Davallou v. United States ( 2021 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 20-1523
    A. MICHAEL DAVALLOU,
    Plaintiff, Appellant,
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant, Appellee,
    ANCIENT AND HONORABLE ARTILLERY COMPANY
    OF MASSACHUSETTS; EMERY A. MADDOCKS, JR.,
    Defendants.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. Leo T. Sorokin, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Lynch, Kayatta, and Barron,
    Circuit Judges.
    Scott E. Charnas, with whom Charnas Law Firm, P.C., Thomas R.
    Murphy, Law Offices of Thomas R. Murphy, LLC, Kevin J. Powers, and
    Law Offices of Kevin J. Powers were on brief, for appellant.
    Thomas E. Kanwit, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
    Andrew E. Lelling, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
    appellee.
    May 25, 2021
    KAYATTA, Circuit Judge.       Michael Davallou alleges that
    he suffered permanent hearing damage when the Massachusetts Army
    National Guard (MANG) negligently fired military artillery "in
    close proximity" to him while he walked through Boston Common.            He
    filed suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
    Act (FTCA), 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1346
    (b), 2671–2680.           The district court
    dismissed the suit, finding that the United States was entitled to
    sovereign immunity pursuant to the FTCA's so-called "discretionary
    function   exception."     See 
    id.
     § 2680(a).          For the following
    reasons, we affirm.1
    I.
    We recite the facts alleged in Davallou's complaint,
    taking as true all well-pleaded facts and drawing all reasonable
    inferences in Davallou's favor.       See Fothergill v. United States,
    
    566 F.3d 248
    , 251 (1st Cir. 2009).        On June 1, 2015, the Ancient
    and   Honorable   Artillery   Company    of     Massachusetts   (AHAC),   a
    historic   military    organization     with    no   present-day   military
    functions, conducted its annual "Change of Command" ceremony, also
    known as the "June Day" ceremony.              AHAC "organized, directed,
    arranged, supervised and controlled" the ceremony, as it had done
    1 Given that we affirm the district court's application of
    the discretionary function exception, we do not address its
    alternative conclusion that the FTCA does not apply because a
    private individual would not be liable for the challenged conduct
    under like circumstances. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 2674
    .
    - 3 -
    each year since at least 2010.    As part of the annual ceremony,
    AHAC "arranged for military artillery to be fired within Boston
    Common [by MANG] . . . in the presence of members of the public."
    In keeping with this tradition, MANG performed an artillery salute
    during the June 2015 ceremony, firing blank rounds from howitzers
    (a type of cannon).    The noise produced by the howitzers caused
    Davallou, who was walking on Boston Common at the time, to suffer
    permanent hearing damage.
    Davallou filed suit against the United States, alleging
    that MANG negligently caused his hearing loss by failing to warn
    him before firing the howitzers and by failing to ensure that he
    remained at a safe distance from the howitzers.2   The government
    moved to dismiss the suit pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign
    immunity, arguing that Davallou's negligence claim arose out of
    MANG members' "performance [of] . . . a discretionary function."
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2680
    (a).    The district court agreed and dismissed
    Davallou's suit against the United States for lack of subject-
    matter jurisdiction.   Davallou appeals.
    2  Davallou also brought negligence claims against AHAC and
    its Executive Secretary, Emery A. Maddocks, Jr., but later
    stipulated to their dismissal pursuant to a settlement agreement.
    - 4 -
    II.
    We review de novo the district court's dismissal for
    lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Shansky v. United States,
    
    164 F.3d 688
    , 690 (1st Cir. 1999).        Federal courts lack subject-
    matter jurisdiction over claims against the United States absent
    a waiver of sovereign immunity.     See Villanueva v. United States,
    
    662 F.3d 124
    , 126 (1st Cir. 2011).       The FTCA "waives the [federal]
    government's sovereign immunity for certain torts committed by its
    employees in the scope of their employment."3            Mahon v. United
    States, 
    742 F.3d 11
    , 12 (1st Cir. 2014); see also 
    28 U.S.C. § 1346
    (b)(1).     But that waiver does not extend to claims based
    upon a government employee's exercise or failure to exercise a
    "discretionary function."      See Mahon, 742 F.3d at 12; 
    28 U.S.C. § 2680
    (a).    The pivotal question is whether Davallou's claim falls
    within the scope of this "discretionary function exception."          If
    so, it must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
    See Bolduc v. United States, 
    402 F.3d 50
    , 55 (1st Cir. 2005).
    To   determine   whether    the   discretionary    function
    exception applies, we follow a "familiar analytic framework."
    Shansky, 
    164 F.3d at 690
    .      First, we must "identify the conduct
    that allegedly caused the harm."        
    Id.
     at 690–91.    Here, Davallou
    focuses on two omissions by MANG:          failing to issue a warning
    3  The government concedes that MANG members were acting as
    federal employees at all times relevant to the complaint.
    - 5 -
    before firing the howitzers and failing to ensure that bystanders
    maintained a safe distance from the howitzers.                    Second, we must
    ask whether that conduct is both "discretionary," 
    id. at 691
    , and
    "susceptible to policy analysis," 
    id. at 692
    .                  Because no federal
    statute, regulation, or policy dictated MANG's safety protocols
    during the June Day ceremony, the parties agree that the challenged
    conduct was discretionary.              Davallou's claim therefore turns on
    his    contention    that      MANG's    exercise     of    discretion   under    the
    circumstances was not susceptible to policy analysis.
    Although     we    employ      a   "case-by-case     approach"      when
    evaluating whether challenged government conduct is susceptible to
    policy analysis, 
    id. at 693
    , several principles guide our inquiry.
    First, the discretionary function exception is not limited to high-
    level policymaking or planning functions.                  Rather, it can apply as
    well    to   day-to-day      operational        decisions.      United   States    v.
    Gaubert, 
    499 U.S. 315
    , 325 (1991).                 Second, it does not matter
    whether MANG consciously engaged in any analysis of any policy
    considerations, see Shansky, 
    164 F.3d at 692
    , or whether its
    decision on how to proceed "was in fact motivated by a policy
    concern," Hajdusek v. United States, 
    895 F.3d 146
    , 150 (1st Cir.
    2018).       Rather,    we     ask   only   whether    "some    plausible   policy
    justification could have undergirded" MANG's conduct.                     Shansky,
    
