Michael Davis v. Ronald King , 584 F. App'x 207 ( 2014 )


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  •      Case: 14-60136      Document: 00512836883         Page: 1    Date Filed: 11/14/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    No. 14-60136
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    Summary Calendar                      November 14, 2014
    Lyle W. Cayce
    MICHAEL EUGENE DAVIS,                                                           Clerk
    Petitioner-Appellant
    v.
    RONALD KING,
    Respondent-Appellee
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 3:13-CV-253
    Before DAVIS, CLEMENT and COSTA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Michael Eugene Davis, Mississippi prisoner # 164121, was convicted of
    armed robbery and, as a habitual offender, was sentenced to serve life in
    prison. Now, he appeals the district court’s denial of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    habeas corpus petition and argues that application of the four-part test given
    in Barker v. Wingo, 
    407 U.S. 514
    , 530 (1972), shows that his speedy trial rights
    were violated.
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 14-60136     Document: 00512836883      Page: 2   Date Filed: 11/14/2014
    No. 14-60136
    In reviewing the denial of § 2254 relief, this court reviews issues of law
    de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Ortiz v. Quarterman, 
    504 F.3d 492
    ,
    496 (5th Cir. 2007). Additionally, the state court’s rejection of claims on the
    merits is afforded deference pursuant to § 2254(d). See Miller v. Thaler, 
    714 F.3d 897
    , 902 n.3 (5th Cir. 2013). Under § 2254(d), habeas relief may not be
    granted with respect to a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state
    court unless the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an
    unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by
    the Supreme Court of the United States,” § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an
    unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
    the State court proceeding,” § 2254(d)(2); see Harrington v. Richter, 
    131 S. Ct. 770
    , 787 (2011).
    Under Barker v. Wingo, 
    407 U.S. 514
    , 530 (1972), this court considers
    four factors when assessing a defendant’s claim that he was deprived of his
    constitutional right to a speedy trial: “Length of delay, the reason for the delay,
    the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.”
    Prejudice is considered while bearing in mind the factors meant to be protected
    by a speedy trial: “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to
    minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility
    that the defense will be impaired.” 
    Id. at 532
    .
    The Barker analysis “eschews rigid rules and mechanical factor-counting
    in favor of a difficult and sensitive balancing process.” Amos v. Thornton, 
    646 F.3d 199
    , 205 (5th Cir. 2011). Consequently, § 2254(d) mandates that this
    court “give the widest of latitude to a state court’s conduct of its speedy-trial
    analysis.” Amos, 646 F.3d at 205. Thus, so long as “there is any objectively
    reasonable basis on which the state court could have denied relief, AEDPA
    demands that [this court] respect its decision to do so.” Amos, 646 F.3d at 205.
    2
    Case: 14-60136   Document: 00512836883    Page: 3   Date Filed: 11/14/2014
    No. 14-60136
    Our review of the record and application of the Barker analysis shows an
    objectively reasonable basis for the state court’s rejection of this claim.
    Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED, and Davis’s request
    for appointed counsel is DENIED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-60136

Citation Numbers: 584 F. App'x 207

Filed Date: 11/14/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023