People v. Quiros CA2/2 ( 2021 )


Menu:
  • Filed 5/5/21 P. v. Quiros CA2/2
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    THE PEOPLE,                                             B299444
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                      (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BA470044)
    v.
    ORDER MODIFYING
    MONICA QUIROS,                                          OPINION AND DENYING
    PETITION FOR REHEARING
    Defendant and Appellant.
    NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT
    THE COURT:*
    The opinion herein, filed on April 14, 2021, is modified as
    follows:
    On page 12, under subheading C., in the second paragraph,
    delete the last sentence that reads: “The record discloses no brief
    filed or any further effort to call a witness on this point before
    defendant rested her case” and replace it with the following:
    “After the prosecution rested, the trial court held a further
    hearing and denied defendant’s request to inquire further as to
    the 2009 and 2010 domestic violence incidents.”
    The modification does not affect the judgment.
    Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.
    *    LUI, P. J.          CHAVEZ, J.             HOFFSTADT, J.
    2
    Filed 4/14/21 P. v. Quiros CA2/2 (unmodified opinion)
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
    opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
    8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
    purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    THE PEOPLE,                                                      B299444
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BA470044)
    v.
    MONICA QUIROS,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County, Michael Garcia, Judge. Affirmed.
    Klapach & Klapach and Joseph S. Klapach for Defendant
    and Appellant.
    Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nancy L. Ladner,
    Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    Defendant and appellant Monica Quiros (defendant)
    appeals her conviction, following a jury trial, of assault with a
    deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)).1 The jury found
    that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the
    victim, Corey Moses. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) The trial court
    suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on three
    years of formal probation.
    We affirm the judgment.
    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    In the mid-afternoon on July 29, 2018, defendant and her
    girlfriend Sydney Sanford were near the intersection of
    Hollywood Boulevard and Vine Street. They encountered Moses,
    loudly expressing frustration at passersby. Moses is six feet two
    inches tall and weighs 170 pounds. Defendant and Sanford are
    both approximately five feet three inches tall and weigh 108
    pounds. Defendant and Sanford looked at each other and shook
    their heads. Moses said, “Mind your fucking business. I’m not
    talking to you,” and walked away.
    Sanford called Moses a “fucking bum.” Moses turned
    around and said, “I’m not confused about my sexuality. [You]
    don’t know if you are a man or a woman.” Moses and Sanford
    cursed at each other, and a physical altercation ensued.
    Moses testified that Sanford punched him in the face. He
    responded by punching Sanford in the face. Defendant
    intervened and she and Moses began shoving each other. Moses
    testified that he shoved defendant to the other side of an adjacent
    city bench. Defendant paused for a few seconds, then “came back
    around” and stabbed Moses on his left side, near the ribcage.
    1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    2
    Moses lifted his shirt and saw blood. Defendant said, “Yeah,
    nigger,” and fled with Sanford.
    Defendant testified that she and Sanford were trying to get
    away from Moses when she noticed Sanford was no longer by her
    side. Defendant turned around and saw Sanford and Moses
    facing each other approximately three feet behind defendant.
    Moses was yelling at Sanford. Defendant yelled, “Get away from
    her,” stepped between Moses and Sanford, and placed her hand
    on Moses’s chest. Moses responded by punching Sanford in the
    eye. He then hit defendant twice – once across her mouth and
    the second time on the left side of her jaw. Defendant fell to the
    ground. When she stood up again, Moses raised his fists and
    approached. Defendant then pulled out her pocketknife and
    stabbed Moses in self-defense.
    Ramiro Lopez witnessed the altercation while stopped in
    his car at a red light. He testified that he saw defendant,
    Sanford, and Moses engaged in a physical altercation. Lopez
    described the altercation as follows: “They were on the sidewalk.
    There was an altercation. They were standing. I saw a lot of
    tugging, pulling, shoving that kind of altercation.” Lopez
    testified that he did not at any time see Moses strike, punch, or
    hit either defendant or Sanford. Lopez described the altercation
    as a “scuffle.” He saw defendant and Sanford run away. He then
    saw Moses raise his shirt, and blood running down Moses’s side.
    After defendant and Sanford fled from the scene, they
    crouched by a gate and called a rideshare vehicle. They were
    arrested shortly thereafter.
    Neither defendant nor Sanford had any visible injuries.
