United States v. Cotton ( 1994 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion












    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT



    ____________________

    No. 93-1695

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,

    v.

    BRIAN COTTON a/k/a "EARL",

    Appellant.


    ____________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Frank H. Freedman, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________


    ____________________


    Before

    Selya, Cyr and Boudin,

    Circuit Judges.
    ______________


    ____________________



    Harry L. Miles for appellant.
    ______________
    Kevin O'Regan, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom A.
    _____________ __
    John Pappalardo, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee.
    _______________


    ____________________

    January 28, 1994

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    CYR, Circuit Judge. Appellant was sentenced pursuant
    CYR, Circuit Judge.
    _____________

    to U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c) and its accompanying Footnote*, which

    provide that the entire weight of a methamphetamine mixture and

    the net weight of the pure methamphetamine in the mixture are to

    be determined, and the court is to use whichever weight yields

    the greater sentence. Appellant claims that Footnote* should be

    disregarded in favor of the "market-oriented" approach supposedly

    approved in Chapman v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct.
    _______ _____________

    1919 (1991), for use in all drug-related sentencings, based on

    the mixture weight, i.e., the total product to be marketed. The
    _______ ____

    "either/or" approach under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c) and its Footnote*

    is directly patterned on 21 U.S.C.

    841(b)(1)(A)(viii),(B)(viii). Appellant concedes that this

    claim is effectively precluded by our decision in United States
    ______________

    v. Stoner, 927 F.2d 45, 47 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
    ______ ____ ______

    ___, 112 S. Ct. 129 (1991), which upheld the "either/or" provi-

    sion in 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)(viii), but urges that we recon-

    sider Stoner in light of Chapman.
    ______ _______

    Appellant overlooks the fact that Congress has not

    adopted a unitary approach to drug-crime punishment but an array

    of distinctive sentencing schemes for various categories of

    drugs. See 21 U.S.C. 841(b). Indeed, the Court in Chapman
    ___ _______

    specifically adverted to the "either/or" sentencing treatment

    prescribed in methamphetamine (and PCP) cases, and concluded that

    "Congress knew how to indicate that the weight of the pure drug

    was to be used to determine the sentence, and did not make that


    2














    distinction with respect to LSD." Chapman, 111 S. Ct. at 1924
    ____ _______ __ ___ _______

    (emphasis added). The "market-oriented" approach appellant

    infers from Chapman would blunt the power of Congress to pre-
    _______

    scribe criminal sanctions and frustrate its mandate in 21 U.S.C.

    841(b)(1)(A)(iv),(viii) & (B)(iv),(viii), as well as U.S.S.G.

    2D1.1(c) and the plain language of Footnote*. See id. at 1926-
    ___ ___

    28 (upholding legislative power to establish distinct sentencing

    schemes for different drugs). We therefore reaffirm Stoner and
    ______

    affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.1

    Affirmed.
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    ____________________

    1Appellant's remaining claim is that the district court
    erred in not departing downward based on the "unusual" circum-
    stance that he was sentenced in accordance with U.S.S.G. 2D1-
    .1(c) and Footnote*. Assuming we have jurisdiction, but see,
    ___ ___
    e.g., United States v. Tucker, 892 F.2d 8, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1989),
    ____ _____________ ______
    mere imposition of sentence in accordance with the applicable
    guidelines does not constitute an "unusual" circumstance warrant-
    ing departure, see United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949-52
    ___ _____________ ______
    (1st Cir. 1993).

    3