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USCA1 Opinion
February 11, 1993 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 92-2060
ALFONSO SERRANO-PEREZ AND LUZ DE DIEGO-R OS,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
FMC CORPORATION, MONSANTO COMPANY, AND ICI AMERICAS, INC.,
Defendants, Appellees.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Breyer, Chief Judge,
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Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
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and Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge.
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Raymond Rivera-Esteves, with whom Juan A. Hernandez-Rivera
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was on brief, for appellants.
Jorge Luis-Cordova, with whom Rivera, Tulla & Ferrer was on
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brief, for ICI Americas, Inc., appellee.
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February 11, 1993
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BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-
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appellants raise two issues on appeal: (1) whether the
district court properly granted summary judgment for
defendant-appellee because of lack of evidence of causation;
and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in
denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the summary
judgment. We affirm the district court on both issues.
I.
I.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS
THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS
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On November 14, 1990, the plaintiffs, father and
mother of Carlos Serrano de Diego, filed a complaint against
defendant-appellee, ICI Americas, Inc., ("ICI") and others.
There has been no appeal as to the other defendants. The
complaint states that it is "based on negligence in failure
to adequately warn and strict liability." It alleges that
plaintiffs' son, Carlos, was a farm worker for ten years and
as such was required to come into contact with "chemicals
and/or agricultural products" manufactured by the defendants.
The complaint states that the chemicals and/or agricultural
products with which Carlos Serrano came in contact "are
unknown at this time." The complaint alleges that as a
result of coming in contact with the chemicals and
agricultural products manufactured by defendants, Carlos
Serrano developed "an aplastic anemia that culminated in his
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death" on January 4, 1990. Damages of three million dollars
were sought.
In its answer, ICI admitted that it manufactures
and sells agricultural chemical products and conducted
business in Puerto Rico. It specified that it manufactured
and sold agricultural products under the trade name Gramaxone
from 1985 to 1987.
On August 2, 1991, the district court ordered that
discovery be concluded by December 31, 1991. A deadline was
set for the disclosure of expert witnesses. On September 26,
1991, all parties brought a joint motion requesting an
extension of the discovery cut-off date to March 31, 1992.
The court responded in October of 1991 by granting a
discovery extension to February 5, 1992. Trial was set for
May 11, 1992.
On April 28, 1992, the court granted defendants'
motions for summary judgment. On May 13 plaintiffs filed a
motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment; it was
denied on August 4, 1992.
II.
II.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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We review a summary judgment de novo. We read the
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record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. E.H.
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Ashley & Co. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Services, 907 F.2d 1274,
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1277 (1st Cir. 1990). Summary judgment is mandated "if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "[S]ummary judgment
will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is
'genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
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Under Rule 56(e):
. . . When a motion for summary judgment
is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of the
adverse party's pleading, but the adverse
party's response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial. If the
adverse party does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall
be entered against the adverse party.
"The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of
the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
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. . . In our view, the plain language of
Rule 56(e) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for
discovery and upon motion, against a
party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party's
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case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
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In its opinion and order granting summary judgment
for the defendants the court noted that defendants presented
the testimony of six expert witnesses to the effect that
there was no causal connection between any of defendants'
pesticides and aplastic anemia. Defendants also submitted
medical literature to the court showing that there was no
causal link between aplastic anemia and defendants'
pesticides. The court further found that plaintiffs had not
presented any expert testimony indicating that defendants'
pesticides caused aplastic anemia.
We have scoured the record thoroughly, including
statements in Carlos Serrano's hospital records that were
excluded by the district court, and have found nothing that
would engender a genuine issue of material fact.1 There was
no expert testimony or medical literature offered by
plaintiffs tending to establish a causal link between
defendants' pesticides and aplastic anemia. It is true that
the excluded hospital records indicated a link between
pesticides and Carlos Serrano's illness. But there was no
evidence that any of the pesticides manufactured by the
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1 We do not intimate that the district court erred in
excluding the portions of the hospital records offered in
evidence.
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defendants could have caused aplastic anemia. More to the
point, there was no evidence offered by plaintiffs
implicating Gramaxone, which was manufactured by the sole
remaining defendant - ICI Americas, Inc. - as a causative
agent of aplastic anemia. The district court concluded its
summary judgment order as follows:
Plaintiffs in this case have offered
no evidence, no expert testimony, and no
epidemiological data that would prove
that defendants' insecticides caused
Serrano's aplastic anemia. Nor have they
submitted evidence that defendants'
insecticides can cause aplastic anemia at
all. Plaintiffs have failed to set forth
any specific facts that show a genuine
triable issue as to the causation of
Serrano's illness.
After reviewing the record carefully in the light
most favorable to plaintiffs-appellants, we are constrained
to agree. The summary judgment is affirmed.
III.
III.
DENIAL OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
DENIAL OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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In denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration
of the summary judgment, the district court stated:
On April 28, 1992, the Court granted
defendants' motions for summary judgment
on the grounds that plaintiffs had failed
to present evidence that defendants'
insecticides caused the decedent's
aplastic anemia. Plaintiffs now move
for reconsideration on the grounds that
they have obtained the services of an
expert who has stated that there may be a
link between defendants' products and
aplastic anemia.
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This case was filed in November
1990. In October of 1991, the Court
granted the parties until February 5,
1992 to conclude discovery. The
defendants point out, and plaintiffs
admit as much in their motion, that they
were not noticed of this expert until
April 24, 1992, more than two months
after the discovery deadline. Discovery
deadlines are necessary for the proper
management of cases. See Thibeault v.
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Square D Co., 960 F.2d 239, 247 n.7 (1st
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Cir. 1992). Because plaintiffs' expert
was secured after the discovery deadline,
the Court denies the motion to reconsider
denies
based on their expert's testimony.
