicates the encroachment into
    the side setback was caused when the location for the new concrete foundation at 638 West was
    mismarked by a subcontractor. The builder testified he did not realize the error until after the
    foundation, walls, and roof were complete and it was no longer cost effective to alter the
    construction. The builder’s attempts to amicably resolve Ryan’s concerns about her adjacent
    residence were unsuccessful. 636-38 corporation asked the municipal zoning administrator for a
    variance from Chicago’s RS-3 zoning ordinance, but the administrator denied the request. The
    Zoning Board of Appeals granted the variance after finding strict compliance would create a
    hardship on the builder and/or the new owner; the small encroachment was a mistake, not profit-
    motivated, and would not impact public safety or be injurious to other property; and a variance
    would not alter the essential characteristics of the neighborhood.
    ¶4     Ryan timely filed for judicial review of the board’s decision dated June 22, 2016, and
    timely issued a summons on or about July 26, 2016, to the board; the builder, DeGrazia; and the
    new homeowner, Sheehan. The record includes a certified mail receipt that Sheehan signed at her
    new home on August 8, 2016, when she accepted delivery of the complaint and summons.
    Immediately below the caption was the subtitle “SUMMONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE
    REVIEW” and the following:
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    1-17-2669
    “To each defendant:
    YOU ARE SUMMONED and required to file an answer in this case or otherwise file
    your appearance in the office of the clerk of this court located in Room 801, Richard J.
    Daley Center, Chicago, Illinois, within 35 days after the date of this summons.”
    ¶5     This was followed by six lines of contact information for petitioner Ryan’s attorney, on
    the left side of the page, and to the right of the attorney contact information was a date field
    which the clerk of the circuit court had completed by stamping the summons date “JUL 26
    2016.” Just below this paragraph, on the bottom half of the one-page summons, was the subtitle
    “CERTIFICATE OF MAILING” and the following:
    “On _______________________, _____, I sent by registered mail a copy of this
    summons to each defendant addressed as follows:
    Defendant                                       Address
    Zoning Board of Appeals—City of               121 N. La Salle, room 905, Chicago, IL
    Chicago                                       60602
    Raymond T. DeGrazia                           3207 S. Emerald, Chicago, IL 60616
    Laura Sheehan                                 638 W. 37th Street, Chicago, IL 60609
    ___________________________________           ___________________________________
    ___________________________________           ___________________________________
    ___________________________________           ___________________________________
    ___________________________________           ___________________________________
    Dated: Dorothy Brown JUL 26 2016
    Clerk of the Court”
    ¶6     DeGrazia filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that Ryan had failed to name his
    corporation as a party to her review action, despite the fact that 636-38 corporation had applied
    for the zoning variance. Ryan then sought leave to amend her complaint to include the
    corporation as a defendant. On February 23, 2017, the circuit court granted Ryan leave to amend
    and denied DeGrazia’s motion as moot. Ryan filed her amended pleading the next day and about
    two weeks later Sheehan filed a special and limited appearance for purposes of challenging the
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    contents of her summons. After written briefs and oral arguments, the circuit court granted
    Sheehan’s motion on June 14, 2017, and later denied a motion for reconsideration.
    ¶7        Ryan contends the circuit court misapplied Illinois law in concluding that it lacked
    jurisdiction over Sheehan and was required to dismiss the complaint seeking administrative
    review. We review the circuit court’s ruling de novo. McGaw Medical Center of Northwestern
    University v. Department of Employment Security, 
    369 Ill. App. 3d 37
    , 39, 
    860 N.E.2d 471
    , 474
    (2006).
    ¶8        “In a general sense, ‘jurisdiction’ refers to the ‘right or power to interpret and apply the
    law,’ or to a court’s ‘sphere of authority or control.’ ” In re M.W., 
    232 Ill. 2d 408
    , 414, 
    905 N.E.2d 757
    , 763 (2009) (quoting Webster’s II New Collegiate Dictionary 601 (1999)). “In a
    technical, legal sense, however, jurisdiction is composed of two distinct elements: subject matter
    jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.” In re 
    M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 414
    . A court can enter a valid
    judgment only if the court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the type of claim and personal
    jurisdiction over the parties. In re 
    M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 415
    .
