Town of Norfolk v. United States Army ( 1992 )


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    July 15, 1992 ____________________

    No. 91-2215

    TOWN OF NORFOLK AND TOWN OF WALPOLE,

    Plaintiffs, Appellants,

    v.

    UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.

    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. A. David Mazzone, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Circuit Judge,
    _____________

    Campbell and Bownes, Senior Circuit Judges.
    _____________________

    _____________________


    Stephen D. Anderson for appellant Town of Norfolk and John
    ___________________ ____
    W. Giorgio for appellant Town of Walpole, with whom Leonard
    ___________ _______
    Kopelman, Kopelman and Paige, P.C., Anderson & Kreiger,
    ________ ____________________________ _____________________
    Christopher H. Little and Tillinghast, Collins & Graham, were on
    _____________________ _____________________________
    brief.
    George B. Henderson II, Assistant United States Attorney,
    _______________________
    with whom Barry M. Hartman, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
    _________________
    Environment and Natural Resources Division, Wayne A. Budd, United
    _____________
    States Attorney, William B. Lazarus, Stephen L. Samuels,
    _____________________ _____________________
    Elizabeth Yu, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Steven H.
    _____________ __________
    Goldberg, of counsel Gary Pasternak, Assistant District Counsel,
    ________ ______________
    Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, were on joint brief
    for appellees United States Army Corps of Engineers and
    Massachusetts Water Resources Authority.





















    ____________________


    ____________________













































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    TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. On this appeal, the Towns of
    _____________

    Walpole and Norfolk challenge the decision of the U.S. Army Corps

    of Engineers ("Corps") to issue a permit under Section 404 of the

    Clean Water Act1 to allow the Massachusetts Water Resources

    Authority ("MWRA") to place fill in an artificial wetland located

    in the Town of Walpole and adjacent to the Town of Norfolk.2

    The district court, in a comprehensive opinion, found that the

    Corps' determinations under Section 404 were not arbitrary,

    capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law and therefore

    it granted summary judgment in favor of the Corps, its district

    engineer for New England, and the MWRA (collectively referred to

    herein as defendants). Norfolk & Walpole v. U.S. Army Corps of
    _________________ __________________

    Engineers, 772 F. Supp. 680 (D. Mass. 1991).
    _________

    In addition, the Towns challenge (1) the district

    court's decision to allow a motion by defendants to quash

    subpoenas and for a protective order to prevent discovery of

    certain documents3 and (2) the district court judge's denial of

    the Towns' motion for his recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.





    ____________________

    1 33 U.S.C. 1344.

    2 In a related appeal, the Towns challenged the adequacy of the
    supplemental environmental impact statement prepared by the
    United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") for the
    proposed landfill. Norfolk v. United States EPA, 761 F. Supp.
    _______ _________________
    867 (D. Mass. 1991). We affirmed the district court's grant of
    summary judgment in favor of the EPA and its Administrator.

    3 Norfolk & Walpole v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 137 F.R.D.
    _________________ ____________________________
    183 (D. Mass. 1991).

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    455(a).4 We affirm the rulings and decisions of the district

    court for the reasons that follow.

    I

    A. Factual Background
    A. Factual Background
    __________________

    This appeal is an offspring of the colossal effort to

    clean up Boston Harbor. This particular controversy -- involving

    the issuance of a permit to construct and operate a landfill in

    Walpole -- has been described elsewhere in detail.5 We

    therefore summarize the facts pertinent to this appeal.

    Pursuant to a compliance plan approved by the District

    Court for the District of Massachusetts to abate the discharge of

    inadequately treated wastewater and sewage sludge and other

    residuals into Boston Harbor, the MWRA was required, among other

    remedies, to construct and operate a landfill by March 1994 to

    hold grit, screenings and, if necessary, digested or heat-dried

    sludge from its wastewater treatment facilities. See generally
    ___ _________

    United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 23 Env't Rep. Cas.
    ______________ __________________________

    1350 (D. Mass. 1985). In 1986 the MWRA began to work closely

    with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to find

    possible alternatives for both sludge management technologies and


    ____________________

    4 Section 455(a) provides:

    Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the
    United States shall disqualify himself,
    _____
    in any proceeding in which his
    impartiality might reasonably be
    questioned.

    5 United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Com., 757 F. Supp. 121,
    _____________ _______________________
    123-26 (D. Mass. 1991), aff'd, 930 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1992).
    _____

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    potential sites for the landfill. Eventually four technologies

    and ten potential sites were identified from a field of 299

    sites.

    Additional evaluation was conducted to further screen

    the potential sites for detailed analysis. The criteria used at

    this stage of the screening included environmental standards,

    such as ecology and air quality and potential groundwater

    effects, and non-environmental criteria, such as cost and the

    extent to which potential communities were already hosting

    permanent wastewater treatment facilities. This screening stage

    eliminated four sites on environmental and other grounds. Of the

    remaining six sites, four were further evaluated for sludge

    processing, while two sites -- Rowe Quarry and MCI-Walpole --

    were further evaluated for a landfill operation.

    In February of 1989, the MWRA issued its Draft

    Environmental Impact Report and Draft Residuals Management

    Facilities Plan ("DEIR"). The MWRA proposed to process sludge at

    the Fore River Staging Area in Quincy, Massachusetts and to

    landfill the residuals at the MCI-Walpole site. In May of 1989,

    EPA issued a Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement

    ("DSEIS"). In its analysis of the proposed landfill at Walpole,

    EPA identified two major critical groundwater supplies. First,

    the Massachusetts Department of Corrections maintains a number of

    public water supply wells located in the Charles River Watershed

    Aquifer to the west of the proposed landfill. These wells supply

    drinking water to the MCI-Norfolk and MCI-Walpole prison


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    facilities. Second, to the east of the landfill site is the head

    of the Neponset Sole Source Aquifer.6 This sole source aquifer

    serves several wells that are the only source of drinking water

    to the residents of the Town of Walpole.7 EPA concluded that

    the nearest of these wells is located more than two miles from

    the landfill site and is separated from the landfill by soils of

    low permeability. In March 30, 1990, EPA formally approved the

    construction and operation of the landfill at the Walpole site.

    Pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act,8 the

    Corps is required to review permit applications for proposal to

    dredge and fill wetlands under the standards set forth in 33

    C.F.R. 320.4(a)(1) and 40 C.F.R. 230. In May 1990, the MWRA

    submitted a revised permit application describing all of its

    proposed projects to clean Boston Harbor, including the Walpole

    landfill.9

    On July 12, 1990, the Corps issued a public notice


    ____________________

    6 A sole source aquifer is a designation given by EPA to the
    principal or sole source of drinking water for a given area. The
    western boundary of the Neponset Sole Source Aquifer runs to the
    east of the MCI-Walpole landfill.

    7 In addition, south of the landfill are wells that supply
    drinking water to Southwood Hospital and north of the landfill
    are wells which supply drinking water to private residences, a
    horse ranch and a dog kennel.

    8 33 U.S.C. 1344.

    9 The projects included the construction of a headworks facility
    for preliminary treatment of sewage on Nut Island, a 5 mile
    inter-island wastewater tunnel between Nut and Deer Island, a 9.5
    mile effluent outfall tunnel and diffuser from Deer Island to
    offshore waters, a sludge processing facility at Quincy, and the
    residuals landfill at issue in this case.

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    concerning the MWRA's application, which proposed to set aside

    forty-six acres of a ninety-four acre plot located in the Town of

    Walpole and adjacent to the Town of Norfolk. Under MWRA's

    proposal, a 600 square foot area of man-made wetland located in

    the center of the proposed project would be filled. This

    wetland, also known as Wetland E, was created by the

    Massachusetts Department of Corrections as an obstacle course for

    training prison guards. The National Marine Fisheries Service

    and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service submitted a comment form

    indicating no objection to the project. EPA and the MWRA

    submitted comments in support of the proposed landfill. However,

    the Towns of Norfolk and Walpole submitted detailed objections to

    the MWRA proposal.

    The Towns objected to the proposed landfill essentially

    on four grounds. First, the Towns claimed that the MWRA had

    failed to demonstrate that no practicable alternative having less

    adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem existed as required under

    40 C.F.R. 230.10(a). Second, the Towns argued that the

    landfill would eliminate over fifty percent of the surface water

    supply to a portion of an adjacent wetland, thus allegedly

    causing substantial disruption to the overall wetland resource,

    including a significant adverse impact on a vernal pool10

    located within 100 to 150 feet of the landfill footprint. Third,

    the Towns alleged that the proposed landfill would adversely

    ____________________

    10 Vernal pools serve as the sole breeding habitat for certain
    amphibian species and provide breeding and feeding habitat for a
    variety of other species.

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    impact wildlife habitats for the great blue heron and the pied-

    billed grebe. Fourth, the Towns claim that the MWRA disregarded

    the adverse impact the proposed landfill would have on

    groundwater resources.

    David H. Killoy, a branch supervisor of the Corps'

    Regulatory Division, also opposed the MWRA's application to

    construct and operate the landfill in Walpole. In a draft

    memorandum dated December 24, 1990, Mr. Killoy found two unique

    conditions which, in his opinion, required that the permit be

    denied because it failed "two parts of the 404(b)(1) guidelines

    and it is contrary to the public interest."11 First, the MWRA

    had failed to demonstrate the nonexistence of a practicable

    alternative to the landfill would have less adverse impact on the

    aquatic ecosystem. Mr. Killoy concluded that even a small threat

    to the Neponset Sole Source Aquifer in the area constituted a

    significant adverse environmental consequence. Second, the

    discharge of fill may contribute to a significant degradation of

    the waters of the United States, in this instance, the wells

    which supply drinking water. Mr. Killoy also noted that in the

    Corps' review of the Central Artery and Tunnel Project, he had

    identified a "wide range of sites which were available for land

    fill."12

    In light of the claims by Mr. Killoy and the Towns, the

    Corps' Regulatory Branch requested its Hydraulics and Water

    ____________________

    11 Memorandum by David H. Killoy, dated December 24, 1990, at 7.

    12 Id. at 6.
    __

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    Quality Branch, Water Control Division to examine the available

    reports and data on groundwater impacts and to prepare a

    technical report on the potential risk for contamination of the

    water supplies. The ensuing report recommended that the

    monitoring system be expanded to include at least one monitoring

    well to detect any leachate13 escaping towards the Neponset

    Sole Source Aquifer. The report concluded "that the risk to

    drinking water supplies from [the Walpole] landfill is

    minor."14

    On January 23, 1991, Mr. Killoy submitted a final

    memorandum summarizing his continued opposition to the Walpole

    landfill. Mr. Killoy asserted that the MWRA had not clearly

    demonstrated that Walpole was the "least environmentally damaging

    practicable alternative" for the following three reasons. First,

    if groundwater flow contributed substantially to the nearby down

    gradient wetlands, then "the removal of 46 acres of groundwater

    recharge area, high on the groundwater divide, by capping could

    deplete the wetlands water supply causing a long term

    degradation."15 Second, the application contained too little

    information on the location of bedrock and its properties.