    164 F.3d at 692
    .             Nor does it matter, for purposes of the
    discretionary       function     exception,       whether    MANG's   conduct     was
    - 6 -
    ultimately negligent:        The exception shields the government from
    liability for discretionary policy choices "whether or not the
    discretion involved be abused."       Evans v. United States, 
    876 F.3d 375
    , 381 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting 
    28 U.S.C. § 2680
    (a)).          Finally,
    because the law presumes that government employees' discretionary
    decisions do indeed involve policy judgments, Davallou bears the
    burden of alleging facts that would support a finding that MANG's
    exercise of discretion in this instance was not susceptible to
    policy analysis. See Gaubert, 
    499 U.S. at
    324–25 ("For a complaint
    to survive a motion to dismiss [based on the discretionary function
    exception], it must allege facts which would support a finding
    that the challenged actions are not the kind of conduct that can
    be said to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime.").
    Considering all the circumstances alleged, we conclude
    that Davallou has not met this burden.          Deciding how to handle
    safety considerations at the annual June Day ceremony implicated
    a number of competing values, including the efficient allocation
    of resources, the historical and ceremonial functions of the event,
    the public's ability to view the event, and the value of the event
    as a military training or recruitment exercise.          Cf. Mahon, 742
    F.3d at 16 (applying the discretionary function exception to the
    government's decision not to raise the railing height in a historic
    building    because     it      actually   or    potentially     involved
    considerations   of   efficiency,     safety,   aesthetics,    and   cost).
    - 7 -
    Given     that    AHAC      allegedly     "organized,     directed,       arranged,
    supervised and controlled" the June Day ceremony for years without
    any prior report of injury, it is plausible that MANG could have
    weighed the various policy considerations and favored the lower
    cost and greater efficiency of relying on AHAC generally when it
    came to safely managing spectators.             Cf. Carroll v. United States,
    
