United Steelworkers (USW) v. National Grid ( 2022 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 21-1833
UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY, RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY,
ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-
CIO/CLC; UNITED STEELWORKERS, LOCAL 12003,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
NATIONAL GRID; BENEFITS COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL GRID USA SERVICE
COMPANY, as Plan Administrator for the Boston Gas Company Union
Employees Pension Plan,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Timothy S. Hillman, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Kayatta, and Gelpí,
Circuit Judges.
Matthew Lutwen, with whom Katharine J. Shaw, Alfred Gordon
O'Connell, and Pyle Rome Ehrenberg PC were on brief, for
appellants.
Patrick M. Collins, with whom Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak
& Stewart, P.C. was on brief, for appellees.
June 28, 2022
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. This case arises at the
intersection of fiduciary-responsibility law under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et
seq., and federal labor arbitration law under the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., and the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 ("Taft-Hartley Act"), 29 U.S.C.
§ 141, et seq. It requires a close examination of the governing
documents to determine whether the district court erred in denying
arbitration requested by the United Steel, Paper and Forestry,
Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service
Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, and the United
Steelworkers Local 12003 (collectively, "Union") on behalf of two
former employees of the Boston Gas Company -- since acquired by
National Grid ("Company") -- as to their claims for pension
benefits. The only question we decide is whether certain disputes
in this case must go to arbitration under the pertinent documents.
The Union represented the two members, Harry Barnard and
Andrew Colleran, in filing grievances asserting that they had been
improperly underpaid their pensions upon retirement from the
Company. The Union submitted the grievances to the pertinent Joint
Pension Committee ("JPC"), formed under the Boston Gas Company
Union Employees' Pension Plan ("BGC Pension Plan"). The JPC
deadlocked in a tie and was unable to resolve the dispute. As the
terms of the BGC Pension Plan provided in the case of a deadlock,
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the Union then sought arbitration over the grievances; the Company
refused to arbitrate.
The Union next filed a complaint in federal court against
the Company and the Retirement Plans Committee of National Grid
USA Service Company as plan administrator for the BGC Pension Plan
("Plan Administrator"), seeking to compel arbitration over the
dispute. The district court declined to order arbitration as
called for in the BGC Pension Plan. United Steel, Paper &
Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l
Union, AFL-CIO v. National Grid, No. 20-11491, 2021 WL 4441214, at
*6 (D. Mass. Sept. 28, 2021).
We reverse, remand, and direct the district court to
refer the matter to arbitration.
I. Background
A. Key Documents
We describe in detail the key documents in this case:
the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"), the KeySpan
Retirement Plan ("Master Plan"), and the BGC Pension Plan, a
component plan of the Master Plan.1 The parties each argue that
1 In 2000, KeySpan Corporation acquired Eastern
Enterprises, the parent company of Boston Gas Company. See S.
Moeller, Local Gas Company Buyout Competed, Cape Cod Times (Nov.
25, 2000, 1:00 AM), https://www.capecodtimes.com/story/news/2000/
11/25/local-gas-company-buyout-completed/51013887007/. In 2007,
National Grid, in turn, acquired KeySpan Corporation. See National
Grid, KeySpan Complete $11.8B Merger, Nat. Gas Intel. (Aug. 27,
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the text of these documents requires judgment in their favor. The
Union and the Company are parties to the CBA, which sets forth
pension benefits for certain employees. These benefits are
described in further detail in the Master Plan and in Addendum M
to the Master Plan, which is the BGC Pension Plan.
The Master Plan details certain provisions of the
pension plan for all National Grid employees, regardless of the
acquired company for whom the employees originally worked. The
BGC Pension Plan provides for additional governing terms for Union
members formerly employed by the Boston Gas Company and its
successors, like Barnard and Colleran. It provides for the
creation of the JPC and the delegation of certain Plan
Administrator fiduciary obligations to the JPC.
1. Collective Bargaining Agreement
The current CBA is in effect from January 20, 2019, to
June 16, 2024. The CBA provides, inter alia, for pension benefits
for employees hired before January 20, 2019. The CBA refers to
2007), https://www.naturalgasintel.com/national-grid-keyspan-comp
lete-11-8b-merger-2/. The Master Plan retained the "KeySpan"
title despite the acquisition.