    Third, the investigation "essentially neglected the presence of

    the [sole source aquifer] and until the final environmental


    ____________________

    13 Leachate refers to precipitation that will percolate through
    the residuals placed at the landfill.

    14 Report, dated February 1991 at 1, 23.

    15 Killoy Memorandum of January 23, 1991, 4.

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    documents ignored the nearby private wells."16 Mr. Killoy,

    however, concluded with the following observation:

    I also recognize that many of the items
    above can be interpreted differently by
    different reviewers who could recommend
    issuance of the permit without appearing
    arbitrary or capricious. This is where
    the decision maker takes over.

    Id. at 52.
    __

    Less than three weeks after Mr. Killoy's last

    memorandum, the Corps issued its Record of Decision ("ROD")

    granting a permit to the MWRA to inter alia construct and operate
    _____ ____

    the MCI-Walpole landfill. As further elaborated below, the Towns

    claim that the Corps' permitting process is plagued with errors

    and that the decision to issue the permit was based on improper

    pressure by the U.S. Department of Justice and EPA.

    B. Statutory and Regulatory Background
    B. Statutory and Regulatory Background
    ___________________________________

    Congress enacted the Clean Water Act17 ("CWA") "to

    restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological

    integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. 1251(a); see also
    ________

    40 C.F.R. 230.1. Section 301 of the CWA makes the discharge of

    pollutants into navigable waters unlawful, unless such discharge

    is authorized by permit. The term "pollutants" is defined

    broadly and includes dredged or fill material.18 The term

    "navigable waters" is similarly all encompassing, covering all


    ____________________

    16 Id. at 14.
    __

    17 33 U.S.C. 1311(a).

    18 33 U.S.C. 1362(6).

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    "waters of the United States." 33 U.S.C. 1362(7). Wetlands are

    included in the definition of "waters of the United States."19



    Section 404 of the CWA authorizes the Corps of

    Engineers to issue or deny permits for the discharge of dredged

    or fill material. 33 U.S.C. 1344(a). Generally an applicant

    seeking a permit under Section 404 submits an individual

    application for each discharge. In considering permit

    applications, the Corps is required to apply the regulations and

    guidelines set forth in Titles 33 and 40 of the Code of Federal

    Regulations. 33 C.F.R. 320 and 40 C.F.R. Part 230.

    Section 404(b)(1) of the CWA directs the Corps to apply

    the guidelines developed by the EPA Administrator in conjunction

    with the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of

    Engineers. 33 U.S.C. 1344(b)(1). These Section 404 guidelines

    are codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 230.

    Under 33 C.F.R. 320.4(a)(1), the Corps evaluates a

    permit application's "probable impacts, including cumulative

    impacts, of the proposed activity on the public interest." 33

    C.F.R. 320.4(a)(1).20 The Towns contend that the Corps'

    ____________________

    19 40 C.F.R. 230.3(s)(7). See also United States v. Riverside
    ________ _____________ _________
    Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (Corps acted reasonably
    ___________________
    in interpreting Clean Water Act to require permits for discharge
    of material into wetland).

    20 Among the factors evaluated under this "public interest
    review" are

    conservation, economics, aesthetics,
    general environmental concerns, wetlands,
    historic properties, fish and wildlife

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    determination to issue the permit is erroneous under subsections

    (a), (b) & (c) of 40 C.F.R. 230.10 and under 33 C.F.R.

    320.4(a)(1).




































    ____________________

    values, flood hazards, floodplain values,
    land use, navigation, shore erosion and
    accretion, recreation, water supply and
    conservation, water quality, energy
    needs, safety, food and fiber production,
    mineral needs, consideration of property
    ownership and, in general, the needs and
    welfare of the people.

    33 C.F.R. 320.4(a)(1).

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    C. Standard of Review
    C. Standard of Review
    __________________

    The district court's grant of summary judgment in favor

    of the defendants is reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Medina &
    __ ____ ___ ____ _________

    Sucesores, Inc., et al. v. Custodio, et al., No. 91-1469, slip
    ________________________ ________________

    op. at 17 (1st Cir. May 7, 1992). Rule 56(c) of the Federal

    Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a motion for summary

    judgment shall be granted if it is clear from the record that

    "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

    moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter law."

    We review the Corps decision to issue the permit under

    the standard of review set forth in the Administrative Procedure

    Act,21 pursuant to which an agency's action will be set aside

    only if it is found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

    discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."

    To determine whether the Corps's decision complies with

    the arbitrary and capricious standard, we consider

    whether the decision was based on a
    consideration of the relevant factors and
    whether there has been a clear error of
    judgment. Although this inquiry into the
    facts is to be searching and careful, the
    ultimate standard of review is a narrow
    one. The court is not empowered to
    substitute its judgment for that of the
    [Corps].

    Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
    ________________________________________ _____

    416 (1971). See also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
    _________ _____________ _________________________

    Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) ("An agency's construction of a statute
    ____

    it is charged with enforcing is entitled to deference if it is

    ____________________

    21 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A).

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    reasonable and not in conflict with the expressed intent of

    Congress"); All Regions Chemical Labs, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 932
    ________________________________ ___________

    F.2d 73, 75 (1st Cir. 1991) ("In reviewing EPA's decision we must

    pay particular attention to the interpretation that it gives its

    own rules and regulations"); Environmental Coalition Broward
    ________________________________

    County, Inc. v. Myers, 831 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1987)
    _____________ _____

    (deference to the Corps' determination is "particularly

    appropriate in the case of complex environmental statutes such as

    the Clean Water Act.").

    II

    Section 230.10(a)
    Section 230.10(a)
    _________________

    Section 230.10(a) provides that:

    no discharge of dredged or fill material
    shall be permitted if there is a
    practicable alternative to the proposed
    discharge which would have less adverse
    impact on the aquatic ecosystem, so long
    as the alternative does not have other
    significant adverse environmental
    consequences.

    40 C.F.R. 230.10(a).

    In its Record of Decision, the Corps found that the

    impact of the Walpole landfill on the aquatic ecosystem to be

    inconsequential considering the low value of the 600 square foot

    landfill and the minor potential secondary impacts to adjacent

    wetlands and waters. The Towns assert that the Corps

    interpretation of the Section 230.10(a) guidelines is flawed for

    three reasons. First, the Corps erred in concluding that the

    direct impacts were "inconsequential." This erroneous

    conclusion, the Towns assert, reversed the presumption embodied

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    in Section 230.10(a), which requires the Corps to presume that

    other practicable alternatives exist. Second, the Towns claim

    that the Corps erred in concluding that the mitigation measures

    proposed in the MWRA's application would render the secondary

    impacts to surrounding wetlands "inconsequential." Third, it is

    alleged that the Corps failed to consider groundwater impacts as

    part of the practicable alternatives analysis because it

    erroneously concluded that the term "aquatic ecosystem" as used

    in Section 230.10(a) generally excludes groundwater.

    A. Did the Corps Reasonably Conclude that There is No
    __________________________________________________________

    Practicable
    ___________

    Alternative?
    ___________

    The Towns argue that the Corps' conclusion that direct

    impacts to Wetland E (the 600 square foot, man-made wetland) were

    inconsequential is not supported by the evidence. This

    "evidence" consists of a By-Law enacted by the Town of Walpole

    making Wetland E a protected resource. This argument fails for

    two reasons.

    First, and foremost, the Towns failed to make this

    Wetland By-Law part of the administrative record. We have no way

    of knowing the terms of this By-Law. Since judicial review of

    the Corps' permit decisions is limited to the administrative

    record, the Towns' argument fails. See, e.g., Friends of Earth
    ___ ____ _________________

    v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1986) (standard of
    _____

    review for the Section 404 permitting process under the

    Administrative Procedures Act is "highly deferential"); Buttrey
    _______


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    v. United States, 690 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
    _____________ ____ ______

    461 U.S. 927 (1983) ("[Courts] look only to the administrative

    record in order to determine if the Corps' decision was

    arbitrary, capricious, or not in accordance with law.").

    Second, even assuming the inclusion of the By-Law in

    the administrative record, the fact that Walpole has passed such

    a By-Law is insufficient to establish that the direct and

    secondary impacts to the ecosystem are not "inconsequential."

    Dubbing a piece of real estate "wetland" by municipal edict does

    not establish such a conclusion de jure for purposes of federal
    __ ____

    law nor does the By-Law grant per se "consequence." We agree
    ___ __

    with the Corps that Walpole's By-Law has no legal significance

    since the MWRA is not subject to them.

    The Towns also claim that in concluding that the

    impacts to Wetland E was negligible and therefore that no other

    practicable alternative having less environmental impact existed,

    the Corps reversed the rebuttable presumption contained in 40

    C.F.R. 230.10(a). We disagree.

