Hal Mullett v. Deborah K. Baker and City of Butler, Indiana , 120 N.E.3d 630 ( 2019 )


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  •                                                                                 FILED
    Mar 08 2019, 5:48 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    James O. Waanders
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Hal Mullett,                                              March 8, 2019
    Appellant-Plaintiff,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-PL-2080
    v.                                                Appeal from the DeKalb Superior
    Court
    Deborah K. Baker and City of                              The Honorable Kevin P. Wallace,
    Butler, Indiana,                                          Judge
    Appellees-Defendants                                      Trial Court Cause No.
    17D01-1408-PL-45
    Crone, Judge.
    Case Summary
    [1]   Hal Mullett appeals the trial court’s order denying his request that Deborah K.
    Baker be ordered to disinter the remains of her mother, Joyce Mullett Mink,
    from a family burial plot purchased by Everett Mullett, Hal’s grandfather and
    Deborah’s great-grandfather. Concluding that Hal waived his argument, we
    affirm.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-PL-2080| March 8, 2019                             Page 1 of 11
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   In 1952, Everett purchased the family burial plot, consisting of five burial
    spaces, in the Butler Cemetery, which is owned and operated by the City of
    Butler (“the City”). Everett was married to Elizabeth Mullett. In 1959, Everett
    died and was buried in space number 3. In 1966, Elizabeth died and was buried
    in space number 2.
    [3]   Everett and Elizabeth had two sons, Gaylord and Earl, who are now both
    deceased but are not buried in the family burial plot.1 Gaylord had three
    children, one of whom is Hal. Earl had a son, Keith. Keith married Joyce, and
    they had several children, including Deborah. In 1985, Keith and Joyce
    divorced, and Joyce married Garner Mink,2 to whom she was married at the
    time of her death.
    [4]   In 2005, Joyce arranged to have her mother, Eula Champion, buried in the
    family burial plot in space number 5. In 2013, Joyce died, and Deborah
    arranged to have Joyce buried in the family burial plot in space number 1.
    [5]   In August 2014, Hal filed a complaint against Deborah and the City, alleging as
    follows: the family burial plot was titled to Everett; neither Joyce nor Deborah
    owns the family burial plot; Hal is Everett’s sole surviving grandson; Hal did
    not execute any written document providing a waiver or giving permission for
    1
    They are buried in separate family burial plots, which are not at issue here.
    2
    The Appealed Order mistakenly refers to Garner as Gaylord.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-PL-2080| March 8, 2019                    Page 2 of 11
    Joyce to be buried in the family burial plot; Joyce was wrongfully buried in the
    family burial plot; and Hal’s sole remedy was disinterment of Joyce’s body.
    Appellant’s App. at 12. Hal prayed that the “court order disinterment of
    Joyce.”3 Id. In March 2014, the City filed a summary judgment motion. In
    July 2015, the trial court issued an order granting the City’s summary judgment
    motion, in which the court stated, “[Hal] concedes that [the City’s] Motion for
    Summary Judgment shall be granted.” Id. at 89.
    [6]   In March 2018, a bench trial was held. Hal and Deborah both testified. After
    the evidence was heard, the trial court took the matter under advisement and
    granted the parties leave to file proposed findings of facts and conclusions
    thereon in lieu of presenting final argument. Hal and Deborah each filed
    proposed findings and conclusions, but neither document is included in the
    record before us.
    [7]   In August 2018, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions thereon,
    in which it found that “[Hal] does not consider [Joyce] a family member and
    has requested the remains of [Joyce] be disinterred and reinterred elsewhere.”
    Appealed Order at 2. The trial court also found that Deborah had not
    consented, nor could she obtain her brothers’ consent, to Joyce’s disinterment,
    and preferred that Joyce’s remains stay in the family burial plot. Id. The trial
    court concluded in relevant part as follows:
    3
    Hal did not challenge Eula’s burial in the family burial plot.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-PL-2080| March 8, 2019         Page 3 of 11
    11. A family burial plot has been created under I.C. 23-14-41-2.
    [Hal] has the right to use a space in the family burial plot under
    I.C. 23-14-41-4.
    12. [Hal] argues that [Joyce] is improperly buried in the family
    burial plot and that “the only available remedy to [him] is the
    removal of [Joyce] from the family burial plot.” [Hal] offers no
    legal authority for this position.
    13. I.C. 24-14-41 et seq. is silent regarding a remedy under these
    circumstances. It may be that the heirs of Everett Mullett and
    Elizabeth Mullett are entitled to damages in the amount of the
    fair market value of a burial space in the Butler Cemetery. But
    the placement of the remains of [Joyce] does not prevent [Hal]
    from being buried in the family burial plot since space number 4
    remains vacant.
    14. I.C. 23-14-57 et seq. speaks about the requirements for
    disinterments, disentombments or disinurnments. [Hal] has not
    argued that he meets these statutory requirements. As [Deborah]
    points out in her proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
    law, disinterment is an extraordinary remedy, which cannot be
    taken lightly.