The Master Plan contains twenty different component
plans that were each merged into the Master Plan because the
Company (National Grid) has acquired a number of companies over
time that each had their own pension plans before their
acquisitions, including the Boston Gas Company. Addendum M to the
Master Plan, the BGC Pension Plan, is the only component plan at
issue.
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the Master Plan and the BGC Pension Plan. The CBA itself also
details many of the core terms in the Master Plan and the BGC
Pension Plan. The CBA states that "[n]othing herein will be
construed to alter, amend or in any way change the provisions of
the Boston Gas Company Union Employees' Pension Plan. Complete
benefit details are contained in the Plan Document." Thus, we
turn to the plan documents.
2. Plan Documents and Delegations to the JPC Under ERISA
i. Master Plan
The Master Plan designates the Retirement Plans
Committee as the plan administrator of the Master Plan under
Section 3(16)(A) of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A). Under
the Master Plan, the Plan Administrator "shall have all powers,
authority and discretion necessary or helpful for carrying out its
responsibilities under the Plan." The Master Plan provides that
the Plan Administrator "shall have full power and complete
discretion:"
(a) To make rules and regulations for the
administration of the Plan which are not
inconsistent with the terms and provisions of
the Plan and applicable law;
(b) To construe and interpret all terms,
provisions, conditions and limitations of the
Plan and to determine all questions arising
out of or in connection with the provisions of
the Plan or its administration, including, but
not limited to, interpretive or factual
questions regarding eligibility, vesting and
the amount, manner and timing of payment of
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benefits, and the Committee's determination on
all such issues shall be final and binding on
all persons and subject to the fullest
deference permitted by law;
. . .
(e) To prescribe procedures to be followed by
Participants, Spouses, . . . and Beneficiaries
for the filing of applications for benefits;
[and]
(f) To prepare and distribute, or cause to be
prepared and distributed, such Participant
disclosures, notices and other communications
as may be required by law or otherwise
determined necessary or desirable by the
Committee; . . . .
Other text in the Master Plan and in the BGC Pension Plan provides
that the Plan Administrator may delegate these powers to others.
Section 7.2 of the Master Plan, for example, provides
that "[i]n accordance with Section 405(c) of ERISA, the [Retirement
Plans] Committee shall have the right . . . to designate persons
other than the Committee to carry out fiduciary responsibilities
(other than trustee responsibilities) under the Plan." See 29
U.S.C. § 1105(c) (providing that a plan administrator may delegate
fiduciary responsibilities if permitted by the ERISA plan).
The Master Plan separately establishes a claims
procedure pursuant to Section 503 of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133.
The review process applies to the denial of a claim for benefits
under the plan and permits a claimant to request, through written
notice, that the Plan Administrator "conduct a full and fair review
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of the denial of the claim." If the claim is denied on review,
the claimant may then bring a civil action under Section 502(a) of
ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
ii. BGC Pension Plan
In furtherance of the Master Plan's provision providing
for the delegation of fiduciary duties, the BGC Pension Plan
provides pension benefits to individuals employed by the Boston
Gas Company and its successors through provisions delegating the
Plan Administrator's authority. The BGC Pension Plan was
established in 1971. In 2003, after KeySpan Corporation acquired
Boston Gas Company, the BGC Pension Plan was consolidated with
other retirement plans maintained by KeySpan Corporation and
became a component plan of the Master Plan. Since at least 1971,
the provisions of the BGC Pension Plan have been amended by the
Union and the Company in collective bargaining agreements. The
Company's right to amend the BGC Pension Plan is subject to the
terms of the CBA.
Article 12 of the BGC Pension Plan outlines the
"Administration of the Plan" and states that "[e]xcept as otherwise
stated in this Article 12, the administration rules of the [BGC
Pension] Plan are set forth in the Master Plan." The terms of the
BGC Pension Plan thus supersede those of the Master Plan where
they are otherwise stated in the BGC Pension Plan.