    None of the comments received by the Corps disputed

    that this 600 square feet area consisted of an isolated, man-

    made, low-value wetland. Neither Town asserted in the comments

    submitted to the Corps that Wetland E has any essential

    ecological value nor have they presented evidence to contradict

    the finding by the Corps that this small area of wetland has

    "virtually no function or value." Record of Decision at 7. In

    addition, we note that Wetland E does not meet the criteria for


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    regulation under the Massachusetts Wetland Protection Act. See
    ___

    310 Code of Massachusetts Regulations 10.57(1)(b).

    The Towns argue that once the Corps found that the

    direct impact of the landfill was "inconsequential," it was

    required to conduct an exhaustive feasibility evaluation of each

    of the 299 alternatives sites initially screened for the

    landfill. See Appellants' Brief at 21. We hold that such a
    ___

    rigid interpretation of the guidelines is not warranted. The

    plain language of the Section 404 regulatory scheme indicates

    that the level of review depends on the nature and severity of

    the project's impact on the environment. The general

    introduction for Section 230.10 states:

    Although all requirements in 230.10
    must be met, the compliance evaluation
    procedures will vary to reflect the
    seriousness of the potential for adverse
    impacts on the aquatic ecosystems posed
    by specific dredged or fill material
    discharge activities.

    40 C.F.R. 230.10. In Section 230.6, the Guidelines further

    provide:

    (a) . . . These Guidelines allow
    evaluation and documentation for a
    variety of actives, ranging from those
    with large, complex impacts on the
    aquatic environment to those for which
    the impact is likely to be innocuous. It
    is unlikely that the Guidelines will
    apply in their entirety to any one
    activity, no matter how complex. It is
    anticipated that substantial numbers of
    permit applications will be for minor,
    routine activities that have little, if
    any, potential for significant
    degradation of the aquatic environment.
    It generally is not intended or expected
    _________________________________________
    that extensive testing, evaluation or
    _________________________________________

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    analysis will be needed to make findings
    _________________________________________
    of compliance in such routine cases.
    ___________________________________

    (b) The Guidelines user, including the
    agency or agencies responsible for
    implementing the Guidelines, must
    recognize that different levels of effort
    that should be associated with varying
    degrees of impact and require or prepare
    commensurate documentation. The level of
    ____________
    documentation should reflect the
    _________________________________________
    significance and complexity of the
    _________________________________________
    discharge activity.
    __________________

    40 C.F.R. 230.6(a) & (b) (1991) (emphasis added).

    Clearly, the guidelines contemplate an analysis which

    varies in magnitude depending on the impact of the proposed

    discharge, rather than the dogmatic scrutiny suggested by the

    Towns. In cases such as this one, where the MWRA and the EPA

    conducted a thorough environmental analysis of alternative sites,

    and where the Corps' determination that the direct impact on the

    aquatic ecosystem of filling the 600 square foot artificial

    wetland is negligible is supported by the administrative record,

    the Corps is not required under Section 230.10(a) to duplicate

    the analysis conducted by the MWRA and EPA. Norfolk & Walpole,
    __________________

    772 F. Supp. at 687.

    Nor can the Corps be faulted for relying on the

    alternative analysis conducted by EPA in its review of the

    landfill pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act.22

    In doing so, the Corps followed the recommendation of Section

    230.10(a)(4), which provides that "the analysis of alternatives

    required for NEPA environmental documents . . . will in most

    ____________________

    22 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.
    __ ___

    -18-














    cases provide the information for the evaluation of alternatives

    under [the Section 404] Guidelines." Although Section 230.10(a)

    recognizes that the NEPA review may provide insufficient analysis

    to meet the Section 404 guidelines requirements, it is apparent

    here that the Corps supplemented the extensive alternatives

    analysis conducted by the MWRA and the EPA. The Corps re-

    evaluated several potential sites to verify that the

    environmental criteria used in the selection of the proposed

    landfill was properly applied. The Corps found

    that many of these sites didn't meet the
    landfill acreage requirements and
    therefore were appropriately not
    considered for landfills. Other sites
    which were considered for landfills were
    ranked lower than Walpole-MCI and
    therefore deemed less preferable and not
    carried forward.

    ROD at 11. The Corps reasonably relied on the substantial

    evaluation conducted by the MWRA and EPA to find that the

    landfill in Walpole was the best alternative under the

    Guidelines. The initial screening for a landfill began with

    approximately 300 potential sites and after substantial

    additional evaluation of about ten individual sites, Walpole was

    selected. Under the practicable alternatives test, the Corps is

    not required to conduct an independent feasibility evaluation of

    each alternative site merely because a party disagrees with its

    ultimate conclusion. We hold that it was not arbitrary,

    capricious or contrary to law for the Corps to conclude that no

    practicable alternative to this 600 square feet of artificial

    wetland exists which would have a lesser "adverse impact on the

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    aquatic ecosystem." 40 C.F.R. 230.10(a)(3). If the Corps'

    determination under Section 404 is reasonably supported by the

    administrative record, our inquiry must end. Friends of Earth,
    ________________

    800 F.2d at 835.














































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    B. Has the Corps Failed to Consider the Secondary Impacts on the
    _____________________________________________________________

    Wetlands of the Proposed Discharge on Aquatic Ecosystem?
    _______________________________________________________

    The Corps analyzed two potential secondary impacts on

    the adjacent wetlands; (1) the possibility that leachate might

    reach the surface waters in the event of a leak from the landfill

    and (2) the loss of surface/groundwater recharge. The Corps

    concluded that although the potential for leachate transmission

    into the adjacent wetlands existed,

    its likelihood will be greatly minimized
    by the state-of-art landfill design and
    collection system which will be used.
    Even if some leakage occurred, the
    propensity of wetlands to assimilate the
    leachate constituents (i.e. act as a
    sink) is well recognized. In fact the
    use of wetlands as tertiary treatment is
    well documented and recognized by EPA.
    Therefore, the effect is expected to be
    minor.

    ROD at 12. The Corps also characterized the possible loss of

    surface water and groundwater recharge as a minor impact since

    "the proportion of precipitation falling on the landfill site

    which infiltrates into the groundwater is small (about 1/5 [of an

    acre]) . . . when compared to the proportion entering the

    adjacent wetlands as surface runoff" and the landfill represented

    a very small portion of the total drainage area supporting the

    off-site wetlands. Id. The district court found that the Corps'
    __

    conclusions regarding the secondary effects of the landfill to be

    reasonable. Norfolk & Walpole, 772 F. Supp. at 688.
    _________________

    The Towns, however, claim that the Corps failed to

    adequately consider secondary wetland impacts as part of the


    -21-














    practicable alternatives analysis. The Towns' argument run as

    follows. First, the Corps attempts to avoid the practicable

    alternatives analysis by concluding that certain mitigation

    measures planned by the MWRA would render any secondary impacts

    to wetlands inconsequential. Second, the Corps' conclusion that

    Wetland E is a minor part of the total drainage areas supporting

    the Stop River wetlands cannot serve as a justification for the

    issuance of the permit, and in any event, the Towns argue that

    they have presented evidence to contradict this finding.

    Citing Bersani v. Robichaud, 850 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir.
    _______ _________

    1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089 (1989), the Towns allege that
    ____ ______

    mitigation measures may not be used to meet the practicable

    alternative analysis. The Towns's interpretation of Bersani is
    _______

    not persuasive. In Bersani, the EPA denied an application for a
    _______

    permit to build a shopping mall on 32 acres of "high quality red

    maple swamp." Id. at 40. To compensate for filling 32 acres of
    __

    this "high quality" wetland, the developer proposed to create 36

    acres of wetland in an off-site gravel pit. The EPA determined

    that this mitigation measure was insufficient because (1) of its

    scientific uncertainty; (2) the availability of an alternative

    site for the shopping mall; and (3) the adverse effect on

    wildlife. Bersani, therefore, does not announce a procedural
    _______

    straitjacket against the use of mitigation measures to compensate

    for environmental losses, but rather it upholds the basic

    proposition that if mitigation measures are insufficient to

    compensate for the loss of a valuable wetland, the permit should


    -22-














    be denied. See also Friends of Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 826
    ________ ________________ _____

    (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming Corps' conditional issuance of a

    Section 404 permit on compliance with an agreement proposing

    mitigation measures).

    Moreover, in this case there will be no destruction of

    a "high quality" wetland area; rather the direct impact on the

    aquatic environment involves the filling of 600 square feet of an

    isolated, artificial wetland that was used by the Department of

    Corrections as an obstacle course for training prison guards. We

    hold that it is reasonable for the Corps to consider, under the

    practicable alternatives analysis, the functional value of the

    wetland to be impacted and the mitigation measures proposed to

    avoid secondary impacts.

    The Towns cite Buttrey v. United States, 690 F.2d 1170
    _______ _____________

    (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 927 (1983) for the
    ____ ______

    proposition that the Corps cannot rely on its conclusion that

    Wetland E is a minor part of the total drainage area supporting

    the Stop River wetlands. In Buttrey, a land developer argued
    _______

    that his project proposal to fill about 40 acres of wetland was a

    "mere flyspeck" in relation to the river watershed adjacent to

    the property. The Fifth Circuit noted that such "piecemeal"

    review of the proposed project is prohibited by 33 C.F.R.

    320.4(b)(3), which provides:

    Although a particular alteration of a
    wetland may constitute a minor change,
    the cumulative effect of numerous
    piecemeal changes can result in a major
    impairment of wetland resources. Thus,
    the particular wetland site for which an

    -23-














    application is made will be evaluated
    with the recognition that it may be part
    of a complete and interrelated wetland
    area.

    Simply stated, 33 C.F.R. 320.4(b)(3) -- which authorizes the

    Corps to consider the cumulative effect of numerous piecemeal

    changes in its "public interest review" analysis -- does not

    apply here. The 600 square foot artificial wetland to be filled

    is not "part of a complete and interrelated wetland area"; it is

    isolated. And none of the comments in this case contradicted the

    Corps' finding that Wetland E had virtually no value. In

    Buttrey, it was undisputed that since the forty acre wetland was
    _______

    located upstream, it served a unique function in maintaining

    downstream water quality. The secondary impacts here result not

    from filling Wetland E but from the setting aside of 46 acres,

    most of which is on upland. Finally, the proposed project in

    Buttrey was opposed by the Fish and Wildlife Service, EPA and the
    _______

    National Marine Fisheries Service because they alleged it would

    inter alia destroy a habitat and nursery ground for wildlife and
    _____ ____

    increase the risk of flooding in surrounding neighborhoods. No

    such opposition was registered by these government agencies

    against this project.