    After her arrest, defendant declined medical attention. Police
    officers recovered a Swiss Army style pocketknife with blood
    3
    residue in the backseat of the rideshare car. Defendant
    stipulated at trial that the knife belonged to her.
    Moses suffered a stab wound in his left torso. He
    underwent surgery the following day to repair a damaged
    diaphragm.
    CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
    Defendant contends the judgment must be reversed for the
    following reasons:
    I. The trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte,
    on self-defense pursuant to CALCRIM No. 3471 and by failing to
    modify CALCRIM No. 3472 to include a self-defense instruction.
    II. The trial court violated defendant’s right to confrontation of
    witnesses by limiting cross-examination of Moses about past
    incidents of domestic violence and by excluding a witness who
    could testify concerning Moses’s past domestic violence.
    III. The prosecutor committed misconduct by allowing Moses to
    testify falsely about his domestic violence history and by making
    false statements about Moses’s domestic violence history during
    closing argument.
    IV. Substantial evidence did not support the jury’s verdict.
    V. To the extent defendant is found to have waived any of her
    appellate challenges, she was denied effective assistance of
    counsel.
    VI. The cumulative effect of the errors below warrant reversal of
    the judgment.
    4
    DISCUSSION
    I. Alleged instructional error
    We review de novo defendant’s claim of instructional error.
    (People v. Ramos (2008) 
    163 Cal.App.4th 1082
    , 1088.) In doing
    so, we consider the jury instructions as a whole, and in context
    with other instructions, to determine whether there was a
    reasonable likelihood the jury misapplied the court’s instructions.
    (People v. Wilson (2008) 
    44 Cal.4th 758
    , 803.)
    Even if instructional error is established, reversal is not
    required unless it is reasonably probable the defendant would
    have obtained a more favorable result if the omitted instruction
    had been given. (People v. Watson (1956) 
    46 Cal.2d 818
    , 836.)
    A. CALCRIM No. 3471
    A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on a
    defense “‘only if it appears that the defendant is relying on such a
    defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a
    defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s
    theory of the case.’” (People v. Breverman (1998) 
    19 Cal.4th 142
    ,
    157, quoting People v. Sedeno (1974) 
    10 Cal.3d 703
    , 716.) The
    trial court here found, in ruling on defendant’s posttrial motion to
    dismiss, that the evidence did not support a duty to instruct
    pursuant to CALCRIM No. 3471.2
    The CALCRIM No. 3471 instruction applies to initial
    aggressors and mutual combatants and specifies the
    circumstances under which such persons may assert a limited
    right of self-defense. Mutual combatants are those who do not
    2      The record does not support defendant’s contention that the
    trial court denied her motion because the instruction was
    inconsistent with the defense theory of the case.
    5
    merely engage in a reciprocal exchange of blows, but who do so
    pursuant to mutual intention, consent, or agreement preceding
    the initiation of hostilities. (People v. Ross (2007) 
    155 Cal.App.4th 1033
    , 1044-1045.) CALCRIM No. 3471 states that a
    defendant who was an initial aggressor or mutual combatant may
    assert a limited right of self-defense when the defendant (1)
    actually and in good faith tried to stop fighting; (2) made the
    opponent aware that the defendant wanted to stop fighting; and
    (3) made the opponent aware the defendant had stopped
    fighting.3 (CALCRIM No. 3471.)
    3      CALCRIM No. 3471 provides: “A person who (engages in
    mutual combat/[or who] starts a fight) has a right to self-defense
    only if: 1. (He/She) actually and in good faith tried to stop
    fighting; [AND] 2. (He/She) indicated, by word or by conduct, to
    (his/her) opponent, in a way that a reasonable person would
    understand, that (he/she) wanted to stop fighting and that
    (he/she) had stopped fighting(;/.)  [AND 3. (He/She) gave (his/her) opponent a
    chance to stop fighting.]
    “If the defendant meets these requirements, (he/she) then
    had a right to self-defense if the opponent continued to fight.
    “[However, if the defendant used only non-deadly force, and
    the opponent responded with such sudden and deadly force that
    the defendant could not withdraw from the fight, then the
    defendant had the right to defend (himself/herself) with deadly
    force and was not required to try to stop fighting(,/or)
    communicate the desire to stop to the opponent[, or give the
    opponent a chance to stop fighting].]