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Article 12 of the BGC Pension Plan provides for the
creation of a JPC as a plan fiduciary composed of three members
appointed by the Union and three members appointed by the Plan
Administrator. Article 2 of the BGC Pension Plan defines the JPC
as:
the Committee appointed to resolve questions
relating to eligibility as set forth in
Article 12, and such Committee shall discharge
its duties as a fiduciary in accordance with
the standards established under ERISA with
respect to any person who exercises any
discretionary authority or responsibility in
the administration of the Plan.
We highlight several pertinent provisions. Under
Article 12, the JPC "shall have such powers as are necessary for
the proper execution of its duties under the Plan, including . . .
[t]o make determinations as to the rights of any Employees applying
for or receiving Retirement Allowances."
Article 12 sets forth a mandatory arbitration clause for
disputes as follows:
12.025. Arbitration. In the event that the
members of a Joint Pension Committee cannot
settle any dispute, with the exception of
determining whether an Employee is disabled,
the whole matter will be referred to
arbitration. The fees for such arbitration
will be paid jointly by the parties involved.
No matter regarding the Plan or any difference
arising thereunder shall be subject to the
grievance procedure of a Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
(second and third emphases added). Article 12 also provides:
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12.027. Referral Back to Parties. Any case
referred to a Joint Pension Committee on which
it has no power to rule shall be referred back
to the parties without ruling.2
B. Procedural History
1. The Union's Grievances
On January 3, 2020, the Union filed grievances under the
CBA on behalf of Barnard and Colleran. The Union asserted that
Barnard and Colleran, who applied for pension benefits upon
2 Article 12 further includes the following relevant
provisions:
12.026. No Power to Modify. The Joint Pension
Committees shall have no power to add to or
subtract from or modify any of the terms of
the Plan nor to change or add to any benefit
provided by the Plan, nor to waive or fail to
apply any provision of the Plan.
. . .
12.029. No Appeal After Review of Claim.
Subject to the provisions of Section 503 of
ERISA and to the "Rules and Regulations for
Administration and Enforcement" issued by the
Department of Labor under Title 29, Part 2560
of the United States Code, which requires that
every pension plan shall provide both a
procedure for presenting claims and a
procedure for a fair review of claims which
shall comply with the regulations of the
Department of Labor, there shall be no appeal
from any ruling by a Joint Pension Committee
which is within its authority; and each such
ruling shall be final and binding on the Union
and its members, the Employee or Employees
involved, and on the Plan Administrator.
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retirement, did not receive the proper pension payments required
under the CBA.
On February 4, 2020, after failing to resolve the
grievances, the Union sought arbitration under the CBA. On
February 10, the Company rejected the Union's request to arbitrate
the grievances, stating that "[p]ursuant to the terms of the
parties' collective bargaining agreement, the grievance is not
arbitrable." Instead, the Company wrote that "[t]he Claims Review
Procedure is the exclusive means by which a Participant must make
a claim for benefits under the Pension Plan, subject to his right
to bring a civil action under Section 502(a) of ERISA."
The Union then submitted Barnard's and Colleran's
grievances to the JPC for a determination of their rights under
the BGC Pension Plan. On June 9, 2020, the JPC met to consider
Barnard's and Colleran's claims that they were eligible for further
benefits but deadlocked in a tie. The JPC then notified the
parties that it was unable to resolve the dispute. The JPC did
not explicitly state whether it was referring the matter back to
the parties under Section 12.027 of the BGC Pension Plan, which
provides: "Any case referred to a Joint Pension Committee on which
it has no power to rule shall be referred back to the parties
without ruling." The JPC's vote on the grievance ended in a tie.
The record is not clear about the basis for that tie.
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On June 15, the Union contacted the Company to propose
potential arbitrators to arbitrate the disputes under Section
12.025 of the BGC Pension Plan. On July 14, the Company again
refused arbitration and stated that the disputes were not
arbitrable under the BGC Pension Plan. In the letter ("July 14
letter"), the Company stated:
[Barnard's and Colleran's] disputes concern a
rule established by the Plan Administrator
that an individual must contact the Pension
Connect Center at least 45 days in advance of
his planned retirement date. Such disputes,
however, are not arbitrable. . . .