    In their comments, the Towns' consultants claim that

    the construction of the landfill would potentially eliminate up

    to fifty percent of the drainage areas to adjacent wetlands,

    including Wetland A, a site which has a vernal pool,

    approximately 150 feet from the footprint of the proposed

    landfill. The Corps, however, concluded that the landfill site

    -24-














    represents less than one percent of the total drainage area and

    that the mitigation measures would render any impacts

    insignificant. With respect to the mitigation measures, the

    Corps specifically found:

    The [MWRA] has committed to develop a
    plan to capture the rainfall and return
    it to the wetlands directly adjacent to
    the landfill to protect their hydrology.
    This leads to the conclusion [that] the
    potential for adverse affect on the
    hydrology of the adjacent wetlands is
    minor. In any event, the development of
    the landfill will include elaborate
    monitoring of baseline conditions of the
    adjacent wetlands, modelling of the water
    flows, and a collection and replacement
    system to return the water to the
    wetlands. A portion, based on the
    modelling, will be returned as surface
    water, and a portion will be returned as
    ground water via an infiltration system.


    ROD at 12. The Corps further noted that the MWRA has implemented

    these mitigation measures in other projects and that the Corps

    had "approval authority over the monitoring and mitigation

    program through a special condition of the permit . . . ." Id.
    __

    The Towns' objection to the Corps findings on the subject of

    drainage reflect nothing more than a disagreement between the

    experts. In cases where technical disputes predominate the

    issues, an agency's expertise is entitled to deference. Chevron
    _______

    U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
    ______ ________________________________________

    844 (1984). We hold that the Corps' conclusions that the

    landfill site represents less than one percent of the total

    drainage area and that the mitigation measures would render any

    potential impact insignificant are not clearly arbitrary,

    -25-














    capricious or otherwise not in accordance to law.




















































    -26-














    C. Are Groundwater Resources Part of the Aquatic Ecosystem for
    ___________________________________________________________

    Purposes of the Practicable Alternatives Analysis?
    _________________________________________________

    In applying the practicable alternatives analysis, the

    Corps excluded groundwater resources from consideration. The

    Towns allege that groundwater resources are part of the "aquatic

    ecosystem" for purposes of the practicable alternatives analysis.

    The district court held that:

    The plain language of the Guidelines
    clearly constrains the alternative
    analysis, in the first instance, to
    effects on the aquatic ecosystem.
    "Aquatic ecosystem," in turn, is defined
    as "waters of the United States,
    including wetlands, that serve as habitat
    for interrelated and interacting
    communities and populations of plants and
    animals." 40 C.F.R. 230.3(c). The
    Corps' determination that groundwater
    sources are not aquatic ecosystems was
    clearly a reasonable interpretation of
    230.10(a), as [groundwater sources]
    cannot be said to "serve as habitat for
    interrelated and interacting communities
    and populations of plants and animals."

    While the impact on groundwater is
    certainly an "environmental consequence,"
    the alternatives analysis is limited to
    comparison of effects on the aquatic
    ecosystem.

    Norfolk & Walpole, 772 F. Supp. at 685. The Towns, however,
    __________________

    argue that groundwater resources are "waters of the United

    States." 40 C.F.R. 230.3(s)(3) provides that the term "waters

    of the United States" includes:

    All other waters such as intrastate
    lakes, rivers, streams (including
    intermittent streams), mudflats, sand-
    flats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie
    potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or
    natural ponds, the use, degradation or

    -27-














    destruction of which could affect
    interstate or foreign commerce including
    any such waters:

    (i) Which are or could be used by
    interstate or foreign travelers for
    recreational or other purposes . . . .

    Although this definition does not indicate whether groundwater

    constitutes "waters of the United States," the Corps has

    interpreted this definition to refer only to surface waters.

    This interpretation has been upheld by some courts. Exxon Corp.
    ___________

    v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1329 (5th Cir. 1977); Kelley v. United
    _____ ______ ______

    States, 618 F. Supp. 1103, 1105 (W.D. Mich. 1985; United States
    ______ _____________

    v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (S.D. Tex. 1975). Although
    _________

    other courts have questioned whether the term "waters of the

    United States" should include groundwaters connected to surface

    waters -- Inland Steel Co. v. E.P.A., 901 F.2d 1419, 1422 (7th
    _________________ ______

    Cir. 1990); McClellan Ecological Seepage v. Weinberger, 707 F.
    _____________________________ __________

    Supp. 1182, 1193-94 (E.D. Cal. 1988) -- we agree with the Corps

    that since such a determination ultimately involves an ecological

    judgment about the relationship between surface waters and

    groundwaters, it should be left in the first instance to the

    discretion of the EPA and the Corps. Cf. United States v.
    __ ______________

    Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985)
    _________________________________

    (deference should be given to "the Corps' ecological judgment

    about the relationship between waters and their adjacent

    wetlands").

    We have carefully examined the Towns' other arguments

    and conclude that they have no merit.


    -28-














    D. Do Other Practicable Alternatives Exist Which Would Have Less
    _____________________________________________________________

    Adverse Effects On The Aquatic Ecosystem?
    ________________________________________

    If the Corps had properly conducted the practicable

    alternatives analysis -- the Towns claim -- it would have been

    unable to overcome the presumption in Section 230.10(a) because

    other alternatives which would have less "severe environmental

    impacts" than Walpole are available. The Towns point out that

    (1) the MWRA itself determined that another alternative -- Rowe

    Quarry -- would have a less severe environmental impact than the

    Walpole site and (2) the Governor of Massachusetts appointed a

    Commission in February of 1991 which identified six other

    alternatives.

    In a draft report dated October 1988, the MWRA

    concluded that "development of the Rowe Quarry as a landfill

    would result in minimal environmental impacts in comparison to

    those that would occur at the Walpole-MCI site."23 On its face

    this statement appears to raise an issue of fact as to whether

    the decision of the Corps was arbitrary. Nevertheless, the issue

    under the practicable alternatives analysis of Section 230.10(a)

    is whether the alternative site would have less adverse impact on

    the aquatic ecosystem than the Walpole site. A finding that a
    ___ _______ _________

    potential site such as Rowe Quarry may have less adverse

    environmental effects does not constitute a finding that such

    site would have less adverse effects on the aquatic ecosystem.

    In fact, EPA concluded that the documents used in the NEPA

    ____________________

    23 Draft Report on Minor Residuals Landfilling at 56.

    -29-














    review, "establish[] that the insignificant potential adverse

    impacts on the aquatic ecosystem at the Walpole site are no

    greater than those which could potentially result from a landfill

    at Rowe Quarry."24 For example, EPA noted that a landfill at

    Rowe Quarry "could potentially cause adverse impacts to the

    Saugus River and Rumney Marsh wetland system, a state designated

    Area of Critical Environmental Concern."25

    The Towns argue that an investigation by the Harbor

    Residuals Landfill Siting Advisory Commission identified six

    potential alternatives to the Walpole site, "all of which are

    superior under the 230.10(a) standard." Brief of Appellants at

    30. The district court concluded that "[t]he Corps cannot be

    faulted for not considering the report of the Governor's

    Commission, however, as the Commission was not even in existence

    until after the [Record of Decision] and the permit were

    issued."26 The district court's conclusion finds support in the

    introduction of the Commission's report, where the first point

    made is that

    the Commission's task has been to
    evaluate alternatives that currently
    offer themselves as options to the
    development and use of the Walpole site,
    not to assess the wisdom of the past
    selection of that site. Our review of
    current alternatives can take account of

    ____________________

    24 Letter dated November 2, 1990 from the Director of EPA's
    Water Management Division to Lt. Colonel Stanley J. Murphy,
    District Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

    25 Id. at 6.
    __

    26 Norfolk & Walpole, 772 F. Supp. at 688.
    _________________

    -30-














    circumstances that were unknown or
    unsettled when the MWRA conducted its
    site selection process and federal and
    state regulators carried out their
    environmental reviews from 1986 to 1990.

    More significantly, the Commission itself recognized that the

    actual feasibility of the six potential alternative sites it had

    identified was an open question.27 Finally, the Commission's

    report contains no discussion of adverse impacts on the aquatic

    ecosystem. With respect to general environmental considerations,

    the Commission's report provides a limited analysis.28

    In sum, the Commission's report is insufficient to

    raise a genuine issue of material fact that the Corps'

    determination that the Walpole site meets the practicable

    alternative analysis was arbitrary, capricious or contrary to

    law.

    III

    Section 230.10(b)
    Section 230.10(b)
    _________________

    Section 230.10(b) provides in pertinent part:

    No discharge of dredged or fill material
    shall be permitted if it:

    * * *

    (3) Jeopardizes the continued existence
    of species listed as endangered or
    threatened under the Endangered Species

    ____________________

    27 Id. at 2 ("[O]ur identification of several, possibly feasible
    __
    alternatives to the Walpole site does not mean that all
    uncertainties surrounding the feasibility of those alternatives
    have been eliminated").

    28 Id. at 20. ("Certainties about environmental acceptability
    __
    will only become available, however, after further planning and
    permitting activities with respect to any of the alternatives").

    -31-














    Act of 1973, as amended, or results in
    likelihood of the destruction or adverse
    modification of a habitat which is
    determined by the Secretary of Interior
    or Commerce, as appropriate, to be a
    critical habitat under the Endangered
    Species Act, as amended.

    The Towns assert that the Corps failed to give adequate

    consideration under Section 230.10(b) to impacts on the habitats

    of pied-billed grebes and great blue herons that are located on

    the Stop River Impoundment, which borders the landfill site to

    the west.29 In the Record of Decision, the Corps recognized

    that [t]he increased noise and activity during
    construction and operation of the
    landfill may adversely impact one of the
    state's largest Great Blue Heron
    rookeries and several pied-billed grebes,
    a state threatened bird in the Stop River
    impoundment a quarter of a mile away.

