Enrique Arroyave v. Lewis M. Rossi , 296 F. App'x 835 ( 2008 )


Menu:
  •                                                             [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    OCT 17, 2008
    No. 08-12008                 THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 07-20156-CV-TEB
    ENRIQUE ARROYAVE,
    and all others similarly
    situated under 29 USC 216,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    LEWIS M. ROSSI,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (October 17, 2008)
    Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    This is a Fair Labor Standards Act case involving claims by the employee,
    Arroyave, of unpaid overtime and late payment of wages. A magistrate judge
    granted the employer, Rossi, summary judgment. Arroyave appeals, arguing that
    he raised a genuine issue of material fact that precluded summary judgment on his
    claim of uncompensated overtime. He argues that he stated in his affidavit that he
    worked a graveyard shift at a mall for Rossi between September 2006 and
    December 2006 for which he was not paid overtime.
    The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FSLA”) requires that employers compensate
    covered employees for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week at one and
    one half times the employees’ regular pay rate. 
    29 U.S.C. § 207
    (a)(1). The
    employee bears the burden of proving that he worked overtime without
    compensation. However, “[t]he remedial nature of this statute and the great public
    policy which it embodies . . . militate against making that burden an impossible
    hurdle for the employee.” Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 
    328 U.S. 680
    ,
    687, 
    66 S.Ct. 1187
    , 
    90 L.Ed. 1515
     (1946), superceded by statute on other grounds.
    It is the employer's duty to keep records of the employee's wages and hours, as
    “[e]mployees seldom keep such records themselves.” 
    Id.
    In situations where the employer's records cannot be trusted and the
    employee lacks documentation, “an employee has carried out his burden if he
    proves that he has in fact performed work for which he was improperly
    2
    compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent
    of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.” 
    Id.
     The employer then
    bears the burden of bringing forth either evidence of the precise amount of work
    performed or evidence to negate the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn
    from the employee's evidence. 
    Id. at 687-88
    , 
    66 S.Ct. 1187
    . “If the employer fails
    to produce such evidence, the court may then award damages to the employee,
    even though the result be only approximate.” 
    Id. at 688
    , 
    66 S.Ct. 1192
    .
    Summary judgment was appropriate because Arroyave failed to produce
    evidence that would support his claim of uncompensated overtime work. Rossi
    produced Arroyave’s time records and wage payments for the time period at issue
    as well as an affidavit that stated that Arroyave was compensated for all his
    overtime wages. Arroyave did not challenge the validity of these records or
    produce any evidence that these records were deficient. Also, his affidavit lacked
    the required specificity to raise a genuine issue of fact. Since the employment
    records established adequate compensation during the period in question, and
    Arroyave failed to produce specific evidence that would refute the accuracy of
    those records, there is no evidence from which a jury could find that Arroyave was
    not compensated for overtime work.
    Arroyave argues that it is undisputed that Rossi took at least ten days after
    3
    the end of the pay period to pay him during the relevant period. He contends that
    Olson v. Superior Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 
    765 F. 2d 1570
    , 1579 (11th Cir. 1985), holds
    that an employee be paid at least minimum wage on payday, and liquidated
    damages are imposed if wages are not paid on time. Arroyave claims that since his
    wages were always paid at least ten days after the end of the pay period, they were
    not prompt and timely, and therefore Rossi was subject to liquidated damages.
    The FLSA provides that “[e]very employer shall pay to each of his
    employees . . . who in any work week is engaged in commerce or in the production
    of goods for commerce . . . not less than the minimum wage rate. . . .” 
    29 U.S.C. § 206
    (b). While the FLSA does not specify when payment of wages must be made,
    the former Fifth Circuit held that liquidated damages are available under the act to
    an employee if the employer failed to pay wages or overtime on the regular
    payment date. Atlantic Co. v. Broughton, 
    146 F.2d 480
    , 482 (5th Cir. 1945).1
    Other Circuits have reached similar holdings. See U.S. v. Klinghoffer Bros. Realty
    Corp., 
    285 F.2d 487
    , 491 (2nd Cir. 1960)(FLSA requires “prompt” payment of
    wages); Martin v. Selker Bros., Inc., 
    949 F.2d 1286
    , 1299 (3rd Cir. 1991)
    (liquidated damages available to employees who are not paid when wages are due);
    1
    We adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down
    prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 
    661 F.2d 1206
    , 1209 (11th Cir.1981).
    4
    Birbalis v. Cuneo Printing Industries, 
    140 F.2d 826
    , 828 (7th Cir. 1944)(liquidated
    damages available for overtime wages not paid at payday); Biggs v. Wilson, 
    1 F.3d 1537
    , 1542-43 (9th Cir. 1993)(wages are late if not paid on payday); and Seneca
    Coal & Coke Co. v. Lofton, 
    136 F.2d 359
    , 363 (10th Cir. 1943)(liquidated
    damages apply where overtime not paid as due in regular course of employment).
    Arroyave cites our decision in Olson, which involved deferred commissions
    for a car salesman. Olson, 
    765 F.2d at 1572
    . In this case, a portion of
    commissions earned by the salesmen were paid on a weekly basis and a portion
    were deferred and paid on a monthly basis. 
    Id.
     The practical effect of this plan
    was that wage payments for some months would be in excess of the minimum
    wage while in other months wage payments would fall below the minimum wage.
    
    Id.
     The question presented to the court was whether the excessive payments could
    be “carried forward” to apply to those months where wages were below the
    minimum wage. 
    Id. at 1578
    . We found that commissions may be carried forward
    so long as an employee was actually paid at least the minimum wage for each pay
    period. 
    Id. at 1578-79
    .
    Arroyave failed to produce evidence that would establish that his wages
    were paid unreasonably late during the relevant period. There is no dispute that
    Arroyave was regularly paid his wages ten days after the end of the pay period.
    5
    Arroyave cites no cases that have held that a ten-day delay between the end of the
    pay period and payday is unreasonable, and has provided no evidence from which
    to conclude that ten days was an unreasonable delay in this case. Arroyave argues
    that courts, including this court in Olsen, have held that wages must be paid at the
    end of the pay period. Neither Olsen nor the other cases cited by Arroyave require
    that wages be paid at the end of the pay period, and Arroyave’s conflation of the
    end of the pay period with the payday is not supported by the case law. The
    magistrate judge committed no error in resolving this ten-day issue.
    AFFIRMED.
    6