    ¶9        The Administrative Review Law (Act) grants special statutory jurisdiction to circuit
    courts to review final decisions of administrative agencies such as the Zoning Board of Appeals
    “within the time and in the manner herein provided,” i.e., as provided in the statute. 735 ILCS
    5/3-102 (West 2016). Because the Act is a departure from common law, the procedures it
    establishes must be strictly followed. Lockett v. Chicago Police Board, 
    133 Ill. 2d 349
    , 353, 
    549 N.E.2d 1266
    , 1267 (1990). Accord McGaw Medical 
    Center, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 42
    (a circuit
    court’s jurisdiction to review administrative decisions is derived solely from statute and if the
    statute’s procedures are not “strictly pursued,” then no jurisdiction is conferred on the circuit
    court (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The court may not resort to other law, either statutory
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    or common law, that either expands or limits the provisions of the [Act] to obtain a different
    result.” McGaw Medical 
    Center, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 43
    .
    ¶ 10   Litigants, however, have struggled to follow the terms of the Act and vest the court with
    jurisdiction. The harsh consequences of seemingly minor errors have prompted the legislature to
    clarify the language of the Act and create exceptions for certain errors. See, e.g., Fragakis v.
    Police & Fire Comm’n of the Village of Schiller Park, 
    303 Ill. App. 3d 141
    , 142-43, 
    707 N.E.2d 660
    , 661-62 (1999) (outlining numerous amendments to the Act and referring to the practice area
    as a “dangerous minefield”).
    ¶ 11   For instance, rules abound on when to file, whom to name as defendants, and how to
    serve notice of an action. Section 3-103 of the Act requires an action for administrative review to
    be filed within 35 days from the date the decision sought to be reviewed was served on the
    affected party. 735 ILCS 5/3-103 (West 2016); Nudell v. Forest Preserve District of Cook
    County, 
    207 Ill. 2d 409
    , 411, 
    799 N.E.2d 260
    , 261 (2003). Unless the action is filed in the 35 day
    period, the circuit court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the party is forever barred from
    obtaining judicial review. 
    Nudell, 207 Ill. 2d at 423
    . Section 3-107 of the Act provides that the
    complaint must name as defendants “the administrative agency and all persons, other than the
    plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative agency.” 735
    ILCS 5/3-107 (West 2016). This requirement, however, has been deemed mandatory, instead of
    jurisdictional, and the legislature has created exceptions so that a petitioner may correct his or
    her complaint rather than seeing it dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See McGaw
    Medical 
    Center, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 43
    (regarding the statutory amendment permitting the
    addition of an “employee, agent, or member of an administrative agency, board, committee, or
    government entity” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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    ¶ 12    As for personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff or petitioner submits to the personal jurisdiction of
    the court by the act of filing a petition or complaint. In re 
    M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 426
    . A respondent
    or defendant becomes subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction by consenting to personal
    jurisdiction by appearing in the action, or may have personal jurisdiction imposed upon him or
    her by the effective service of a summons. In re 
    M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 426
    . The objectives of
    service of process on a defendant are, first, to notify a defendant of pending litigation so that she
    or he may appear and defend, and second, to vest personal jurisdiction in the court. Charter Bank
    & Trust of Illinois v. Novak, 
    218 Ill. App. 3d 548
    , 552, 
    578 N.E.2d 629
    , 631 (1991); White v.
    Ratcliffe, 
    285 Ill. App. 3d 758
    , 763-64, 
    674 N.E.2d 906
    , 911 (1996) (“[p]roper service of
    summons is a prerequisite for obtaining [personal] jurisdiction over a party,” and “a judgment
    entered without proper service of process is void even if the party against whom a judgment is
    entered had notice of the proceedings”); In re 
    M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 426
    .