    ROD at 7. The Towns argue that the Corps violated Section

    230.10(b) because it failed to conduct an extensive review of

    these impacts to wildlife. We disagree. As the district court

    recognized, Section 230.10(b) does not apply here because neither

    the pied-billed grebe nor the great blue heron are "species

    listed as endangered or threatened under the Endangered Species

    Act of 1973." 40 C.F.R. 230.10(b). Furthermore, the National

    Marine Fisheries Department and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife

    Service -- the federal agencies empowered to protect wildlife

    resources -- have indicated no objection to the landfill at

    Walpole.

    ____________________

    29 Massachusetts has listed the pied-billed grebe as endangered
    and threatened under state law. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 131, 4,
    clause 13A; Mass. Regs. Code tit. 321, 8.01(3)(b).

    -32-














    Notwithstanding the clear language of Section

    230.10(b), the Towns assert that Section 230.30(a) requires that

    the impact of the landfill on the pied-billed grebe be analyzed

    under Section 230.10(b). Section 230.30(a) states that

    "[l]istings of threatened and endangered species as well as

    critical habitats are maintained by some individual States and by

    the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the

    Interior." The district court concluded that consideration of

    impacts on wildlife, including species listed as endangered under

    state law, is properly reviewed under Section 230.10(c), which

    provides in pertinent part:

    Except as provided under section
    404(b)(2), no discharge of dredged or
    fill material shall be permitted which
    will cause or contribute to significant
    degradation of the waters of the United
    States. Findings of significant
    degradation related to the proposed
    discharge shall be based upon appropriate
    factual determinations, evaluations and
    tests required by Subparts B and G, after
    _____
    consideration of Subparts C through F,
    ________________________________________
    with special emphasis on the persistence
    and permanence of the effects outlined in
    those subparts.

    40 C.F.R. 230.10(c) (emphasis added). As the underlined part

    indicates, Section 230.10(c), unlike Section 230.10(b),

    specifically refers to Subpart D of the Section 404 Guidelines,

    which includes Section 230.30(a).

    Furthermore, the evidence indicates that the landfill

    would not threaten the continued existence of the grebe. The

    Stop River Impoundment is located approximately 2,000 feet from

    the boundary of the landfill footprint and, according to the

    -33-














    Towns' consultant, only one pair of grebes has been sighted in

    this area. The projected noise level of the construction and

    operation of the landfill is expected to be 45 decibels. In its

    Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, EPA reasonably

    concluded that this noise impact would not threaten the existence

    of the grebe.










































    -34-














    Noise levels exceeding 60 dBA [decibels]
    are considered loud to wildlife, and
    levels exceeding 75 dBA may cause
    damaging effects (Santa Barbara County,
    1984). Since noise levels are projected
    to be about 45 [decibels] at the edge of
    the Stop River impoundment (2,000 feet
    from the noise source), significant noise
    impacts would not occur to wildlife
    (including the heron rookery) using the
    impoundment.

    DSEIS at 5-93. Regarding noise levels that could potentially

    impact waterfowl and other wildlife using adjacent wetlands, EPA

    explained:

    Resident wildlife species at the site
    currently use the nearby impoundment,
    wetlands, and forested areas in spite of
    the activities of two local prisons and
    an adjacent firing range. These
    activities have resulted in ambient
    noises levels up to 49 dBA at the closest
    sample point to the reservoir (MWRA,
    RMFP, Screen, I, 1988). Animals using
    the site have likely become accustomed to
    such daily noise levels given the
    extended exposure. Any noise-related
    impacts that occur at the heron rookery
    (a resource of special concern) could be
    mitigated by limiting construction
    activity to nonbreeding periods such as
    fall and winter.

    Id. Finally, the district court made two findings to support its
    __

    determination that the Corps' conclusion that impacts on wildlife

    were insignificant "was not unreasonable." Norfolk & Walpole,
    __________________

    772 F. Supp. at 690. First, the Towns'

    own exhibit states that although herons
    "tend to prefer more remote, serene
    habitats," they "are generally tolerant
    of noise and other human disturbances,"
    [Exh. "E" at 7], and that "the Heron is
    generally more sensitive to noise and
    other disturbances than the Grebe or Wood
    Duck," id. at 8.
    __

    -35-














    Id. at 19. Second, the district court found that the Corps had
    __

    specifically considered negative effects of the landfill on the

    grebe and the blue heron in its public interest analysis. Given

    these findings, we cannot say the permit decision was arbitrary.

    IV

    Section 230.10(c)
    Section 230.10(c)
    _________________

    Under 40 C.F.R. 230.10(c), the Corps must reject a

    permit application which proposes a discharge "which will cause

    or contribute to significant degradation of the waters of the

    United States."30

    The Corps did not specifically consider the impact on

    groundwaters as required pursuant to Section 230.10(c) because it

    erroneously claimed that groundwaters effects on "municipal water

    supplies" were not part of the "significant degradation"

    test.31 The district court concluded that although the Corps

    had not properly conducted the Section 230.10(c) analysis, the

    Corps' findings under its public interest review analysis

    indicated that the Corps had properly evaluated groundwater

    ____________________

    30 As discussed ante, at 24-25, groundwater effects were not
    ____
    considered under Section 230.10(a) because that section calls for
    a determination of the "adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem."
    Aquatic ecosystem is defined as a water of the United States
    "that serve as habitat for interrelated and interacting
    communities and populations of plants and animals." 40 C.F.R.
    230.3(c). It is clear that groundwater resources do not "serve
    as habitat for interrelated and interacting communities and
    populations of plants and animals." See Norfolk & Walpole, 772
    ___ __________________
    F. Supp. at 685.

    31 The Corps did conclude in its "Short Form, Section 404(b)(1)
    Guidelines Compliance Determination" that the landfill will not
    cause significant adverse effects on municipal water supplies.
    Norfolk & Walpole, 772 F. Supp. at 690.
    _________________

    -36-














    impacts. The district court explained:

    The [Record of Decision] discusses at
    great length -- no subject is given more
    careful attention -- the possible effects
    of leaks in the landfill on nearby
    drinking water supplies, including ten
    private wells near the site, larger wells
    3,500 feet away that supply drinking
    water to the adjacent prisons, a well
    supplying a hospital in the vicinity, and
    the Head of Neponset Sole-Source Aquifer.
    The [Record of Decision] indicates that
    the Corps evaluated the tests performed
    by the EPA and the MWRA for the EIS and,
    where necessary, conducted its own tests.

    Norfolk & Walpole, 772 F. Supp. at 690. The district court noted
    _________________

    that the Corps addressed each of the Towns' objections to the

    Corps' groundwater analysis. Id.
    __

    The Towns do not argue that the Corps' findings or

    conclusions regarding potential impacts to groundwater resources

    are arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not in accordance with

    law. Instead, the Towns argue that the Corps' failure to analyze

    impacts to groundwaters under Section 230.10(c) constitutes

    reversible error. We think this argument elevates form over

    substance.

    Under 40 C.F.R. 230.10(c), "[f]indings of significant

    degradation related to the proposed discharge shall be based upon

    appropriate factual determinations, evaluations, and tests

    required by Subpart B and G, after consideration of Subparts C

    through F, . . ." The Corps' public interest review analysis

    demonstrates that although the exact wording of Section 230.10(c)

    was neglected, the intent and purpose of that section was

    satisfied. The Corps provided a lengthy and detailed evaluation

    -37-














    of the potential impacts of the landfill on groundwater supplies.

    The Corps' Hydraulics and Water Quality Branch performed an

    independent analysis of the potential impact on groundwater

    supplies and concluded that "the risk to drinking water supplies

    from the landfill is minor." In sum, the Towns' challenge under

    Section 230.10(c) fails.

    V

    Public Interest Review
    Public Interest Review
    ______________________

    Under 33 C.F.R. 320.4(a), the Corps is required to

    evaluate a permit for "the probable impacts, including cumulative

    impacts, of the proposed activity and its intended use on the

    public interest." The Towns assert that the Corps' public

    interest review was inadequate because the Corps should have

    weighed the impact of the Walpole landfill against the ultimate

    need to clean-up Boston Harbor. According to the Towns, the

    Corps should weigh the adverse impacts of the Walpole landfill

    against other sites potentially available. But this narrow

    interpretation of the public interest review is illogical since

    it asks the Corps to duplicate the "practicable alternatives"

    analysis of 40 C.F.R. 230.10(a).

    The Corps' conclusion that the MWRA's proposed project

    is not contrary to the public interest is reasonably supported in

    the administrative record. Under the "public interest" review,

    the Corps conducts a general balancing of a number of economic

    and environmental factors and its ultimate determinations are

    entitled to substantial deference. Environmental Coalition of
    ___________________________


    -38-














    Broward County, Inc. v. Myers, 831 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir.
    ______________________ _____

    1987). We must not lose sight of the fact that the 600 square

    feet to be filled has no ecological value and is isolated.

    Furthermore, the Corps conditioned the MWRA's application "to

    require maintenance of existing ground and surface water

    hydrologic regime which supports the adjacent wetlands."

    Finally, as the district court noted:

    Considering the necessity of the landfill
    in the overall clean-up project, the
    MWRA's history of difficulty in acquiring
    any site, . . . as compared with what the
    ___
    Corps determined to be insignificant
    effects on wetlands, the Corps'
    conclusion that the project is not
    contrary to the public interest was
    justified.

    Norfolk & Walpole, 772 F. Supp. at 692.
    _________________

    VI

    Communications between the Department of Justice,
    Communications between the Department of Justice,
    _________________________________________________

    EPA and the Corps
    EPA and the Corps
    _________________

    Between late December 1990 and early 1991, while the

    MWRA's application for the Section 404 permit was pending, there

    were a number of communications among officials of the Corps and

    attorneys of the Department of Justice and officials of the EPA.

    Based upon a request pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act

    ("FOIA"),32 the Towns reviewed some internal Corps documents

    which expressed opposition to the issuance of the permit and


    ____________________

    32 5 U.S.C. 552. The Freedom of Information Act creates a
    presumption that an agency must disclose all written information
    in an agency's possession, unless exempted under one of the
    exceptions of the Act.

