United States v. Guzman-Batista , 783 F.3d 930 ( 2015 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-1059
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
LUIS A. GUZMÁN-BATISTA,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Thompson, Circuit Judges.
Liza L. Rosado-Rodríguez, Research and Writing Specialist,
with whom Héctor E. Guzmán-Silva, Jr., Federal Public Defender, and
Héctor L. Ramos-Vega, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Supervisor, Appeals Section, were on brief, for appellant.
Juan Carlos Reyes-Ramos, Assistant United States Attorney,
with whom Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, and
Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief,
Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee.
April 22, 2015
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Luis A.
Guzmán-Batista ("Guzmán") appeals the district court's decision,
following a de novo Franks hearing, rejecting the magistrate
judge's report and recommendation and denying Guzmán's motion to
suppress evidence seized following a search of his home.
Specifically, Guzmán argues that the district court erred by
failing to take into account certain facts which purportedly
established that the agent's sworn statement in support of the
warrant contained false statements, and that without those
statements, probable cause for the warrant was lacking. Because
this argument effectively boils down to a credibility determination
-- something the district court is in a much better position to
evaluate than we are -- we affirm.
I. Background
A. The Warrant and Subsequent Search
On October 17, 2012, Puerto Rico Police Agent Héctor L.
Rivera-Torres ("Agent Rivera") applied for a search warrant in the
Superior Court of Puerto Rico, Ponce Part. According to his sworn
statement in support of the warrant, on October 9, 2012, at
approximately 10:45 a.m., Agent Rivera arrived at the Los Pinos
ward in Villalba, Puerto Rico in an unmarked car. He parked in
front of unit #A-8, a white two-story residence with gray balcony
columns, which was occupied by Adam Rodríguez León, a suspect in a
marijuana investigation. After surveilling unit #A-8 for
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approximately one hour, Agent Rivera observed Guzmán -- whom he
recognized as a defendant accused of murder and on pre-trial
release -- arrive on a "yellow four track" all-terrain vehicle
("ATV"). Guzmán entered unit #A-8 and was inside for approximately
five minutes before coming out and returning to the ATV. Agent
Rivera observed Guzmán stand on the ATV, raise his sweater, remove
a gray pistol from the front of his waistband, and move it to the
back of his waistband. Guzmán then started the ATV and drove away.
Agent Rivera chose to follow Guzmán and observed him make the first
left-hand turn into the Apeadero ward, stop on the right hand side
of the street, get off the ATV, cross the street, and enter the
right side of a cream-colored wood and zinc residence with a rusted
roof and Miami windows. Agent Rivera waited for approximately
twenty minutes but Guzmán never reemerged from the residence.
Based on his observation of Guzmán's presence at a
location thought to be involved in narcotics trafficking and his
observation of the pistol, Agent Rivera sought a search warrant for
the cream-colored wood and zinc home. The warrant was issued, and
the subsequent search uncovered six 9mm bullets.
B. The Proceedings
Because Guzmán was under indictment on state murder
charges, his possession of the six 9mm bullets violated 18 U.S.C.
-3-
§ 922(n),1 and he was accordingly indicted on October 24, 2012. On
January 8, 2013, Guzmán filed a motion to suppress, alleging that
the ammunition was discovered pursuant to a state search warrant
filled with false statements, without which probable cause could
not have been found. Specifically, Guzmán argued that it was not
possible for Agent Rivera to have observed him at unit #A-8 with
the gun because he was wearing an electronic monitoring device as
part of his pre-trial conditions for his state murder case and the
device did not issue any out-of-range alerts during the time period
in question. He therefore requested a Franks hearing.2 Guzmán's
motion was referred to a magistrate judge for a report and
recommendation (R&R).3
1
18 U.S.C. § 922(n) makes it "unlawful for any person who is
under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year to . . . receive any firearm or ammunition which
has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce."
2
"A defendant who believes that the police included false
statements or material omissions in an affidavit underlying a
search warrant may request an evidentiary hearing pursuant to
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)." United States v.
Materas, 483 F.3d 27, 28 n.1 (1st Cir. 2007).
3
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) permits a district judge to "designate
a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including evidentiary
hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings
of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the
court."
