Providence v. Ana ( 1997 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 96-2006
PROVIDENCE SCHOOL DEPARTMENT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANA C., a minor,
Defendant-Appellee.
ERRATA SHEET
ERRATA SHEET
The opinion of this Court issued on March 3, 1997 is
corrected as follows:
On the cover sheet, line 16: substitute "Pollock" for
"Pollack" and substitute "Incorporated" for "Inc."
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 96-2006
PROVIDENCE SCHOOL DEPARTMENT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANA C., a minor,
Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNTIED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT COURT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Raymond J. Pettine, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Cyr, and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
David A. Wollin, with whom Patricia K. Rocha, R. Bart Totten and
Adler Pollock & Sheehan Incorporated were on brief for appellant.
Martha McVicker, with whom the Rhode Island Protection and
Advocacy System was on brief for appellee.
March 3, 1997
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. An impartial review
LYNCH, Circuit Judge.
officer, acting under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., found that
the Providence School Department owed benefits to a special
needs student, Ana C., for parts of the years 1990 through
1992. The School Department sought review in the United
States District Court within thirty days of receiving that
decision, consistent with the time periods contained in the
state Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). The district
court dismissed the claim as untimely, finding that federal
law borrowed a different state limitations period, one which
uses issuance of a decision, not receipt of a decision, to
trigger the thirty day period.1 We reverse the dismissal.
I.
The essential facts are not in dispute. Ana C., a
mentally retarded minor, is entitled to receive special
educational services under the IDEA. Ana lived in
Providence, Rhode Island from August 1989 to November 1992,
and she was entitled to 230 days of special education
services per year under the Rhode Island Board of Regents'
Regulations Governing the Special Education of Children with
Disabilities (the "Regulations").
1. Because the enactment of the IDEA preceded the enactment
of 28 U.S.C. 1658, the IDEA is unaffected by that
establishment of a four year statute of limitations for all
federal causes of action lacking a specific limitations
period. Id.
-2-
2
The School Department did not provide Ana the
summer educational services she sought for the summers of
1990, 1991, and a portion of 1992. The School Department
conceded in October of 1992 that Ana was entitled to receive
a total of 150 days of special education that the Department
had previously failed to provide. But when the School
Department learned that Ana and her father had moved to West
Chester, Pennsylvania in November 1992, it reversed its
position, saying that Ana could not receive the 150 days as
long as she resided outside of Rhode Island.
Ana sought a hearing. On August 30, 1995, an
impartial hearing officer for the Rhode Island Department of
Education ("RIDE") decided that, because Ana lived out of
state, she could not receive the 150 days. The officer was
not an employee of the school district or a member of the
school committee, in accordance with 20 U.S.C. 1415(b)(2)
and section 7 of the Regulations.
Ana, then age fourteen, appealed the hearing
officer's decision pursuant to 20 U.S.C. 1415(c) and
section 9 of the Regulations. An impartial review officer
reversed. As required by section 10 of the Regulations, that
officer was not an employee of the Rhode Island Department of
Education or a member of the Rhode Island Board of Regents.
His decision, dated January 23, 1996, awarded Ana
-3-
3
compensation for 150 days of special education from the
Department, despite her Pennsylvania residency.
The review officer's decision was forwarded to the
Office of Special Needs of the RIDE and was received on
January 26, 1996. The RIDE then forwarded the decision to
counsel for Ana and to the School Department. Though the
precise date of the forwarding is unclear, the School
Department did not receive the decision until February 7,
1996.
The Providence School Department, pursuant to 20
U.S.C. 1415(e)(2), filed its complaint challenging the
final agency decision in the United States District Court for
the District of Rhode Island on March 4, 1996. Ana then
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was
filed forty-one days after the state review officer issued
his decision. This, Ana argued, exceeded the thirty days
from issuance allowed by law and was thus untimely.