    -39-














    which noted that these communications had occurred. The Towns

    therefore notified the keeper of the records of the United States

    Attorney for the District of Massachusetts to appear for a

    deposition and subpoenaed all documents concerning pre-permit

    communications between the EPA, the Department of Justice and the

    Corps ("defendants"). Asserting inter alia the attorney client
    _____ ____

    and work product privileges, the defendants moved to obtain a

    protective order and quash the subpoenas. The Towns maintain

    that these documents should originally have been included in the

    administrative record because they may show that the Department

    of Justice and EPA improperly pressured the Corps to issue the

    permit sought by MWRA.

    On May 13, 1991, the district court issued an order

    directing the defendants to submit the documents to the court for

    in camera inspection. The U.S. Attorney submitted 38 documents
    __ ______

    and the EPA submitted 19 documents. Assistant U.S. Attorney

    Henderson divided the documents into four categories. Category I

    consists of letters from the U.S. Attorney's Office to the Corps

    of Engineers. Category II consists of notes of communications

    between Department of Justice Attorneys or Assistant U.S.

    Attorney Henderson and Corps of Engineers officials, most of whom

    are in house counsel for the Corps. Category III consists of

    internal communications among the Department of Justice attorneys

    and the U.S. Attorney's Office. Category IV consist of a draft

    of an unsigned letter from the Corps to the MWRA dated January 4,

    1991.


    -40-














    EPA's counsel Jeffrey T. Fowley similarly divided the

    documents submitted by the EPA for in camera review into three
    __ ______

    categories. Category I consists of communications between EPA

    attorneys and Corps of Engineers personnel. Category II consists

    of communications between EPA technical personnel and Corps of

    Engineers personnel. Category III consists of documents created

    by EPA's consultant, Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. Although the Towns

    challenge the exclusion of all these documents, they first

    challenge the exclusion of the documents contained in Category II

    and III of the U.S. Attorney's submission and all of the

    documents submitted by the EPA.

    After finding that the Corps personnel had only seen

    seven of the 57 documents, the district court concluded that the

    remaining 50 documents did not belong in the administrative

    record because they were never considered by Corps personnel.

    With respect to the seven documents at issue, the district court

    concluded that all but two were not properly made part of the

    administrative record and the other two were shielded from

    discovery by the attorney-client privilege. Town of Norfolk &
    __________________

    Walpole v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 137 F.R.D. 183, 190
    _______ ______________________________

    (D. Mass. 1991).

    In an exhaustive opinion, the district court noted that

    courts may look beyond the administrative record when there is "a

    strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior before such

    inquiry may be made." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
    _______________________________________

    Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). The district court judge
    _____


    -41-














    concluded on the basis of his in camera review that the documents
    __ ______

    did not provide a showing of bad faith. Town of Norfolk &
    __________________

    Walpole, 137 F.R.D. at 189.
    _______

    The Towns argue that the district court applied the

    wrong standard (1) in excluding the fifty documents that the

    Corps never considered; (2) in excluding letters by the U.S.

    Attorney's Office to the Corps; (3) in excluding from the

    administrative record two letters which comment on the merits of

    the petition; and (4) in excluding a draft letter prepared by the

    Corps pursuant to the deliberative privilege. Alternatively, the

    Towns claim that even if these documents were properly excluded,

    the district court erred in not permitting supplementation of the

    administrative record. For the reasons that follow, we hold that

    district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the

    protective order and the motion to quash the subpoenas.

    A. Did the District Court Err in Excluding Documents Never Seen
    _____________________________________________________________

    by the Corps?
    __ _________

    The Towns argue that the test of whether information is

    part of an administrative record is whether the information was

    directly or indirectly considered by the permitting agency. They

    argue that in concluding that all but seven of the fifty seven

    documents did not belong in the administrative record because

    these documents were never seen by the Corps, the district court

    erred because it created a rule that allows administrative

    agencies to avoid "judicial review of their actions by relying on

    oral communications." Brief of Appellants at 43.


    -42-














    The Towns seem to be asserting that every document

    which reflects an oral communication with a government agency

    must be included in the administrative record, even if these

    documents are not in the possession of the agency. The fallacy

    of this argument is obvious. Were we to accept it, government

    agencies would be required to collect from all parties who had

    oral communications with the agency concerning the issue under

    consideration, all documents reflecting these communications with

    the agency and include them in the record. There is no support

    in administrative law for such a requirement and its legality is

    highly questionable.

    We have carefully reviewed the remaining fifty

    documents and conclude that these documents contain no factual or

    policy information relevant to the issuance of the permit.

    Indeed, National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 677 F. Supp.
    _____________________________ _______

    1445, 1457 (D. Mont. 1985) -- cited by the Towns in support of

    this argument -- supports the district court's decision to

    exclude the documents. In National Wildlife, the court concluded
    _________________

    that the contents of the personal files and notes of employees of

    the Department of the Interior were properly not made part of the

    administrative record. Id. at 1457. Similarly, most of the
    __

    submissions by EPA and the Justice Department consists of notes

    of the personnel of these agencies which reflect telephone

    conversations of no significance. The remaining documents --

    with a few exceptions discussed below -- consist of notes made by

    various government attorneys during telephone conversations and


    -43-














    they reflect the mental impressions and opinions of these

    attorneys.

    We therefore hold that the district court did not abuse

    its discretion in excluding these documents. We now review the

    district court's conclusion that the seven documents seen by the

    Corps' personnel did not belong in the administrative record.










































    -44-














    B. Did the District Court Err in Excluding Seven Documents Seen
    _____________________________________________________________

    by the Corps But Not Included in the Administrative Record?
    __ _______________________________________________________

    The district court concluded that seven of the

    documents were seen by the Corps and warranted separate

    consideration. Six of the documents are letters from the U.S.

    Attorney's Office to the Corps of Engineers and the seventh

    document is an unsigned draft of a letter from Colonel Phillip R.

    Harris, District Engineer for the New England Division, to

    Richard D. Fox of the MWRA.

    The district court concluded that the six letters did

    not belong in the administrative record because they did not

    contain factual statements or made policy recommendations and

    because only two of these letters commented on the merits of the

    petition. These two letters were written by Assistant U.S.

    Attorney Henderson and sent to Gary Pasternak, Assistant District

    Counsel for the Corps, and to Colonel Harris, the District

    Engineer. In both letters, Assistant U.S. Attorney Henderson

    expressed his opinion that David Killoy's memorandum of December

    24, 1990, could be withheld from public disclosure under the

    deliberative process privilege of the FOIA. Assistant U.S.

    Attorney Henderson expressed his view that the Killoy memorandum

    was a deliberative document and that its analysis was "faulty."

    The district concluded that it was "highly unlikely

    that the Corps of Engineers would have relied on this statement

    in deciding the permit question," since the letter provided "no

    legal, factual, or policy reason for this conclusory statement,


    -45-














    and the statement was made only to support the U.S. Attorney's

    position that the memoranda were 'deliberative.'" Alternatively,

    the district court held that these letters were protected from

    disclosure under the attorney-client privilege.

    The district court's action is fully supportable. A

    person asserting the attorney-client privilege with respect to a

    document provided by an attorney has the burden of showing four

    elements:

    (1) that he was or sought to be a client
    of [the attorney]; (2) that [the
    attorney] in connection with the
    [document] acted as a lawyer; (3) that
    the [document] relates to facts
    communicated for the purpose of securing
    a legal opinion, legal services or
    assistance in a legal proceeding; and (4)
    that the privilege has not been waived.

    United States v. Bay State Ambulance and Hosp. Rental Service,
    ______________ _______________________________________________

    Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing United States v.
    ____ _____________

    Wilson, 798 F.2d 509, 512 (1st Cir. 1986)).
    ______

    At the time these six letters were written -- from January

    to February of 1991 -- the Towns had brought several suits to

    attempt to overturn the decision to place the landfill in

    Walpole. The Towns had (1) filed suit in state court challenging

    the state environmental review process; (2) filed a motion to

    intervene in a suit filed by the United States seeking an order

    from the district court to transfer the Walpole site from the

    Department of Corrections to the MWRA; and (3) filed suit in the

    district court challenging EPA's review of the landfill selection




    -46-














    under the National Environmental Policy Act.33 Clearly, the

    Towns had made every effort to overturn the decision to locate

    the landfill in Walpole and it was reasonable for the Corps and

    the U.S. Attorney to anticipate litigation over the Corps permit

    decision. As the district court found:

    An attorney-client relationship exists
    between the Corps of Engineers and the
    U.S. Attorney in connection with
    anticipated litigation. See 28 U.S.C.
    ___
    516-519 (plenary authority of Attorney
    General and Department of Justice to
    conduct and direct litigation involving
    the United States or its agencies); see
    ___
    also 5 U.S.C. 3106 (heads of executive
    ____
    and military departments to refer
    litigation to Justice Department). The
    [six] letters reveal that the U.S.
    Attorney was acting as a lawyer and was
    engaged in giving the Corps legal advice
    with respect to reasonably anticipated
    litigation (that is, the instant case).
    All the letters begin with the heading,
    "ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION,
    PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL," and there
    is no indication that these
    communications were disclosed to third
    parties.

    Id. at 190.
    __

    The Corps has met each of the elements required to

    assert the attorney-client privilege. The Corps was a client of

    the U.S. Attorney. The letters were from the U.S. Attorney to

    its client and by the content of the letters, it is clear that

    they "relate to facts communicated for the purpose of securing a

    legal opinion, legal services or assistance in a legal

    proceeding." Bay State Ambulance and Hosp. Rental Serv., 874
    _____________________________________________


    ____________________

    33 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.
    __ ___

    -47-














    F.2d at 28. Finally, the Corps has not waived the privilege.

    Although there may be an unusual and extraordinary

    circumstance where a document protected by the attorney-client

    privilege should be made part of the administrative record, this

    is clearly not the case.