    661 F.3d 87
    , 104 (1st Cir. 2011) (applying the discretionary
    function exception where the government ceded responsibility for
    managing known safety risks to independent contractors); Wood v.
    United States, 
    290 F.3d 29
    , 40 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that the
    "delegation      of   the    responsibility       for   safety    issues      to   the
    contractor suggests that . . . the [Navy] had determined already
    that in obtaining the 'best value' for the American taxpayer,
    worker safety should be a primary concern of the contractor" rather
    than the Navy).
    One    can   imagine    circumstances       in   which     such   policy
    considerations could not plausibly have informed MANG's conduct.
    Imagine, for example, that unprotected individuals were standing
    an arm's length away from the howitzers as MANG prepared to fire.
    With MANG thus on notice that AHAC's safety precautions were
    failing    and    that      spectators     were    in   imminent       danger,     the
    government's      proffered      policy    justifications        for    firing     the
    howitzers "may be so far-fetched as to defy any plausible nexus
    between the challenged conduct and the asserted justification."
    - 8 -
    Shansky,   
    164 F.3d at 695
    ;   accord   Hajdusek,   895    F.3d    at   152
    (predicting that a decision to have Marine Corps recruits "jump
    off a twenty-foot high cliff onto concrete" during training would
    not be protected, as such a decision would "amount to a complete
    rejection" of safety considerations).
    Such     cases,      though,     "invariably    involve        extreme
    circumstances."      Shansky, 
    164 F.3d at 695
    .              As in Hajdusek,
    Davallou's complaint alleges no facts "supporting an inference
    that [the defendant] would have [had] reason to know ex ante that
    the [challenged conduct] was sufficiently likely to cause serious
    injury as to deem it the product of a rejection of a policy goal
    rather than a balancing of such goals."           895 F.3d at 153.        Rather,
    the complaint alleges in conclusory terms that MANG fired artillery
    in a ceremony organized and controlled by AHAC without first
    issuing a warning or making a "reasonable effort to keep members
    of the public including plaintiff a safe distance from said
    artillery."       In similarly vague terms, the complaint further
    alleges that MANG fired that artillery "in close proximity to
    civilians," including Davallou, even though "[t]he level of noise
    and/or   sonic    waves    produced    by   the   firing   of    said    military
    artillery . . . was sufficient to cause tinnitus, permanent damage
    to hearing, and other injury to human beings."                  We do not know
    from the complaint where in the park the ceremony was held, how
    close AHAC allowed the public (including Davallou) to get to the
    - 9 -
    howitzers at the time of the artillery salute, or whether anyone
    was even aware of Davallou's presence when the howitzers were
    fired.       We also do not know how far from the howitzers the public
    would have had to stand in order to avoid any substantial risk of
    hearing loss.         Nor is there reason to believe that anyone else had
    previously suffered injury as a result of AHAC's supervision of
    the       annual    June    Day    ceremony.        Without    at   least    some   such
    averments, Davallou has not carried his burden of alleging facts
    that could support a finding that MANG exhibited such a complete
    disregard for public safety that its decisions could not have been
    driven by policy analysis.                See Gaubert, 
    499 U.S. at
    324–25.
    In arguing to the contrary, Davallou points to a line of
    cases from the Ninth Circuit holding that a "decision not to warn
    of    a    specific,       known   hazard    for    which     the   acting   agency   is
    responsible         is   not    the   kind   of     broader    social,   economic     or
    political          policy      decision     that    the     discretionary     function
    exception is intended to protect."                 Sutton v. Earles, 
    26 F.3d 903
    ,
    910 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added); accord, e.g., Green v. United
    States, 
    630 F.3d 1245
    , 1252 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that the
    discretionary function exception did not apply to the Forest
    Service's failure to warn property owners of its decision to light
    a backfire nearby).             But none of the Ninth Circuit cases Davallou
    relies on dealt with the policy consideration applicable here (the
    advantages of relying on AHAC as before).                     And if we were to read
    - 10 -
    those cases as broadly as Davallou does, they would place outside
    the discretionary function exception all instances in which the
    government knowingly creates a risk of injury without issuing a
    warning, even if the risk is minimal and a particular type of
    warning    would    undermine       competing     policy    interests.       Such    a
    sweeping    approach    is    contrary       to   our    precedents.        We    have
    previously rejected the notion that "when safety becomes an issue,
    all else must yield."         Shansky, 
    164 F.3d at 693
     (explaining that
    "there is no principled basis for superimposing a generalized
    'safety exception'         upon the discretionary function defense").
    Rather, as we have already explained, a "case-by-case approach is
    required."      Id.; accord Hajdusek, 895 F.3d at 150.
    Davallou falls back on the argument that MANG's conduct
    was "not readily amenable to policy analysis" because it implicated
    only "technical safety assessments conducted pursuant to prior
    policy choices."       Shansky, 
    164 F.3d at 694
    ; see also Berkovitz v.
    United States, 
    486 U.S. 531
    , 547 (1988) (concluding that the
    government's       approval    of     an    unsafe      vaccine    batch   was    not
    susceptible to policy analysis because the government had failed
    to   follow     already-settled        scientific       criteria    for    assessing
    vaccine safety).       In advancing this argument, he relies solely on
    a training manual prepared by the U.S. Army Public Health Command,
    entitled      "Readiness     through       Hearing   Loss    Prevention,"        which
    recognizes that firing a 155-millimeter howitzer creates a risk of
    - 11 -
    hearing      loss.     But,     unlike    the     vaccine      safety    standards    in
    Berkovitz, the training manual does not purport to establish
    concrete safety criteria that account for any risk to public safety
    or any of the other competing interests that MANG might have
    considered in this instance.              Rather, the manual simply explains
    how noise can cause hearing loss, how service members                               using
    military equipment can protect themselves from noise, and how
    hearing loss can adversely affect readiness for combat.                        This sort
    of general educational information does not remove MANG's conduct
    in this case from the realm of policy decisions.                        Cf. Shuman v.
    United States, 
    765 F.2d 283
    , 285–86, 293–94 (1st Cir. 1985)
    (finding      that     the    Navy's     promulgation          of     advisory    safety
    guidelines for shipyards did not eliminate the Navy's discretion
    to prioritize production over safety).
    III.
    This is a challenging case, and a sad one.                         Assuming
    that his allegations are true, Davallou was simply taking a walk
    through one of our country's most celebrated city parks when,
    through no fault of his own, he was exposed to noise loud enough
    to   cause    permanent       hearing    damage.         Our    federal      government,
    however, does not allow itself to be sued for its discretionary
    decisions,      even    bad     ones,    so     long     as    they    are    reasonably
    susceptible      to    policy    analysis.         And    on    the    facts     alleged,
    additional precautions were not so obviously needed that the
    - 12 -
    decisions to proceed according to tradition and to leave the
    management of spectators to AHAC fell outside the realm of possible
    policy decisions. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
    court.
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