Accepting the report and recommendation of a United
States Magistrate Judge, the district court granted Ana's
motion and dismissed the School Department's complaint.
Although section 1415(e)(2) does not specify a limitations
period, the Supreme Court has directed federal courts to
"apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations
under state law," DelCostello v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983), so long as "it is not
-4-
4
inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so." Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985). The magistrate judge
had found that the most closely analogous statute was R.I.
Gen. Laws 16-39-3.1 and therefore that the thirty day
limitations period had begun to run when the decision was
issued on January 23, 1996.2
The School Department appeals, arguing that the
most analogous state limitations statute is the Rhode Island
APA, R.I. Gen. Laws 42-35-15, under which the thirty day
limitations period begins to run from the date of receipt
rather than the date of issuance. See Bayview Towing, Inc.
v. Stevenson, 676 A.2d 325, 328 (R.I. 1996) (thirty day
limitations period under section 42-35-15 triggered by
receipt of the final agency decision). Under that standard,
the Department argues, its appeal was timely filed and
improperly dismissed.
II.
This case presents a pure issue of law. Our review
of a grant of a motion to dismiss is de novo. Glassman v.
Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir. 1996).
In enacting the IDEA, Congress contemplated that
there would be judicial review of the decisions of the review
2 The Department did not argue that the "issuance" of the
decision was the date it was sent to the parties, rather than
the date the review officer submitted it to the state agency
to send to the parties. Accordingly, we do not consider that
point.
-5-
5
officer, but did not set a statutory time limit during which
the petition for judicial review must be brought. Courts
have looked to the most analogous statutes of limitations
from the laws of the pertinent state, provided that those
laws do not conflict with the federal policies inherent in
the statute. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 266-67. In Amann v.
Town of Stow, 991 F.2d 929, 931 (1st Cir. 1993)(per curiam),
this court, in a case involving a special needs child from
Massachusetts, held that the Massachusetts APA contains the
"most analogous" state law cause of action to the civil
action authorized by section 1415(e)(2). In so doing, this
court found that "courts reviewing agency decisions under the
IDEA will rely primarily on the administrative record, and
will scrutinize agency action for procedural regularity and
substantive validity, but will not impos[e] their view of
preferable . . . methods on the state agency. Thus, the
character of the hearing . . . under the Massachusetts
statute is essentially one of review." Id. at 932 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). The Amann court also
considered whether the short limitations period (thirty days
from receipt) was inconsistent with the goals of the IDEA,
and concluded that it was not. Id.For similar reasons, the Rhode Island APA governs
the limitations period for judicial review in this case. The
Rhode Island APA, like the Massachusetts APA, confines review
-6-
6
to the record or, in cases of alleged procedural
irregularity, to proof in court of those irregularities.
R.I. Gen. Laws 42-35-15(f). The reviewing court "shall not
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to weight
of the evidence on questions of fact." Id. 42-35-15(g).
The court "may reverse or modify the [agency] decision if
substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced" in
a manner consistent with the usual grounds for reversal on
judicial review of an administrative agency. Id. The
character of the hearings under both the Rhode Island APA and
the IDEA is essentially one of review. Cf. Board of Educ. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207-09 (1982); Burlington v. Department
of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 791 (1st Cir. 1984).
The district court focused on the provisions of
R.I. Gen. Laws 16-39-3.1. By its literal terms, that
section is not a judicial review provision for an aggrieved
party but a finality and enforcement provision for the
prevailing party where no review was available or was sought:
Enforcement of final decisions --
All final decisions made after a hearing
by the commissioner of elementary and
secondary education or the board of
regents for elementary and secondary
education, and which are not subject to
further judicial or administrative
review, shall be enforceable by mandamus
or any other suitable civil action in the
superior court for Providence County at
the request of any interested party. All
such decisions of the commissioner and
board shall become final if judicial or
further administrative review is not
-7-
7
properly sought within thirty (30) days
of their issuance.
Id. 16-39-3.1.