    ¶ 13    Looking further into the procedures that must be followed to effectively invoke the
    personal jurisdiction of the circuit court, section 3-105 of the Act specifies the use of registered
    or certified mail to serve a summons for administrative review on the administrative agency and
    each of the defendants. 735 ILCS 5/3-105 (West 2016). Section 3-105 also provides, “The form
    of the summons *** shall be according to rules of the Supreme Court.” 735 ILCS 5/3-105 (West
    2016). Illinois Supreme Court Rule 101 requires that a summons be “directed to each defendant”
    and that the format “substantially” follow the sample summons that is included in the rule. Ill. S.
    Ct. R. 101 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016). 1 The caption of the sample form directs “naming all defendants.”
    Ill. S. Ct. R. 101(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016). Also relevant is Illinois Supreme Court Rule 131(c) (eff.
    1
    The relevant version of Rule 101 included the sample form within the rule (Ill. S. Ct. R. 101(b)
    (eff. Jan. 1, 2016)), but as of 2018, the sample form was moved to the Article II Forms Appendix (Ill. S.
    Ct. R. 101 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018), Art. II Forms Appendix).
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    1-17-2669
    Jan. 1, 2016), which concerns pleadings and other documents that are filed and served, and
    provides that, in cases where there are multiple parties, “it is sufficient in entitling documents,
    except a summons, to name the first-named plaintiff and the first-named defendant with the usual
    indication of other parties.” (Emphasis added.)
    ¶ 14   Sheehan persuaded the circuit court that Ryan’s summons did not comply with these
    requirements and that these requirements were jurisdictional and could not be corrected by
    amending the complaint.
    ¶ 15   Long-standing precedent indicates a summons “which does not name a person on its face
    and notify him to appear, is no summons at all, so far as the unnamed person is concerned.” Ohio
    Millers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Inter-Insurance Exchange of the Illinois Automobile Club, 
    367 Ill. 44
    , 56, 
    10 N.E.2d 393
    , 398 (1937). The summons in Ohio Millers Mutual was declared
    invalid because it failed to name approximately 3000 people and business entities on its face.
    Ohio Millers 
    Mutual, 367 Ill. at 45
    , 56. The summons was directed only to “ ‘Inter Insurance
    Exchange of the Illinois Automobile Club, David Rosenbach, as attorney in fact of the Inter
    Insurance Exchange of the Illinois Automobile Club, and;’ ” Ohio Millers 
    Mutual, 367 Ill. at 45
    .
    Attached to the back of the summons was a list of 3000 names without any further information
    about those people, corporations, and other firms, and the sheriff had made no attempt to serve
    anyone on the list. Ohio Millers 
    Mutual, 367 Ill. at 45
    -46. The fatal defect in Goodkind v.
    Bartlett, 
    153 Ill. 419
    , 
    38 N.E. 1045
    (1894), was that one of the defendants was not identified by
    name at all but was merely described as the person married to another of the defendants. The
    summons and complaint named “John N. Hummer and……Hummer, his wife” as defendants.
    
    Goodkind, 153 Ill. at 423
    . The court held that absent a statute permitting it, “persons, natural or
    artificial, cannot be made parties litigant by mere descriptio personae, but must be designated by
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    name, both in the process and in the judgment.” 
    Goodkind, 153 Ill. at 423
    . The court
    distinguished the situation where the party has been identified by the wrong name, holding that
    “in case of misnomer, if the summons is served on the party intended, and he fails to appear, or,
    appearing, fails to object, the judgment against him will be binding.” 
    Goodkind, 153 Ill. at 423
    .
    The summons in Theodorakakis v. Kogut, 
    194 Ill. App. 3d 586
    , 588-89, 
    551 N.E.2d 261
    , 270
    (1990), was deemed invalid because a trust was designated with the wrong number, “4289,” even
    though the body of the complaint contained the correct number, “44289.” The face of the
    summons did not name a legally existent party and a complaint is not considered part of the
    summons. 