The JPC is formed under Section 12.02 of the
Pension Plan, in addition to the Plan
Administrator, "to determine questions of
eligibility under the Plan." There is no
"question of eligibility" concerning Mr.
Colleran or Mr. Barnard. Each has been
determined eligible for and is receiving
benefits under the Pension Plan. Because
there is no question of eligibility, there is
[no] dispute that would be arbitrable under
section 12.025.
The letter also restated the Company's position that
"[t]he Claims Review Procedure is the exclusive means by which a
Participant must make a claim for benefits under the Pension Plan,
subject to his right to bring a civil action under Section 502(a)
of ERISA."
2. District Court's Denial of Arbitration
On August 7, 2020, the Union filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
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alleging two causes of action. The Union brought Count I pursuant
to the Taft-Hartley Act and the FAA seeking to compel arbitration
under the CBA. The Union brought Count II pursuant to the FAA
seeking to compel arbitration under the BGC Pension Plan.3
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). On
September 28, 2021, the district court granted the motion and
dismissed the complaint. United Steel, 2021 WL 4441214, at *6.
As to Count I, the court held that the pension grievances were not
arbitrable under the CBA. Id. at *4. As to Count II, the court
held that the JPC did not have authority to rule on the grievances,
and, therefore, the arbitration provision set forth in Section
12.025 of the BGC Pension Plan was inapplicable. Id. at *5. The
3 The Union has standing to bring suit to compel
arbitration under Section 12.025 of the BGC Pension Plan. The
Union meets the three requirements for standing as outlined by the
Supreme Court: (1) it suffered an "injury in fact" because of its
inability to arbitrate the dispute on behalf of its members;
(2) the injury is causally connected to the Company's refusal to
arbitrate; and (3) the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61
(1992).
The Company's argument that only JPC members may refer
disputes to arbitration incorrectly reads the language of the BGC
Pension Plan, which provides under Section 12.025 that "[i]n the
event that the members of a Joint Pension Committee cannot settle
any dispute, . . . the whole matter will be referred to
arbitration." The BGC Pension Plan is ambiguous as to who refers
the matter to arbitration and places no limitations on who may sue
to compel arbitration.
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court further held that "[t]he Plan Administrator's determination
to this effect was not arbitrary and capricious." Id.The Union timely appealed the district court's holding
as to Count II. The Union has not appealed the district court's
dismissal of Count I.
II. Clear Delegations of Discretionary Authority to the JPC
The governing law is well established. The Supreme Court
has held that a challenge to the denial of benefits "is to be
reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives
the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to
determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the
plan." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115
(1989). "We have long recognized that the threshold question in
determining the standard of review is whether the provisions of
the benefit plan at issue 'reflect a clear grant of discretionary
authority to determine eligibility for benefits.'" Gross v. Sun
Life Assur. Co. of Can., 734 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2013) (emphasis
in original) (quoting Leahy v. Raytheon Co., 315 F.3d 11, 15 (1st
Cir. 2002)). The authority must be expressly provided for, see
Rodriguez-Abreu v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 986 F.2d 580, 583–
84 (1st Cir. 1993), and the plan "must offer more than subtle
inferences," Gross, 734 F.3d at 16. Where a pension plan makes
such a clear grant of authority, the administrator's decision will
be upheld "unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
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discretion." Stephanie C. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass. HMO
Blue, Inc., 813 F.3d 420, 427 (1st Cir. 2016).
Further, "ERISA allows named fiduciaries to delegate
responsibilities (other than trustee responsibilities) through
express procedures provided in the plan." Rodriguez-Abreu, 986
F.2d at 584. For a proper delegation of authority, "the delegation
must be clear and the fiduciary must properly designate a delegate
for the fiduciary's discretionary authority." Rodríguez-López v.
Triple-S Vida, Inc., 850 F.3d 14, 19, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2017).
