Street v. Vose ( 1993 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion




    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]


    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ____________________


    No. 92-1823

    RICHARD A. STREET,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    GEORGE A. VOSE, COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
    Circuit Judges.
    ______________

    ____________________

    R. A. Street on brief pro se.
    ____________
    Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant Attorney General, and
    ____________________
    Michael H. Cohen, Counsel, Department of Correction, on brief for
    _________________
    appellees.


    ____________________

    May 12, 1993
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    Per Curiam. In a prior appeal in this case, we
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    vacated the dismissal of appellant's complaint under Fed. R.

    Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because it had entered without providing the

    plaintiff with notice and an opportunity to oppose or amend.

    Street v. Vose, No. 90-1415, slip op. (1st Cir. Mar. 6,
    ______ ____

    1991). This appeal challenges the entry of summary judgment

    in favor of the defendants. We affirm.

    I
    I
    _

    The appellant, a Massachusetts inmate, sued various

    correction officials and officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983

    alleging that he was denied constitutionally adequate access

    to the courts while confined in the segregation unit of the

    Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Cedar Junction

    (MCI-CJ).1 After remand, the defendants moved to dismiss,

    or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Appellant's

    opposition, like the defendants' motion, was supported by

    documentary evidence, and the district court properly treated

    the motion as one for summary judgment.

    Plaintiff's chief contention is that he was

    repeatedly denied access to the separate satellite library

    provided for segregated inmates, and access to other library


    ____________________

    1. The appellant was housed in this unit for approximately
    six months on "awaiting action" status before being
    officially classified to the unit in December 1989.
    Plaintiff's allegations cover the entire period, and although
    both parties make much of the import of these distinctions in
    status, for purposes of this discussion, we do not find the
    differences of any material relevance.

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    materials from the prison's main library, in violation of the

    First and Fourteenth Amendments as well as the terms of a

    Stipulation of Dismissal (Stipulation) in another case,

    Cepulonis v. Fair, No. 78-3233-Z (D. Mass. Jun. 24, 1987).
    _________ ____

    The Stipulation set forth, inter alia, detailed procedures
    _____ ____

    regarding segregated inmates' use of the satellite library

    and legal materials at MCI-CJ.2 On appeal, appellant has

    not pursued any argument with respect to his third cause of

    action, which appears to assert state-created rights arguably

    inherent in the Stipulation, and, accordingly, that issue has

    been waived.




    ____________________

    2. As to specific claims that fall within the scope of the
    Stipulation, Street alleges that: between December 1988, when
    he was formally classified to the segregation unit, and March
    1990, he filed 51 requests to use the satellite law library,
    but was given timely access only 10 times and otherwise had
    to wait up to two weeks before being given access; routinely,
    no justification or reason was given as to why timely access
    could not be provided; requests were not collected daily, as
    required; some written requests were refused or not
    processed; volumes and equipment in the library were not
    maintained, and the library facility and hours were
    insufficient partly because other inmates who were not
    classified to the segregation unit, but were housed there,
    were allowed to use the satellite law library, thus
    effectively denying access to those for whom the satellite
    library was intended. Street also contends that of ten
    requests for materials from the main library, three were not
    processed, and, as to the rest, only a small portion of the
    requested materials were received. Of two requests for legal
    assistance, one was granted late, and the other was denied.
    Finally, copying requests were denied, and necessary books
    were unavailable. There are other claims beyond the
    Stipulation: that his legal papers were "ransacked" and
    stolen, and that favored inmates are allowed frequent use of
    the satellite library.

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    II
    II
    __

    As we observed in our prior ruling, it is

    undisputed that inmates seeking release or otherwise

    contesting the constitutionality of the conditions of their

    confinement possess a right of access to the courts, that is,

    the right to "adequate law libraries or adequate assistance

    from persons trained in the law." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
    ______ _____

    817, 821, 827-28 (1977) (upholding state access-to-the-courts

    plan under which, inter alia, inmates not facing court
    _____ ____

    deadlines might have a month's wait for a library visit).