    Theodorakakis, 194 Ill. App. 3d at 589
    .
    ¶ 16   These principles were restated in Arch Bay Holdings, LLC-Series 2010B v. Perez, 
    2015 IL App (2d) 141117
    , 
    43 N.E.3d 562
    —a case that the circuit court expressly relied on in
    dismissing Ryan’s complaint for administrative review. The defendant’s name was omitted from
    the face of the summons and appeared only on an attached list that instructed the process server
    to serve certain individuals. Arch Bay Holdings, 
    2015 IL App (2d) 141117
    , ¶ 16. Under Ohio
    Millers Mutual, the failure to include the defendant’s name on the face of the summons rendered
    it “no summons at all.” Arch Bay Holdings, 
    2015 IL App (2d) 141117
    , ¶ 16. The court further
    noted that a summons is to be evaluated on its own, not in conjunction with the contents of the
    complaint. Arch Bay Holdings, 
    2015 IL App (2d) 141117
    , ¶ 19. Also, actual knowledge of an
    action through a flawed summons does not vest the court with personal jurisdiction. Arch Bay
    Holdings, 
    2015 IL App (2d) 141117
    , ¶ 19; U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Johnston, 2016 IL App
    (2d) 150128, ¶ 28, 
    55 N.E.3d 742
    (service of an invalid summons is ineffective).
    ¶ 17   Even so, courts “should not elevate form over substance, but should construe a summons
    liberally.” 
    Novak, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 552
    . The summons in Novak correctly named the
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    defendant, provided the correct address for the courthouse, and was personally served on the
    defendant a month prior to the hearing. 
    Novak, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 551
    . The summons’ only flaw
    was that it did not specify a date for the defendant to appear. 
    Novak, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 551
    . The
    court found that despite this failing, the summons adequately supported personal jurisdiction
    over the defendant because the document gave notice that a legal action had been brought against
    her and that a hearing would be conducted. 
    Novak, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 551
    . When the defendant
    received the summons, she contacted the clerk of the court and was told the date, time, and
    courtroom number where the case would be heard. 
    Novak, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 550
    . She went to
    that courtroom on the correct day and time. 
    Novak, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 550
    . In a subsequent
    motion to quash service of process, she swore the case was not called while she was in the
    courtroom and that two days later she received a letter from the plaintiff’s attorney informing her
    that a judgment had been entered against her that day. 
    Novak, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 550
    . The court
    acknowledged that the document was “ ‘imperfect’ ” but found that the omitted information was
    “not so serious a deficiency” as to invalidate the summons. 
    Novak, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 551
    -52.
    Despite its imperfection, the face of the summons achieved its intended purposes of (1) notifying
    the defendant of the pending litigation and enabling her to appear and defend and (2) vesting
    personal jurisdiction in the trying court. See 
    Novak, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 552
    ; Johnston, 2016 IL
    App (2d) 150128, ¶ 28 (service of process protects an individual’s right to due process by
    providing notice and an opportunity to be heard and it vests jurisdiction over the individual). The
    fact that the defendant did not hear the case being called in the courtroom, or did not step
    forward and question the clerk about the case, could have occurred even if the defendant had
    received a summons that was technically perfect. 
    Novak, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 551
    .
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    1-17-2669
    ¶ 18   Additionally, in the context of the stricter service requirements imposed under the Act,
    the Illinois Supreme Court has emphasized that an established rule of statutory construction is to
    “liberally construe a right to appeal so as to permit a case to be considered on its merits.”
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cox v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 
    96 Ill. 2d 399
    ,
    403, 
    451 N.E.2d 842
    , 844 (1983). Moreover, “[t]he underlying spirit of our system of civil
    justice is that controversies should be determined according to the substantive rights of the
    parties. This notion is not only intuitive—it is the articulated public policy of the State. See 735
    ILCS 5/1-106 (West 1996).” Smith v. City of Chicago, 
    299 Ill. App. 3d 1048
    , 1054-55, 
    702 N.E.2d 274
    , 279 (1998).