    “[A fight is mutual combat when it began or continued by
    mutual consent or agreement. That agreement may be expressly
    stated or implied and must occur before the claim to self-defense
    arose.]”
    6
    There was no evidence that defendant was either the initial
    aggressor or a mutual combatant at the time she intervened
    between Moses and Sanford. Defendant testified that she urged
    Moses to “get away” and attempted to physically separate Moses
    and Sanford by placing herself between them.
    Defendant maintains the jury could have concluded she
    was the initial aggressor because she either placed her hand on
    Moses’s chest (according to defendant’s testimony) or shoved him
    (according to Moses) at the time she intervened and because the
    jury was instructed, pursuant to CALCRIM No. 3470, that the
    slightest touching can be unlawful.4
    There was no evidence, however, that defendant attempted
    to stop the fight after she and Moses began either shoving or
    hitting each other. There was also no evidence that Moses
    responded to defendant’s unlawful touching with sudden and
    deadly force. The trial court did not err by concluding the
    evidence did not support application of CALCRIM No. 3471.
    People v. Quach (2004) 
    116 Cal.App.4th 294
    , on which
    defendant relies, is inapposite. The court in that case reversed
    an attempted murder conviction because although the trial court
    instructed the jury that a mutual combatant has a right of self-
    defense if attempting to stop the fight, the trial court failed to
    instruct that the mutual combatant has a right to self-defense if
    the opponent responds with sudden deadly force. (Id. at pp. 300-
    302.) Here, there was no evidence that defendant and Moses
    4     The relevant language in CALCRIM No. 3470 states: “The
    slightest touching can be unlawful if it is done in a rude or angry
    way. Making contact with another person, including through his
    or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause
    pain or injury of any kind.”
    7
    were engaged in mutual combat when she intervened, and there
    is no evidence that Moses responded to defendant’s intervention
    with deadly force. Although Moses either shoved or punched
    defendant, there was no evidence that his response constituted
    deadly force.
    The trial court’s failure to instruct the jury with CALCRIM
    No. 3471 did not negate defendant’s self-defense theory. The trial
    court gave several self-defense instructions, including CALCRIM
    Nos. 3470, 3472, and 3474. The record discloses no instructional
    error.
    B. Modification of CALCRIM No. 3472
    Defendant contends the trial court should have modified
    CALCRIM No. 34725 to instruct the jury that an initial aggressor
    has a right of self-defense if the opponent responds to the initial
    provocation with excessive or deadly force. Defendant provides
    no authority supporting the proposition that the court had a sua
    sponte duty to modify the instruction in this manner. To the
    extent defendant believed the instructions were incomplete or
    needed elaboration, it was her obligation to request additional or
    clarifying instructions. (People v. Dennis (1998) 
    17 Cal.4th 468
    ,
    514.) Her failure to do so forfeits the claim on appeal. (Ibid.)
    Moreover, for reasons discussed in section IA above, the
    evidence did not support modification of CALCRIM No. 3472.
    There was no evidence that defendant attempted to stop the fight
    after she and Moses began shoving or hitting each other. There
    was also no evidence that Moses responded to defendant’s
    unlawful touching with sudden and deadly force.
    5     The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM
    No. 3472, which states: “A person does not have the right to self-
    defense if he or she provokes a fight or quarrel.”
    8
    C. No prejudicial error
    Even assuming the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury
    with CALCRIM No. 3471 and to modify CALCRIM No. 3472
    constituted error, defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice.
    (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) The ultimate issue
    for the jury was whether defendant used unreasonable force by
    stabbing Moses with a pocketknife during the altercation.
    The record shows the jury was instructed on self-defense.
    The jury was given CALCRIM Nos. 3470 (Right to Self-Defense
    or Defense of Another (Non-Homicide)), 3472 (Right to Self-
    Defense: May Not Be Contrived), and 3474 (Danger No Longer
    Exists or Attacker Disabled). CALCRIM No. 3470 explained that
    the People had “the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
    that the defendant did not act in lawful self-defense.” The jury
    was also instructed that self-defense was a legal defense to the
    charge of assault with a deadly weapon. The record shows the
    jury considered defendant’s self-defense theory but rejected it.
