Com. v. Schrock, S. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SARAH BRETTON SCHROCK,
Appellant No. 679 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of April 9, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-56-CR-0000277-2014
BEFORE: BOWES, MUNDY AND JENKINS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED APRIL 25, 2016
Sarah Bretton Schrock appeals from the judgment of sentence of April
9, 2015, following her convictions for driving under the influence (“DUI”),
driving while license is suspended or revoked, and careless driving. We
affirm.
At approximately 2:25 a.m., on December 1, 2013, Pennsylvania State
Police Trooper Scott Kemerer observed a black Chevy Malibu traveling on
South Pleasant Avenue in Somerset, Pennsylvania. Trooper Kemerer was
following the vehicle when it came to a red traffic signal at the intersection
of South Pleasant Avenue and East Main Street. A CVS Pharmacy and
railroad crossing were located at this intersection. While stopped directly
behind the vehicle, Trooper Kemerer ran its registration information through
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NCIC, which indicated that Appellant was a female and the registered owner
of the car. It also showed Appellant’s driver’s license was suspended due to
a prior DUI.
From his position directly behind the vehicle, and with the aid of the
ambient light provided by the CVS Pharmacy and the illuminated railroad
crossing, Trooper Kemerer was able to observe the operator’s hair.
Specifically noting the length of the hair, the trooper believed that the driver
was female.
Based on this observation and the information provided by the NCIC,
Trooper Kemerer initiated a traffic stop. Appellant identified herself to
Trooper Kemerer, and following the stop, she was arrested for DUI after
displaying signs of intoxication. Her blood was drawn within two hours of
the traffic stop, and subsequent chemical testing disclosed a blood alcohol
content of .177%.
Based on this encounter, Appellant was charged with the above-
mentioned crimes. Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress all the
evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, arguing that Trooper
Kemerer lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion necessary to initiate the
traffic stop. A suppression hearing was conducted, and after hearing
argument on the motion, the trial court declined to suppress the evidence.
Following a nonjury trial on January 23, 2015, Appellant was found guilty on
all charges. This timely appeal followed.
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The Appellant submits the following question for our consideration:
Whether the court erred in finding that the police had
reasonable suspicion to stop the Appellant’s vehicle where the
stop was premised solely on information from NCIC that the
owner of the vehicle was DUI suspended and that the owner was
female, and where it was not possible to identify the operator as
female given the lighting conditions and the fact that the officer’s
view of the operator was obstructed by the vehicle’s headrest.
Appellant’s brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
In cases involving a review of the denial of a defendant’s suppression
motion, we are subject to the following standard of review:
[An appellate court’s] standard of review in addressing a
challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to
determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions
drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth
prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only
the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence
for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s
factual findings are supported by the record, [the appellate
court] is bound by [those] findings and may reverse only if the
court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where . . . the appeal of
the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations
of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not
binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if
the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.
Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to []
plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526-527 (Pa.Super. 2015)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010)).
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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Initially, we note the level of suspicion that a police officer must
possess before stopping a vehicle is codified at 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b), which
states:
Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of
checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a
violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a
vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the
vehicle's registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle
identification number or engine number or the driver's license, or
to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably
believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
Id.
This Court clarified this general rule in Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10
A.3d 1285 (Pa.Super. 2010) (en banc). In Feczko, this Court determined
that the language of Section 6308(b), as interpreted by our Supreme Court,
establishes that reasonable suspicion is required to effectuate a traffic stop
where the stop is based on suspicion of criminal activity or a suspected
violation of the Motor Vehicle Code that requires additional investigation.
Id. at 1291.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court defines “reasonable suspicion” as
follows:
Reasonable suspicion is a less stringent standard than probable
cause necessary to effectuate a warrantless arrest, and depends
on the information possessed by the police and its degree of
reliability in the totality of the circumstances. In order to justify
the seizure, a police officer must be able to point to ‘specific and
articulable facts’ leading him to suspect criminality is afoot.”
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Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 95 (Pa. 2010) (citing
Commonwealth v. Cook, 735 A.2d 673, 676 (Pa. 1999)). Here, further
investigation was required to confirm whether the operator of the vehicle
was driving with a suspended license. Therefore, we must determine only
whether the trooper had the requisite level of reliable information, based on
the totality of the circumstances, at the time of the traffic stop to establish
that he was acting with reasonable suspicion.
Notwithstanding the quantum of cause necessary for an officer to stop
a vehicle as outlined by the case law above, Appellant argues that the officer
involved herein lacked sufficient probable cause to justify a traffic stop.
Appellant’s brief at 11-13. Appellant concedes the officer had information at
the time of the stop, based on the NCIC, that the owner of Appellant’s
vehicle was a female with a DUI-suspended license. Id. at 15. Nonetheless,
she asserts that, given the lighting conditions, the position of the respective
vehicles, and the fact that the trooper’s view was obstructed by the headrest
in Appellant’s vehicle, he was unable to reliably identify Appellant’s gender,
or any other identifying features. Id. at 14. As a result, Appellant
continues, the trooper did not have sufficient probable cause to effectuate a
traffic stop.
Initially, we note that Appellant improperly relies upon the probable
cause standard. Here, Trooper Kemerer needed to investigate further to
determine whether a Vehicle Code violation was occurring, i.e., whether
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Appellant was driving the car. Hence, the officer required only reasonable
suspicion rather than probable cause, as outlined in Feczko, supra. We
find Trooper Kemerer possessed sufficient information regarding the identity
of the driver to support his reasonable suspicion. In denying Appellant’s
motion to suppress, the trial court found Commonwealth v. Hilliar, 943
A.2d 984 (Pa.Super. 2008), dispositive. We agree.
The defendant’s arrest in Hilliar arose from circumstances
substantially similar to those at issue here. In Hilliar, a police officer
conducted a traffic stop after running the defendant’s license plate and
finding the owner’s license was suspended. Hilliar, 943 A.2d at 987. The
information included the owner’s age and gender. Id. at 987-88. After
observing that the driver was of the same gender, similar age, and was in
possession of the owner’s vehicle, the police officer stopped the vehicle on
suspicion of driving on a suspended license. Id. This Court held that the
police officer’s suspicion that the driver of a vehicle was likely the owner was
reasonable because the driver matched the description of the owner, a
middle-aged man. Id. at 990.
Here, Trooper Kemerer obtained information that the owner of the
black Chevy Malibu was a female, and had a suspended license. He
testified, and the suppression court credited this testimony, that his
observation of the driver’s hair formed the basis of his belief that the driver
was female. Contrary to Appellant’s position, Trooper Kemerer asserted he
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had an unobstructed view through the vehicle’s rear-window and sufficient
ambient lighting to perceive the length of the driver’s hair. Notably, Trooper
Kemerer did not testify to observing the driver’s entire head, thus rendering
Appellant’s argument that his view was obstructed by the headrest
unavailing.
Prior to initiating the traffic stop, Trooper Kemerer had personal
knowledge that the owner of the black Chevy Malibu was a female with a
DUI suspended license. Furthermore, based on his personal observations,
he believed the person in possession of the Chevy Malibu was female. Just
as in Hilliar, Appellant’s traffic stop was a valid means to further investigate
whether the driver was operating the vehicle under a suspended license.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/25/2016
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