    ¶ 19   Notably, the legislature recently amended the law concerning civil summons in order to
    clarify that technical errors do not deprive the circuit court of personal jurisdiction, which the
    trial judge did not have the benefit of prior to ruling on Sheehan’s motion to dismiss. During the
    pendency of this appeal, the legislature amended section 2-201 of the Code of Civil Procedure by
    adding paragraph (c):
    Ҥ 2-201. Commencement of actions-Forms of process.
    (a) Every action, unless otherwise expressly provided by statute, shall be commenced
    by the filing of a complaint. The clerk shall issue summons upon request of the plaintiff.
    The form and substance of the summons, and of all other process, and the issuance of
    alias process, and the service of copies of pleadings shall be according to rules.
    (b) One or more duplicate original summonses may be issued, marked ‘First
    Duplicate,’ ‘Second Duplicate,’ etc., as the case may be, whenever it will facilitate the
    service of summons in any one or more counties, including the county of venue.
    (c) A court’s jurisdiction is not affected by a technical error in format of a summons if
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    1-17-2669
    the summons has been issued by a clerk of the court, the person or entity to be served is
    identified as a defendant on the summons, and the summons is properly served. This
    subsection is declarative of existing law.” (Emphasis in original.) Pub. Act 100-1048, § 5
    (eff. Aug. 23, 2018) (amending 735 ILCS 5/2-201).
    ¶ 20   Although section 2-201 is part of article II and thus concerns civil actions, rather than
    article III which is specific to administrative review actions, the amendment was to clarify
    existing law, rather than change it. We are confident that the legislature intended for summons to
    be evaluated consistently, rather than for special standards to be read into the language directly
    applicable to administrative review actions.
    ¶ 21   On appeal, Ryan contends that the face of the summons she sent to Sheehan for judicial
    review complied with the Act and the rules of the supreme court, despite the fact that the caption
    of the summons listed only “Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Chicago, et al” as
    defendants and did not expressly include Sheehan. Ryan makes this argument because of the
    additional information on the face of the summons, which we set out above. Sheehan responds
    that a party seeking administrative review must strictly adhere to the procedures set out in the
    Act, but she “was named only parenthetically on the certificate of mailing [section of the
    summons],” and that case law supports the conclusion that the court lacked jurisdiction over
    Sheehan and properly dismissed Ryan’s action. The three other parties, Zoning Board of
    Appeals, DeGrazia, and 636-38 corporation, filed appellate appearances, but not briefs.
    ¶ 22   We have evaluated the summons in light of the Act, rules of the Illinois Supreme Court,
    and objectives of service of process. In our opinion, the format and contents of this summons
    adequately notified Sheehan of the pending administrative review action and her opportunity to
    respond and also vested the circuit court with personal jurisdiction over Sheehan. The caption
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    included “et al.,” in lieu of defendant Sheehan’s (or defendant DeGrazia’s) actual name, but this
    was followed by clear statements on the face of the summons that Sheehan was a “defendant” to
    an administrative review action Ryan filed in the circuit court and summoned Sheehan to
    respond to the proceeding in that new forum. Just below the caption was the direction “[t]o each
    defendant *** to file an answer in this case or otherwise file your appearance *** within 35 days
    after the date of this summons;” and Sheehan’s full name and mailing address was printed just
    slightly lower on the same page, under the columns “Defendant” and “Address,” and
    immediately below the clerk’s statement, “On [JUL 26 2016], I sent by registered mail a copy of
    this summons to each defendant addressed as follows.” All of this information appeared on the
    face of the summons. This one-page summons repeatedly and clearly identified Sheehan as a
    “defendant” in an action in the circuit court of Cook County and summoned the defendant to
    respond to the proceeding in that new forum. Despite the use of “et al.” in the caption, this
    summons adequately informed Sheehan of the pending action against her and what she needed to
    do in order to appear and defend her interests. See 
    Novak, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 552
    . When looking
    at the face of this particular summons, we find that the use of the word “et al.” in the caption,
    rather than expressly listing all the defendants in the caption, was a minor and inconsequential
    violation of the requirements of the Act and rules of the Illinois Supreme Court. There was no
    due process violation here. The circuit court obtained personal jurisdiction over Sheehan when
    she accepted certified mail delivery of Ryan’s one-page summons and attached complaint for
    administrative review.
