Gongora v. United States ( 1993 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion



    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT



    ___________________


    No. 91-2136




    WILFREDO GONGORA
    a/k/a PEDRO GUERRERO,
    Petitioner, Appellant,

    v.

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Respondent, Appellee.


    __________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO


    [Hon. Jos Antonio Fust , U.S. District Judge] ___________________


    ___________________

    Before

    Breyer, Chief Judge, ___________
    Selya and Cyr, Circuit Judges. ______________

    ___________________

    Wilfredo Gongora on brief pro se. ________________
    Daniel F. Lopez-Romo, United States Attorney, and Luis A. ____________________ ________
    Plaza, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee. _____



    __________________

    July 13, 1993
    __________________

















    Per Curiam. Wilfredo Gongora appeals from a ___________

    judgment dismissing his motion to vacate his sentence under

    28 U.S.C. 2255. He claims that his sentence was illegally

    enhanced in violation of 21 U.S.C. 851.1 Finding no

    illegal enhancement, we affirm.

    I.

    On September 24, 1987, Gongora and eight others were

    arrested on the high seas aboard the COLOSO II, a Panamanian

    tugboat. The Coast Guard made the arrest after observing

    numerous bales of marijuana being thrown from the tugboat.

    Gongora and the captain and other crew members of the COLOSO

    II were charged with violating 46 U.S.C. App. 1903(a) and 18

    U.S.C. 2 (aiding and abetting the unlawful possession of

    5818 kilograms of marijuana, with the intent to distribute

    same, on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the

    United States). A jury convicted Gongora and his

    codefendants on December 16, 1987.

    The statute the defendants were convicted under

    incorporates the penalty provisions of 21 U.S.C. 960 for

    ____________________

    1. 21 U.S.C. 851(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that:

    No person who stands convicted of an offense under
    this part [i.e., 21 U.S.C. 841 et seq.] shall be
    sentenced to increased punishment by reason of one
    or more prior convictions, unless before trial, or
    before entry of a plea of guilty, the United States
    attorney files an information with the court (and
    serves a copy of such information on the person or
    counsel for the person) stating in writing the
    previous convictions to be relied upon....

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    first offenders and the penalty provisions of 21 U.S.C. 962

    for second offenders.2 Under 21 U.S.C. 960, first

    offenders are subject to a mandatory minimum penalty of ten

    years' imprisonment and five years of supervised release, and

    a maximum term of life imprisonment. A person convicted of a

    second or subsequent offense "is punishable by a term of

    imprisonment twice that otherwise authorized" and "twice the

    term of supervised release otherwise authorized." 21 U.S.C.

    962(a). Thus, repeat offenders of 46 U.S.C. App. 1903 are

    subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years'

    imprisonment and ten years of supervised release. However,

    to subject a repeat offender to that mandatory minimum, the

    government must first file an information notifying the

    offender of the prior convictions it intends to rely upon in

    seeking an enhanced sentence under 21 U.S.C. 851. See 21 ___

    U.S.C. 962(c)("Section 851 of this title shall apply with

    ____________________

    2. 46 U.S.C. App. 1903 (g) provides:

    (1) Any person who commits an offense under this
    section shall be punished in accordance with the
    penalties set forth in section 1010 of the
    Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
    of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 960).

    (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this
    subsection, any person convicted of an offense under
    this chapter shall be punished in accordance with
    the penalties set forth in section 1012 of the
    Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
    of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 962) if such offense is a second
    or subsequent offense as defined in section 1012(b)
    of that Act.


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    respect to any proceeding to sentence a person under this

    section.") See also United States v. Craveiro, 907 F.2d 260, ___ ____ _____________ ________

    262 & n. 4 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1015 _____ ______

    (1990)(noting that double penalties for second or subsequent

    conviction under 21 U.S.C. 962 required proof of recidivism

    under procedures set forth in 21 U.S.C. 851(a)(1)).

    The case was called for sentencing on February 25, 1988.

    Six of the crew members had no prior criminal records and

    received sentences of ten years' imprisonment and five years

    of supervised release, the mandatory minimum for first

    offenders under 21 U.S.C. 960(b)(1)(G). Before trial, the

    prosecutor had filed an information notifying the captain

    (defendant Corpus) that the government would seek to enhance

    his sentence pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 851 on the basis of his

    prior marijuana smuggling conviction. The trial judge

    sentenced the captain to a thirty-year prison term and ten

    years of supervised release. Another crew member (Alfonso

    Gonzalez) had a prior conviction for marijuana smuggling, but

    the government had not filed a 851 information with respect

    to him. Gonzalez received a thirty-year prison term and five

    years of supervised release.



