In re W.M. ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-1676
Filed January 24, 2018
IN THE INTEREST OF W.J.M.,
Minor Child,
P.J., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Deborah Farmer
Minot, District Associate Judge.
A father appeals the order terminating his parental rights to his child.
AFFIRMED.
Amy L. Evenson of Larson & Evenson, Iowa City, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and John B. McCormally, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Anthony A. Haughton of Linn County Advocate, Inc., Cedar Rapids,
guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
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DOYLE, Judge.
A father appeals the order terminating his parental rights to his child under
Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g), (h), and (o) (2017). The father does not
challenge the evidence establishing the statutory grounds for termination. He
instead contends that termination of his parental rights is not in the child’s best
interest. We review his claim de novo. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa
2014).
The father’s sole allegation on appeal is that termination is not in the child’s
best interest because a relative “is willing to assume legal custody of the child
under Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(a).” Section 232.116(3)(a) states that the
court “need not terminate the relationship between the parent and child if the court
finds . . . [a] relative has legal custody of the child.” However, because the child is
not in the legal custody of a relative, section 232.116(3)(a) does not apply. See
id. at 113 (finding section 232.116(3)(a) inapplicable because the child was not in
the legal custody of a relative at the time of termination). We instead consider the
father’s claim under the best-interest provision of section 232.116(2), which
requires that the court “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best
placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the
physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child” in determining
whether to terminate parental rights. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Iowa
2010) (stating the court “should base its best-interest determination on the
legislative requirements contained in section 232.116(2)”).
In considering a child’s best interest, we note that the need for a permanent
home is of primary importance. See In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa 2006)
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(Cady, J., concurring specially) (noting the “defining elements in a child’s best
interest” are the child’s safety and “need for a permanent home”). Although the
law requires a “full measure of patience with troubled parents who attempt to
remedy a lack of parenting skills,” this patience has been built into the statutory
scheme of chapter 232. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Iowa 2000). Once the
grounds for termination exist, time is of the essence. See In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d
609, 614 (Iowa 1987).
The district court found the child’s “needs for permanency, security, safety,
and their imminent and long-term physical, mental, and emotional health cannot
be met by [the father]; therefore, the needs of the child for safety, stability, and
permanency compel termination of parental rights so that [the child] can be freed
for adoption.” The record establishes as much. The child has never met the father,
who is a convicted sex offender and serving a prison sentence for violating his
special sentence. The father’s discharge date is in April 2021. Although the father
hopes to have a relationship with the child, he cannot visit the child until he
completes sex-offender treatment. Under these facts, delaying permanency any
further is contrary to the child’s best interest.
Because termination of the father’s parental rights serves the child’s best
interest, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.