An ERISA plan may also delegate discretionary authority
to a neutral arbitrator to break deadlocks. See Atkins v. Bert
Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan, 694 F.3d 557, 568-69 (5th
Cir. 2012) ("[T]he Supreme Court and this court have reinforced
the propriety of plan administrators' utilization of a neutral
arbitrator to break a deadlock."). The Taft-Hartley Act expressly
permits an ERISA plan with employee and employer representatives
to utilize an impartial arbitrator to break a deadlock: "[U]pon
and in the event the employer and employee groups deadlock on the
administration of such fund and there are no neutral persons
empowered to break such deadlock, such agreement provides that the
two groups shall agree on an impartial umpire to decide such
dispute." 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B). The Supreme Court has
endorsed the use of a neutral arbitrator to break a deadlock as
consistent with the purposes of the Taft-Hartley Act. See N.L.R.B.
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v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 337-38 (1981) ("[Section] 302(c)(5)
[of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)] explicitly
provides for the compulsory resolution of any deadlocks among
welfare fund trustees by a neutral umpire.").
Here, the BGC Pension Plan, by its clear terms,
designates the JPC as a fiduciary and delegates discretionary
fiduciary responsibilities under ERISA to the JPC in several areas.
See Rodríguez-López, 850 F.3d at 23; Terry v. Bayer Corp., 145
F.3d 28, 37-38 (1st Cir. 1998) ("ERISA allows named fiduciaries to
delegate responsibilities by expressly providing for procedures
for named fiduciaries to designate persons other than named
fiduciaries to carry out fiduciary responsibilities (other than
trustee responsibilities) under the plan." (cleaned up)).
The JPC "shall have such powers as are necessary for the
proper execution of its duties" and is authorized to decide under
Section 12.027 the matters on which it has "power to rule." That
latter power includes the authority to resolve "questions relating
to eligibility":
the Committee appointed to resolve questions
relating to eligibility as set forth in
Article 12, and such Committee shall discharge
its duties as a fiduciary in accordance with
the standards established under ERISA with
respect to any person who exercises any
discretionary authority or responsibility in
the administration of the Plan.
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In addition to these delegations, the BGC Pension Plan
delegates discretionary authority over other questions to the JPC.
For example, the BGC Pension Plan delegates to the JPC the power
(1) to decide whether an employee is disabled under Section 12.025
("In the event that the members of a Joint Pension Committee cannot
settle any dispute, with the exception of determining whether an
Employee is disabled . . . ."); (2) to determine how benefits will
be distributed upon termination of the pension plan under Section
13.03 ("The benefits provided for in this Article 13 may be
distributed . . . as determined by the Joint Pension
Committee . . . ."); and (3) to find a beneficiary incompetent
under Section 15.03 ("If the Joint Pension Committee shall find
that any person to whom a benefit is payable from the Fund is
unable to care for his affairs because of illness or
accident . . . .").
Under federal substantive law, we must consider the
entire text of the relevant documents. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.
v. United States, 536 F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Considering the entire text, we note the express delegation under
Section 2.13 of the BGC Pension Plan that the JPC is "appointed to
resolve questions relating to eligibility" (emphasis added).4 The
4 Section 12.02 of the BGC Pension Plan states that the
JPC shall be "formed to determine questions of eligibility under
the Plan." We do not read this statement of purpose to be a limit
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inclusion of the words "relating to" explicitly indicates that
this delegation is broader than the other delegations under the
BGC Pension Plan. See NOAA Md., LLC v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs.
Admin., 997 F.3d 1159, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ("We must interpret
a contract in a manner that gives meaning to all of its provisions
and makes sense, and we seek to avoid conflict or surplusage of
the contract's provisions." (cleaned up)). The Supreme Court and
this circuit have consistently stated that the phrase "relating
to" is a broad one. See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1992) ("The ordinary meaning of these
words is a broad one -- 'to stand in some relation; to have bearing
or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or
connection with.'" (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed.
1979))); Moore v. Elec. Boat Corp., 25 F.4th 30, 35 n.4 (1st Cir.
2022).