    B. Did the District Court Err in Excluding as Deliberative a
    ____________________________________________________________

    Draft Letter Prepared by the Corps?
    _____ ____________________________

    The district court concluded that an unsigned draft of

    a letter from Colonel Phillip R. Harris, District Engineer for

    the New England Division to Richard D. Fox of the MWRA was

    protected by the deliberative process privilege.

    The deliberative process privilege protects the

    internal deliberations of an agency in order to prevent "injury

    to the quality of agency decisions." NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &
    ____ ________________

    Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 (1975). Two requirements must be met
    ___

    before the government may properly withhold a document from

    disclosure. Nadler v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 955 F.2d 1479,
    ______ _______________________

    1490-91 (11th Cir. 1992). First, the document must be prepared

    prior to a final decision "in order to assist an agency

    decisionmaker in arriving at his decision." Id. at 1491 (citing
    __

    Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 421 U.S. 168,
    _________________ ____________________________

    184 (1975)). Second, the document must be "a direct part of the

    deliberative process in that it makes recommendations or

    expresses opinions on legal or policy matters." Id. (citing
    __

    Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
    ______ _____

    Furthermore, factual information that may be segregated from the


    -48-














    rest of the document is not protected by the privilege. 5 U.S.C.

    552(b); Nadler, 955 F.2d at 1491; Hopkins v. U.S. Dept. of
    ______ _______ ______________

    Housing & Urban Dev., 929 F.2d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 1991).
    ____________________

    The document at issue here is an unsigned draft letter

    from Colonel Harris, dated January 4, 1991, to Richard Fox of the

    MWRA informing the MWRA that the Corps would not be able to issue

    a permit for the Walpole landfill "by the end of January

    deadline" and setting forth two options to "stay on the court

    mandated schedule" for the Boston Harbor cleanup project. The

    draft letter has no factual information and it reflects a

    preliminary position by the Corps that was subsequently rejected.

    Accordingly, the draft letter is clearly protected from

    disclosure by the deliberate process privilege.

    C. Did the District Court Err in Not Permitting Supplementation
    ____________________________________________________________

    of the Record?
    __ __________

    The Towns seek to include the 57 documents in the

    administrative record based on the assertion that the Department

    of Justice and the EPA secretly and improperly "pressured" the

    Corps to issue the permit. The district court examined the

    documents in camera and concluded the they did not demonstrate
    __ ______

    bad faith or improper behavior to warrant ordering the

    supplementation of the administrative record.

    The basis for our review of the permit decision here

    is the administrative record. Florida Power & Light Co. v.
    ____________________________

    Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44 (1985); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138,
    ______ ____ _____

    142 (1973); Friends of the Earth, 800 F.2d at 829. Courts
    ______________________


    -49-














    require a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior before

    ordering the supplementation of the administrative record.

    Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
    _________________________________________ _____

    (1971); Havasupai Tribe v. Robertson, 943 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir.
    _______________ _________

    1991).

    Citing D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d
    ____________________________ _____

    1231, 1249 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972), the
    ____ ______

    Towns asserts that the district court erred in concluding that

    there was no improper behavior here, particularly given the ex
    __

    parte high level discussions among executive branch officials.
    _____

    We think that the Towns' exaggerate the reach of Volpe.
    _____

    Volpe does not dilute the requirement of making a
    _____

    strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior before

    supplementing the record. In Volpe, a divided panel of the
    _____

    District of Columbia Circuit held that the Secretary of

    Transportation had failed to comply with the statutory

    requirements and other provisions applicable to federal funded

    highway projects in approving construction of a bridge across the

    Potomac. The defects in the Secretary's decision in Volpe were
    _____

    colossal, including his failure to compile an administrative

    record or to make formal findings and his approval of the bridge

    project prior to the finalization of the plans for the

    bridge.34 The evidence in Volpe also showed that the Chairman
    _____

    ____________________

    34 These facts are in sharp contrasts with the MWRA's
    application, which among other measures, spent more than $10
    million on the site selection process and obtained the necessary
    environmental approvals from state and federal authorities. See
    ___
    United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Com'n, 930 F.2d 132, 134 (1st
    _____________ ________________________

    -50-














    of the Subcommittee on the District of Columbia of the House

    Appropriations Committee publicly pressured the Secretary by

    threatening to withhold funds for the District's rapid transit

    system unless the bridge project was approved. Two judges held

    that the Secretary of Transportation's decision would be invalid

    if based in whole or in part on "political pressure." Id. at
    __

    1246.35

    Our review of the in camera submission supports the
    __ ______

    district court's conclusion that there is no evidence here to

    suggest that "political pressure" or any kind of unseemly

    influence, in whole or in part, affected the Corps' permitting

    process. In this case, the Corps has presented a detailed Record

    of Decision and it is reasonably supported by the administrative

    record. It shows that the Corps based its decision on the

    factors relevant to determining whether the MWRA's permit

    application complied with the Section 404 Guidelines and whether

    issuance of the permit would be in the public interest.

    The Towns claim inter alia that "Volpe stands for the
    _____ ____ _____

    proposition that if other litigation [involving the United

    States] or the Boston Harbor clean-up project" were considered by

    the Corps in issuing the permit, the decision must be vacated and


    ____________________

    Cir. 1991).

    35 A different majority of two judges, however, concluded that
    the district court had not found that "political pressure" had
    influenced the Secretary's decision. Significantly, only one
    judge in the panel found that the district court had held that
    "extraneous pressure" had coerced the Secretary to approve the
    bridge project. Id. at 1246.
    __

    -51-














    remanded. Although this interpretation of Volpe seems
    _____

    questionable, we need not conclusively determine its soundness

    since none of the documents submitted for in camera review show
    __ ______

    any indication of impropriety by the United States or that the

    position of the United States in other litigation was considered

    by the Corps in its permitting process. The Towns have not

    presented any evidence that the fact that the U.S. Attorney's

    Office represented the Corps and the EPA was a factor considered

    in the permitting process. The Justice Department has the sole

    responsibility for representing executive branch agencies in

    litigation. The Supreme Court has recognized that the main

    purposes of centralizing litigation responsibility in the Justice

    Department is to assure that the United States should speak with

    one voice "that reflects not the parochial interests of a

    particular agency, but the common interests of the Government and

    therefore of all the people." United States v. Providence
    ______________ __________

    Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 706 (1988).
    ___________

    Finally, we have examined the in camera submission and
    __ ______

    conclude that adding these submissions to the record would serve

    no purpose. The Killoy memoranda explained in sufficient details

    the internal Corps opposition to the issuance of the permit. The

    Towns have not cited precedent -- nor have we found any --

    indicating that a district court should allow supplementation of

    an administrative record with information which is already

    properly documented in the administrative record.

    D. Whether the District Court Judge Erred in Denying the Towns'
    ____________________________________________________________


    -52-














    Motion for His Disqualification?
    _______________________________

    During the proceedings below, the Towns moved pursuant

    to 28 U.S.C. 455(a) to excuse Judge Mazzone. Section 455(a)

    provides that a judge "shall disqualify himself in any proceeding

    in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Judge

    Mazzone denied the Towns' motion for his disqualification finding

    no basis for it since "[t]he record in this case is lengthy, and,

    as both sides point out, there are occasions when my rulings and

    orders, or remarks from the bench in connection with a ruling,

    have evoked disappointment from the litigants." Memorandum Order
    ________________

    of May 21, 1991.

    The issue of disqualification in this Circuit turns on

    whether the charge of lack of
    impartiality is grounded on facts that
    would create a reasonable doubt
    concerning the judge's impartiality, not
    in the mind of the judge himself or even
    necessarily in the mind of the litigant
    filing the motion under 28 U.S.C. 455,
    but rather in the mind of a reasonable
    man.

    United States v. Arache, 946 F.2d 129, 140 (1st Cir. 1991)
    ______________ ______

    (citing United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 265 (1st Cir.
    _____________ ______

    1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 909 (1977)), cert. denied, 112 S.
    ____ ______ ____ ______

    Ct. 1507 (1992). We review Judge Mazzone's denial of the Towns'

    motion for his recusal under the abuse of discretion standard.

    United States v. L pez, 944 F.2d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 1991); Camacho
    _____________ _____ _______

    v. Autoridad de Tel fonos de Puerto Rico, 868 F.2d 482, 490 (1st
    ______________________________________

    Cir. 1989).

    Judge Mazzone made several statements in the course of


    -53-














    the Boston Harbor litigation which the Towns assert would cause a

    reasonable person to question his impartiality. The first

    statement was made on July 2, 1990, when Judge Mazzone denied a

    request by the United States for an order requiring the MWRA to

    commence the planning of an alternative landfill since the

    Massachusetts legislature had decided to postpone voting on the

    transfer of Walpole site from the Department of Corrections to

    the MWRA until December 5, 1990. Instead, Judge Mazzone chose

    to wait until after the December 5, 1990, vote in the

    Massachusetts legislature. The judge, however, made the

    following comment:

    At the same time, I am mindful of the
    high risk that attends my decision to
    forego action until December 5, 1990. At
    stake is the credibility of the Court's
    schedule and the public's faith in the
    integrity of the entire project. In the
    event that necessary legislation has not
    been approved by that date and that
    slippage in the schedule results from the
    paralysis surrounding the siting issue, I
    will entertain and intend to grant a
    motion for sanctions designed to ensure
    immediate resolution of the matter.

    It is true that Judge Mazzone's comments, viewed in isolation,

    might require further scrutiny. However, given the context in

    which these comments were made, we conclude that they at most

    indicate that Judge Mazzone was irritated at the snail's pace in

    which the Commonwealth was moving to fully comply with the

    district court's plan to clean up Boston Harbor. In fact, Judge

    Mazzone made the statement as a background comment to his denial
    ______

    of a request by the United States for stricter compliance with


    -54-














    the court's mandated schedule. In this sense Judge Mazzone's

    comments -- to the effect that the Commonwealth was placed in

    actual notice that he would not tolerate further unjustified

    delays -- were eminently reasonable.