    However, such access is subject to reasonable restrictions:

    meaningful access means no more than that the state must

    assure an indigent inmate "an adequate opportunity to present

    his claims fairly." Id. at 823 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417
    ___ ____ _______

    U.S. 600, 615-16 (1974)). The relevant inquiry is whether an

    inmate has been afforded "a reasonably adequate opportunity

    to present claimed violations of fundamental rights to the

    courts." Id. at 825 (emphasis added).
    ______ ___

    Moreover, virtually all circuit courts have read an

    injury element into less than total access-denial claims and

    required prisoners to shoulder an initial burden of showing

    that the deprivation caused some quantum of prejudice with

    respect to pending or contemplated litigation. See Strickler
    ___ _________

    v. Waters, ___ F.2d ___, ___ & n.10, 1993 WL 86457, *4, *11,
    ______

    No. 92-6147 (4th Cir. Mar. 26, 1993) (collecting cases). We



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    held as much in Sowell v. Vose, 941 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir.
    ______ ____

    1991): Where a prisoner has not been denied complete access

    to legal materials, but alleges only restrictions on such

    access, "actual injury [is] a prerequisite to recovery."

    Thus, unless the deprivation clearly amounts to an absolute,

    inherently prejudicial restriction on access (clearly not the

    case here), in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment,

    "actual injury", i.e., an adverse effect on litigation caused

    by the challenged conduct must be sufficiently alleged by the

    plaintiff. See id. at 34-35; see also Shango v. Jurich, 965
    ___ ___ ___ ____ ______ ______

    F.2d 289, 292 (7th Cir. 1992); Crawford-El v. Britton, 951
    ___________ _______

    F.2d 1314, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 62
    _____ ______

    (1992). To that end, an affidavit opposing summary judgment

    must demonstrate with specifics, and not speculation, how the

    challenged conduct caused legal harm. Sowell, 941 F.2d at
    ______

    35-36.

    III
    III
    ___

    Sowell was decided after our prior ruling in this
    ______

    case and before defendants' summary judgment motion was

    filed. In its accompanying memoranda, however, the

    defendants pointed out, citing Sowell, that plaintiff's
    ______

    complaint had failed to allege that any of the purported

    restrictions had prejudiced him in his ability to pursue

    this, or any other, lawsuit. The motion was supported by the

    affidavit of MCI-CJ Superintendent Duval who attested that,



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    since being housed in the segregation unit, the plaintiff

    "has used, and continues to use the satellite law library."



    Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition stated that

    his failure to allege actual prejudice was due to his lack of

    legal training and the defendants' restriction on access. He

    contended that prejudice was demonstrated by the dismissal of

    another named action in February 1990.3 Alternatively,

    plaintiff argued that he did not need to show actual

    prejudice because the Cepulonis Stipulation controlled
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    access-denial claims by segregation unit inmates at MCI-CJ

    and expressly reserved to inmates the right to bring an

    action for damages. Supporting plaintiff's memorandum were

    the Stipulation and the affidavits of the plaintiff and seven

    other segregation unit inmates each attesting, in identical

    fashion, to numerous violations of the Stipulation.4

    These profferings by the plaintiff fail to

    demonstrate a genuine issue as to actual injury. Appellant,

    who is an experienced pro se litigator, does not claim any
    ___ __


    ____________________

    3. However, when the opposition was filed, plaintiff knew
    that that dismissal had been vacated and the case remanded.
    Street v. Maloney, No. 90-1280, slip op. (1st Cir. Dec. 29,
    ______ _______
    1990).

    4. Included were: routine delays of 4-8 days in receiving
    access to the satellite library; missing books and torn and
    missing pages in many volumes; out-of-date supplements and
    pocket parts; delays of several weeks in receiving books from
    the main library; typewriter and copier frequently broken;
    lack of paper and other supplies.

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    delay or interruption in this or any other pending case; he

    cites no court-imposed deadlines that he has missed, or that

    he has been unable to pursue any legal claim as a result of

    any of the alleged deprivations. See Shango, 965 F.2d at
    ___ ______

    293. At most, he has described some delay in receiving

    access to library materials. Such temporary restrictions on

    access, bereft of indications of adverse legal consequence,

    do not implicate a Bounds right. Chandler v. Baird, 926 F.2d
    ______ ________ _____

    1057, 1063 (11th Cir. 1991). Further, appellant has

    presented well-drafted pleadings to this court, as well as

    the district court, demonstrating that he has retained the

    ability to "participate meaningfully in the legal process."