Even assuming that section 16-39-3.1 is a judicial
review provision, this section of Rhode Island law is not the
most analogous to the federal scheme. The decision at issue
was made by an impartial review officer (not by one of the
officials listed). See Regulations 10 (impartial review
officer may not be the Commissioner or an employee of the
Rhode Island Department of Elementary and Secondary
Education); see also 20 U.S.C. 1415(b)(2) (impartial due
process hearing officer may not be an employee of the state
educational agency). The decision was also subject to
further judicial or administrative review.
As a matter of federal law, the administrative
decision here is more similar to those governed by section
16-39-4, which expressly states that any aggrieved party may
obtain judicial review "as provided in chapter 35 of title
42." Chapter 35 of title 42 is the Rhode Island APA.
Chapter 39 itself is concerned with "[p]arties having any
matter of dispute between them arising under any law relating
to schools or education." R.I. Gen. Laws 16-39-1. The
federal district court for the district of Rhode Island had
previously noted that section 16-39-4 applies to cases
involving benefits for handicapped children under chapter 39.
-8-
8
Laura V. v. Providence Sch. Bd., 680 F. Supp. 66, 70 (D.R.I.
1988).
In holding that the APA does not apply, the
opinion in the trial courts relied on a different chapter of
the education laws, chapter 60. Chapter 60 establishes the
Board of Regents for Elementary and Secondary Education and
defines its duties. Chapter 60 contains a provision
exempting itself from the provisions of the APA. Rhode
Island General Laws section 16-60-10 states that "the
provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, chapter 35
of title 42, shall not apply to this chapter."
Federal law requires that we look to the most
closely analogous statute of limitations, and the review
procedures which have been applied to chapter 60 are not
analogous to the review provisions of the IDEA. Under
section 16-60-10, review of decisions of the Board of Regents
is by writ of certiorari. Pawtucket Sch. Comm. v. Board of
Regents for Elementary and Secondary Educ., 513 A.2d 13, 15
(R.I. 1986); Bristol Sch. Dep't v. Board of Regents for
Educ., 396 A.2d 936 (R.I. 1979). Review under the IDEA is a
matter of right rather than discretionary. Under the
provisions of the IDEA, all aggrieved parties, school
committees and parents alike, are entitled to judicial
review:
Any party aggrieved by the findings and
decision made under subsection (b) of
-9-
9
this section [providing for first level
of administrative review] who does not
have the right to an appeal under
subsection (c) [providing for impartial
review of the hearing officer's
decision], and any party aggrieved by the
findings and decision under subsection
(c), shall have the right to bring a
civil action with respect to the
complaint presented pursuant to this
section . . . .
20 U.S.C. 1415(e)(2) (emphasis added); see also Doe v.
Anrig, 561 F. Supp. 121, 124 (D. Mass. 1983) (reviewing
town's appeal from administrative decision under the IDEA,
then known as the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act). Indeed, entitlement to review is arguably the most
salient feature of review under the IDEA. Review under the
Rhode Island APA is also a matter of right. See R.I. Gen.
Laws 16-35-15 (providing that anyone who has exhausted all
available administrative remedies is entitled to judicial
review under the APA). By contrast, review by writ of
certiorari to the state's highest court is discretionary and
is used for significant issues of public interest. Because
federal law requires borrowing the most closely analogous
statute of limitations, we look to section 16-39-4, the
provision providing for APA review, rather than to case law
providing for review by writ of certiorari.
The adoption of the district court's position would
pose another problem under federal law, which we describe,
but which we need not resolve in light of our holding. Under
-10-
10
that position, parents or school systems seeking to appeal
from decisions by impartial review officers acting pursuant
to the IDEA would effectively have less than thirty days
within which to seek judicial review. That is because the
finality provision of section 16-39-3.1 starts the clock
running from the date a decision is issued. Here the parties
did not receive the review officer's decision until
approximately fifteen days after the date of that decision,
and thirteen days after it was received by the RIDE. Thus,
about half of the thirty days had elapsed before the parties
even knew of the decision. The delay occurred because the
hearing officer forwarded the decision to the state
Department of Special Education, which then forwarded it to
the parties. Bureaucracies being what they are, some delay
is inevitable. Whether less than thirty days to seek review
would be inconsistent with the IDEA's goal of parental
involvement is a serious issue.3 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.