-4-
1. Proceedings Before the Magistrate Judge
Having determined that Guzmán had met the requirements
for a Franks hearing,4 the magistrate judge held the hearing on
March 5, 2013. Guzmán initially presented two witnesses. The
first witness, Guzmán's mother Ada Batista, testified that as part
of his pre-trial conditions, Guzmán was required to stay inside his
home unless he was granted permission to go to court or the
hospital. She added that she was at the house on October 9, 2012,
at 11:45 a.m., and while she had not seen Guzmán personally, she
would have known if he was not there because the electronic
monitoring device would have given off a loud alert if he had left
the premises.
The second witness was Yashira Silva-González ("Silva"),
the supervisor of the Arrest Unit of Puerto Rico's Pre-Trial
Services Office which oversaw Guzmán's home monitoring. Silva
explained that the electronic monitoring system used a radio
frequency and was composed of two parts: a receiving unit and a
bracelet worn by Guzmán at all times. She further explained that
Guzman's system had a medium perimeter extending between 75-150
4
"A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Franks
where the defendant 'makes a substantial preliminary showing' that
both (1) 'a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with
reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in
the warrant affidavit' and (2) 'the allegedly false statement is
necessary to the finding of probable cause.'" United States v.
Reiner, 500 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S.
at 155-56).
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feet from the receiving unit and a six-minute grace period. In
other words, if the bracelet was outside of the perimeter for more
than six minutes, an alert would issue. The alert would be audible
in the premises and would also be electronically sent to the Pre-
Trial Services Office. Silva testified that Pre-Trial Services had
received twenty-three alerts from Guzmán's electronic monitoring
device between December 1, 2011, and October 16, 2012, but none on
October 9, 2012. She also testified that Guzmán's file showed
numerous attempts to "manipulate" the electronic monitoring device
so it would not register an alert, but that there was no
"manipulation" alert5 registered on October 9. In response to a
question from the magistrate judge, Silva testified that there was
evidence that Guzmán's electronic monitoring device was working
that day.6
The government presented only one witness: Agent Rivera.
Agent Rivera reiterated what was contained in his sworn statement
supporting the search warrant but provided additional details about
the incident. He testified that he was parked 80 feet from unit
#A-8 and did not know where Guzmán was coming from when Guzmán
5
Silva testified that a "manipulation" alert was different than
a "violation-of-the-perimeter" alert and that her office knew the
reason behind each alert it received.
6
The receiving unit receives sporadic "hello" communications to
indicate that the electronic monitoring system is operational.
Silva testified that such a communication was received on
October 9, 2012.
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first arrived at the home. Regarding the travel between unit #A-8
in the Los Pinos ward and Guzmán's home in the Apeadero ward, Agent
Rivera stated that the two houses were only 600 meters apart. He
testified that both he and Guzmán were driving at "normal" speed --
approximately 35 miles-per-hour -- and while he slowed down for
speed bumps, Guzmán did not. Guzmán did, however, slow down when
making the turn. According to Agent Rivera, it took no more than
a minute to travel between the two houses and that it was
approximately six minutes from the time he first saw Guzmán until
Guzmán entered his home. Finally, Agent Rivera could not explain
why he failed to arrest Guzmán on October 9, given that he knew
Guzmán was under house arrest and that he had observed Guzmán with
the handgun.
In rebuttal, Guzmán called Frances Rivas-Rodríguez
("Rivas"), a paralegal/investigator at the Federal Public
Defender's Office. Rivas testified that the distance from Guzman's
home to the border of the street is 60 feet, from Guzmán's home to
unit #A-8 is 1,917 feet, and from the entrance of the street to the
entrance of unit #A-8 is 554 feet. In addition, Rivas presented
videos of her driving between Guzmán's house and unit #A-8 at both
30 and 35 miles-per-hour; at 30 miles-per-hour the trip took one
minute and eight seconds, whereas it took one minute and four
seconds at 35 miles-per-hour. She admitted reducing her speed when
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she turned into the wards and was unable to say if traveling in an
ATV would be faster than in a car.
On April 11, 2013, the magistrate judge issued her R&R.
She found that Guzmán's electronic monitoring device was working
properly on October 9, 2012, and thus in order to believe the
version of the facts presented by the government and Agent Rivera,
everything described by Agent Rivera must have occurred in less
than six minutes. According to the R&R, this was "inconceivable"
because there was no way, given that Guzmán was in unit #A-8 for
approximately five minutes, that he was able to arrive at unit #A-8
from an unknown location, exit unit #A-8, get on his ATV, and
return to his own home in less than one minute, all without
realizing that he was being followed. The R&R also found it
"troubling" that Agent Rivera testified that the whole encounter
took approximately six minutes -- the exact time of the grace
period -- yet never stated this in his sworn statement in support
of the warrant. It also emphasized that the six minutes observed
by Agent Rivera failed to take into account the time Guzmán must
have been outside the perimeter before arriving at unit #A-8.