    Similarly, the government also did not file a 851

    information on Gongora, the last to be called for sentencing.

    Gongora's Presentence Report (PSR) indicated that Gongora was



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    subject to the ten year-to-life range applicable to first

    offenders under 21 U.S.C. 960(b)(1)(G). However, the PSR

    also identified two prior arrests for drug crimes. One of

    these resulted in a 1983 conviction for violating 21 U.S.C.

    955a, the predecessor to 46 U.S.C. App. 1903.3 Gongora

    initially denied that he was the person with the criminal

    record described in the PSR. The district court continued

    Gongora's sentencing so that an evidentiary hearing could be

    held. Gongora's counsel moved to waive the hearing. On

    March 3, 1988, Gongora admitted to the 1983 conviction.

    Nevertheless, the district court proceeded with the hearing

    and an FBI fingerprint expert established that Gongora indeed

    had been convicted of the 1983 marijuana smuggling charge

    under 21 U.S.C. 955a.

    The trial court sentenced Gongora to thirty years'

    imprisonment and five years of supervised release. All

    convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. See United ___ ______

    States v. Corpus, 882 F.2d 546 (1st Cir. 1989). Thereafter, ______ ______

    the district court entered two orders affecting Gongora's

    sentence. On September 6, 1989, it ordered that all the

    defendants' supervised release terms should be replaced by

    terms of special parole. Amended judgments issued. On April

    ____________________

    3. The 1983 conviction was for Gongora's participation in an
    attempt to import 57,265 pounds of marijuana into the United
    States. The Puerto Rico federal district court (Torruella,
    J.) sentenced Gongora to three years' imprisonment and three
    years of special parole.

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    17, 1990, the court clarified its previous order by

    specifying that the defendants were not eligible for parole

    under the 1986 amendments to 21 U.S.C. 960 and 962. This

    ruling was affirmed on appeal. See United States v. De Los ___ _____________ ______

    Santos-Himitola, 924 F.2d 380 (1st Cir. 1991).4 _______________

    In 1991, Gongora filed the instant 2255 motion.

    Relying on Hardy v. United States, 691 F.2d 39, 41-42 (1st _____ ______________

    Cir. 1982)(vacating sentence where record suggested

    government may not have filed 851 information), Gongora

    argued that his sentence had been illegally enhanced because

    the district court had relied on his prior conviction in

    imposing his thirty-year prison term and the government had

    failed to file a pretrial enhancement information under 21

    U.S.C. 851. Gongora maintained that the district court

    lacked jurisdiction to impose the thirty-year sentence and

    that his sentence should be reduced to the ten year prison


    ____________________

    4. In De Los Santos-Himitola, 924 F.2d at 381-82 & n. 2, we ______________________
    observed that the district court correctly left the special
    parole terms in place when it determined that the defendants
    were not eligible for parole, but that the Supreme Court had
    granted certiorari review on whether the mandatory minimum
    supervised release terms required by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
    of 1986 applied to offenses committed between October 27,
    1986 and November 1, 1987. The Supreme Court answered this
    question in the affirmative. See Gozlon-Peretz v. United ___ _____________ ______
    States, 498 U.S. 395, 404-410 (1991). Thus, these ______
    defendants' sentences may include an incorrect term of
    special parole. See Padilla Palacios v. United States, 932 ___ _________________ ______________
    F.2d 31, 32-34 (1st Cir. 1991)(per curiam)(holding supervised
    release applied to 2255 petitioner convicted of violating 46
    U.S.C. App. 1903). As the issue has not been raised, we do
    not consider it.

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    term imposed on the first offenders. Gongora filed several

    documents in support of his 2255 motion, including the

    district court's September 6, 1989 order revoking the

    defendants' supervised release terms. Footnote one of that

    order stated: "Defendants with prior criminal convictions

    were sentenced under 21 U.S.C. section 962(a), authorizing

    sentences twice the length of those otherwise provided."