    Sowell, 941 F.2d at 35. While it is true that the plaintiff
    ______

    did point to one adverse judgment, it was later vacated, see
    ___

    ante n.3, and we can find nothing in the record indicating a
    ____

    prejudicial "causal relationship" between that dismissal, or

    any of the alleged deprivations, for that matter, and the

    conduct of the defendants. Id.; see also Crawford-El, 951
    ___ ___ ____ ___________

    F.2d at 1321; Chandler, 926 F.2d at 1062.5
    ________

    IV
    IV
    __

    The Stipulation itself, however, does not, as

    appellant appears to contend, afford an independent basis of


    ____________________

    5. Because we decide that the plaintiff has failed to meet
    the initial burden to show prejudice, we need not address the
    degree to which any restrictions on access to legal materials
    are related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v.
    ______
    Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
    ______

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    relief from asserted violations of the right of access to the

    courts. See Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1122-23 (5th
    ___ _____ ________

    Cir. 1986). The Cepulonis litigation that ultimately spawned
    _________

    the Stipulation at issue here was a class action initiated by

    segregation unit inmates at MCI-CJ (then MCI-Walpole) to

    vindicate Bounds rights. See Cepulonis v. Fair, 732 F.2d 1,
    ______ ___ _________ ____

    2 (1st Cir. 1984). And while the Stipulation states that its

    procedures provide "adequate access to the courts," we have

    not had occasion to decide whether the terms of the

    Stipulation are constitutionally required, and offer no

    opinion in that regard. Even assuming that the provisions of

    the Stipulation were intended to meet no more than minimal

    constitutional requirements regarding segregated inmate

    access to the courts, we would still find the grant of

    summary judgment to the defendants proper: The evidence

    offered by the plaintiff concerning any violations of the

    Stipulation suffers from the same infirmity described in our

    discussion above - - - the failure to demonstrate a

    sufficient quantum of prejudice to permit the case to proceed

    further.6


    ____________________

    6. To the extent that the plaintiff simply seeks to enforce
    the Stipulation, he may not do so directly under 1983.
    DeGidio v. Pung, 920 F.2d 525, 534 (8th Cir. 1990); Green,
    _______ ____ _____
    788 F.2d at 1123; cf. Welch v. Spangler, 939 F.2d 570, 572
    ___ _____ ________
    n.2 (8th Cir. 1991) (district court proceeding included both
    1983 and contempt actions). The district court that
    approved the Cepulonis Stipulation inherently retains
    _________
    jurisdiction to enforce its own consent decree, see In re
    ___ _____
    Donald Pearson, ___ F.2d ___, ___ No. 92-2158, slip op. at 9
    ______________

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    Thus, because the record presents no material

    factual dispute that the appellant, while housed in the

    segregation unit during the times in question, was denied

    meaningful access to the courts, the defendants' motion for

    summary judgment was properly granted.

    V
    V
    _

    We also find no abuse of discretion in the denial

    of the plaintiff's motion for the district judge's recusal.

    Merely issuing unfavorable rulings, Lisa v. Fournier Marine
    ____ ________________

    Corp., 866 F.2d 530, 532 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
    _____ _____ ______

    819 (1989), or taking other judicial action during the course

    of proceedings cannot form the basis of a disqualification

    claim absent a showing of personal bias, United States v.
    ______________

    Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018, 1022-23 & n.9 (1st Cir. 1990), an
    _______

    assertion not made here. Nor was district court's refusal to

    grant a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff an abuse

    of discretion. See Gulley v. Orr, 905 F.2d 1383, 1386 (10th
    ___ ______ ___

    Cir. 1990) (absent a showing of prejudice, there is a strong

    preference for a disposition on the merits); Richman v.
    _______

    General Motors Corp., 437 F.2d 196, 199 (1st Cir. 1977).
    _____________________

    Finally, appellant complains that he was excluded from two

    status conferences. While such ex parte proceedings are
    __ _____



    ____________________

    (1st Cir. Mar. 16, 1993), and parties with standing to do so
    may seek compliance in that court. See, e.g., Consumer
    ___ ____ ________
    Advisory Bd. v. Glover, ___ F.2d ____, ___, No. 92-1550, slip
    ____________ ______
    op. at 3-4 (1st Cir, Mar. 31, 1993).

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    disfavored, see Oses v. Massachusetts, 961 F.2d 985, 986 (1st
    ___ ____ _____________

    Cir. 1992); In re Donald Pearson, ___ F.2d ___, ___ No. 92-
    ____________________

    2158, slip op. at 16 (1st Cir. Mar. 16, 1993), the ex parte
    __ _____

    contacts here caused no perceivable harm. See id. slip op.
    ___ ___

    at 17; Grieco v. Meachum, 533 F.2d 713, 719 (1st Cir.), cert.
    ______ _______ _____

    denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976).
    ______

    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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