    Id. The trial court ordered that “[Hal’s] request that [Deborah] be ordered to
    disinter the remains of [Joyce] is overruled and denied.” Id. at 3. This appeal
    ensued.
    Discussion and Decision
    [8]   Before turning to Hal’s challenge to the appealed order, we note that Deborah
    has not filed an appellee’s brief, and therefore we will not undertake the burden
    of developing arguments for her. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 
    17 N.E.3d 350
    , 351 (Ind. Ct.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-PL-2080| March 8, 2019             Page 4 of 
    11 App. 2014
    ). Instead, we apply a less stringent standard of review and will
    reverse upon a showing of prima facie error, which is error “at first sight, on
    first appearance, or on the face of it.” Orlich v. Orlich, 
    859 N.E.2d 671
    , 673 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2006). However, to determine whether reversal is required, we are
    still obligated to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record. Jenkins, 17
    N.E.3d at 352.
    [9]   Hal seeks to disinter Joyce’s remains from the family burial plot. Indiana Code
    Section 23-14-57-1 governs the requirements for disinterment and provides in
    relevant part as follows:
    (a) As used in this section, “removal” or “removed” refers to the
    disinterment, disentombment, or disinurnment of the remains of
    a deceased human.
    (b) Except as provided in subsection (e) and sections 4 and 5 of
    this chapter, the remains, either cremated or uncremated, of a deceased
    human shall not be removed from a cemetery without:
    (1) a written order:
    (A) that is issued by the state department of health; and
    (2) the written consent of:
    (A) the owner of the cemetery; or
    (B) the owner’s representative; and
    (3) the written consent of a person or persons referred to in one (1) of
    the following clauses, which are listed according to priority:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-PL-2080| March 8, 2019                        Page 5 of 11
    (A) The individual who was the spouse of the deceased at
    the time of the deceased’s death.
    (B) The surviving adult child of the deceased. If there is more
    than one (1) surviving adult child of the deceased, the
    requirement for written consent under this subdivision is
    satisfied if:
    (i) any one (1) of the surviving adult children
    provides written consent to the removal of the
    deceased’s remains;
    (ii) the consent provided under item (i) confirms that
    all other surviving adult children of the deceased
    have been notified of the proposed removal of the
    deceased’s remains; and
    (iii) the state department of health does not receive a
    written objection to the proposed removal from any
    of the deceased’s surviving adult children.
    ….
    (c) Before issuing a written authorization under subsection (b),
    the state department of health shall do the following:
    (1) Obtain written evidence that a licensed funeral director
    has agreed to:
    (A) be present at the removal and at the reinterment,
    reentombment, or reinurnment of the remains; and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-PL-2080| March 8, 2019                     Page 6 of 11
    (B) cause the completed order of the state department of
    health to be recorded in the office of the county recorder
    of the county where the removal occurs.
    (2) Obtain a copy of:
    (A) the written consent required under subsection (b)(3);
    or
    (B) a court order obtained by a person under subsection (d).
    (d) If the written consent of an individual authorized under subsection
    (b)(3) to give consent is not available, a person who has made a request
    under this section to the state department of health may petition a court
    to determine whether to waive the consent requirement of subsection
    (b)(3). In determining whether to waive the requirement, the court shall
    consider the viewpoint of any issue (as defined in IC 29-1-1-3)[4] of the
    deceased. In a proceeding under this subsection, the court may not order
    the disinterment, disentombment, or disinurnment of the remains of a
    deceased human.
    (Emphases added.)
    [10]   Hal frames the issue on appeal as whether “the Trial Court err[ed] in refusing to
    order the consent, or to determine the unavailability and waiver of the
    requirement of consent, under Indiana Code 23-14-57 of a family member to
    the disinterment of a non-family member wrongfully buried in a family burial
    4
    Indiana Code Section 29-1-1-3(16) provides, “‘Issue’ of a person, when used to refer to persons who take by
    intestate succession, includes all lawful lineal descendants except those who are lineal descendants of living
    lineal descendants of the intestate.”
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-PL-2080| March 8, 2019                                  Page 7 of 11
    plot.” Appellant’s Br. at 4. He argues that he is seeking a determination that
    “the consent of Deborah necessary for correction of Joyce’s wrongful burial is
    either unnecessary or that such consent is unavailable and the requirement of
    consent be considered waived, so that [he] can initiate the disinterment of Joyce
    through the state department of health, and so that the Cemetery can fulfill its
    statutory duty to correct a wrongful burial,” under Indiana Code Section 23-14-
    59-2.5 Id. at 22. According to Hal, the City has a statutory duty to correct the
    wrongful burial under Indiana Code Section 23-14-59-2, and therefore the
    consent for disinterment required under Section 23-14-57-1(b)(3) should either
    not be required or waived under Section 23-14-57-1(d).