On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the district court abused
its discretion in denying their motion. We disagree.
The district courts are necessarily afforded
substantial discretion in ruling on motions for
reconsideration. See Mackin v. City of Boston, 969 F.2d
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1273, 1279 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3314
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(1993); Weinberger v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d
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518, 528 (1st Cir. 1991); see also Appeal of Sun Pipe Line
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Co., 831 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
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1055 (1988). Substantial discretion, though, does not mean
unbridled discretion and a district court's decision to deny
a motion to reconsider its judgment will be reviewed for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17,
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20-21, (1st Cir. 1992); Weinberger, 925 F.2d at 528; Sun
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Pipe, 831 F.2d at 25. In Roberts we reiterated how we
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determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion.
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In making discretionary judgments, a
district court abuses its discretion when
a relevant factor deserving of
significant weight is overlooked, or when
an improper factor is accorded
significant weight, or when the court
considers the appropriate mix of factors,
but commits a palpable error of judgment
in calibrating the decisional scales.
See Independent Oil and Chem. Workers of
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Quincy, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Mfg.
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Co., 864 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir. 1988);
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In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
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Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1019 (1st Cir.
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1988); United States v. Hastings, 847
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F.2d 920, 924 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
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488 U.S. 925, 109 S. Ct. 308, 102 L. Ed.
2d 327 (1988).
United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d at 21.
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The broad measure of discretion enjoyed by the
district courts in managing the litigation before it includes
the control of pre-trial discovery. Mark v. Great Atlantic &
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Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 179, 186 (1st Cir. 1989); In
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re Recticel Foam Co., 859 F.2d 1000, 1006 (1st Cir. 1988),
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(district judge is in unique position to balance all
potentially conflicting interests among the litigants and its
decisions on the scope of the discovery process are
ordinarily left to the judge's informed judgment).
The use of discovery closure dates and deadlines
for disclosure of the identities of experts are important
tools for case management. Their use, including the setting
of specific deadlines, is not only within the sound
discretion of the district court, but has been strongly urged
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by us. In Thibeault v. Square D Co., 960 F.2d 239, 247 n.7
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(1st Cir. 1992), we stated:
. . . [W]e urge, in the strongest
possible terms, that district courts (as,
indeed, is most frequently done in this
circuit) set pretrial deadlines for
disclosing the identities of experts. In
the same vein, we heartily endorse the
utilization of discovery closure dates,
available under Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(3), as
a case management tool. After all, the
adversarial cast of our system of
justice, combined with the increasingly
complex and unwieldy nature of modern
litigation practice, frequently require
that trial courts provide strong guidance
to counsel and assume hands-on control of
the discovery process.
Plaintiffs have advanced three related reasons for
their failure to comply with the discovery deadline. They
argue first that defendant made it difficult for them to
determine the chemical ingredients in its
pesticide Gramaxone. This difficulty was compounded,
plaintiffs claim, by the court's pretrial protective order
that precluded the use of an expert by plaintiffs that was
associated with the manufacturing of pesticides.2 Both of
these factors, according to plaintiffs, combined to make
obtaining an expert a difficult and slow process. Plaintiffs
assert that the court was informed of this problem at a
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2 The protective order was issued to protect the trade
secrets pertaining to some of the other defendants'
pesticides, but did not pertain to ICI.
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pretrial conference on February 20, 1992. This was after
discovery had closed.
Plaintiffs eventually obtained the services of an
expert, Dr. Padovani, a university professor at the
University of Puerto Rico, Magaguez Campus. It is not clear
from plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration when the expert
was retained, but it can be fairly inferred that it was after
the discovery closure date of February 5, 1992. According to
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration:
As a result of extensive research,
Dr. Padovani was also of the opinion that
Paraquat exposure had led to the onset of
aplastic anemia. In support of that
opinion, plaintiffs submitted to
defendant ICI fruits of their
investigation which established a causal
link and consisted of scientific
publications entitled Paraquat
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Intoxication and Isolated Aplastic
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Anemia, and Isolated Aplastic Anemia
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After Paraquat Poisoning.3
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This information was disclosed to defense counsel
on April 24, 1992, more than two months after the cut-off
date for pretrial discovery.
Plaintiffs' reasons for failure to meet the
discovery schedule fell far short of showing an abuse of
discretion by the district court. The deadlines imposed gave
plaintiffs more than a year from the filing of the complaint
to obtain the services of an expert witness. Counsel for
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3 Paraquat is one of the ingredients in Gramaxone, the
pesticide manufactured by defendant, ICI Americas, Inc.
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plaintiffs knew or should have known at the time the
complaint was drawn that only expert testimony could
establish a causal link between defendant's pesticide and
Carlos Serrano's illness and death. Some preliminary
spadework should have been done before the complaint was
filed. We do not think the discovery schedule was
unreasonably short.
In a pretrial order issued February 20, 1992, which
plaintiffs signed, the court listed as an "uncontested
material fact" that the plaintiffs had not proffered any
competent expert testimony showing that any of the
defendants' products, to which exposure was alleged, caused
the aplastic anemia. By this time, trial had already been
set for March 11, 1992. Defendants and the district court
were noticed of plaintiffs' proposed expert witness on April
24, 1992 two months after the discovery deadline and less
than one month prior to the start of the trial.
Were we to find that the district court abused its
discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration, we
would be flouting our own precedent, abdicating our
supervisory responsibility, and turning over the control of
discovery to the lawyers. The district court's order on the
The district court's order on the
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motion for reconsideration is affirmed.
motion for reconsideration is affirmed.
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Costs on appeal are awarded to appellee.
Costs on appeal are awarded to appellee.
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Document Info
Docket Number： 92-2060
Filed Date： 2/11/1993
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 3/3/2016