    The jury instructions given did not result in a miscarriage
    of justice. Defendant’s conduct in stabbing Moses after he shoved
    her away negates her claim that she acted in self-defense. Both
    the driver of a rideshare vehicle and defendant entered after the
    assault and arresting officers observed no defensive wounds on
    defendant. Defendant’s use of the pocketknife to stab Moses, and
    Moses’s need for surgery the following day to repair damage
    caused by the stab wound, constitute substantial evidence that
    defendant used unreasonable force. Defendant has not
    demonstrated that she would have obtained a more favorable
    result had CALCRIM No. 3471 or a modified CALCRIM No. 3472
    been given. She fails to establish that prejudicial error occurred.
    9
    II. Confrontation of witness
    A. Applicable law and standard of review
    The constitutional right of confrontation of witnesses
    includes the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses on matters
    reflecting on their credibility. (People v. Dalton (2019) 
    7 Cal.5th 166
    , 214.) Not every restriction on a defendant’s cross-
    examination, however, violates the Constitution. “The trial court
    retains wide latitude to restrict repetitive, prejudicial, confusing,
    or marginally relevant cross-examination. Unless the defendant
    can show that the prohibited cross-examination would have
    created a significantly different impression of the witness’s
    credibility, the trial court’s exercise of discretion to restrict cross-
    examination does not violate the constitutional right of
    confrontation.” (People v. Sanchez (2016) 
    63 Cal.4th 411
    , 450-
    451.)
    A trial court also has broad discretion under Evidence Code
    section 352 to determine whether the probative value of evidence
    is outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice, confusion, or
    consumption of time. (People v. Lewis (2001) 
    26 Cal.4th 334
    , 374-
    375.) We review for abuse of discretion defendant’s claim that
    the trial court’s restriction of the scope of cross-examination
    violated her rights under the confrontation clause. (People v.
    Peoples (2016) 
    62 Cal.4th 718
    , 765.)
    B. Evidentiary rulings
    At a pretrial evidentiary hearing, defendant’s trial counsel
    expressed his intent to present evidence of Moses’s history of
    domestic violence. Moses was arrested in 2008 for misdemeanor
    domestic battery. Moses’s then girlfriend (who is also the mother
    of his child) subsequently filed a request for a restraining order,
    accompanied by a declaration referring to Moses’s alleged acts of
    10
    violence in 2009 and 2010. Defense counsel sought to call
    Moses’s former girlfriend to testify about the contents of the
    declaration as propensity evidence under Evidence Code section
    1103. The prosecutor argued in response that the 2009 and 2010
    alleged incidents did not result in convictions or a restraining
    order; the incidents occurred ten years ago and involved domestic
    violence against Moses’s former girlfriend; whereas the
    circumstances of this case involved violence against strangers.
    The trial court ruled that the defense could ask Moses
    about the facts concerning the 2008 incident. The court
    precluded, under Evidence Code section 352, reference to any
    other past allegedly violent conduct by Moses. The trial court
    deferred ruling, until after Moses’s testimony, on whether
    Moses’s former girlfriend could be called by defendant to testify
    as a witness.
    Moses testified on direct examination that he was arrested
    in 2008 and charged with domestic violence. He said he was not
    convicted in connection with that arrest but attended classes.
    Moses further testified that since the 2008 arrest, he had not
    been arrested or convicted of any crimes involving violence or
    assault.
    On cross-examination, Moses described his relationship
    with his former girlfriend and the circumstances leading to his
    2008 arrest. Moses testified that his then girlfriend “would beat
    on me, and I wouldn’t put my hands on her. I would never put
    my hands on her. But after awhile, as a human being, you can’t
    be nobody’s punching bag, man, woman. . . . [¶] . . . The cops
    came, one of us has to go. Me being a man, hey.”
    The following exchange between defense counsel and Moses
    then occurred:
    11
    “[Defense counsel]: One of the thin[g]s you told us earlier
    on direct examination was that since that arrest in 2008, you
    haven’t had any domestic violence incidents, is that correct?
    “[Moses]: Right.
    “[Defense counsel]: That is not true at all, is it, sir?”
    The prosecutor objected that defense counsel’s question exceeded
    the scope of the trial court’s ruling limiting inquiry into Moses’s
    domestic violence history. The trial court sustained the objection.
    The defense subsequently rested without seeking to call Moses’s
    former girlfriend as a witness.