Finally, the R&R found it "difficult to believe" that Agent Rivera
chose not to detain Guzmán on October 9 -- despite being aware that
he was violating the terms of his pre-trial release and observing
him with a firearm -- and instead waited eight days before seeking
a search warrant.
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As a result, the R&R "f[ou]nd the version of facts as
testified by PRPO Rivera-Torres and as similarly included in the
sworn statement in support of the state search warrant to be too
incredible to believe." It also concluded that the sworn statement
in support of the search warrant "had false and/or misleading
information in reckless disregard of the truth and that without
such information the sworn statement would not have sufficed to
establish probable cause for the state search warrant." It
therefore recommended that the district court grant Guzmán's motion
to suppress.
2. Proceedings Before the District Court
The government filed objections to the R&R and requested
a de novo hearing.7 The district court granted this request,
explaining that "the magistrate judge's recommendations are based
on her credibility determinations of the witnesses" and that it
would be improper for the district court to decide the issue
7
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) provides that, "[w]ithin fourteen days
after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file
written objections" to a magistrate judge's proposed findings and
recommendations. "A judge of the court shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which objection is made." Id.; see
also United States v. Hernández-Rodríguez, 443 F.3d 138, 147-48
(1st Cir. 2006) ("The Supreme Court has held that a district judge
need not hear the live testimony of a witness in order to accept
the credibility determination of a magistrate judge. However,
. . . . absent special circumstances, a district judge may not
reject the credibility determination of a magistrate judge without
first hearing the testimony that was the basis for that
determination." (internal citation omitted)).
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"without first hearing the testimony that was the basis for that
determination."
The de novo hearing took place on July 2, 2013. Guzmán
provided essentially the same evidence via testimony from Batista
(through an agreed-upon proffer) and Silva. At the close of this
evidence, the government argued that Guzmán had not met his burden,
and thus asked the district court to deny the motion to suppress.
The district court refused, however, and strongly urged the
government to call Agent Rivera to testify because the district
court "d[id]n't have any evidence that [Guzmán] was outside the
house. So . . . it would be to the Government's benefit to show
that he was outside the house." It added that "if the agent says,
'I saw him outside the house,' even though he was within the
perimeter for less than six minutes, that may be sufficient for me.
I don't know."
In response, the government called Agent Rivera, who
provided the same information as at the initial hearing before the
magistrate judge and in his sworn statement in support of the
warrant. He added, however, a few additional details. First,
Agent Rivera testified that it only took "a matter of seconds" for
Guzmán to leave unit #A-8 in Los Pinos, return to the ATV, turn it
on, move the gun from the front of his waistband to the back, and
begin moving. He added that he followed Guzmán "at a prudent
distance" and observed Guzmán pass over the speed bumps "quickly"
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and not slow down as he made the left-hand turn into the Apeadero
ward. Finally, Agent Rivera testified that he was traveling
"around 35, 40" miles-per-hour and that Guzmán "was going a little
faster."
On cross-examination, Agent Rivera stated that he did not
use a camera or take any pictures during his surveillance that day.
He also explained that he did not detain Guzmán when he saw him in
violation of his pre-trial conditions and carrying the handgun "for
safety purposes."8 Finally, Agent Rivera conceded that evidence in
a prior case he was involved in was suppressed because the Puerto
Rico Commonwealth court determined that Agent Rivera's testimony
was "stereotype," "unreal," and "improbable."
The government also presented the testimony of Vladimir
González, an agent at the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives ("ATF") and a former engineer. Agent González testified
that the distance from Guzmán's house to the road was 110 feet, and
thus was contained within the 75-150 feet perimeter of the
electronic monitoring device. He further testified that he
measured the distance between the two houses and arrived at a
distance of "around 1,802 feet." Thus, at a constant speed of 25
miles-per-hour (i.e., not including slowing down for speed bumps or
turns), it would take forty-nine seconds to travel between Guzmán's
8
Agent Rivera elaborated on redirect that his safety concern came
about because he "saw that [Guzmán] had a weapon" and because he
was conducting surveillance by himself, without any backup.