    ¶ 23   Sheehan’s reliance on Arch Bay Holdings is misplaced, as the defendant’s name in that
    case did not appear on the face of the summons at all. See Arch Bay Holdings, 
    2015 IL App (2d) 141117
    , ¶ 21 (reversing the trial court’s denial of the borrower’s motion to quash service in a
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    mortgage foreclosure action where the face of the summons did not include the borrower’s
    name). Here, however, Sheehan’s name does appear prominently on the face of the summons, as
    a “Defendant,” and the summons notifies “each defendant” of the time and place at which she
    must appear.
    ¶ 24   Sheehan’s reliance on Central States Trucking Co. v. Department of Employment
    Security, 
    248 Ill. App. 3d 86
    , 
    618 N.E.2d 430
    (1993), is also misplaced. In that case, a necessary
    party, the director of the Department of Employment Security, was omitted entirely from the
    summons and the complaint for administrative review. The director was named “only
    parenthetically on the certificate of mailing” in her capacity as the head of the defendant
    department and her name appeared in two exhibits attached to the complaint. Central States
    
    Trucking, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 89
    . The director was served with the summons, not as a named
    defendant, but in her capacity as head of the department. The reviewing court deemed both the
    summons and complaint defective due to the abject omission of the director as an actual party
    and affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the proceedings. Central States Trucking, 
    248 Ill. App. 3d
    at 90. In contrast, Ryan indicated Sheehan was a defendant on the face of the summons,
    named Sheehan as a party defendant in the complaint for administrative review, and served
    Sheehan with the summons and complaint in her capacity as a named defendant. To be clear,
    Sheehan’s name was not enclosed within parentheses, and she was not identified in a
    representative capacity or by a title or other description—she was named as a defendant on the
    face of the summons. This case is not like Central States Trucking, 
    248 Ill. App. 3d 86
    . For that
    matter, it is not like 
    Goodkind, 153 Ill. at 423
    , in which the summons and complaint named
    “John N. Hummer and …… Hummer, his wife” as defendants and did not effectively include
    John N. Hummer’s wife Rachael Hummer.
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    ¶ 25   Nor is this case like Hanke v. Department of Professional Regulation, 
    296 Ill. App. 3d 825
    , 
    696 N.E.2d 12
    (1998), despite Sheehan’s contention that Hanke is directly on point and
    supports the dismissal of Ryan’s complaint. In Hanke, the plaintiff sought administrative review
    of the denial of an Illinois nursing license. 
    Hanke, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 826
    . Although she
    summoned the director of the Department of Professional Regulation, she failed to cause
    summons to issue against the Department of Professional Regulation and on the individual
    members of the committee of nurse examiners. 
    Hanke, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 827
    . Thus, Hanke and
    Central States Trucking are similar to each other, in that those plaintiffs made no attempt to
    serve necessary parties, and dissimilar from the present case in which the plaintiff effectively
    served all the necessary parties.
    ¶ 26   The face of this summons clearly communicated that Sheehan had been named and
    served as a defendant to Ryan’s action for administrative review. Having found that the contents
    of the face of this timely summons were sufficient, we do not need to address the parties’
    additional arguments regarding the difference between jurisdictional and merely mandatory
    requirements under the Act, and whether Ryan was entitled to a good faith exception for
    noncompliance with the stated procedures. We reverse the dismissal order and remand the cause
    for further proceedings.
    ¶ 27   Reversed and remanded.
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