    C. No abuse of discretion
    Defendant fails to establish any abuse of discretion. The
    record shows that defense counsel was allowed to cross-examine
    Moses about his 2008 arrest for domestic violence. The trial
    court precluded cross-examination about other alleged but
    unproven incidents of domestic violence against Moses’s
    girlfriend in 2009 and 2010. The trial court offered to revisit the
    issue of whether Moses’s former girlfriend could testify for
    purposes of impeaching Moses’s testimony; however, the defense
    never sought to present her as a witness.
    “The court will allow the cross-examination as to the
    incident in 2008. The court, on [Evidence Code section] 352
    analysis, the court will preclude any reference to any further
    conduct. [¶] I will review whatever brief is filed by the parties as
    to whether or not any external extrinsic evidence is admissible on
    those.” The record discloses no brief filed or any further effort to
    call a witness on this point before defendant rested her case.
    At oral argument defendant took the position that People v.
    Castain (1981) 
    122 Cal.App.3d 138
     (Castain) controlled. We find
    that Castain does not support defendant’s argument that
    12
    excluding evidence concerning the 2009 and 2010 domestic
    violence incidents was an abuse of discretion. The defendant in
    Castain argued that he could not be convicted of battery on a
    police officer and resisting arrest because the arresting officer,
    Revak, had used excessive force. (Id. at p. 142.) He sought to
    introduce testimony by two other individuals who claimed Revak
    had used excessive force on other occasions, but the trial court
    excluded the proffered testimony under Evidence Code section
    352. The Court of Appeal held that exclusion of such testimony
    was an abuse of discretion. The court reasoned that the
    testimony was “highly probative” to show that Revak had a
    propensity to use excessive force against persons he arrested or
    detained or a pattern of behavior in this regard. (Id. at p. 143.)
    The court in Castain further reasoned that “[a] jury, hearing
    evidence of only one other violent confrontation involving the
    officer, might conclude it was an isolated aberration” but “would
    be much less likely to reach that conclusion if it had heard
    evidence of two such incidents.” (Ibid.) Unlike Castain, Moses’s
    history of domestic violence against his longtime girlfriend and
    mother of the child was not “highly probative” to show a
    propensity to initiate violent contact with strangers on a public
    street or a pattern of behavior toward such strangers.
    The record discloses no abuse of discretion. “[T]he
    Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective
    cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in
    whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”
    (Delaware v. Fensterer (1985) 
    474 U.S. 15
    , 20.) A trial court’s
    exercise of its discretion to limit cross-examination does not
    violate the Sixth Amendment unless the defendant can show that
    the prohibited examination would have produced “‘a significantly
    13
    different impression’” of the witness’s credibility. (People v.
    Hamilton (2009) 
    45 Cal.4th 863
    , 943.) Defendant fails to make
    such a showing.
    III. Alleged prosecutorial misconduct
    Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct
    by eliciting false testimony from Moses that since his 2008 arrest,
    he had not been arrested or convicted of any crimes involving
    violence or assault, by not correcting that allegedly false
    testimony, and by stating during closing argument that Moses
    had not been involved in any incidents of violence since 2008.
    During closing argument, the prosecutor stated: “There is the
    2008 misdemeanor arrest for the domestic violence incident that
    he [Moses] even admitted to that he didn’t suffer a conviction for.
    He does not have any arrest or conviction or anything involving
    violence or assault, anything like that since then, over 10 years
    ago.”
    Defendant forfeited her claim of prosecutorial misconduct
    by failing to object to the allegedly improper questioning, Moses’s
    response, and the prosecutor’s allegedly false or misleading
    closing argument. “‘A defendant may not complain on appeal of
    prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion, and on the
    same ground, the defendant objected to the action and also
    requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the perceived
    impropriety.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lopez (2008) 
    42 Cal.4th 960
    ,
    966.)
    Even absent such forfeiture, there was no evidence that
    Moses’s testimony was false or that the prosecutor made false
    statements during closing argument. There was no evidence that
    Moses was subsequently arrested or convicted of any crimes
    involving violence or assault. The unsubstantiated declaration of
    14
    Moses’s former girlfriend, which was never introduced or
    admitted into evidence, does not state that Moses was arrested or
    convicted for alleged acts of domestic violence in 2009 and 2010.