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house and unit #A-8; at 30 miles-per-hour it would take around
forty seconds. On cross-examination, Agent González stated that
this latter calculation was only an estimate.
Finally, Guzmán once again presented Rivas as a rebuttal
witness. She gave the same testimony as she did in the initial
Franks hearing and introduced the same videos into evidence. On
cross-examination, she conceded that she was not an engineer.
After hearing all of this evidence, the district court
announced its decision from the bench. It stated as follows:
First of all, I find, based on evidence
I believe credible, that Defendant Guzmán
violated the Commonwealth Court order that he
remain inside his house.
Whether he was inside the perimeter
during the time he was outside the house or
whether he had been outside the perimeter for
less than the six-minute grace period during
the time he was outside the house is not of
importance to the Court.
The perimeter and the six-minute grace
period are not part of the State Court's order
but an administrative matter established by
the pretrial office so as not to congest the
system with alerts.
The fact that Defendant Guzmán-Batista
violated the conditions imposed is only
important to show that he was out of his
residence, not to show that probable cause
existed for a search warrant.
But the evidence that the Court
believes credible also consists [of the fact]
that Defendant Guzmán-Batista was outside the
house, in which he had to remain, on a Yamaha
Banshee four-track and that he removed the
gray pistol from his front waistband and
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placed it in his back waistband. That gave
Agent Rivera probable cause to obtain a search
warrant for the house into which Defendant
Guzmán-Batista entered, the wooden house with
the rusty zinc roof and the Miami windows.
The magistrate judge focused on the
fact that there was no alert because she found
that Defendant Guzmán-Batista was either
within the perimeter or outside the perimeter
for less than six minutes, but I don't think
that's important here.
Therefore, I am going to reject the
magistrate's report and recommendation and
allow the evidence to be presented.
Guzmán subsequently entered a conditional plea of guilty
on September 12, 2013, reserving his right to challenge the
district court's ruling on his motion to suppress. On December 12,
2013, he was sentenced to thirteen months of imprisonment and three
years of supervised release. He now timely appeals.
II. Discussion
Guzmán argues that the district court erred when it
denied his motion to suppress because it should not have accepted
the version of events as described by Agent Rivera and the
government. In other words, the district court committed
reversible error when it credited Agent Rivera's testimony. We
disagree.
While we review a district court's ultimate decision to
suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant de novo, the
"factual findings made by a district court in connection with a
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Franks hearing are reviewed for clear error."9 United States v.
Tzannos, 460 F.3d 128, 135-36 (1st Cir. 2006). Clear error exists
when there is a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed." Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573
(1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under any set of
circumstances, clear error is "not an easy standard to meet."
United States v. Kinsella, 622 F.3d 75, 86 (1st Cir. 2010). This
is particularly true, however, when the challenge is to a witness's
credibility, due to our "inability to see witnesses face-to-face or
to appraise in person their demeanor and inflection." United
9
Guzmán argues that the district court failed to make factual
findings on the record, and thus the more lenient de novo standard
applies. This argument lacks merit. A district court is not
required to make written findings of fact; rather, it is only
required to "state its essential findings on the record," Fed. R.
Crim. P. 12(d), so we may review the record in a "reasoned and
meaningful manner," United States v. Fields, 371 F.3d 910, 916 (7th
Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district
court specifically stated that: "based on evidence [it] believe[d]
credible, that Defendant Guzmán violated the Commonwealth Court
order that he remain inside his house"; it "believe[d] credible
. . . that Defendant Guzmán-Batista was outside the house, in which
he had to remain, on a Yamaha Banshee four-track and that he
removed the gray pistol from his front waistband and placed it in
his back waistband"; and "[t]hat gave Agent Rivera probable cause
to obtain a search warrant for the house into which Defendant
Guzmán-Batista entered, the wooden house with the rusty zinc roof
and the Miami windows." It also explained that it did not think it
was important or necessary to its determination whether or not
Guzmán was outside the perimeter for less than six minutes. These
are obvious findings of fact which are more than sufficient for us
to review the record in a reasoned and meaningful matter. Thus,
clear error is the appropriate standard. Cf. United States v.
Carrigan, 724 F.3d 39, 45 (1st Cir. 2013) (explaining that the
standard of review is de novo when the district court fails to make
any findings of fact).