    Gongora insists that this notation shows that the district

    court impermissibly imposed a twenty-year mandatory minimum

    term on Gongora as a repeat offender under 21 U.S.C. 962

    then added ten years. The government conceded that no 851

    information had been filed on Gongora, but argued that

    Gongora had been sentenced under 21 U.S.C. 960(b)(1)(G) and

    that his sentence had not been unlawfully enhanced since it

    was within the ten year-to-life range applicable to first

    offenders under that statute. The government further argued

    that Gongora's five-year supervised release term showed that

    the district court did not unlawfully enhance his sentence,

    as a ten-year term would have been required for a repeat

    offender. The government maintained that Gongora's sentence

    was unreviewable under United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, _____________ ______

    447 (1972)("... a sentence imposed by a federal district

    judge, if within statutory limits, is generally not subject

    to review.") The district court ruled that Gongora had

    not been sentenced under 21 U.S.C. 962 but rather had been



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    sentenced to a term within the ten year-to-life range

    applicable to him under 21 U.S.C. 960(b)(1)(G). The

    sentencing judge acknowledged that he had considered the

    prior conviction in imposing the sentence. However, in view

    of the fact that Gongora did not contend that Fed. R. Crim.

    P. 32(c)(governing disclosure of PSR) had been violated, the

    judge discerned no illegality in the thirty-year sentence and

    dismissed Gongora's 2255 motion. This appeal followed.

    II.

    "Congress enacted section 851(a)(1) and the procedure

    for filing an information to protect defendants from

    receiving increased statutory sentences ... resulting from

    prior, incorrectly charged offenses ... and to give

    defendants the opportunity to show that they were not the

    persons convicted." United States v. Wallace, 895 F.2d 487, ______________ _______

    489 (8th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). In Hardy v. United _____ ______

    States, 691 F.2d at 41, we observed that a district court ______

    lacks jurisdiction to enhance a convicted defendant's

    sentence on its own motion if the government has not filed an

    information seeking a sentence enhancement under 21 U.S.C.

    851(a)(1). See also United States v. Belanger, 970 F.2d ___ ____ _____________ ________

    416, 418 (7th Cir. 1992)("Failure to file [ 851] information

    before trial deprives the district court of jurisdiction to

    impose an enhanced sentence."); United States v. Williams, _____________ ________





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    899 F.2d 1526, 1528-29 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. ______________

    Olson, 716 F.2d 850, 851-54 (11th Cir. 1983). _____

    Nevertheless, this rule is not dispositive of the

    present case, for it is clear that the district court had

    jurisdiction to impose Gongora's thirty-year prison sentence

    as it was within the ten year-to-life range applicable to

    first offenders. See 21 U.S.C. 960(b)(1)(G). Section 851 ___

    applies only where the government seeks to enhance the

    mandatory statutory minimum or maximum sentence of a

    defendant. See, e.g., United States v. French, 974 F.2d 687, ___ ____ _____________ ______

    697-98 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1431 (1993) _____ ______

    ( 851 applied where defendant's mandatory sentence was

    enhanced from twenty years to life under recidivist provision

    of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)); United States v. Sanchez, 917 _____________ _______

    F.2d 607, 616 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1625 _____ ______

    (1991) ("The section 851(a)(1) enhancement notice requirement

    applies 'to situations in which a convicted defendant's

    statutory minimum or maximum penalty is enhanced _________

    ...'")(citation omitted); United States v. Wallace, 895 F.2d _____________ _______

    at 490 (same). The fact that the government did not file a

    851 information on Gongora meant that the district court was

    not compelled to impose the mandatory minimum sentence of

    twenty years imprisonment and ten years of supervised release

    required by 21 U.S.C. 962. However, the absence of this

    information did not rob the district court of its discretion



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    to impose such a sentence under the statutory authority

    vested in it under 21 U.S.C. 960(b)(1)(G).

    The absence of a 851 enhancement information does not

    preclude a sentencing court from considering a defendant's

    prior convictions in determining whether the defendant should

    be treated as a Career Offender under the Sentencing

    Guidelines. See United States v. Whitaker, 938 F.2d 1551, ___ _____________ ________

    1552 (2d Cir. 1991)(per curiam); United States v. Sanchez, _____________ _______

    id.; United States v. Marshall, 910 F.2d 1241, 1444-45 (5th ___ _____________ ________

    Cir. 1990). While this is a pre-Guidelines case, the

    rationale of these authorities applies with like force to

    Gongora's claim. Thus, the district court lawfully

    considered Gongora's prior conviction in imposing a thirty-

    year prison term, see Corpus, 882 F.2d at 553, and correctly ___ ______

    dismissed the 2255 motion. Affirmed. _________























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