    The defense did not seek to have Moses’s former girlfriend testify
    at trial, and the trial court did not preclude her from testifying as
    a witness.
    People v. Daggett (1990) 
    225 Cal.App.3d 751
    , on which
    defendant relies, is inapposite. The court in that case reversed
    the conviction on the ground that the trial court erroneously
    excluded evidence that the minor victim in a child molestation
    case had previously been molested by persons other than the
    defendant. (Id. at p. 757.) That error was then compounded
    when the prosecutor argued to the jury that “[i]nappropriate
    sexual behavior is not inherent in children,” and that the victim
    must have learned about oral copulation and sodomy from being
    “being exposed to it” by the defendant. The court in Daggett
    explained that “[t]he prosecutor asked the jurors to draw an
    inference they might not have drawn if they had heard the
    evidence the judge had excluded” and therefore “unfairly took
    advantage of the judge’s ruling.” (Id. at p. 758.) Here, in
    contrast, the trial court allowed evidence and cross-examination
    concerning Moses’s 2008 arrest for domestic violence. Although
    the court limited the inquiry to that incident, it did not preclude
    testimony from Moses’s former girlfriend. Rather the trial court
    reserved ruling on that issue until after Moses testified.
    Defendant never sought to have Moses’s former girlfriend testify
    as a witness, and there was no evidence, excluded or otherwise,
    that Moses was subsequently arrested or convicted for other
    domestic violence incidents.
    15
    The record accordingly does not support defendant’s claim
    of prosecutorial misconduct.
    IV. Substantial evidence supports the verdict
    We review defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
    evidence supporting her conviction under the substantial
    evidence standard. Under that standard, we review the record as
    a whole in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
    whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
    solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find
    defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson
    (1980) 
    26 Cal.3d 557
    , 578.) In doing so, we do not reweigh the
    evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or reevaluate the
    credibility of witnesses. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 
    6 Cal.4th 1199
    ,
    1206.)
    Substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict. Moses
    testified that when defendant intervened between him and
    Sanford, Moses and defendant began shoving one another back
    and forth. After Moses shoved defendant several feet away from
    him, defendant paused, and then approached and stabbed Moses
    in the side, damaging his diaphragm.
    Lopez’s testimony corroborated in part Moses’s version of
    events. Lopez testified that he saw a scuffle between defendant
    and Moses. The two were pushing and pulling at each other
    while standing on the sidewalk. Lopez did not see any punches
    or blows exchanged during the scuffle. Lopez saw defendant and
    Sanford run away. He then saw Moses lift his shirt and blood
    running down Moses’s side.
    On appeal, defendant reiterates her version of the incident,
    insisting that she intervened between Moses and Sanford in an
    effort to stop the fight, that she merely placed her hand on
    16
    Moses’s chest, that Moses responded by punching her and
    Sanford in the face, and that stabbing Moses was in reasonable
    self-defense. The jury rejected defendant’s self-defense claim,
    and we do not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate issues of
    credibility. (People v. Ochoa, 
    supra,
     6 Cal.4th at p. 1206.)
    Defendant fails to establish any grounds for overturning the
    jury’s verdict.
    V. Ineffective assistance of counsel
    The Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel
    includes the right to the effective assistance of counsel.
    (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 686-694; see also
    Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) It is the defendant’s burden to
    demonstrate that trial counsel was inadequate and that prejudice
    resulted. (Strickland v. Washington, at pp. 686-694.) Prejudice is
    shown by “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
    unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
    been different.” (Id. at p. 694.) We review an ineffective
    assistance of counsel claim de novo. (People v. Taylor (1984) 
    162 Cal.App.3d 720
    , 725.)
    Defendant fails to sustain her burden of demonstrating
    prejudice. For reasons discussed, defendant fails to establish
    that she would have obtained a more favorable result had defense
    counsel not failed to request CALCRIM No. 3471 or a modified
    CALCRIM 3472, to object to the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct,
    or to object to the exclusion of evidence concerning Moses’s past
    acts of domestic violence.
    VI. Cumulative error
    Defendant fails to establish any prejudicial error in the
    trial court below. There is accordingly no cumulative error that
    warrants reversal of the judgment.
    17
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
    ____________________________, J.
    CHAVEZ
    We concur:
    __________________________, P. J.
    LUI
    __________________________, J.
    HOFFSTADT
    18