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States v. Henderson, 463 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we are
"especially deferential to the district court's credibility
judgments." Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted);
see also Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575 (explaining that a challenge
based on a district court's credibility determination "can
virtually never be clear error"). Indeed, absent objective
evidence that contradicts a witness's story or a situation where
the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible that
no reasonable factfinder would credit it, Anderson, 470 U.S. at
575, "the ball game is virtually over" once a district court
determines that a key witness is credible. Rivera-Gómez v. de
Castro, 900 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1990).
Here, the district court heard all the testimony,
observed Agent Rivera's demeanor, and "believe[d] credible" Agent
Rivera's testimony that "Defendant Guzmán-Batista was outside the
house, in which he had to remain, on a Yamaha Banshee four-track
and that he removed the gray pistol from his front waistband and
placed it in his back waistband." This finding is effectively
"game over" for Guzmán. See id.
In an attempt to get around this, Guzmán hinges his
entire claim on the assertion that because the electronic
monitoring device never sent an alert, everything described by
Agent Rivera must have occurred within the six-minute grace period
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permitted by the electronic monitoring device. He claims that not
only is this assertion so implausible that it should not be
credited, but also that he provided objective evidence proving that
it is impossible. We have carefully reviewed the transcripts of
both Franks hearings and come to a different conclusion. Agent
Rivera testified that Guzmán was inside unit #A-8 for
"approximately" five minutes and it only took a matter of seconds
for Guzmán to exit the house, reposition the gun, and leave the
premises. Agent González, meanwhile, testified that at thirty
miles-per-hour, it would take around forty seconds to travel
between the two houses, and Agent Rivera testified that Guzmán was
traveling faster than that. Moreover, the distance between the
road and the entrance to Guzmán's house was only 110 feet, and thus
could have been contained within the perimeter of the electronic
monitoring device. As a result, it is possible for the events to
have occurred within the six-minute grace period, with time left
over for Guzmán to have left the perimeter and arrived at unit #A-8
before first being seen by Agent Rivera. It is also important to
remember that all of Agent Rivera's observations were
approximations, and thus the events could have transpired even more
quickly.
Admittedly, it is a bit convenient that Agent Rivera's
observation of Guzmán coincided perfectly with the timing of the
grace period. However, the government provided multiple
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explanations. First, it argued that Guzmán had numerous alerts for
violating the electronic monitoring device. It is reasonable to
believe that, through these alerts, Guzmán learned that he had six
minutes before an alert would be sent, and thus tailored his
behavior accordingly. Second, the government posited that Guzmán's
file noted multiple "manipulation" attempts. It is also possible,
they argued, that he had succeeded in manipulating the system so
that he could violate the perimeter for more than six minutes
without setting off the alert. The burden of persuasion is on
Guzmán, not the government, and given the evidence presented of
multiple alerts and numerous violations of his pre-trial
conditions, neither of these scenarios are "so implausible" that no
reasonable factfinder could credit Agent Rivera's testimony. See
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575.
Guzmán does present compelling evidence. However, as
just explained, this evidence is not "objective evidence that
contradicts [Agent Rivera's] story." Id. At most, it creates two
possible alternative versions of the events of October 9, 2012.
The first is the consistent story described by Agent Rivera in his
sworn statement in support of the warrant and at both Franks
hearings; the second is, as Guzmán argues, that Agent Rivera
fabricated his entire observation as a ruse to gain access to
Guzmán's residence. The district court credited Agent Rivera's
version of events, and "a district court's choice between two
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plausible competing interpretations of the facts cannot be clearly
erroneous." Henderson, 463 F.3d at 32 (quoting United States v.
Weidul, 325 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 2003)); Rivera-Gómez, 900 F.2d at
4 (explaining that "[o]nce credited," the defendant's testimony
"supported the district court's rationale almost singlehandedly"
because the "[d]efendant's testimony was neither severely impeached
nor inherently improbable").
III. Conclusion
Though Guzmán presents a strong case that the version of
events described by Agent Rivera may not be true, we see nothing in
the record to definitely and firmly convince us that a mistake has
been committed by the district court. At the end of the day, this
was a credibility determination by the district court, and we will
not second-guess its decision to credit Agent Rivera's testimony as
credible after it heard all the testimony and observed all of the
witnesses' demeanors firsthand. Having found Agent Rivera's
testimony -- and thus his sworn statement in support of the warrant
-- to be credible, there was easily probable cause to issue the
search warrant. Guzmán's motion to suppress was properly denied.
AFFIRMED.
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