Further, Section 12.025 of the BGC Pension Plan provides
a delegation of authority to a neutral arbitrator in the event the
JPC deadlocks, which serves the purposes of the Taft-Hartley Act,
on the JPC's authority, particularly where other provisions in the
BGC Pension Plan expressly provide that the scope of the JPC's
authority exceeds "questions of eligibility." See NVT Techs.,
Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d 1153, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("When
interpreting the contract, the document must be considered as a
whole and interpreted so as to harmonize and give reasonable
meaning to all of its parts.").
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as recognized by the Supreme Court. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B);
Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. at 337-38.
The question at the heart of this case is whether the
Union's grievances fall within the JPC's purview as "questions
relating to eligibility," and thus are subject to arbitration in
the event of a deadlock. However, there is an initial threshold
question as to whether the JPC, under the documents, has the
authority to decide whether it has "power to rule."
In answering that question, "we review the language of
the Plan de novo, just as we would review the language of any
contract." Stephanie C., 813 F.3d at 428 (quoting Ramsey v.
Hercules Inc., 77 F.3d 199, 205 (7th Cir. 1996)). When reviewing
the language of an ERISA benefit plan, we look to federal
substantive law and "common-sense canons of contract
interpretation." Bellino v. Schlumberger Techs., Inc., 944 F.2d
26, 29 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Burnham v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 873 F.2d 486, 489 (1st Cir. 1989)).
The Company argues that as a matter of law, the authority
to decide whether the JPC had the "power to rule" on the grievances
was retained by the Plan Administrator in the Master Plan.
We disagree. Nowhere in either the Master Plan or the
BGC Pension Plan does the plain text "unambiguously indicate" that
the Plan Administrator retained the authority to determine whether
a dispute is within the JPC's "power to rule." Stephanie C., 813
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F.3d at 428 ("The phraseology that [defendant] chose to use in the
Certificate to describe its decisionmaking authority is capable of
supporting reasonable differences of opinion as to the nature and
extent of the authority reserved to [defendant]."); see Gross, 734
F.3d at 16.
To the contrary, Section 12.027 of the BGC Pension Plan
states that the authority to determine whether a matter falls
within or outside the JPC's "power to rule" has been delegated to
the JPC: "Any case referred to a Joint Pension Committee on which
it has no power to rule shall be referred back to the parties
without ruling." Under Article 12, the JPC necessarily must have
the power to make that determination. In addition, under Section
12.029, the JPC's decisions "within its authority" are "binding on
. . . the Plan Administrator."
The first issue for the arbitrator is to determine
whether the JPC has the "power to rule" on the grievances. If so,
the resolution of the ambiguity in the record as to the basis of
the JPC's deadlock and whether to then proceed to resolve the
merits of the Union's grievances are matters for the arbitrator to
decide. We note, again, that the jurisdiction of the JPC is not
limited to "questions of eligibility" under the plain terms of the
BGC Pension Plan. The "relating to" language under the BGC Pension
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Plan indicates that the JPC's delegated authority is broader than
just "questions of eligibility."5
Finally, the Company protests that a reading of the JPC's
authority which would result in sending these matters to
arbitration would necessarily mean that the JPC has the authority
to resolve "virtually any dispute over vesting, amount or form of
pension benefits." The Company is free to argue that to the
arbitrator. We do point out that the delegation of authority
described above does not render the Master Plan's claims procedure
superfluous, as the Master Plan's claims procedure would still
apply to other Company employees covered by the Master Plan but
not subject to the BGC Pension Plan.
It is up to an arbitrator, not a court, to determine the
matters described above. The arbitrator will determine whether
the JPC has the power to resolve the disputes, and, if so, whether
the arbitrator should proceed to address the merits in the wake of
the JPC's deadlock.
5 Further, the BGC Pension Plan indeed grants the JPC
authority to decide issues that do not fall under the Plan
Administrator's limited definition of "eligibility," including the
power to decide whether an employee is disabled, the power to
determine how benefits will be distributed upon termination of the
pension plan, and the power to find a beneficiary incompetent and
designate who may receive their pension payment.
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III. Conclusion
Reversed and remanded to the district court with
directions to grant the Union's request for arbitration.
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