-
USCA1 Opinion
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
____________________
No. 92-1307
ISAAC AYCOX,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
BROOKE HOUSE, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
____________________
Before
Breyer, Chief Judge,
___________
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
____________________
and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
_____________
____________________
Isaac Aycox on brief pro se.
___________
Howard A. Brick, Cynthia O. Hamilton, Donald K. Stern, Daniel P.
_______________ ____________________ _______________ __________
Tighe, and Hale and Dorr, on Memorandum in Support of Motion for
_____ ______________
Summary Disposition, for appellees.
____________________
August 26, 1992
____________________
Per Curiam. Pro se inmate Isaac Aycox appeals from
__________
a district court judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. 1983
complaint against Brooke House, a Massachusetts halfway
house, and its director, Andy McDonald. The district court
ruled that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted and simultaneously denied the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
I.
_
We recite only those facts relevant to the issues
on appeal. In 1976, plaintiff was convicted of armed robbery
and sentenced to ten to twenty years' imprisonment. He was
transferred to Brooke House in September 1988. Plaintiff
alleged that he was deceived into signing a "Community
Release Agreement" in connection with this transfer. On
October 2, 1988, while "on furlough" from Brooke House,
plaintiff went to visit his fiancee in Springfield,
Massachusetts and found her with another man. An altercation
ensued. Plaintiff was arrested and arraigned in Springfield
district court on the following day. He was then taken to
the Massachusetts Correction Institute (M.C.I.) at Cedar
Junction, a maximum security prison. On or about October 6,
1988, plaintiff received disciplinary reports from Brooke
House which charged him with violating "'prison institutional
and disciplinary rules and regulations'" as a result of his
conduct in Springfield on October 2-3, 1988. Plaintiff
-3-
alleges that these reports fraudulently identified Brooke
House as one of the DOC's "Contact Pre-release Programs."
Plaintiff claimed that Brooke House had no authority to issue
disciplinary reports against him and, as a result of these
reports, plaintiff's "rights to parole release" have been
adversely affected. Plaintiff sought compensatory and
punitive damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive
relief.1
On August 23, 1989, Brooke House and McDonald moved
to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
They argued that the complaint failed to state a claim
because Massachusetts law authorized Brooke House to issue
disciplinary reports and because the complaint wholly failed
to allege any facts with respect to McDonald. Plaintiff did
not oppose this motion. On January 23, 1990, plaintiff
appeared for a scheduling conference before a magistrate
judge (magistrate), who set October 31, 1990 as a discovery
deadline. After plaintiff filed interrogatories and a
request for protection of documents, the defendants moved to
stay all discovery and requested an expedited ruling on their
motion to dismiss. Plaintiff opposed this motion by filing a
____________________
1. The complaint also named three "program pre-release
officers" as defendants (i.e., Bernard Menendez, Karen
Posnick, and Douglas Davis), but it failed to allege any
facts as to how these defendants deprived plaintiff of any
federal rights. The district court allowed motions to
dismiss on behalf of these defendants on August 11, 1989.
Plaintiff does not attack this ruling on appeal.
-4-
"Motion to Set Aside Motion for Stay." Without alleging any
facts, this motion argued that McDonald should not be
dismissed for the same reason that the other individual
defendants were dismissed. On November 11, 1990, plaintiff
filed a motion for summary judgment and a supporting
affidavit. The latter averred that "the Commonwealth
subjected me to lost (sic) of liberty and freedom in
violation of due process of law." In contrast to the
allegations in his complaint, the plaintiff's affidavit
claimed that he was not "on furlough" on October 2, 1988, but
rather, that he was free on a "24 hour pass." Plaintiff
complained that because Brooke House reported that he was "on
furlough" on October 2, 1988, the DOC confiscated all of his
good time credits and plaintiff was prosecuted as a habitual
offender for the events of October 2-3, 1988. As a result,
he is now serving a mandatory ten-year sentence.
On July 2, 1991, the district court referred the
motion to dismiss, the motion for summary judgment, and all
discovery-related motions to the magistrate for a report and
recommendation.2 On July 18, 1991, the magistrate issued a
report which recommended that the defendants' motion to
dismiss be allowed because the complaint failed to indicate
____________________
2. Plaintiff filed an "Objection to the Wording" of the
order referring the aforementioned motions to the magistrate
which argued that the motion to dismiss should not be allowed
since the defendants had not produced documents nor opposed
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
-5-
that Brooke House deprived plaintiff of liberty without due
process and further failed to allege any facts regarding
McDonald. Plaintiff filed timely objections to the
magistrate's report which reiterated that Brooke House did
not have legal authority to issue disciplinary reports and
that Brooke House caused plaintiff to forfeit all his good
time credits by holding themselves out as a correctional
facility. Plaintiff further objected on the ground that he
never received a copy of the defendants' motion to dismiss.
The district court adopted the magistrate's report. On
October 29, 1991, the court allowed the defendants' motion to
dismiss and denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.