    Furthermore, the historical context on which these

    comments were made is significant. For more than five years,

    Judge Mazzone has overseen and continues to oversee the project

    to induce the Commonwealth and its agencies to comply with

    federal law by cleaning up Boston Harbor. Back in 1985, Judge

    Mazzone found the Commonwealth and the MWRA liable for violations

    of a permit issued under the provisions of the National Pollution

    Discharge Elimination System.36 These violations continue

    today.

    The second statement which the Towns claim amounts to

    specific behavior which reasonably calls into question Judge

    Mazzone impartiality is found in an Order entered after the

    Massachusetts legislature voted against the transfer of Walpole

    from the Department to the MWRA. The legislature voted against

    the transfer on December 6, 1990, and shortly thereafter, the

    United States filed a motion before Judge Mazzone to compel the

    transfer of the Walpole site to the MWRA or for sanctions.

    On February 25, 1991, Judge Mazzone granted the United

    States' motion by imposing a moratorium on any new sewer

    connections to MWRA's system. In response to an argument by the


    ____________________

    36 See generally United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 23
    ___ _________ _____________ _________________________
    Env't Rep. Cas. 1350 (D. Mass. 1985).

    -55-














    Commonwealth to the effect that any action by the district court

    would be premature, Judge Mazzone stated:

    First the statement that the schedule is
    not yet in severe jeopardy is true only
    if one assumes that the landfill will
    ultimately be located at the Walpole
    site. If I must eventually order the
    Commonwealth to effect the transfer, I
    can delay doing so for some time,
    although I do not believe that court
    action can wait as long as September,
    1992. But if the Walpole site, for which
    much of the requisite studying, planning,
    and testing has already been completed,
    is not to be the ultimate site for the
    ___
    landfill, then another site must be
    selected immediately if there is to be
    ___________
    any chance of beginning construction as
    planned. In fact, given the need to
    complete state and federal environmental
    impact reports for any new site, it may
    already be too late. It is therefore my
    conclusion that there is now a real and
    imminent threat to the schedule.

    While that statement indicates that Judge Mazzone wanted a

    landfill site to be selected right away, and his concern that

    only the Walpole site was sufficiently advanced to meet the

    court's schedule, it does not indicate a preference for Walpole

    per se so long as some other suitable site was expeditiously
    ___ __

    chosen. These statements simply show that Judge Mazzone was

    weighing the factors to take into account in determining an

    appropriate sanction to bring the Commonwealth into compliance

    with the scheduling order. Indeed, the statement reveals Judge

    Mazzone's awareness of the distinct possibility that at the end

    of the site selection process, Walpole might not be the site for

    the landfill.

    The Towns also claim that Judge Mazzone prejudged the

    -56-














    issues in this case because he stated that the Walpole site "was

    exhaustively reviewed and approved by the EPA, the MWRA and the

    Army Corps of Engineers . . .," a month after the complaint in

    this case was filed and before the defendants had answered it.

    Additionally, in one of the regularly issued compliance orders,

    dated March 1, 1991, Judge Mazzone stated:

    I have reviewed the record of decision
    attached to the permit, and note the
    Corps finding that the siting process for
    the Walpole-MCI [landfill] was
    satisfactory under both NEPA and
    404(b)(1) guidelines.

    We find nothing here which rises to the level of partiality

    needed to compel recusal. If one considers that the MWRA spent

    more than $10 million in the site selection process, that the EPA

    closely monitored the MWRA site selection process and that the

    Corps issued a extensive Record of Decision supported by the

    administrative record, it seems more than reasonable to conclude

    that the site selection process was "exhaustively reviewed." And

    no reasonable person could conclude that merely noting that the

    Corps had reached a determination under the 404 Guidelines shows

    that Judge Mazzone was biased. In short, the statements of Judge

    Mazzone which the Towns claim would cause a reasonable person to

    question the impartiality of Judge Mazzone are statements which

    in our opinion state the obvious, and reflect common sense.

    Given the context in which these remarks were made and their

    substance, we hold that Towns have failed to show that Judge

    Mazzone committed an abuse of discretion in denying their motion

    for his disqualification.

    -57-














    Finally, the Towns claim that since Judge Mazzone has

    overseen compliance with the administration of the scheduling

    plan to clean up Boston Harbor, his sitting over the adversarial

    aspects of the case, including this Section 404 case, gives rise

    to an appearance of partiality requiring disqualification. Since

    Judge Mazzone has required strict compliance with the compliance

    plan -- including ordering a sewer moratorium to compel the

    Legislature to transfer the Walpole site -- and the Towns'

    challenge to the Section 404 permitting process represents a

    threat to the schedule, they contend a reasonable person would

    question the ability of Judge Mazzone to preside over the Section

    404 case. There is a difference, however, between the real

    appearance of bias, and the fact that a judge is sometimes

    required to act against the backdrop of official positions he

    took in other related cases. A judge cannot be replaced every

    time a case presents an issue with which the judge's prior

    official decisions and positions may have a connection. This

    Circuit has made clear that "[o]ur system of justices does not

    require that judges be empty vessels, wholly ignorant of all of

    the antecedents of a case." Camacho, 868 F.2d at 490. The Towns
    _______

    have made no showing that Judge Mazzone's actions in the Boston

    Harbor cleanup litigation personally placed him in a position in

    which he would have been constrained to decide the Section 404

    case in favor of the Corps. There were other options compatible

    with continuing the Boston Harbor cleanup if the Walpole site

    proved unsatisfactory. We are unwilling to assume that a


    -58-














    district judge -- of whom there is no question whatever of any

    personal or improper interest -- would be so overcome by concerns

    in the Boston Harbor cleanup case as to unable to render a just

    and professional decision in this one.

    Judge Mazzone carefully considered the merits of the

    Towns' challenge to the Section 404 permitting process. He

    rejected the Corps' position that groundwater effects did not

    have to be considered under 40 C.F.R. 230.10(c). The fact that

    Judge Mazzone presided over other cases arising from the effort

    to clean up Boston Harbor makes him arguably the most qualified

    judge to preside over this case since his expertise in the legal

    aspects of the Boston Harbor cleanup, will result in a more just

    and efficient resolution of the issues in cases relating to the

    Boston Harbor cleanup effort. See, e.g., In Re Allied-Signal
    ___ ____ ____________________

    Inc., 891 F.2d 967, 972 (1st Cir. 1989); cert. denied, 495 U.S.
    ____ ____ ______

    957 (1990). While it is obvious that a judge's prior orders

    might place him or her in a position that would lead a reasonable

    person to question whether he or she would remain impartial in a

    subsequent proceeding, see, e.g., United States v. Chantal, 902
    ___ ____ _____________ _______

    F.2d 1018 (1st Cir. 1990) (sentencing judge's views that

    defendant was an "unreconstructed drug trafficker" might lead a

    reasonable person to question the judge's impartiality in a

    subsequent sentencing proceeding), we do not find this to be such

    a case. L pez, 944 F.2d at 37 (minimal factual basis required
    _____

    for an inference of impartiality) (citing United States v.
    ______________

    Giorgi, 840 F.2d 1022, 1036 (1st Cir. 1988). We add that had
    ______


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    another judge been assigned to this case, he or she would plainly

    not have viewed Walpole's case in a vacuum. That judge would

    have learned of the Boston Harbor cleanup schedule and would have

    been exposed to whatever additional concerns compliance with that

    schedule imposed here.

    This last point requires us to further comment.

    Although parties are not to be discouraged or castigated in the

    pursuit of good faith challenges to the impartiality of a

    particular judge or judges, neither should such action be taken

    lightly or without foundation, merely as another tactical weapon

    in the arsenal of trial strategy. While we understand

    appellant's feelings, we hold that the disqualification motion in

    this case was totally without a basis in fact or law.

    VI

    In conclusion, we find that the Corps properly applied

    its Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines and properly concluded that the

    landfill was not contrary to the public interest. The district

    court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the defendants'

    motion to quash the subpoena and protective order and denying the

    Towns' motion for the judge's disqualification.

    Affirmed.
    ________












    -60-







Document Info

Docket Number: 91-2215

Filed Date: 7/15/1992

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015

Authorities (27)

United States v. Jerome Fleet Cowden , 545 F.2d 257 ( 1976 )

United States v. Edgardo Giorgi, United States of America v.... , 840 F.2d 1022 ( 1988 )

Isaac Camacho v. Autoridad De Telefonos De Puerto Rico , 868 F.2d 482 ( 1989 )

United States v. Frank Arache , 946 F.2d 129 ( 1991 )

25-socsecrepser-443-medicaremedicaid-gu-37849-28-fed-r-evid , 874 F.2d 20 ( 1989 )

In Re Allied-Signal Inc. , 891 F.2d 967 ( 1989 )

Exxon Corporation v. Russell E. Train and Jack E. Ravan , 554 F.2d 1310 ( 1977 )

John Buttrey and John Buttrey Developments, Inc. v. United ... , 690 F.2d 1170 ( 1982 )

Joseph M. Nadler v. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal ... , 955 F.2d 1479 ( 1992 )

environmental-coalition-of-broward-county-inc-v-charles-t-myers-iii , 831 F.2d 984 ( 1987 )

United States v. Christian Lopez , 944 F.2d 33 ( 1991 )

john-a-bersani-newport-galleria-group-robert-j-congel-and-the-pyramid , 850 F.2d 36 ( 1988 )

thomas-g-hopkins-as-president-of-local-17-of-the-international-union-of , 929 F.2d 81 ( 1991 )

United States v. William H. Wilson, Jr. , 798 F.2d 509 ( 1986 )

John A. Volpe v. D. C. Federation of Civic Associations , 405 U.S. 1030 ( 1972 )

Inland Steel Company and Bethlehem Steel Corporation v. ... , 901 F.2d 1419 ( 1990 )

Camp v. Pitts , 93 S. Ct. 1241 ( 1973 )

National Labor Relations Board v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 95 S. Ct. 1504 ( 1975 )

United States v. Metropolitan District Commission , 757 F. Supp. 121 ( 1991 )

Towns of Norfolk & Walpole v. United States Army Corps of ... , 772 F. Supp. 680 ( 1991 )

View All Authorities »