Society Insurance Co. v. Donna Nystrom ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    DEC 4 2017
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    SOCIETY INSURANCE COMPANY,                       No.   16-16812
    Plaintiff-Appellant,               D.C. No. 2:13-cv-01007-NVW
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    DONNA NYSTROM; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted November 16, 2017
    Pasadena, California
    Before: KOZINSKI and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and GETTLEMAN,** District
    Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Robert W. Gettleman, United States District Judge for
    the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 22(a)(1) authorizes a stakeholder, such as plaintiff Society
    Insurance Company (“Society”), to join “[p]ersons with claims that may expose
    [the stakeholder] to double or multiple liability,” and requires such parties to
    interplead. The primary purpose of interpleader is “for the stakeholder to protect
    itself against the problems posed by multiple claimants to a single fund,” including
    double liability as well as the cost of litigation. Michelman v. Lincoln Nat’l Life
    Ins. Co., 
    685 F.3d 887
    , 894 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted).
    In the instant case, Society’s interpleader action was properly filed because
    there were two or more claimants of diverse citizenship at the time the suit was
    filed. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1). After Society deposited the funds, the district court
    properly dismissed Society with prejudice and enjoined the claimants from
    instituting any proceedings affecting the funds. See 28 U.S.C. § 2361.
    The district court erred in its sua sponte order (Doc. 126) bringing Society
    back into the case, vacating its original orders, dismissing the action, and ordering
    the funds returned to Society. That order defeated the purpose of the interpleader
    and denied Society the protection to which it was entitled. The original
    interpleader action was not premature because at the time of filing there were
    multiple claimants with colorable claims to the insurance proceeds, and Society
    had conceded coverage by depositing the funds. See 
    Michelman, 685 F.3d at 894
    .
    2
    That Society is defending its insured in state court under a reservation of rights has
    no bearing on the propriety of the interpleader.
    Nor did the failure of the claimants to resolve their disputes give the court
    grounds to dismiss the action and return the funds to Society, which had been
    dismissed with prejudice over a year earlier. A party’s failure to prosecute its
    claim may be grounds for dismissal, Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), but that was not the
    reason given by the court, and it would be an abuse of discretion for the court to
    vacate its previous dismissal with prejudice of Society based on the claimants’
    failure to prosecute. See Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 
    291 F.3d 639
    , 641-644 (9th Cir.
    2002) (Dismissal for want of prosecution or failure to comply with a court order is
    reviewed for abuse of discretion.).
    The district court’s order (Doc. 126) is reversed in all respects. Society is
    directed to redeposit the funds (including interest) that it had received from the
    court as a result of the district court’s order, and the district court is directed to
    dismiss Society with prejudice and proceed consistent with this order.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-16812

Filed Date: 12/4/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021