II.
__
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the district court
erred in denying his motion for summary judgment because the
defendants falsely represented that Brooke House had
authority to issue disciplinary reports under M.G.L. c.127,
49. Plaintiff also argues that the court should not have
allowed the defendants' motion to dismiss because he never
received a copy of it. We reject both contentions.
Plaintiffs' challenge to Brooke House's authority
to issue disciplinary reports is specious. In Lanier v.
______
Fair, 876 F.2d 243, 244-45 (1st Cir. 1989), this court
____
recognized this very facility as a "minimum security halfway
-6-
house . . . that operate[s] under the auspices of
Massachusetts Halfway House, Inc. and the Department of
Correction (DOC)." Plaintiff acknowledged that he signed a
community release agreement upon entering Brooke House. We
take notice that when plaintiff entered Brooke House in 1988,
such agreements typically provided that "Community Release
Programs are an extension of the confines of the institution"
and inmates like the plaintiff agreed that "all [DOC] rules
and regulations will be in effect throughout my community
release time." See 103 C.M.R. 465.21, Exhibit C (effective
___
March 20, 1987). Massachusetts G.L. c.127, 49 further
provides that an inmate who participates in educational,
training and employment programs outside correctional
facilities "shall remain subject to the rules and regulations
of the correctional facility. . . . " It is beyond
peradventure that plaintiff remained subject to the DOC's
rules while he resided at Brooke House and that Brooke House
therefore had authority to issue disciplinary reports
charging him with violations of these rules. Plaintiff's
challenge to Brooke House's authority to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against him fails to state a viable
claim for relief.3
____________________
3. On appeal, plaintiff argues that his allegations against
Brooke House should be read to include its director, Andy
McDonald. Even if we do so, the complaint still falls short.
As the allegations against Brooke House are specious, they
remain specious even when read against McDonald.
-7-
To be sure, we have recognized that inmates such as
Lanier have a liberty interest in remaining at Brooke House
______
that is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. Such
inmates may not be returned to higher custody absent due
process. See 876 F.2d at 246-250. But the instant complaint
___
does not allege sufficient facts to suggest that plaintiff
did not receive due process. Rather, from all that appears
in the complaint, plaintiff received notice of the charges
against him when he received the disciplinary reports from
Brooke House on October 6, 1988. Apart from the general
allegation that plaintiff's parole was "adversely affected,"
what followed is unpled and, therefore, unknown. "It is not
enough to allege a general scenario which could be dominated
by unpleaded facts. . . . " Dewey v. University of New
_____ __________________
Hampshire, 694 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1982). Even a pro se
_________
prisoner's complaint must set forth "minimal facts . . . as
to who did what to whom and why." Id. The instant complaint
___
raised only a baseless technical challenge to Brooke House's
authority to issue disciplinary reports. It did not allege
any facts showing that the events surrounding plaintiff's
return to higher custody and prosecution violated plaintiff's
constitutional rights. Dismissal of the complaint against
-8-
both Brooke House and McDonald for failure to state a claim
was therefore proper.4
We further reject plaintiff's unsworn claim that
this dismissal was not fair because he never received a copy
of the defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiff's brief
indicates that he learned that the motion had been filed at
least as early as the January 23, 1990 scheduling conference.
During the twenty-two months that elapsed between this
conference and the dismissal of the complaint, plaintiff
filed several documents with the court which indicated that
he had knowledge of the substance of the defendants' motion.
For example, plaintiff's opposition to the defendants' motion
to stay discovery effectively argued that McDonald should not
be dismissed because the complaint failed to set forth any
facts against him. If plaintiff did not have a copy of the
motion itself, he should have raised this before the
magistrate issued her recommendation. Moreover, the
magistrate's report afforded plaintiff sufficient notice of
the shortcomings in his complaint. His failure to come
____________________
4. Similarly, while inmates may have a protected liberty
interest in their reserve parole dates under Massachusetts
law, see Lanier, 876 F.2d at 253, as well as a protected
___ ______
interest in good time credits, see Nelson v. Commissioner of
___ ______ _______________
Correction, 390 Mass. 379, 388-89 (1983), neither the
__________
complaint nor plaintiff's summary judgment filings describe
any conduct by Brooke House or McDonald which suggests that
these defendants violated plaintiff's right to due process by
instituting disciplinary proceedings that resulted in the
loss of these rights.
-9-
forward with additional facts supporting his claims in
response to the magistrate's report persuades us that
dismissal remained proper even if plaintiff did not receive
the motion to dismiss. See Purvis v. Ponte, 929 F.2d 822,
___ ______ _____
826-27 (1st Cir. 1991) (affirming dismissal for failure to
state a claim where magistrate's report notified plaintiff of
complaint's deficiencies).
Judgment affirmed.
_________________
-10-
Document Info
Docket Number： 92-1307
Filed Date： 8/26/1992
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/21/2015