    5
    Indiana Code Section 23-14-59-2 provides,
    When a wrongful burial, entombment, inurnment, disinterment, disentombment, or
    disinurnment referred to in section 1(1), 1(2), 1(4), or 1(5) of this chapter occurs, the cemetery
    owner shall:
    (1) at the expense of the cemetery owner, correct the wrongful burial, entombment,
    inurnment, disinterment, disentombment, or disinurnment as soon as practical after becoming
    aware of the error; and
    (2) notify:
    (A) the spouse, if living, of the deceased person whose remains were wrongfully buried,
    entombed, inurned, disinterred, disentombed, or disinurned, or whose outer burial
    container was wrongfully placed;
    (B) the parents, if living, of a deceased minor child whose remains were wrongfully buried,
    entombed, inurned, disinterred, disentombed, or disinurned, or whose outer burial
    container was wrongfully placed;
    (C) the person or persons whose marker, monument, memorial, foundation, or base was
    wrongfully placed; or
    (D) the person or persons who authorized the original burial, entombment, inurnment,
    disinterment, disentombment, or disinurnment;
    of the occurrence.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-PL-2080| March 8, 2019                                       Page 8 of 11
    [11]   Our review of Hal’s complaint, the transcript of the bench trial, and the
    appealed order reveals that he did not present this argument to or request this
    relief from the trial court. In his complaint, Hal alleged that Joyce was
    wrongfully buried in the family burial plot because neither she nor Deborah
    owned the family burial lot, and that he, as the sole surviving grandson of the
    person who had held title to the family burial lot, had not executed a written
    document indicating a waiver or giving permission for Joyce to be buried there.
    Hal prayed for the court to order Joyce’s disinterment. At the bench trial, Hal’s
    attorney stated in his opening statement that “[Hal] is requesting the only relief
    he can receive which will be of any satisfaction is that [Joyce be] disinterred and
    located on another lot, a process that is not common but not unheard of.” Tr.
    at 5. The parties did not present closing arguments at trial, and Hal has not
    included his proposed findings and conclusions in his appendix. In the
    appealed order, the trial court concluded that Hal had not argued that he met
    the statutory requirements for disinterments under Indiana Code Section 23-14-
    57 and denied “[Hal’s] request that [Deborah] be ordered to disinter the
    remains of [Joyce].” Appealed Order at 3.
    [12]   As we have previously explained,
    A party generally waives appellate review of an issue or
    argument unless that party presented that issue or argument
    before the trial court. However, that principle is not without
    limits....
    The rule that parties will be held to trial court theories by the
    appellate tribunal does not mean that no new position may be
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-PL-2080| March 8, 2019            Page 9 of 11
    taken, or that new arguments may not be adduced; all that it
    means is that substantive questions independent in character and
    not within the issues or not presented to the trial court shall not
    be first made upon appeal. Questions within the issues and before
    the trial court are before the appellate court, and new arguments
    and authorities may with strict propriety be brought forward....
    This rule exists because trial courts have the authority to hear
    and weigh the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, to
    apply the law to the facts found, and to decide questions raised
    by the parties. Appellate courts, on the other hand, have the
    authority to review questions of law and to judge the sufficiency
    of the evidence supporting a decision.
    The rule of waiver in part protects the integrity of the trial court;
    it cannot be found to have erred as to an issue or argument that it
    never had an opportunity to consider. Conversely, an
    intermediate court of appeals, for the most part, is not the forum
    for the initial decisions in a case.
    Showalter v. Town of Thorntown, 
    902 N.E.2d 338
    , 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)
    (citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied.
    [13]   Given the importance of consent to disinterment required by Section 23-14-57-
    1(b)(3), it is significant that there is absolutely no mention in the complaint,
    transcript, or appealed order of the explicit authority granted in Subsection 1(d)
    to the trial court to waive the consent requirement after considering the
    viewpoint of any issue of the deceased. Also, although Subsection 1(d)
    explicitly prohibits a court from ordering the disinterment of the remains of a
    deceased human, the trial court did not mention that prohibition in deciding
    not to order disinterment. Hal has been afforded an evidentiary hearing on the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-PL-2080| March 8, 2019           Page 10 of 11
    legal issues he raised; he may not obtain a second bite at the apple by raising a
    new legal argument that cannot be decided on facts that are not already in the
    record.6 For this reason, we find his argument on appeal waived. Therefore,
    we affirm.
    [14]   Affirmed.
    Vaidik, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.
    6
    Hal does not argue that the family consent requirements under Section 23-14-57-1(b)(3) are inapplicable as
    a matter of law when a wrongful burial occurs under Section 23-14-59-2.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-PL-2080| March 8, 2019                               Page 11 of 11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18A-PL-2080

Citation Numbers: 120 N.E.3d 630

Filed Date: 3/8/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023