1415(b)(1)(D) (requiring school authorities to give parents
notice of pertinent procedures); see also Amann, 991 F.2d at
932.
Finally, even if we were to choose the applicable
statute of limitations based solely on the requirements of
3 The parties advise us that the hearing officers are now
told to mail their decisions directly to the parties. Even
so, the mail takes time, which again cuts into the thirty day
limitations period.
-11-
11
state law, it is far from clear that chapter 60 is applicable
here. By its terms, this exclusion from the APA applies only
to chapter 60, and not to the provisions of chapter 39 on
which the Providence Department relies. If one probes behind
the literal terms of the chapter 60 exclusion provision,
there is little reason to think this exclusion was meant to
apply to disputes between a child and a school system, like
the dispute here. The Rhode Island APA has a number of
provisions governing the internal operations of state
agencies, such as the procedures for adopting rules, R.I.
Gen. Laws 42-35-3, and restrictions on ex parte contacts,
id. 42-35-13. That the Rhode Island legislature may have
intended to exempt the Board of Regents from these rules
under certain circumstances does not necessarily mean that
the legislature intended to exempt from judicial review under
the APA matters within the purview of chapter 39 concerning
benefits owed to children under education laws. In Pawtucket
School Committee v. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance, 610 A.2d
1104, 1106 (R.I. 1992), for example, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court found that because section 16-39-2, which governs the
appeal of school committee actions to the Commissioner of
Education, was not expressly exempted from the Rhode Island
APA pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 42-15-18(b), certain
provisions of the APA applied to hearings conducted by the
Commissioner. Similarly, while listing numerous other
-12-
12
provisions to which the APA does not apply, section 42-15-
18(b) contains no express exemption for section 16-39-3.1.
It may be true that, under certain circumstances,
as a matter of Rhode Island law, review of decisions pursuant
to chapter 39 is not governed by the APA. There is case law
suggesting that judicial review of a Board of Regents
decision is only available through a writ of certiorari. See
D'Ambra v. North Providence Sch. Comm., 601 A.2d 1370, 1372
(R.I. 1992). We need not resolve this issue of state law,
for this case is more analogous, as a matter of federal law,
to the type of cases reviewed under the APA.
For these reasons, we hold that the Rhode Island
APA, R.I. Gen. Laws 42-35-15, including the statute of
limitations and triggering event it sets forth, is the most
closely analogous statute under state law and therefore
applies to IDEA appeals from Rhode Island.4 Because the
School Department's notice of appeal fell within the Rhode
Island APA limitations period, the decision of the district
court dismissing the case is reversed, and the case is
4 In light of this ruling, the Rhode Island Department of
Elementary and Secondary Education may wish to reconsider the
language it uses on its notice of decision: "The Rhode Island
Department of Education does not set a time frame to bring
civil action, and defers that issue to the court in which
appellant seeks jurisdiction." Cf. Speigler v. District of
Columbia, 866 F.2d 461, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (rejecting
application of statute of limitations to bar parents' actions
where parents had not been notified of the limitations
period).
-13-
13
remanded for prompt disposition. "The legislative history,
statutory terms, and regulatory framework of the IDEA all
emphasize promptness as an indispensable element of the
statutory scheme." Amann, 991 F.2d at 932. While the courts
have acted expeditiously (eleven months from filing the
complaint through this appeal), the events at issue go back
to 1990. Justice would be best served by a prompt resolution
of the longstanding dispute. No costs are awarded.
-14-
14